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1. Introduction  
In reply to the EU Commission’s Request for service number JUST/2019/JCOO/FW/CIVI/0167, the 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) in consortium with Civic Consulting carried out 
a Study to support the preparation of a report on the application of Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 on the 
law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II Regulation”), hereafter, the “Study”. 
The Study conducts a legal analysis and assessment of the practical experiences and problems of 
interpretation in the application of the Rome II Regulation for the period 2010-2020. 
 
1.1. Structure  
The Study consists of four main parts: 
A legal study presenting desk research and national reports covering the 26 Member States and the UK 
(which was an EU Member State applying the Rome II Regulation during the relevant period covered by 
this Study).  
An empirical study, consisting of empirical findings per country which are based on qualitative interviews 
with selected experts on the Rome II Regulation and on an online survey which was distributed amongst 
stakeholders with relevant experience. 
A comparative table summarising the legal issues identified across all Member States. 
A synthesis report summarising the legal and empirical findings across all Member States. 
 
1.2. Legal study 
• Desk Research 
BIICL’s team conducted thorough desk research comprising an analysis of CJEU decisions, relevant studies 
and the main literature on the Rome II Regulation. The desk research also focused on three areas of special 
interest (artificial intelligence (AI), business and human rights and SLAPPs). 
• National Reports 
National Rapporteurs from each of the covered jurisdictions were charged with analysing case law and 
doctrine. They were instructed to address a series of questions identifying practical problems with the 
application of the Rome II Regulation. They carried out intensive desk research on the use of the Regulation 
in their respective jurisdiction, including an analysis of relevant judgments.. They further assessed whether 
the exclusion of certain areas from its scope of application (eg., privacy claims) created problems and 
whether new areas (such as business and human rights or AI) would need to be specifically addressed by 
the Rome II Regulation. 
 
1.3. Empirical study 
BIICL organised a consultation of over 100 academics and practitioners, selected from the networks of 





and claimant and defendant lawyers with relevant experience in tort cases and cross-border tort litigation 
under the Rome II Regulation and academics with relevant experience of the Rome II Regulation. 
The empirical study was based on the same series of questions addressed by the National Rapporteurs. It 
covered practical problems and gaps in the application of the Regulation and invited recommendations to 
address these. 
Potential respondents contribute via two different methods: 
• An online questionnaire, tailored to the aims of the project 
• A series qualitative individual interviews, conducted by telephone or video-link with a selection of 
key stakeholders.  
 
2. Legal and Empirical Data  
The legal and empirical studies revealed that the Rome II Regulation has worked well in practice.  
Many of the problems identified in the Study are marginal issues, some of which have only arisen in one or 
two jurisdictions. In other cases, the identified problems were related to cases where the Member State 
courts have simply failed to apply the provisions of the Regulation properly. Some consisted of theoretical 
issues raised by commentators, which have not given rise to difficulties in practice.  
The relatively small number of references for preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Rome II 
Regulation received by the CJEU, and the limited number of cases reaching the decision stage, also show 
that overall the Rome II Regulation has worked well in practice. 
 
2.1. Key Provisions and conflict-of-laws rules of the Rome II Regulation 
Whilst the National Rapporteurs and the stakeholders consulted in the empirical study generally agree that 
the provisions of the Rome II Regulation work well in practice, more than 20% of the stakeholders expressed 
a need for improvement of two provisions: Art. 4 and Art. 1 (respectively 29% and 28%). Seven provisions 
gathered 10% to 19% of respondents agreeing over a need for improvement: Art. 5 (18%), Art. 14 (18%), 
Art. 6 (16%), Art. 16 (16%), Art. 2 (15%), Art. 15 (12%), Art. 7 (11%). The debates around these provisions 
remain however largely academic or purely national, as generally also shown by the National Reports, 
and no significant issues were identified regarding their practical application. 
 
• Material scope (Art. 1) 
Several National Rapporteurs and a majority of the stakeholders were of the opinion that Art. 1 works well. 
The issues identified pertain to residual specific situations. 66% of the respondents were of the opinion that 
the sector of defamation and privacy needed a common set of EU choice of law rules, to improve 
compatibility with the Brussels I bis Regulation, to address the risks of forum shopping, and to support legal 
certainty and predictability. 
 
• Concept of "non-contractual obligations" (Art. 2) 
The shortcomings identified with the scope of the Regulation pertain to difficulties of characterising claims, 
and respondents reported that the scope of non-contractual obligations encompassed by the Rome II 
Regulation beyond simple delicts is insufficiently clear. Domestic caselaw across the Member States 





contract with protective effect for third parties, the liability of a falsus procurator, and obligations resulting 
from the offering or announcement of a promotional prize. The overall recommendation based on the legal 
and empirical study was that clarification of such issues should come from case law addressing specific 
circumstances. Given the marginal significance of these issues, attempts to clarify through legislation would 
likely create further difficulties. 
 
• General rule (Art. 4) 
National Rapporteurs did not report major difficulties with the application of Art. 4, although some areas of 
uncertainty remain. Under Art. 4(1), some uncertainty was reported as to the identification of the place of 
direct damage in cases of financial loss. There is also no complete homogeneity among the domestic courts 
as to the nature of the damage suffered by relatives of victims of traffic accidents. Under Art. 4(2), some 
uncertainty was reported regarding the identification of the “person claimed to be liable”, the operation of 
the rule where there are more than two parties to proceedings, and the proper approach to identifying 
habitual residence. Regarding prospectus liability and financial market torts, the doctrine in several Member 
States suggests the introduction of a special conflict rule designating the law of the country where the 
affected financial instrument is traded. 
 
• Product liability (Art. 5) 
The issues identified were marginal and of a doctrinal nature, including a debate regarding which law 
applies if none of the conditions of Art. 5(1) sentence 1 lit. (a), (b) or (c) Rome II are met. 
Regarding AI, respondents reported uncertainty as to whether  an AI system is a “product” falling within 
Rome II’s product liability rules. The scope of the product liability rules will affect how readily AI systems can 
be addressed by Rome II and its current doctrine. 
 
• Unfair competition (Art. 6) 
Jurisprudential debate was reported in one Member State regarding whether Art. 6 of the Rome II 
Regulation takes precedence over the E-commerce Directive. The scope of application of Art. 6(3) raised 
some limited doctrinal discussion, including whether it is necessary for the anticompetitive acts in question to 
have been committed by an undertaking that effectively exercised activity on the respective market, and 
whether it applies to all acts restricting free competition or only to acts prohibited in the TFEU. 
Difficulties are expected to emerge regarding the interlink between Art. 6 and AI. 
 
• Environmental damage (Art. 7) 
Art. 7 has not caused major problems and the areas of uncertainty identified below are mostly doctrinal, 
including:  
- The interaction of Art. 7 with Art. 17 and the effect of foreign authorisations on the liability of the polluter 
- The interaction of Art. 7 with Art. 14 






• Freedom of choice (Art. 14) 
Several participants suggested that Art. 14 needs some improvement, although the issues reported were 
mostly of a doctrinal nature, and included: 
- The meaning of “freely negotiated” in Art. 14(1) lit. (b), and whether it includes standard clauses or 
general terms and conditions. 
- The assessment of the validity and form of the choice of law, and whether Art. 3(5), 10, 11 and 13 
Rome I apply by analogy to Art. 14 Rome II, or if the lex fori applies. 
- The notion of ‘commercial activity’ for the purposes of Art. 14(1)(b). 
 
• Scope of the law applicable (Art. 15) 
Difficulties surrounding the application of Art. 15 were reported in the doctrine and arose in the case law of 
several Member States. Stakeholders reported some uncertainty as to: 
- whether a third party participating in a tort committed by another person will be submitted to the same 
law as the latter or not. 
- Art. 15(c): the law applicable to the right of a court to estimate damages, and the interlink with public 
policy. 
- whether or not interest on damages falls within Article 1(3) or Article 15. 
 
• Overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16) 
Several participants suggested that Art. 16 needs some improvement, although the issues reported were 
mostly of a doctrinal nature, and included: 
- The questions as to whether Art. 16 Rome II disallows the application of overriding mandatory 
provisions of third countries. 
- The suggestion to import the definition in Art. 9(1) Rome I to improve the coherence between instruments. 
 
2.2. Areas of special interest  
 
• Artificial Intelligence  
The AI findings depend more heavily on desk research and hypothetical application of the Rome II 
Regulation than other Sections of this Study. This is due to the sparsity of case law in the area, and 
comparatively low levels of AI-specific responses from expert study participants. The AI section of the Study 
analyses what AI is, how it can cause damage that may breach non-contractual obligations engaging Rome 
II, and (with hypothetical examples) how specific Rome II articles may apply in AI contexts. 
Future application of Rome II to AI cases depends in part upon how substantive legal systems will develop 
in response to AI as more AI-related disputes come before the courts and technology continues to develop. 
The Study therefore considers the Draft Regulation accompanying the European Parliament’s resolution of 
20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for AI as a potential 
model for substantive AI regulation. 
With that foundation, the application of specific articles of the Rome II Regulation is discussed in the context 





contractual obligations. While the challenges of applying the Rome II Regulation in this context are not 
necessarily new or unique to AI, the nature of AI systems may generate increasingly frequent and complex 
incidences of familiar problems, often in combination. 
The most notable challenges that Rome II may face in an AI context are: (1) difficulty localising damage or 
effect where breach of a non-contractual obligation generates a purely virtual outcome; and (2) the risk of 
liability gaps where states diverge in their allocation of liability to parties responsible for different parts of 
complex AI systems. These challenges can be compared to difficulties in cases involving the internet, 
financial loss and complex manufacturing relationships. One must consider whether the rules developed in 
response to specific problems in those contexts are fit for purpose when applied to AI systems. 
 
• Business and human rights  
The business and human rights findings are based on desk research and the analysis of the legal and 
empirical studies conducted across the Member States. In transnational cases involving human rights 
abuses, the application of the general rule of Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation has led to significant 
problems for claimants who are victims of human rights abuses. Under Article 4(1), the applicable law is 
the law of the country where the damage occurred (lex loci damni). When multinational corporations carry 
out cross-border activities, human rights abuses committed by their subsidiaries or suppliers in developing 
countries (host states) will usually be governed by the law of the host state. Although the advantage or 
disadvantage of the lex loci damni for the claimant depends on the host State involved, there is a risk that 
the law applicable will be the law of a State with weak regulatory standards, poor rule of law or governance 
structures.  
Several academics and consulted stakeholders suggested to amend the Rome II Regulation and add a 
conflict-of-laws provision specific to human rights abuses, mirroring the “principle of ubiquity” found under 
Article 7. Others suggested that a more efficient solution, both in terms of protection of the victims and legal 
certainty for businesses, would be to classify the provisions of the EU Parliament Draft Directive as overriding 
mandatory provisions within the meaning of Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation. This was the approach 
adopted in the European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2021 with recommendations to the Commission 
on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability (2020/2129(INL)). 
 
• SLAPPs 
In the EU context, Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are groundless or exaggerated 
lawsuits and other legal forms of intimidation initiated by state organs, business corporations and individuals 
in power against weaker parties – journalists, civil society organisations, human rights defenders and others 
– who express criticism or transmit messages uncomfortable to the powerful, on a public matter.  The Study 
addresses the specific issue of the law applicable to claims in tort for defamation when they are used as 
SLAPPs, focusing on the risks of forum and law shopping associated with the current lack of a harmonized 
EU rule on the subject. The findings in this area are based on desk research, as well as a limited number of 
cases and national examples reported by a few National Rapporteurs.  
In the current context, cross-border SLAPPs based on defamation are subject to national conflict-of-laws 
rules, which allows ample room for manoeuvre regarding forum and law shopping tactics on the part of 
plaintiffs and may lead to unsatisfactory outcomes with respect to EU standards of freedom of speech and 
other fundamental rights.  
The Study finds that a unified EU approach to the conflict-of-laws in SLAPPs based on defamation could 





defamation, including outside the context of SLAPPs, should be covered by the Rome II Regulation and a 
preference should be given to a rule designating the law of the victim's habitual residence, without prejudice 







Executive Summary (FR) 
 
1. Introduction  
En réponse à la demande de service de la Commission européenne numéro 
JUST/2019/JCOO/FW/CIVI/0167, le British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) en 
consortium avec Civic Consulting a réalisé une étude pour soutenir la préparation d'un rapport sur 
l'application du Règlement (CE) n° 864/2007 sur la loi applicable aux obligations non contractuelles (le 
"règlement Rome II"), (ci-après, l'"Étude"). 
L'Étude effectue une analyse juridique et une évaluation des expériences pratiques et des problèmes 
d'interprétation liés à l'application du règlement Rome II pour la période 2010-2020. 
 
1.1. Structure  
L'Étude est composée de quatre parties principales : 
Une étude juridique présentant des recherches documentaires et des rapports nationaux couvrant les 26 
États membres appliquant le règlement Rome II et le Royaume-Uni (qui était un État membre de l'UE 
appliquant le règlement Rome II pendant la période concernée couverte par cette étude). 
Une étude empirique, consistant en des résultats empiriques par pays, basés sur des entretiens qualitatifs 
avec des experts du règlement Rome II et une enquête en ligne distribuée aux parties prenantes ayant une 
expérience pertinente. 
Un tableau comparatif résumant les problèmes juridiques identifiés dans tous les États membres. 
Un rapport de synthèse résumant les résultats juridiques et empiriques dans tous les États membres. 
 
1.2. Etude légale 
• Recherche documentaire 
L'équipe de BIICL a effectué une recherche documentaire approfondie comprenant une analyse des 
décisions de la CJUE, des études pertinentes et de la littérature sur le règlement Rome II. La recherche 
documentaire s'est également concentrée sur trois domaines d'intérêt particulier (intelligence artificielle (IA), 
entreprises et droits de l'homme, et les poursuites stratégiques contre la mobilisation publique (SLAPPs)). 
• Rapports nationaux 
Les rapporteurs nationaux de chacune des juridictions concernées ont été chargés d'analyser la 
jurisprudence et la doctrine. Ils ont été chargés d'aborder, à la lumière de la série de questions sur lesquelles 
se fonde la présente Etude, les problèmes pratiques liés à l'application du règlement Rome II. Ils ont effectué 
des recherches documentaires approfondies sur l'utilisation du règlement Rome II dans la jurisprudence de 
leurs États membres respectifs, y compris une analyse des arrêts pertinents rendus dans les États membres. 
Ils ont en outre évalué si l'exclusion de certains domaines du champ d'application du règlement Rome II 
(par exemple, la protection de la vie privée) créait des problèmes et si de nouveaux domaines thématiques 
(tels que les entreprises et les droits de l'homme ou l'intelligence artificielle) devraient être traités plus 






1.3. Etude empirique 
BIICL a organisé une consultation de plus de 100 universitaires et praticiens, qui ont été sélectionnés parmi 
les réseaux de BIICL, du consortium ainsi que des rapporteurs nationaux. Plus spécifiquement, l'étude 
empirique a interrogé des juges, des avocats ayant une expérience pertinente dans les affaires de 
responsabilité délictuelle et des litiges transfrontaliers en matière délictuelle en vertu du règlement Rome II, 
ainsi que des universitaires ayant une expérience pertinente du règlement Rome II. 
L'étude empirique était basée sur la même série de questions que celles posées par les rapporteurs 
nationaux. Elle couvrait les problèmes pratiques et les lacunes dans l'application du règlement et offrait la 
possibilité de formuler des recommandations pour y remédier.  
Les répondants potentiels ont contribué par deux méthodes différentes : 
• Un questionnaire en ligne, adapté aux objectifs du projet, 
• Une série d'entretiens individuels qualitatifs, menés par téléphone ou par liaison vidéo avec une 
sélection de parties prenantes clés.  
 
2. Données juridiques et empiriques 
Les études juridiques et empiriques ont révélé que le règlement Rome II a bien fonctionné dans la pratique.  
Bon nombre des problèmes identifiés dans l'étude sont des questions marginales, dont une partie ne s'est 
posée que dans une ou deux juridictions. Dans d'autres cas, les problèmes identifiés étaient liés à des 
affaires dans lesquelles les tribunaux des États membres n'ont tout simplement pas appliqué correctement 
les dispositions du règlement, ou consistaient en des questions théoriques soulevées par les commentateurs, 
qui n'ont pas donné lieu à des difficultés dans la pratique. 
Le nombre relativement faible de demandes de décision préjudicielle sur l'interprétation du règlement Rome 
II reçues par la CJUE, et le nombre limité d'affaires atteignant le stade de la décision, montrent également 
que, dans l'ensemble, le règlement Rome II a bien fonctionné dans la pratique. 
 
2.1. Dispositions clés et règles de conflit de lois du règlement Rome II 
Bien que les rapporteurs nationaux et les parties prenantes consultées dans l'étude empirique conviennent 
généralement que les dispositions du règlement Rome II fonctionnent bien dans la pratique, plus de 20% 
des parties prenantes ont exprimé le besoin d'améliorer deux dispositions: : l'art. 4 et l'art. 1 (respectivement 
29% et 28%). Sept dispositions ont recueilli entre 10 et 19 % de répondants s'accordant sur la nécessité 
d'une amélioration : l'art. 5 (18%), l'art. 14 (18%), l'art. 6 (16%), Art. 16 (16%), Art. 2 (15%), Art. 15 
(12%), Art. 7 (11%). Les débats autour de ces dispositions restent cependant largement académiques ou 
purement nationaux, comme le montrent généralement aussi les rapports nationaux, et aucun problème 
significatif n'a été identifié concernant leur application pratique. 
 
• Champ d’application (Art. 1) 
Plusieurs rapporteurs nationaux et une majorité de participants sont d'avis que l'art. 1 fonctionne bien. Les 
problèmes identifiés concernent des situations spécifiques résiduelles. 66% des répondants sont d'avis que 





choix de la loi applicable, afin d'assurer une meilleure compatibilité avec le règlement Bruxelles I bis, 
d'aborder les risques de forum shopping et d’améliorer la sécurité juridique et la prévisibilité. 
 
• Concept d’ « obligations non-contractuelles » (Art. 2) 
Les lacunes identifiées concernant le champ d'application ont trait à la difficulté de caractériser les 
demandes. Les répondants ont indiqué que le champ d'application des obligations non contractuelles 
couvertes par le règlement Rome II au-delà des simples délits n'est pas suffisamment clair. La jurisprudence 
interne des États membres indique qu'il subsiste une incertitude quant à la qualification d'une série 
d'obligations spécifiques, telles que le contrat à effet protecteur pour les tiers, la responsabilité d'un falsus 
procurator et les obligations résultant de l'offre ou de l'annonce d'un prix promotionnel. La recommandation 
générale basée sur l'étude juridique et empirique est que la clarification de ces questions devrait venir de 
la jurisprudence traitant de circonstances spécifiques. Étant donné l'importance marginale de ces questions, 
les tentatives de clarification par voie législative créeraient probablement des difficultés supplémentaires. 
 
• Règle générale (Art. 4) 
Les rapporteurs nationaux n'ont pas signalé de difficultés majeures dans l'application de l'art. 4, bien que 
certaines zones d'incertitude subsistent. En vertu de l'art. 4(1), une incertitude a été signalée quant à 
l'identification du lieu du dommage direct en cas de perte financière. Il n'y a pas non plus d'homogénéité 
totale entre les tribunaux nationaux quant à la nature du préjudice subi par les proches des victimes 
d'accidents de la circulation. En vertu de l'art. 4(2), une incertitude a été signalée concernant l'identification 
de la « personne dont la responsabilité est invoquée », l'application de la règle lorsqu'il y a plus de deux 
parties à la procédure, et l'approche appropriée pour identifier la résidence habituelle. En ce qui concerne 
la responsabilité en matière de prospectus et les délits sur les marchés financiers, la doctrine de plusieurs 
États membres suggère l'introduction d'une règle de conflit spéciale désignant la loi du pays où l'instrument 
financier concerné est négocié. 
 
• Responsabilité du fait des produits (Art. 5) 
Les problèmes identifiés sont marginaux et de nature doctrinale, y compris un débat sur la loi applicable si 
aucune des conditions de l'art. 5(1) (a), (b) ou (c) de Rome II n'est remplie. 
En ce qui concerne l'intelligence artificielle, les répondants ont fait part de leur incertitude quant à la question 
de savoir s'il s'agit d'un « produit » relevant des règles de Rome II en matière de responsabilité du fait des 
produits. Le champ d'application des règles de responsabilité du fait des produits affectera la facilité avec 
laquelle les systèmes d'intelligence artificielle peuvent être traités par Rome II et sa doctrine actuelle. 
 
• Concurrence déloyale et actes restreignant la libre concurrence (Art. 6) 
Un débat jurisprudentiel a été signalé dans un État membre concernant la question de savoir si l'art. 6 du 
règlement Rome II prévaut sur la directive sur le commerce électronique. Le champ d'application de l'art. 
6(3) a soulevé quelques discussions doctrinales limitées, notamment sur la question de savoir s'il est 
nécessaire que les actes anticoncurrentiels en question aient été commis par une entreprise qui a 
effectivement exercé une activité sur le marché concerné, et s'il s'applique à tous les actes restreignant la 
libre concurrence ou seulement aux actes interdits par le TFUE. 






• Atteinte à l'environnement (Art. 7) 
L'art. 7 n'a pas causé de problèmes majeurs et les zones d'incertitude identifiées ci-dessous sont 
principalement d'ordre doctrinal, notamment :  
- L'interaction de l'art. 7 avec l'art. 17 et l'effet des autorisations étrangères sur la responsabilité du 
pollueur. 
- L'interaction de l'art. 7 avec l'art. 14. 
- La détermination du lieu où le fait dommageable s'est produit. 
 
• Liberté de choix (Art. 14) 
Plusieurs participants ont suggéré que l'art. 14 a besoin d'être amélioré, bien que les problèmes signalés 
soient principalement de nature doctrinale, et comprennent : 
- La signification de « librement négocié » aux fins de l'art. 4(1)(b), et si cela inclut les clauses 
standard ou les conditions générales. 
- L'évaluation de la validité et de la forme du choix de la loi applicable, et si les art. 3(5), 10, 11 et 
13 Rome I s'appliquent par analogie à l'art. 14 Rome II, ou si la lex fori s'applique. 
- La notion d'  « activité commerciale » aux fins de l'art. 14(1)(b). 
 
• Portée de la loi applicable (Art. 15) 
Des difficultés autour de l'application de l'art. 15 ont été signalées par la doctrine et ont été relevées dans 
la jurisprudence de plusieurs États membres. Les intervenants ont fait état d'incertitude concernant : 
- Le fait de savoir si un tiers participant à un délit commis par une autre personne sera soumis à la 
même loi que cette dernière ou non. 
- L’art. 15(c) : la loi applicable au droit d'un tribunal d'estimer les dommages, et le lien avec l'ordre 
public. 
- Le fait de savoir si les intérêts sur les dommages et intérêts relèvent ou non de l'article 1(3) ou de 
l'article 15. 
 
• Dispositions impératives dérogatoires (Art. 16) 
Plusieurs participants ont suggéré que l'art. 16 a besoin d'être amélioré, bien que les problèmes signalés 
soient principalement de nature doctrinale, et comprennent : 
- La question de savoir si l'art. 16 Rome II interdit l'application de dispositions impératives 
dérogatoires de pays tiers. 







2.2. Domaines d’intérêt particulier   
 
• Intelligence artificielle  
Les conclusions de la section sur l’IA reposent davantage sur des recherches documentaires et une 
application hypothétique du règlement Rome II que les autres sections de cette étude. Cela est dû à la rareté 
de la jurisprudence dans ce domaine et au nombre relativement faible de réponses spécifiques à l’IA 
fournies par les experts participant à l'étude. La section de l'Etude consacrée à l’IA analyse ce qu'est l’IA, 
comment elle peut causer des dommages susceptibles de constituer une violation des obligations non 
contractuelles découlant de Rome II, et (à l'aide d'exemples hypothétiques) comment certains articles de 
Rome II peuvent s'appliquer dans des contextes impliquant l’IA. 
L'application future de Rome II aux affaires d'IA dépend en partie de la manière dont les systèmes juridiques 
de fond se développeront en réponse à l'IA, à mesure que les tribunaux seront saisis d'un plus grand nombre 
de litiges liés à l'IA et que la technologie continuera de se développer. L'Etude considère donc le projet de 
règlement accompagnant la résolution du Parlement européen du 20 octobre 2020 contenant des 
recommandations à la Commission sur un régime de responsabilité civile pour l'IA comme un modèle 
potentiel de réglementation de fond de l'IA. 
Sur cette base, l'application d'articles spécifiques du règlement Rome II est examinée dans le contexte des 
nouvelles situations et des nouveaux défis qui peuvent survenir lorsque des systèmes d'IA sont impliqués 
dans des violations d'obligations non contractuelles. Si les défis liés à l'application du règlement Rome II 
dans ce contexte ne sont pas nécessairement nouveaux ou propres à l'IA, la nature des systèmes d'IA peut 
générer des incidences de plus en plus fréquentes et complexes de problèmes familiers, souvent en 
combinaison. 
Les défis les plus notables auxquels Rome II peut être confronté dans un contexte d'IA sont les suivants : (1) 
la difficulté de localiser le dommage ou l'effet lorsque la violation d'une obligation non contractuelle génère 
un résultat purement virtuel ; et (2) le risque de lacunes en matière de responsabilité lorsque les États 
divergent dans l'attribution de la responsabilité aux parties responsables de différents éléments de systèmes 
d'IA complexes. Ces défis peuvent être comparés aux difficultés rencontrées dans les affaires impliquant 
l'internet, les dommages financiers et les relations complexes de fabrication. Il faut se demander si les règles 
élaborées en réponse à des problèmes spécifiques dans ces contextes sont adaptées lorsqu'elles sont 
appliquées aux systèmes d'IA. 
 
• Entreprises et droits de l’homme 
Les conclusions de la section sur les entreprises et les droits de l’homme sont basées sur des recherches 
documentaires et l'analyse des études juridiques et empiriques menées dans les États membres. Dans les 
affaires transnationales impliquant des violations des droits de l'homme, l'application de la règle générale 
de l'art. 4(1) du règlement Rome II a entraîné des problèmes importants pour les victimes de violations des 
droits de l'homme. En vertu de l'art. 4(1), la loi applicable est la loi du pays où le dommage est survenu (lex 
loci damni).  Lorsque des sociétés multinationales exercent des activités transfrontalières, les violations des 
droits de l'homme commises par leurs filiales ou leurs fournisseurs dans des pays en développement (États 
d'accueil) seront généralement régies par la loi de l'État d'accueil. Bien que l'avantage ou le désavantage 
de la lex loci damni pour le demandeur dépende de l'État hôte concerné, il existe un risque que le droit 
applicable soit celui d'un État dont les normes réglementaires ou les structures de gouvernance sont plus 
faibles. 
Plusieurs des universitaires et des parties prenantes consultées ont suggéré de modifier le règlement Rome 





« principe d'ubiquité » de l'article 7. D'autres ont suggéré qu'une solution plus efficace, tant en termes de 
protection des victimes que de prévisibilité et sécurité juridique pour les entreprises, consisterait à qualifier 
les dispositions du projet de directive du Parlement européen en tant que dispositions impératives au sens 
de l'article 16 du règlement Rome II. Il s’agit de l'approche adoptée dans la résolution du Parlement 
européen du 10 mars 2021 contenant des recommandations à la Commission sur le devoir de vigilance et 
la responsabilité des entreprises (2020/2129(INL)) . 
 
• Poursuites stratégiques contre la mobilisation publique (ou poursuites-bâillons, SLAPPs) 
Dans le contexte de l'UE, les poursuites stratégiques contre la participation publique, ou poursuites-bâillons, 
sont des poursuites sans fondement ou exagérées et d'autres formes juridiques d'intimidation initiées par des 
organes de l'État, des sociétés commerciales et des individus au pouvoir contre des parties plus faibles - 
journalistes, organisations de la société civile, défenseurs des droits de l'homme et autres - qui expriment 
des critiques ou transmettent des messages gênants pour les puissants, sur une question publique.  L'Etude 
aborde la question spécifique du droit applicable aux plaintes en responsabilité civile pour diffamation 
lorsqu'elles sont des poursuites-bâillons, en se concentrant sur les risques de forum shopping et de law 
shopping associés à l'absence actuelle de règle européenne harmonisée sur le sujet. Les conclusions dans 
ce domaine sont basées sur des recherches documentaires, ainsi que sur un nombre limité de cas et 
d'exemples nationaux rapportés par quelques rapporteurs nationaux.  
Dans le contexte actuel, les poursuites-bâillons transfrontalières fondées sur la diffamation sont soumises 
aux règles nationales de conflit de lois, ce qui laisse une grande marge de manœuvre aux plaignants en ce 
qui concerne les tactiques de forum shopping et de law shopping et peut conduire à des résultats 
insatisfaisants au regard des normes européennes en matière de liberté d'expression et d'autres droits 
fondamentaux.  
L'Etude conclut qu'une approche européenne unifiée du conflit de lois dans les poursuites-bâillons basées 
sur la diffamation pourrait atténuer la plupart des difficultés des victimes de ces poursuites-bâillons dans un 
contexte transfrontalier. Plus précisément, la diffamation, y compris en dehors du contexte des poursuites-
bâillons, devrait être couverte par le règlement Rome II et une préférence devrait être donnée à une règle 






Executive Summary (DE) 
 
1. Einleitung  
Die EU-Kommission hat das British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) im Konsortium mit 
Civic Consulting mit der Studie JUST/2019/JCOO/FW/CIVI/0167 beauftragt (im Folgenden "Studie"), 
die einen Bericht über die Anwendung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 864/2007 über das auf außervertragliche 
Schuldverhältnisse anzuwendende Recht ("Rom-II-Verordnung") vorbereiten soll. 
Die Studie analysiert und bewertet für den Zeitraum 2010-2020 praktische Erfahrungen und Auslegungsprobleme 
bei der Anwendung der Rom-II-Verordnung. 
 
1.1. Aufbau  
Die Studie besteht aus vier Teilen: 
Eine rechtliche Studie, basierend auf einer Analyse der Literatur und Rechtsprechung, sowie auf 
Länderberichten für die 26 Mitgliedstaaten und das Vereinigte Königreich (das im relevanten Zeitraum ein 
EU-Mitgliedstaat war, der die Rom-II-Verordnung anwandte).  
Eine empirische Studie, die die praktische Anwendung der Verordnung in jedem Mitgliedstaat evaluiert. Sie 
stützt sich auf qualitative Interviews mit ausgewählten Experten sowie auf eine Online-Umfrage, die an 
Stakeholder mit einschlägiger Erfahrung bei der Anwendung der Rom-II-Verordnung gerichtet war.  
Eine rechtsvergleichende Tabelle, die in den Mitgliedsstaaten identifizierte, rechtliche Probleme aufzeigt. 
Eine Synthese, die die rechtlichen und empirischen Ergebnisse für alle Mitgliedstaaten zusammenfasst.  
 
1.2. Rechtliche Studie 
• Desk Research 
BIICL analysierte EuGH-Entscheidungen, relevante Studien und die wichtigste Literatur zur Rom-II-
Verordnung. Zudem wurden drei Bereiche näher untersucht, die von besonderem Interesse sind (künstliche 
Intelligenz (AI), Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte sowie SLAPPs).  
• Länderberichte 
Nationale Berichterstatter aus jeder der erfassten Rechtsordnungen wurden mit der Analyse der nationalen 
Rechtsprechung und Lehre beauftragt. Sie hatten einen Fragenkatalog abzuarbeiten, um praktische 
Probleme bei der Anwendung der Rom-II-Verordnung aufzuzeigen. Sie analysierten die Anwendung der 
Verordnung einschließlich der einschlägigen Urteile. Darüber hinaus bewerteten sie, ob der Ausschluss 
bestimmter Bereiche aus dem Anwendungsbereich der Verordnung (z. B. Verletzungen der Privatsphäre) 
Probleme aufwirft und ob neue Bereiche (z. B. Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte oder künstliche Intelligenz) 
in der Rom-II-Verordnung speziell geregelt werden sollten. 
 
1.3. Empirische Studie 
BIICL konsultierte über 100 Akademiker und Rechtspraktiker, die aus den Kontakten des Instituts, des 
Konsortiums sowie der nationalen Berichterstatter ausgewählt wurden. Diese waren im Wesentlichen 





grenzüberschreitenden Schadensersatzprozessen, sowie Akademiker, die auf die Rom-II-Verordnung 
spezialisiert sind. 
Die empirische Studie basierte auf dem gleichen Fragenkatalog, der auch den nationalen Berichterstattern 
vorgelegt wurde. Sie soll praktische Probleme und Lücken bei der Anwendung der Verordnung aufzeigen 
und den Teilnehmern die Möglichkeit eröffnen, Empfehlungen abzugeben. 
Die Befragten konnten auf zwei verschiedene Arten an der Umfrage teilnehmen: 
- durch Ausfüllen eines Online-Fragebogens, der die Themen des Projekts abdeckt; 
- durch qualitative Einzelinterviews, die per Telefon oder Video mit einer Auswahl von Schlüsselakteuren 
geführt wurden.  
 
2. Ergebnisse der rechtlichen und empirischen Studie  
Die rechtliche und empirische Analyse haben ergeben, dass die Rom-II-Verordnung in der Praxis gut 
funktioniert.  
Bei vielen der in der Studie festgestellten Probleme handelt es sich eher um Randthemen, die zum Teil nur in 
einem oder zwei Ländern aufgetreten sind. In anderen Fällen betrafen die festgestellten Probleme 
mitgliedstaatliche Gerichtsentscheidungen, in welchen die Verordnung nicht ordnungsgemäß angewendet 
wurde. In einigen Fällen handelte es sich um theoretische Probleme, die von Kommentatoren aufgeworfen 
wurden, die in der Praxis jedoch bislang keine feststellbaren Schwierigkeiten bereitet haben.  
Die relativ geringe Zahl der beim EuGH eingegangenen Vorabentscheidungsverfahren zur Auslegung der 
Rom-II-Verordnung und die begrenzte Zahl der Fälle, die das Entscheidungsstadium erreicht haben, zeigen 
ebenfalls, dass die Rom-II-Verordnung in der Praxis insgesamt gut funktioniert. 
 
2.1.  Zentrale Bestimmungen und Kollisionsnormen der Rom-II-Verordnung 
Während sich die nationalen Berichterstatter und die in der empirischen Studie befragten Stakeholder im 
Allgemeinen einig sind, dass die Bestimmungen der Rom-II-Verordnung in der Praxis gut funktionieren, 
sahen doch mehr als 20 % der Befragten einen Verbesserungsbedarf bei zwei zentralen Bestimmungen: bei 
Art. 4 und Art. 1 (jeweils 29% und 28%). Bei sieben weiteren Vorschriften sehen 10 % bis 19 % der 
Befragten einen Verbesserungsbedarf: Art. 5 (18%), Art. 14 (18%), Art. 6 (16%), Art. 16 (16%), Art. 2 
(15%), Art. 15 (12%) und Art. 7 (11%). Die Diskussion um diese Bestimmungen bleibt, wie die 
Länderberichte zeigen, jedoch weitgehend akademisch oder auf bestimmte Mitgliedstaaten beschränkt, 
und es wurden keine wesentlichen Probleme bei der praktischen Anwendung festgestellt. 
 
• Materieller Anwendungsbereich (Art. 1) 
Mehrere nationale Berichterstatter und eine Mehrheit der Stakeholder waren der Meinung, dass Art. 1 bis 
auf einen spezifischen Punkt unproblematisch ist: 66 % der Befragten waren der Ansicht, dass der Bereich 
Verleumdung bzw. Schutz der Privatsphäre einer gemeinsamen EU-weiten Regelung bedarf, um eine 
bessere Vereinbarkeit mit der Brüssel-Ibis-Verordnung zu gewährleisten, die Risiken des "forum shopping" 
abzumildern, sowie Rechtssicherheit und Vorhersehbarkeit zu garantieren. 
• Konzept der "außervertraglichen Schuldverhältnisse" (Art. 2) 
Die im Zusammenhang mit dem Anwendungsbereich von Art. 2 festgestellten Unzulänglichkeiten beziehen 





einfachen Delikten nicht klar ist, welche außervertraglichen Schuldverhältnisse von der Rom-II-Verordnung 
erfasst sein sollen. Die Rechtsprechung in den Mitgliedstaaten deutet darauf hin, dass bei der Qualifikation 
in einer Reihe von Fällen weiterhin Unsicherheit besteht (z. B. Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter, 
Haftung eines falsus procurator und Verpflichtungen, die sich aus dem Angebot oder der Ankündigung eines 
Werbepreises ergeben). Die auf der Grundlage der rechtlichen und empirischen Untersuchung getroffene 
allgemeine Empfehlung war jedoch, dass die Klärung dieser Fragen durch die Rechtsprechung erfolgen 
sollte. Angesichts der relativ geringen Bedeutung dieser Fragen würde der Versuch einer Klarstellung durch 
den Gesetzgeber wahrscheinlich eher zu neuen Schwierigkeiten führen. 
 
• Allgemeine Kollisionsnorm (Art. 4) 
Aus den Länderberichten wurden im Allgemeinen keine größeren Schwierigkeiten bei der Anwendung von 
Art. 4 ersichtlich, allerdings gibt es hier doch eine Unsicherheit: Im Rahmen von Art. 4(1) wurde über 
Probleme bei der Bestimmung des unmittelbaren Schadensortes bei reinen Vermögensschäden berichtet. 
Auch bei der Bestimmung der Art des Schadens, den Angehörige von Verkehrsunfallsopfern erleiden, 
besteht keine vollständige Homogenität zwischen nationalen Gerichten. Im Rahmen von Art. 4(2) besteht 
eine Unsicherheit bei der Bestimmung der "Person, deren Haftung geltend gemacht wird", bei der 
Anwendung der Vorschrift im Fall von mehr als zwei Verfahrensbeteiligten und bei der Vorgehensweise zur 
Bestimmung des gewöhnlichen Aufenthalts. In Bezug auf die Prospekthaftung und Finanzmarktdelikte 
schlägt die Lehre in mehreren Mitgliedstaaten die Einführung einer speziellen Kollisionsnorm vor, nach der 
das Recht des Landes Anwendung findet, in dem das betroffene Finanzinstrument gehandelt wird. 
 
• Produkthaftung (Art. 5) 
Die identifizierten Probleme waren eher marginal und wurden in der Lehre diskutiert, so etwa die Frage, 
welches Recht anwendbar sein soll, wenn keine der Voraussetzungen des Art. 5(1) Satz 1 lit. (a), (b) oder 
(c) Rom-II-Verordnung erfüllt sind. 
In Bezug auf AI ist fraglich, ob es sich um ein "Produkt" handelt, das unter die Produkthaftungsregeln von 
Rom II fällt. Der Anwendungsbereich der Produkthaftungsvorschriften hängt davon ab, inwieweit AI-
Systeme von der Rom-II-Verordnung und ihrer derzeitigen Auslegung erfasst werden können. 
 
• Unlauterer Wettbewerb (Art. 6) 
In einem Mitgliedstaat wurde eine rechtswissenschaftliche Debatte darüber geführt, ob Art. 6 der Rom II-
Verordnung Vorrang vor der E-Commerce-Richtlinie hat. Der Anwendungsbereich von Art. 6(3) warf einige 
wenige Diskussionen auf, einschließlich der Frage, ob es notwendig ist, dass wettbewerbswidrige 
Handlungen von einem Unternehmen begangen wurden, das tatsächlich eine Tätigkeit auf dem jeweiligen 
Markt ausübte, und ob Art. 6 für alle Handlungen gilt, die den freien Wettbewerb einschränken, oder nur 
für Handlungen, die gem. AEUV verboten sind. 
Schwierigkeiten werden auch im Zusammenspiel von Art. 6 und AI erwartet. 
 
• Umweltschäden (Art. 7) 
Art. 7 hat keine größeren Anwendungsprobleme verursacht. Allerdings wurden die folgenden Punkte in der 





- das Zusammenspiel von Art. 7 mit Art. 17 und die Auswirkung ausländischer Genehmigungen auf die 
Haftung des Schadensverursachers 
- das Zusammenspiel von Art. 7 mit Art. 14 
- die Bestimmung des Ortes, an dem das schädigende Ereignis eingetreten ist. 
 
• Rechtswahl (Art. 14) 
Mehrere Teilnehmer finden Art. 14 verbesserungsbedürftig, und führten hierzu u.a. folgende Punkte an: 
- die Bedeutung von "frei ausgehandelt" in Art. 14(1) lit. (b) und die Frage, ob damit Standardklauseln oder 
allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen gemeint sind. 
- die Beurteilung der Gültigkeit und Form der Rechtswahl, und ob Art. 3(5), 10, 11 und 13 Rom I analog 
zu Art. 14 Rom II gelten, oder ob die lex fori Anwendung findet. 
- den Begriff der "gewerblichen Tätigkeit" gem. Art. 14(1)(b).  
 
• Geltungsbereich des anzuwendenden Rechts (Art. 15) 
Bei der Anwendung von Art. 15 wurden von der Lehre einige Schwierigkeiten festgestellt. Diese zeigten sich 
auch in der Rechtsprechung mehrerer Mitgliedstaaten. Die Stakeholder berichteten über Probleme bei der 
Auslegung folgender Fragen: 
- ob ein Dritter, der sich an einer von einer anderen Person begangenen unerlaubten Handlung beteiligt, 
demselben Recht unterworfen wird wie diese Person oder nicht. 
- Art. 15(c): das auf eine Schadensschätzung durch ein Gericht anwendbare Recht und das Zusammenspiel 
mit dem ordre public. 
- ob Zinsen auf Schadensersatz unter Artikel 1(3) oder Artikel 15 fallen oder nicht. 
 
• Eingriffsnormen (Art. 16) 
Mehrere Teilnehmer schlugen Änderungen von Art. 16 vor. Sie betreffen u. a: 
- die Frage, ob Art. 16 Rom II die Anwendung drittstaatlicher Eingriffsnormen zulässt. 
- den Vorschlag, die Definition des Art. 9(1) Rom I in Art. 16 Rom II zu übernehmen, um die Kohärenz 
zwischen den Verordnungen zu verbessern. 
 
2.2. Spezielle Themenbereiche 
 
• Künstliche Intelligenz (AI) 
Die Anwendung der Rom-II-Verordnung auf den Bereich AI beruht in stärkerem Maße als andere Abschnitte 
dieser Studie auf einer hypothetischen Betrachtung. Dies ist auf die spärliche Rechtsprechung in diesem 
Bereich und die vergleichsweise geringe Anzahl an Kommentaren von fachkundigen Stakeholdern 
zurückzuführen. Die Studie definiert den Begriff der künstlichen Intelligenz und erörtert, wie es im 
Zusammenhang mit AI zu einer außervertraglichen Haftung kommen kann, die unter Rom II fällt, sowie (mit 
hypothetischen Beispielen) wie bestimmte Vorschriften der Rom II-Verordnung im Zusammenhang mit AI 





Die künftige Anwendung der Verordnung auf Fälle mit AI-Bezug hängt zum Teil davon ab, wie das 
materielle Recht reagieren wird, wenn mehr AI-bezogene Streitigkeiten vor die Gerichte kommen und sich 
die Technologie weiterentwickelt. Die Studie betrachtet daher die Entschließung des Europäischen 
Parlaments vom 20. Oktober 2020 mit Empfehlungen an die Kommission für eine Regelung der 
zivilrechtlichen Haftung beim Einsatz künstlicher Intelligenz (2020/2014(INL)) als potenzielles Modell für 
eine materielle AI-Regulierung. 
Auf dieser Grundlage wird die Anwendung spezifischer Artikel der Rom-II-Verordnung im Kontext neuer 
Situationen erörtert, die sich ergeben können, wenn außervertragliche Schuldverhältnisse im 
Zusammenhang mit AI-Systemen entstehen. Während die Anwendung der Rom-II-Verordnung nicht 
unbedingt zu neuen oder AI-spezifischen Herausforderungen führt, kann die Natur von AI-Systemen zu 
immer häufigeren und komplexeren Szenarien mit bereits bekannten Problemen führen, oft in Kombination. 
Die wichtigsten Probleme, die bei der Anwendung der Rom-II-Verordnung in einem AI-Kontext auftreten 
können, sind: (1) die Schwierigkeit, einen Schaden zu lokalisieren, wenn eine außervertragliche 
Verletzungshandlung ein rein virtuelles Ergebnis erzeugt; und (2) das Risiko von Haftungslücken, wenn 
Staaten bei der Zuweisung der Haftung an Parteien, die für verschiedene Teile komplexer AI-Systeme 
verantwortlich sind, divergieren. Diese Herausforderungen lassen sich mit komplexen Fällen vergleichen, in 
denen es um das Internet, finanzielle Schäden und vielschichtige Produktionsbeziehungen geht. Hier stellt 
sich die Frage, ob die Regeln, die als Reaktion auf spezifische Probleme in diesen Szenarien entwickelt 
wurden, auch für die Anwendung auf AI-Systeme geeignet sind.  
 
• Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte 
Die Analyse des Themas Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte basiert sowohl auf desk research als auch auf den 
Länderberichten und der empirischen Studie in den Mitgliedstaaten. Bei grenzüberschreitenden 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen hat die Anwendung der allgemeinen Regel von Artikel 4 Absatz 1 der Rom-
II-Verordnung zu erheblichen Problemen für die Opfer geführt. Nach Artikel 4(1) ist das anwendbare Recht 
das Recht des Landes, in dem der Schaden eingetreten ist (lex loci damni). Wenn multinationale 
Unternehmen grenzüberschreitend tätig sind, werden Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die von ihren 
Tochtergesellschaften oder Zulieferern in Entwicklungsländern (host states/ Gaststaaten) begangen 
werden, in der Regel dem Recht des Gaststaates unterworfen sein. Obwohl der Vorteil oder Nachteil der 
lex loci damni für den Kläger vom jeweiligen Gaststaat abhängt, besteht das Risiko, dass das anwendbare 
Recht das Recht eines Staates mit schwachen Regulierungsstandards, fehlenden 
Rechtsstaatlichkeitsprinzipien oder schlechten Regierungsstrukturen ist.  
Mehrere Akademiker und Interessenvertreter schlugen vor, die Rom-II-Verordnung zu ändern und eine 
spezielle Kollisionsnorm für Menschenrechtsverletzungen einzuführen, die das "Ubiquitätsprinzip" des 
Artikel 7 widerspiegelt. Andere finden es sowohl im Hinblick auf den Schutz der Opfer als auch auf die 
Rechtssicherheit für Unternehmen effizienter, die Bestimmungen des Richtlinienentwurfs des EU-Parlaments 
als zwingende Vorschriften im Sinne von Artikel 16 der Rom-II-Verordnung einzustufen. Dieser Ansatz 
wurde in der Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments vom 10. März 2021 mit Empfehlungen an die 
Kommission zur Sorgfaltspflicht und Rechenschaftspflicht von Unternehmen (2020/2129(INL) verfolgt. 
 
• SLAPPs 
Im EU-Kontext sind strategische Klagen gegen öffentliche Beteiligung (SLAPPs) unbegründete oder 
übertriebene Klagen sowie andere rechtliche Formen der Einschüchterung, die von staatlichen Organen, 
Wirtschaftsunternehmen und Machthabern gegen schwächere Parteien - Journalisten, Organisationen der 





Angelegenheit Kritik äußern oder für Machthaber unangenehme Botschaften übermitteln.  Die Studie befasst 
sich mit der spezifischen Frage, welches Recht auf deliktische Ansprüche wegen Verleumdung anwendbar 
ist, wenn diese in der Form von SLAPPs eingesetzt werden, und konzentriert sich dabei auf die Risiken des 
Forum- und Law-Shopping, die mit dem derzeitigen Fehlen einer harmonisierten EU-weiten Regelung zu 
diesem Thema verbunden sind. Die Ergebnisse in diesem Bereich basieren auf desk research sowie auf einer 
begrenzten Anzahl von Fällen und nationalen Beispielen, die von einigen Länderberichterstattern angeführt 
wurden.  
Im gegenwärtigen Kontext unterliegen grenzüberschreitende SLAPPs, die auf Verleumdung beruhen, den 
nationalen Kollisionsnormen, was einen großen Spielraum für Forum- und Law-Shopping-Taktiken der 
Kläger zulässt und zu unbefriedigenden Ergebnissen im Hinblick auf EU-Standards zur Meinungsfreiheit 
und anderen Grundrechten führen kann.  
Die Studie kommt zu dem Schluss, dass ein EU-weit einheitlicher Ansatz für Kollisionsnormen im 
Zusammenhang mit grenzüberschreitenden SLAPPs die meisten Schwierigkeiten der Opfer abmildern 
könnte. Insbesondere sollten Verleumdungen, auch außerhalb des Kontexts von SLAPPs, von der Rom-II-
Verordnung erfasst werden. Hier sollte einer Regelung Vorzug gegeben werden, die auf dem Recht des 









Synthesis Report  
The following Synthesis combines the findings gathered from the legal and empirical studies conducted across the 
Member States, and draws conclusions and provides recommendations for each provision of the Rome II Regulation.   
 
Introduction  
The consultation reveals that the Rome II Regulation has worked well in practice. 90% of the stakeholders ranked their 




To the question of which features of the Rome II Regulation are in need of improvement: 
• Only two provisions garnered over 20%: Art. 4 and Art. 1, with respectively 29% and 28% of the consulted 
stakeholders of the opinion that the provisions need improvement. The main issues identified with Art. 4 relate 
to the identification, under Art. 4(1), of the place where the direct damage occurred when the damage is of 
a financial nature, and the lack of precision as to the concept of “the person claimed to be liable” under Art. 
4(2). Regarding Art. 1, the exclusion under Art. 1(2) lit. (g) of non-contractual obligations arising out of 
violations of privacy and rights relating to personality has been identified as problematic by several national 
experts who pointed to forum shopping as a resulting risk. 
• Seven provisions gathered 10% to 19% of respondents agreeing over a need for improvement: Art. 5 (18%), 
Art. 14 (18%), Art. 6 (16%), Art. 16 (16%), Art. 2 (15%), Art. 15 (12%), Art. 7 (11%). The debates around 
these provisions remain however largely academic, and no significant issues were identified regarding their 
practical application. 






Many of the problems identified below are rather at the periphery in terms of their significance, and reveal mostly 
marginal issues including: 
• Cases where Member State courts have simply failed to apply the provisions of the Regulation properly. 
• Technical or theoretical issues raised by commentators, which have not given rise to difficulties in practice. 
• Issues arising in a narrow and specific class of cases, often giving rise to an issue in one or two Member 
States. 
 
The CJEU has rendered 8 decisions on the Rome II Regulation (see Legal Study, Part. 2 of the Report, for a detailed 
analysis of the decisions). The relatively small number of references to the CJEU, and the limited number of cases 
reaching the decision stage, also illustrate how well the Rome II Regulation has worked in practice. 
 
Material scope (Art. 1) 
The provisions regarding the scope of applicability (Arts. 1 and 2) are respectively the second and third provisions to 
which stakeholders refer to most prominently in the empirical study. Approval as to the functionality of the provisions is 
moderate: respectively 43% and 36% of the participants were of the opinion that Arts. 1 and 2 work well. One 
stakeholder commented that the scope of non-contractual obligations encompassed by Rome II beyond simply delicts 
is insufficiently clear. Another participant added that courts had not had ‘major problems’ with Arts. 1 and 2, but ‘in 
specific situations’, the provisions could generate difficulties of interpretation, such as in identifying whether a claim is 
contractual or non-contractual.  
The difficulties in properly qualifying a claim under Art. 1 in certain specific situations appears as well in national 
doctrine and caselaw. German doctrine reveals a lack of consensus as to the extent to which claims for refunds based 
on an act of specific public power are to be classified as “civil and commercial matters” within the meaning of Art. 1. 
This is particularly problematic in cases where the State takes responsibility for remedying environmental damage but 
imposes the cost of doing so on a private party.  In that respect, the English expert points to the decisions C-814/79 
Netherlands v Rüffer (Brussels Convention) and notes that it is unclear whether the CJEU’s case law on Art. 1 (Brussels 
I bis) would lead to the same result today. 
The scope of Art. 1(2) lit. (d) is subject to debate. It is disputed in German doctrine whether liability for incorrect 
prospectuses is covered by Art. 1(2) lit. (d). The English expert points to CJEU case law on the equivalent exception in 
the Rome I Regulation, which has taken a narrow approach (C-25/18 Kerr v Postnov, C-272/18 Vfk v TVP 
Treuhand). Additionally, German doctrine questions whether Art. 1(2) lit. (d) also excludes any liability of officers and 
shareholders in other situations, e.g. in case of an abuse of the corporate form leading to a piercing of the corporate 
veil. The scope of application of Art. 1(2) lit. (d) raised uncertainty in Dutch doctrine and Slovenian caselaw as well, 
regarding the liability of directors and administrators.  
Some additional residual difficulties were identified: Slovakian caselaw reveals some uncertainty as to the application 
of Art. 1(1) for claims regarding unpaid tolls for motorway in a foreign country, with respect to non-contractual 
obligations in administrative matters. In that respect, the English expert notes that the issue is most likely contractual, by 





• Issues identified regarding specifically the exclusion of personality rights (including defamation) from the 




When asked about the need for specific rules in some areas, 66% of all the respondents answered that the sector of 
defamation and privacy needed a common set of EU choice of law rules. Two respondents noted that including relevant 
provisions on defamation and privacy in Rome II would lead to a better compatibility with the jurisdictional rules of the 
Brussels I bis Regulation. 3 respondents mentioned that the inclusion of such rules would address the risks of forum 
shopping, and 5 respondents further added this would support legal certainty and predictability. One Portuguese 
academic added that the exclusion of personality rights and defamation created problems before Portuguese courts 
because there are divergent interpretations as to what the term “personality rights” covers.  English case law has also 
suggested difficulties in the areas of malicious falsehood and harassment. One academic/lawyer from Belgium with 
practical experience in cases involving cross-border defamation pointed out that the exclusion of defamation from the 
scope of Rome II significantly complicated the position of the victims. 
National rapporteurs for Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia, and Spain reported 
doctrine’s criticism in their respective jurisdictions over the exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to 
personality from the Rome II Regulation. It is for instance debated in German literature whether the exemption also 
covers injuries to the body or health stemming from the violation of personal rights, such as an incorrect medical 
consultation leading to an operation without consent. 
In France, the exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality from the Rome II Regulation is seen 
as a political failure in Europe, especially in light of the recent increase in the number of cyber-offences by the media. 
Hungarian literature also notes that it is the ‘most unfortunate handicap’ of the Rome II Regulation. Hungarian and 
Maltese doctrine note that the absence of regulation provides opportunities for forum shopping. Hungarian literature 
places further emphasis on the new challenges raised by online platforms and asks whether a Member State could 
oblige a platform to remove harmful content posted by users residing in other Member States. 
Austrian literature reports that the exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality leads to different 
conflict-of-law provisions and thus possibly the application of different laws. Croatian literature also mentions this 
concern, particularly for claims involving defamation, calling for a rule in Rome II according to which the law of the 
country would apply in which a publication is made available. The Hungarian solution (article 23 of the new Act of 
International Private Law) designates as applicable the law of the habitual residence/registered place of business of 
the victim. Additionally it allows for a limited unilateral choice of the applicable law by the victim (this choice will 





where the centre of his interests is located, or, alternatively the law of the state where the violating party’s habitual 
residence (or, for legal persons, its seat) is located. These solutions are presented as possible model rules for EU law.  
In Spain, the majority of academics consider that the best solution to the current exclusion of violations of privacy and 
rights relating to personality is to amend the Rome II Regulation to include a rule based on the application of the law 
of the victim's habitual residence, without prejudice to the possibility of the parties choosing the applicable law in 
accordance with Art. 14, and the possible application of an escape clause based on the closest connection principle. 
The German and Austrian rapporteurs link the omission of personality rights in Rome II with a discussion on the GDPR. 
They ask whether the GDPR contains provisions that could be considered as conflict-of-laws rules, in particular Art. 3 
GDPR. Germany’s rapporteur is doubtful whether Art. 3 GDPR is a special conflict-of-laws rule in the sense of Art. 23 
Rome I Regulation and Art. 27 Rome II Regulation. The Austrian national report asks whether Art. 3 GDPR can be 
considered to be an overriding mandatory rule.  
Few of the consulted stakeholders commented generally on SLAPPs, mostly for lack of caselaw and/or doctrine in their 
respective Member States. Of the four out of all respondents who commented on SLAPPs, three of them argued that 
the lack of relevant choice-of-law rules in Rome II incites forum shopping. They were of the opinion that specific rules 
are needed. One Belgian academic and lawyer based this observation on his personal practical experience with three 
cases where he encountered SLAPPs. In addition, Hungarian organisations are pushing for the implementation of anti-
SLAPP measures at the EU level, claiming that Rome II leads to a ‘race to a bottom’ leaving victims with the lowest 
standards. In Slovenia, the policy debate focuses on the effect of lawsuits directed against journalists, and the 
insufficient protection both in relation to the plaintiff, as in relation between journalists and their employers. In Malta, 
the assassination of a Maltese journalist and actions against various Maltese media outlets have rendered the exclusion 
of defamation violations a matter of important concern and political divide. 
The relevance of SLAPPs in relation to the interplay between the Rome II Regulation and the treatment defamation and 
data protection is generally less discussed in national literature. There is also little to no relevant case law.  
The Slovenian national rapporteur suggests that the issue of SLAPPs should be tackled in the debate regarding a 
possible common rule on defamation and violations of privacy, and that a substantive regulation of this field should be 
adopted at EU level. In Malta, proposed recommendations have focused on the issue of recognition and enforcement 
of judgments rather than on the applicable law question. Proposals to amend the Maltese “Media and Defamation 
Act” of 2018 included the suggestion to apply public policy to defamation lawsuits filed abroad. The proposal was 
rejected by the Maltese government, which argued that to conduct a public policy test, the courts in Malta would 
invariably be exercising jurisdiction that they do not have, and the Brussels Regulation specifically prohibits courts of 
Member States to use the test of public policy to alter the rules of jurisdiction. 
Conclusions: 
The exclusion under Art. 1(2) lit. (g) of non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating 
to personality, including defamation, is considered problematic. National experts express the need for a rule 
(encompassing the issue of SLAPPs) in Rome II designating the the law of the victim's habitual residence, without 
prejudice to Art. 14.  
 
Temporal scope (Arts. 31-32) 
Arts. 31 and 32 are frequently referred to in practice according to respectively 18% and 13% of the stakeholders 
consulted. Greek, Dutch and English caselaw, as well as Austrian and German doctrine, identified some issues 
regarding the meaning of “the event giving rise to the damage” under Art. 31. In German doctrine, it is still disputed 
in particular whether the decisive factor should be the infringement of legal rights or the action leading to it. The answer 
to this question also affects the precise determination of the event giving rise to damages in cases of actions of a certain 
duration, such as in cases of omission and in cases of strict liability. Croatian, Hungarian and Polish caselaw also 
reveal some residual misapplication of the temporal scope of Rome II.  






Concept of "non-contractual obligations" (Art. 2) 
48% of the consulted stakeholders refer to Art. 2 frequently in their work, and 36% found the provision “works well”. 
Many respondents identified shortcomings with the scope, noting that characterisation of claims is a difficult issue; that 
the scope of non-contractual obligations encompassed by Rome II beyond simple delicts is insufficiently clear. In 
product liability, one respondent commented that it is not clear where contractual liability ends and non-contractual 
liability begins. Another noted the difficulties faced by courts in differentiating between contractual and non-contractual 
issues in the context of motor vehicle insurance in traffic accidents. In that respect, the English expert points here to C-
559/14 Ergo Insurance, the leading case on classification under the Rome I and Rome II Regulations. A further 
respondent questioned whether the scope of the set-off rule in Art. 17 Rome I encompasses the set-off of non-
contractual obligations, or solely contractual ones. Specific problem areas identified include personality rights, 
financial and indirect damages, and a lack of harmonisation of the concepts contractual and non-contractual 
obligations. 
Domestic caselaw demonstrates some specific difficulties as well. Although CJEU caselaw is fairly clear on the 
classification under Brussels I, some uncertainty remains before Austrian and German courts as to the characterisation 
of a contract with protective effect for third parties under Rome II. In addition, German doctrine disagrees regarding 
the relationship between Rome I and Rome II. While some authors assume that the Rome I and II Regulations, taken 
together, determine the applicable law of each type of obligation, others argue that not every obligation can be 
attributed to one of the two Regulations, such as the creditor's challenge in a case of insolvency, or liability in cases of 
a takeover of a company. The classification of liability as a falsus procurator is equally controversial in German 
literature. Opinion is also divided as to the classification of an obligation resulting from the offering or announcement 
of a promotional prize, as is often done in the retail sector (case C-27/02 Engler points to a contractual classification). 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the liability of an expert for his expert opinion to persons who have not themselves 
concluded a contract with the expert is to be classified as a contractual or non-contractual obligation.  
Greek caselaw reveals some fluctuation as to the way courts qualify the issue of the extent of the liability of the buyer 
of an undertaking, or a shipowner, for their debts. Italian courts encountered some difficulties to characterise as 
contractual or non-contractual the obligation of a hotel towards a client who fell down the stairs, and the obligation of 
a doctor who failed to detect a fatal disease. Romanian judges have encountered difficulties in differentiating 
contractual from non-contractual claims, for instance in situations involving insurance claims. Croatian caselaw reveals 
some residual difficulties as well.  
At the appeal level, French courts have demonstrated some resistance to the Granarolo approach, and implicit 
rejection can be found in decisions from the French Cour de cassation as well. 
Conclusions: 
Domestic caselaw across the Member States indicates that clarification is needed as to the characterisation of a series 
of specific obligations, such as a contract with protective effect for third parties, the liability of a falsus procurator, an 
obligation resulting from the offering or announcement of a promotional prize. 
The clarification should come from caselaw. These cases seem of marginal significance and attempts to clarify through 
legislation will likely create further difficulties.  
 
Universal application (Art. 3) 
Art. 3 did not raise specific comments or criticism. Half of all participants thought that Art. 3 (universal application) 
“works well” (50%). The experts for Greece and Latvia noted some reluctance from the courts to apply foreign law, in 
particular the law of a non-Member State. They reported marginal cases where the courts seemingly tried to avoid the 
application of foreign law by applying the escape clause to establish a closer connection with the law of the forum. 






General rule (Art. 4) 
National rapporteurs did not report major difficulties with the application of Art. 4, although some areas of uncertainty 
remain. From a practitioner’s perspective, the provision has raised more concern. Art. 4 is the provision to which 
stakeholders refer the most in practice (84%), and while 64% of the respondents are of the opinion that the provision 















• The approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art. 4(1) 
The application of Art. 4(1) and the identification of the place of direct damage is generally unproblematic, except for 
lingering uncertainties in some Member States regarding relatives of victims of traffic accidents, and financial damage.  
The Cypriot and English experts reported some cases where judges experienced difficulties to identify the place where 
the direct damage occurred when the damage was of a financial nature, and in some cases, fell back on Art. 4(3). 
Cases where English courts have been required to apply Article 4(1) to financial damage often arise in the context of 
fraud claims and concern the torts of conspiracy or dishonest assistance. The variation in the factual scenarios 
underlying the disputes undoubtedly contributes to the difficulty in developing a clear approach. In that respect, the 
English expert notes that the CJEU’s jurisprudence on the concept of “damage” under Brussels I in financial cases has 
lacked a clear anchor, with each step forward (Universal Music) being followed by a case generating doubt (Lober). 
Hungarian doctrine, Romanian caselaw, as well as five respondents among the consulted stakeholders  consider that 
the question of whether the damage of the relatives of victims of car accidents is direct or indirect is still an open question 
(some courts consider that the damage is direct, contrary to what the CJEU decided in Florin Lazar v Allianz SpA).  
The Polish expert reported one case where the court misapplied Art. 4(1): German law was applicable under Art. 4(1) 
and the court ruled that, as German law provided for similar rules relating to financial compensation as Polish law, the 
court could thus base its decision exclusively on Polish law.   
• The approach to the first rule of displacement in Art. 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
Bulgarian and Portuguese legal authors suggest that the application of Art. 4 (2) could lead to unjust outcomes in cases 
involving multiple parties or claims, some of them with habitual residence in the same, but the others in different 
countries. 
Bulgarian authors note that “the person claimed to be liable” is a broader concept than the concept of a person who 
caused the damage, as it includes also the situation in which one person bears liability for another person who actually 
caused the damages (i.e. a parent for the acts of a minor). They suggest amending Art. 4(2) and replacing “the person 
claimed to be liable” with “the person who caused the damage” as, under Art. 15(g), the law applicable shall govern 
the liability for the acts of another person.  The English expert also notes that the lack of precision in the terms (use of 
singular, lack of precision as to who is “the person claimed to be liable” and the “person sustaining damage”) has 
caused problems in England. 
Other issues have arisen under Art. 4(2) for English courts, including the operation of the rule where there are more 
than two parties to proceedings, and the proper approach to identifying habitual residence. The English expert also 
reported unanswered questions in relation to the meaning and application of the “person sustaining damage” in the 
context of secondary claimants, or “ricochet” claimants. Examples of such claims, which are increasingly common, 
include where a dependant of an injured or deceased victim seeks to recover in respect of their loss of dependency. It 
is not yet clear whose habitual residence is relevant in such a context. The English expert also noted that further 
guidance on the proper approach to habitual residence for individuals would be helpful in practice.  
Romanian and Slovenian courts experienced some difficulties applying Art. 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties, 
and relied on the escape clause, applying both Art. 4(2) and 4(3) as a result.  
Participants also suggested specific areas that could benefit from special rules, including: rules on indirect victims and 
claims by family members; rules on multi-vehicle accidents, to which Art. 4 seems ill-suited, for example because it 
leaves unanswered whether Art. 4(2) applies where a driver injures multiple pedestrians from different countries. 
• The approach to the escape clause in Art. 4(3) 
Bulgarian authors note that Art. 4(3) has limited application in practice. Some minor criticism surrounding the 
application of Art. 4(3) includes unpredictability, the risk of forum shopping, and the increased probability that courts 
will apply the lex fori. In that respect, Slovenian doctrine criticises the overly broad application of the escape clause 
by Slovenian courts, which tend to depart quickly from the basic rule of lex loci damni to apply the lex fori under Art. 
4(3). 
The Belgian expert reported a case where the court misunderstood the nature of Art. 4(3) and applied both Art. 4(1) 
and (3). The Cypriot and Romanian experts also reported minor misunderstandings from the courts as to the application 





Polish courts encountered some difficulties in interpreting the term “manifestly more closely connected” and the close 
connection of the pre-existing relationship between the parties with the tort/delict in question. Romanian literature 
stresses this issue as well.   
• Suitability of Art. 4 to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts 
The German, French and Italian experts noted the complexity of financial market torts, and suggested a need for a 
special set of rules. 
There is broad agreement in German literature that Art. 4(1) is ill-fitted to financial market torts for the following reasons: 
the localisation of financial loss is difficult, and also, any localisation involving investor-specific criteria (such as the 
place of the investor’s habitual residence or the place of establishment of the bank managing his account), would lead 
to a fragmentation of the applicable law to the liability for a single financial market tort, e.g. misrepresentation in a 
prospectus. This would confer an unjustified advantage on investors from a state with a high protective standard, who 
would be allowed to raid the coffers of the issuer at the expense of other investors. Moreover, the applicable law 
would become unforeseeable for the issuer given that the habitual residence of the investor or the establishment of his 
bank is mostly unknown to the issuer. At the same time, the fragmentation of the applicable law would also render 
collective actions of investors more difficult.  
The German Council for Private International Law suggests amending Rome II to introduce  a special conflict rule for 
financial market torts, designating the law of the country where the affected financial instrument is traded. Similarly, 
Italian doctrine is of the opinion that the liability of rating agencies would be most conveniently governed by the law 
of the market in which the rated title is being traded. To achieve that result, this author argued, one should be ready to 
resort to Art. 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation. 
• Suitability of Art. 4 to govern Artificial Intelligence cases (see also 2.2.1) 
Under Art. 4(1), AI systems that do not have tangible, physical outputs may face difficulties of localisation to a 
particular country. When the AI system itself is damaged, it may also be difficult to connect the damage to a country if 
the AI has only a virtual presence. 
Under Art. 4(2), as a matter of substantive law, it may be challenging to identify which party is legally capable of 
being held liable. If, for example, they have masked their identity, it may also be difficult to identify them as a practical 
matter. That said, once an individual has been identified and a claim brought against them, the mechanics of applying 
Art. 4(2) to identify the applicable law should be straightforward. The biggest risk is that of a negative liability gap 
arising from Art. 4(2)’s interaction with Art. 4(1). 
While Art. 4(3) may avoid the negative liability gap problem where the facts independently indicate a manifestly closer 
connection, it is by no means a reliable solution. A scheme where the default rule produces principled and predictable 
answers in AI cases would be more consistent with the Rome II desiderata than a heavy reliance on Art. 4(3). 
• Suitability of Art. 4 to govern business and human rights cases (see 2.2.2) 
In transnational cases involving human rights abuses, under the general rule of Article 4(1), the applicable law is the 
law of the country where the damage happened (lex loci damni).  Although the advantage or disadvantage of the lex 
loci dami for the claimant depends on the host state involved, it can mean that the law applicable will be the law of a 
state with weak regulatory standards, poor rule of law or governance structures.  
When considering the case of Jabir and others v KiK, which had been brought before the German courts, a study 
requested by the European Parliament pointed out that the fact that the law of the host State (Pakistan) was the 
applicable law under the general rule of Rome II “created major hurdles” for the claimants because of the lower health, 
safety and labour standards, weaker governance structure and enforcement mechanisms, and shorter statutes of 
limitation provided by Pakistani law.  
In the 2020 Draft Directive on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability, the European Parliament 
concluded that “the application of the general rule in Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation can lead to significant 
problems for claimants who are victims of human rights abuses, particularly in cases where the companies are large 






73% of the BHR experts are of the opinion that a set of special rules tailored to the specificities of corporate human 
rights abuses is needed in Rome II. Out of the 19 experts who believe specific rules are needed, 7 of them pointed to 
the mechanism of Article 7 of Rome II as a good solution, although some note the issue of preserving the 
competitiveness of EU undertakings as well One of the experts further commented that the introduction of specific 
criteria leading to the application of the law of the place of incorporation / establishment of the parent company 
enhance the accountability of MNCs and would strengthen predictability and legal certainty for victims. Another 
respondent referred to the European Parliament’s draft proposal and its Article 6a allowing victims to choose between 
the law of the country in which the damage occurred (lex loci damni), the law of the country in which the event giving 
rise to the damage occurred (lex loci delicti commissi) and the law of the place where the defendant undertaking is 
domiciled or, lacking a domicile in the Member State, where it operates. Another respondent designated Article 11 of 
the Second Revised Draft of the Binding Treaty1260 as a better option, less complex and demanding than Article 6a 
of the Draft proposal. 
Conclusions: 
- Art. 4(1): some uncertainty remains as to the identification of the place of direct damage when the damage 
is financial. There is no complete homogeneity among the domestic courts as to the nature of the damage 
suffered by relatives of victims of traffic accidents. 
- Art. 4(2): some uncertainty remains regarding the identification of the “person claimed to be liable”, the 
operation of the rule where there are more than two parties to proceedings, and the proper approach to 
identifying habitual residence. 
- Art. 4(3): rarely, domestic caselaw reveals a misapplication of the provision.  
- Prospectus liability and financial market torts: the doctrine in several Member States suggests the introduction 
of a special conflict rule for financial market torts designating the law of the country where the affected 
financial instrument is traded. 
 
Product liability (Art. 5)  
20% of the stakeholders consulted refer to Art. 5 frequently in their practice, and 18% identified the provision as 
requiring improvement. In product liability, one respondent commented that it is not clear where contractual liability 
ends and non-contractual liability begins. Some participants also suggested that the product liability provision could 
benefit from a more consumer-friendly approach.  
Some debates surrounding Art. 5 exist in academic literature. A question discussed in German doctrine is which law 
applies if none of the conditions of Art. 5(1) sentence 1 lit. (a), (b) or (c) Rome II are met. Proposals for filling this gap 
include: (1) the law that of the state that is closest to the one mentioned in Art. 5(1) sentence 1 lit. (a), (b) or (c) Rome II, 
provided that the product is also marketed there; (2) the application of the general rule of Art. 4; and (3) the analogous 
application of Art. 5(1) sentence 2. Additionally, Polish doctrine reveals differences of interpretation regarding the 
term “marketing of a product”.  
Participants were less familiar with Rome II’s interaction with other international conventions such as the 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, with 45% responding that they did not know whether Rome II 
works well alongside them. Slovenian caselaw reveals at least one misapplication of Rome II where the Convention 
should have applied.  
Regarding Artificial Intelligence, the uncertainty as to whether AI is a “product” falling within Rome II’s product liability 
rules was highlighted by three respondents. The scope of the product liability rules will affect how readily AI systems 
can be addressed by Rome II and its current doctrine. One respondent for Poland identified AI cases involving damage 
caused by autonomous vehicles and drones as cases falling under Rome II’s product liability rules. 
Conclusions: 
- There is some residual uncertainty as to which law applies if none of the conditions of Art. 5(1) sentence 1 
lit. (a), (b) or (c) Rome II are met. 







Unfair competition (Art. 6) 
27% of the respondents refer to Art. 6 frequently in their work, and 16% are of the opinion that the provision is in need 
of improvement, although no direct recommendations were submitted by the consulted stakeholders. 
Regarding Art. 6(1), in academic literature, Belgian and Romanian doctrine questions whether the “mosaic approach” 
should be adopted when markets of multiple countries are affected by unfair market practices. The interpretation of 
Art. 6(1) and its relation to the E-commerce Directive is the subject of diverging opinions in case law by two different 
chambers of the Austrian Supreme Court. The seventh chamber of the Court ruled that the country-of-origin principle 
underlying the E-commerce Directive (and the transposing Austrian Act; the “E-Commerce Act”) would govern the civil 
liability of a host provider. In the view of the chamber, in Austrian law this principle would have a conflict-of-laws 
dimension despite the CJEU’s ruling in eDate Advertising  to the contrary. The fourth chamber of the same court, 
specialising in intellectual property law, has adopted a different position:  in its view, Art. 6 of the Rome II Regulation 
takes precedence over the E-commerce Directive and the transposing Austrian Act. The law applicable to behaviour 
on the internet allegedly amounting to unfair competition would therefore be the law of the market affected and not 
that of the country of origin of the e-commerce service provider. 
Regarding Art. 6(2), German authors report uncertainty regarding whether the reference to Art. 4 only concerns 
Art. 4(1) or also Art. 4(2) and (3).  
Art. 6(3) is also the topic of doctrinal discussion. Romanian literature questions whether it is necessary, in order to fulfil 
the condition, for the anticompetitive acts in question to have been committed on the respective market by an 
undertaking that effectively exercised activity on the respective market, or if a wider conception can be admitted to 
reflect the extremely large territorial scope of certain antitrust legislations worldwide. Slovenian doctrine questions the 
scope of application of Art. 6(3) as well, regarding in particular whether it applies to all acts restricting free competition 
or if Recital 23 restricts its application to acts prohibited in the TFEU.  
The interlink between Art. 6 and Artificial Intelligence is discussed. Romanian doctrine highlighted that difficulties might 
appear in connection with illicit behaviours committed through internet or through AI. In general, substantive 
competition law expected to be significantly affected by the growth of Artificial Intelligence. As different competition 
law regimes respond differently to these new challenges, this may create complexities in determining whether an 
allegedly anticompetitive act falls within the (autonomously defined) scope of Art. 6. As for the Art. 6 connecting 
factors, the most unique challenge in AI cases may lie in identifying whether, for the purposes of Art. 6(3), a country’s 
market ‘is, or is likely to be, affected,’ where the market for AI systems or components is non-price and/or multi-sided. 
Conclusions: 
- Jurisprudential debate was reported in one Member State  regarding whether Art. 6 of the Rome II Regulation 
takes precedence over the E-commerce Directive or not. 
- The scope of application of Art. 6(3) raised some doctrinal discussion: it is necessary for the anticompetitive 
acts in question to have been committed by an undertaking that effectively exercised activity on the respective 
market? Does it apply to all acts restricting free competition or only to acts prohibited in the TFEU? 
- Difficulties are expected to emerge regarding the interlink between Art. 6 and AI.  
 
Environmental damage (Art. 7) 
The provision did not raise much criticism among the respondents and ranked only in 9th position in the list of provisions 
“in need of improvement “ (according to 11% of the stakeholders). However, the German expert identified two main 
issues with the provision: the interaction of Art. 7 with Art. 17 of the Regulation and the effect of foreign authorisations 
on the liability of the polluter, and the right of the victim to choose the applicable law. The French expert noted 
difficulties as well with the autonomy of the parties. The German expert suggested that, in order to exclude conflicts 
between different jurisdictions and possibilities of forum shopping, there should be coherent EU regulation regarding 
the question whether a choice in a particular proceeding is limited or whether it also has effects for subsequent 





the operative event for environmental damage, and whether Art. 7 allows a choice between the law of the place of 
the environmental damage or the law of personal damage. The English expert reported some discussion about the 
question whether environmental damage covers the torts of private nuisance (Rylands v Fletcher). Three stakeholders 
also identified issues regarding the determination of the notion of “environmental damage” and the determination of 
the place where the harmful event occurred. 
Conclusions:  
Art. 7 has not caused major problems and the areas of uncertainty identified below are mostly doctrinal: 
- The interaction of Art. 7 with Art. 17 and the effect of foreign authorisations on the liability of the polluter, 
- The interaction of Art. 7 with Art. 14, The determination of the place where the harmful event occurred. 
 
Infringement of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
Most of the issues identified regarding Art. 8 are doctrinal, and touch upon the application of the provision to violations 
of intellectual property rights on the internet. Uncertainty has been reported in France, Germany, Italy, and Poland. 
German doctrine suggests the introduction of an “effects” principle or a de minimis threshold. 
Additionally, Belgian caselaw contains two examples of misunderstanding/misapplication of Arts. 4(1) & 4(3), where 
the specific rule in Art. 8 should have been applied instead. A further issue reported by German doctrine is how the 
ownership of intellectual property rights is to be determined. Some authors think that this is a preliminary question, 
which has to be decided according to international conventions or national conflict-of-laws rules. Another strand in the 
literature wants to submit this problem to the Rome II Regulation.  
Polish and Romanian doctrine questioned the relevance and application of Art. 13. 
Conclusions: 
Uncertainty regarding the application of Art. 8 to violations of intellectual property rights on the internet has been 
reported in several Member States.  
 
Industrial action (Art. 9) 
Only 6% of the consulted stakeholders identified Art. 9 as a provision they refer to frequently in their practice. Some 
specific difficulties were identified by respondents. Two participants noted difficulties in labour law, concerning the 
scope and purpose of Art. 9 and the relationship between employment contracts and tort. Another respondent opined 
that Art. 7(2) of Brussels I bis (connecting factor for matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict) has been ‘interpreted 
in a claimant-friendly manner’ on economic injury, and that it undermines Art. 9 Rome II when industrial action in one 
country causes economic damage in another. 
Caselaw across Member States did not reveal any specific issues with the provision, however German and Polish 
academic literature identified some areas of uncertainty regarding the scope of application of Art. 9. German doctrine 
questioned whether Art. 9 also covers the law governing the liability of officials of the organisations representing their 
professional interests, former employees, and atypical union members, such as students.  Furthermore, German, and 
Polish doctrine debated whether the provision also covers the law applicable to the liability of third persons that are 
not directly connected to the strike, e.g. the participants of a “flash mob”. Polish doctrine reported some debate 
surrounding the scope of application, the connecting factor and the admission of the choice of law by parties. The 
concept of ‘industrial action’ gave rise to discussion as to its interpretation, and the reference to Art. 4(2) was also 
criticised as the application of the different connecting factors could lead to the application of different governing laws 
and result in unsatisfactory results. The reference also leaves open the question as to whether Art 4(2) is, in such cases, 
capable of displacement by Art 4(3) (cf Art 5(1), where the problem does not arise as Art 5(2) has its own escape 





Additionally, the English expert noted that the CJEU’s decision in C-337/17 Feniks is potentially problematic if Rome 
I (like Brussels I) is extended to the knowing violation by a third party of another’s contractual rights. If so, the scope of 
Art. 9 (and the nuanced solution it adopts) would be significantly reduced. 
Regarding a potential link between Artificial Intelligence and industrial action, DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) 
attacks, a common form of “hacktivism”, could be used and treated as a legitimate form of protest in the future. If these 
developments occur, there may be a challenge in localising industrial action that occurs in a virtual space. 
Conclusions: 
- Clarify the scope of application of Art. 9 (for instance via a recital): does it apply to third persons not directly 
connected to the strike?  
- Clarify what is to be considered “the country where the action is to be, or has been, taken” if the action occurs 
in a virtual place. 
 
Unjust enrichment (Art.10) 
Art. 10 has not caused major problems among the consulted stakeholders, however national rapporteurs reported 
some uncertainty.  
In Austrian literature, the precise scope of the concept “unjust enrichment” is deemed unclear. The prevailing view is 
that Art. 10 applies to recourse claims of a party that has voluntarily settled debt of a third party.  Others stress that 
internationally, these cases are sometimes treated using the rules of subrogation. It is also unclear in which cases a 
“relationship existing between the parties” can be found. Additionally, both Austrian and German literature discuss 
whether the “existing” condition in Art. 10(1) is met where the relationship between the parties, such as a contract or 
a tort, arises in the same moment the unjust enrichment occurs. In England, it is debated whether gain based damages 
for tort fall within Art. 4 or Art. 10 (a question complicated by a national law debate as to whether gain based damages 
are compensatory or not). 
German doctrine also identified some uncertainty regarding the relationship between Art. 10 and Art. 4, and whether 
“unjust enrichment by subtraction” and “unjust enrichment by wrongdoing” both fall under Art. 10. The relationship 
between unjust enrichment and rights in rem is also discussed.   
Art. 10(3) and the reference to the “country in which the unjust enrichment took place” create some discussion. 
Romanian doctrine noted that uncertainty may arise when the unjust enrichment occurred on the territories of multiple 
states (e.g., frequently in case of cross-borders financial transactions).  
The same issue could arise regarding Artificial Intelligence, if the enrichment is virtual: blockchain systems are 
decentralised, hosted on multiple servers across the world, and available to anyone to access through the internet. If 
the enrichment is treated as taking place in the virtual space, it is difficult to localise to an individual geographic 
location. 
Croatian caselaw reveals some marginal difficulties. Additionally, there is currently uncertainty before English courts 
as to whether a claim for knowing receipt falls within Article 4 or Article 10. 
Conclusions: 
Art. 10 has not caused major problems and the areas of uncertainty identified below are doctrinal: 
- When is the “existing” condition in Art. 10(1)  met? 
- Regarding the relationship between Art. 10 and Art. 4: do “unjust enrichment by subtraction” and “unjust 
enrichment by wrongdoing” both fall under Art. 10? 
- There is some residual uncertainty regarding the relationship between unjust enrichment and rights in rem. 
- How to apply Art. 10(3) when the unjust enrichment takes place in multiple countries, or if the enrichment 






Negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
Art. 11 appear to be rarely relied upon in practice among the stakeholders consulted (11%). The Austrian and German 
experts identified residual difficulties with the applicability of the provision. The Austrian expert highlighted a 
controversy as to how the word "existing" legal relationship should be interpreted. Some argue in favour of applying 
the rule to relationships which arise in the same moment as the negotiorum gestio. Additionally, the Austrian and 
German expert pointed out that there is some uncertainty under Art. 11(3) and that it is unclear whether ‘the law of the 
country in which the act was performed’ refers to the country where the action took place or where a loss occurred 
that was caused by an action. The German expert also noted some uncertainty with regard to the applicability of the 
provision if the negotiorum gestio consists of multiple actions taking place in different countries: it is difficult to identify 
the place which is decisive for Art. 11(3). 
No specific recommendations 
 
Culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
18% of the respondents frequently refer to Art. 12 in their practice. The provision did not generate much criticism 
among the stakeholders, but the national experts reported some difficulties. 
Austrian and German doctrine contain debate regarding the relationship between Art. 12 and Art. 4 in situations 
involving third-party liability. Part of the doctrine argues that third persons are not party to the contract and thus Art. 4 
applies. Other authors argue in favour of looking at the nature of the specific duty that was breached, and apply Art. 
12 if the duty is more of a contractual nature (it is subsequently debated whether paragraph 1 or 2 of Art. 12 should 
apply). 
The German rapporteur reported uncertainties with regard to the delineation of Art. 12 Rome II and the Rome I 
Regulation. First, it is deemed unclear whether the violation of precontractual disclosure obligations is governed by 
Rome I or Rome II.  A similar problem arises with damage suffered by the conclusion of a contract that does not meet 
the expectations of one party as it was based on wrong information. Such damage could be subject to Rome I or Art. 
12 Rome II.  Moreover, it is unclear whether the liability of an agent without authority is governed by Rome II, as 
advocated by the minority view among German scholars, or by Rome I, as the majority thinks. 
Austrian, German, Dutch and Polish doctrine question the order of priority of the lit. (a) to (c) in Art. 12(2), and whether 
they are to be considered alternatives, or instead form a hierarchical order. 
The Italian rapporteur reported case law where courts experienced difficulties to localise damage in pre-contractual 
liability cases. Italian doctrine stresses that known difficulties with the localisation of pure economic loss (as addressed 
in Marinari and Kronhofer) are set to resurface under Art. 12(2)(a).  
The Romanian expert reported residual difficulties regarding the articulation between Art. 8 and Art. 12. 
Conclusions: 
Art. 12 has not caused major problems and the areas of uncertainty identified below are doctrinal: 
- The relationship between Art. 12 and Art. 4 in situations involving third-party liability. 
- What is the order of priority of the lit. (a) to (c) in Art. 12(2): are they alternatives of equal rank, or form a 
hierarchical order? 
- The delineation of Art. 12 Rome II and the Rome I Regulation. 
 
Freedom of choice (Art. 14) 
Art. 14 ranked in fifth position in the list of the provisions addressed in the empirical study (44% of the respondents), 
with 18% of the consulted stakeholders being of the opinion that the provision needs improvement. Several participants 
suggested specific changes to Art. 14, and the majority of respondents indicated that parties rarely make use of the 






Austrian and German doctrine report some uncertainty around the meaning of ‘freely negotiated’ in Art. 14(1) lit. (b) 
Rome II. It is discussed whether standard clauses or general terms and conditions can be classified as freely negotiated, 
and if so, under what circumstances. 
Austrian, German, Croatian and Italian doctrine note that the Rome II Regulation does not contain any provisions 
dealing with the validity and form of the choice of law, or the standards for such assessments. Consequently, it is 
disputed whether Art. 3(5), 10, 11 and 13 Rome I have to be applied by analogy to Art. 14 Rome II or whether the 
lex fori should apply. 
French and Italian doctrine question the notion of ‘commercial activity’ for the purposes of Art. 14(1)(b), i.e., whether 
it includes activities other than those carried out in the field of industry or trade, such as the activities of artistic performers 
or athletes, or those of a company manager. 
Italian doctrine questions the admissibility of dépeçage under Art. 14, and it is also discussed in Austrian literature 
whether the choice of law can only refer to the entire non-contractual obligation or whether it can also be restricted to 
parts of it, such as the amount of damages. 
French commentators have noted that the choice of the parties being “expressed or demonstrated with reasonable 
certainty by the circumstances of the case” may give rise to some uncertainty and might result in inconsistent case law. 
Conclusions:  
The doctrine of several Member States noted some remaining uncertainty regarding: 
- The meaning of “freely negotiated” in Art. 4(1) lit. (b): does it include standard clauses or general terms and 
conditions? 
- The assessment of the validity and form of the choice of law: do Art. 3(5), 10, 11 and 13 Rome I apply by 
analogy to Art. 14 Rome II, or does the lex fori apply? 
- What is included in the notion of ‘commercial activity’ for the purposes of Art. 14(1)(b). 
- The admissibility of dépeçage under Art. 14. 
 
Exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ (Art. 1(3)) and relation to Arts. 21-22 
The practical use of Arts. 21 and 22 appear limited, with respectively 2% and 17% of the stakeholders referring to 
them frequently in their work. National experts did not raise any specific issues, except for the German rapporteur who 
identified two issues regarding Art. 22. First, it is unclear under which law the required standard of proof is determined, 





governed by the lex causae or the lex fori. Furthermore, it is debated whether the law applicable to prima facie 
evidence is to be determined according to the lex fori or the lex causae.  
No specific recommendations 
 
Pleading, proof and application of the substantive rules of the law applicable 
49% of the consulted stakeholders noted courts’ difficulties in ascertaining the content of foreign law. Comments 
highlight procedural divergence between Member States: foreign law is either considered law or fact, leading to 
differences specifically in the roles of judges, parties and experts.  
 
Many participants highlight the inadequacy of existing expertise, particularly in the context of less frequently 
encountered legal systems or linguistic barriers. Several also refer to the lengthiness of processes for ascertaining 
foreign law, particularly where national bodies or foreign jurisdictions are engaged. The Italian expert reported that 
the approach of Italian courts to the pleading, proof and application of foreign law is not entirely satisfactory, in 
particular regarding the ascertainment of foreign law. Information collected through the Ministry of Justice and 
diplomatic or consular representations often consist in the mere reproduction of legal texts, without any background 
information and without an illustration of the way in which the texts in question are normally understood and applied 
in practice. Expert opinions do provide such additional elements of understanding, but the drafting of such opinions 
requires time, and the costs are borne by the parties. The Latvian and Slovenian experts noted that the national legal 
framework is not suitable for the application of foreign law. The Slovenian expert reported difficulties for the judges to 
ascertain the content of foreign law: foreign law cannot be ascertained by experts as a means of evidence because 
expert evidence can only be provided on matters of fact, and foreign law is considered a question of law in Slovenia. 
Hungarian doctrine identifies a problem regarding national laws having different rules for allowing appeals based on 
a wrong application and interpretation of foreign applicable (substantive) law, ultimately leading to unfair results and 
potentially denying parties of their important procedural right to appeal. 
As to the general assessment of damages under foreign law, many respondents noted the difficulties of applying 
Member States’ different rules on damage calculation, in particular the application of foreign tariffs. One highlighted 
that these tariffs are set to the standard of living in the state of the law being applied, rather than the country where the 
victim lives. 
One respondent proposes a European-level institute for comparative law to provide expert advice to Member State 
courts on the content of foreign laws. This is supported by Hungarian authors who stress the need for a better system 
of communication between Member State courts and adequate legal framework and technical requirements to 





Conclusions :  
- Procedural divergence exists between the Member States, specifically in the roles of judges, parties, experts, 
and national organisations, and regarding the status of foreign law (law or fact). 
- Among the general issues identified are the additional time and costs pertaining to the ascertainment of 
foreign law, and the potential inaccuracy of application. 
- Some respondents and national experts suggest the need for a European-level institute and/or an improved 
system of communication between Member State courts to enhance the understanding of the content of 
foreign law and speed up court proceedings. 
 
Scope of the law applicable (Art. 15) 
The scope of the law applicable is frequently referred to in practice (Art. 15 ranked fourth in the list of provisions most 
referred to, with 47% of the respondents). Difficulties surrounding the application of Art. 15 were reported in doctrine 
and caselaw in Germany, France, Hungary, and the United Kingdom. 
German doctrine reports persisting difficulties regarding claims involving multiple parties. It is discussed whether the 
governing law has to be determined individually for each relation between two parties or whether it could also 
comprise relations to third parties. Some of the consulted stakeholders mentioned uncertainty regarding secondary 
victims, and the standing of victims’ family members to request compensation under Art. 15. 
Art. 15 (c) raised questions in German, French and Hungarian doctrine. It is disputed in German literature whether this 
provision also includes the right of a court to estimate damages or whether this is to be determined according to the 
lex fori as part of procedural law. There has been some debate in French doctrine as well regarding the impact of Art. 
15(c) over traffic accidents and the resulting assessment of damages. Hungarian scholars raised questions about the 
amount of compensation awardable under Art. 15(c) and whether the public policy clause would result in setting aside 
the applicable law based on Rome II if the amount of compensation awardable under the given national law would 
harm the human dignity of the injured person. 
In connection with Art. 15 (f) Rome II, there is debate in German doctrine as to whether the law applicable to claims 
of an indirectly injured party is determined according to the law applicable to the relationship between the tortfeasor 
and the directly injured party or whether the applicable law to this relationship is to be determined independently. 
English courts have grappled with a number of difficult issues concerning the scope of the applicable law, regarding 
in particular the assessment of damages, and whether or not interest on damages falls within Art. 1(3) or Art. 15. 
Conclusions: 
The doctrine of several Member States noted some remaining uncertainty regarding: 
- Whether a third party participating in a tort committed by another person will be submitted to the same law 
as the latter or not. 
- Art. 15(c): the law applicable to the right of a court to estimate damages, and the interlink with public policy. 
- Whether or not interest on damages falls within Article 1(3) or Article 15. 
 
Overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
42% of the stakeholders refer to Art. 16 in their practice, and the provision ranked in 6th position in the list of provisions 
considered to be “in need of improvement” (according to 16% of the respondents).  
To improve the coherence of specific provisions, two participants commented that the rules on overriding mandatory 
provisions under Art. 9 Rome I are superior to their equivalent under Art. 16 Rome II, one suggesting that the definition 
in Art. 9(1) Rome I be imported into the latter. The contrast between Rome I and Rome II was also noticed in the legal 
study. The German expert noted that an important academic debate exists as to whether Art. 16 Rome II disallows the 
application of overriding mandatory provisions of third countries.  This debate has been caused by the absence of a 





should include a specific rule on this question. Art. 19 of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law was given 
as an example. 
• Overriding mandatory provisions in business and human rights cases 
Overriding mandatory provisions may play a part in business and human rights litigation and have been deemed 
promising by the doctrine. Two stakeholders favoured the protection of human rights abuses victims through mandatory 
due diligence and the application of Article 16 of Rome II. One of those two experts nonetheless noted that mandatory 
due diligence at the EU level was “ambitious” and required a “firm commitment” from the EU in the protection of human 
rights. The recent national legislative initiatives on a mandatory corporate duty of care regarding human rights and the 
environment, as well as the developments about mandatory due diligence at the European level, are of particular 
interest. At the EU level, it has been suggested by the doctrine that the provisions of the 2020 Draft Directive should be 
classified as overriding mandatory provisions, so as to apply irrespective of the otherwise applicable law. This 
approach was adopted by the European Parliament in a resolution on 10 March 2021.  
Conclusions:  
There is some uncertainty as to whether Art. 16 Rome II disallows the application of overriding mandatory provisions 
of third countries. 
 
Direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18) 
22% of the stakeholders consulted refer frequently to Art.18 in their work. Direct claims against insurers gave rise to 
some challenges concerning the interaction of Rome II with Brussels I bis. One respondent raised the particular 
difficulties of insurers bringing claims against tortfeasors, for example in understanding which law determines the 
insurer’s ability to bring a claim, the amount of the claim, and the substantive requirements for liability. 
Two main issues were identified in German academic literature: the consequences of choosing a law under Art. 14 
Rome II that does not recognise a direct claim and the extent to which such a choice of law requires the consent of the 
insurer, and the delimitation of the governing tort law and the law governing the insurance contract under Art. 18 
Rome II. Polish, Slovenian, and Spanish caselaw revealed similar difficulties, and scholars identified the need for Rome 
II to provide a definition of “direct action”. 
Conclusions: 
- Clarification is needed on the interaction between Rome II and Brussels I bis. 
- The interaction between Art. 14 and Art. 18 Rome II has been deemed unclear in the doctrine and case law 
of several Member States. The  need for Rome II to provide a definition of “direct action” has been suggested. 
 
Subrogation (Art. 19) 
The consulted stakeholders did not report any specific difficulties regarding Art. 19, which was identified by 15% of 
the respondents as a provision frequently referred to.  
Doctrinal discussion has been reported in Germany. There is debate as to whether Art. 19 Rome II is directly applicable 
or only by analogy if the third party's obligation to satisfy the creditor is not imposed directly against the creditor but 
only in the relationship between the third party and the debtor. In addition, it is discussed whether Art. 19 is applicable 
in cases where a third party who has paid the entire debt due to an obligation towards the creditor may seek recourse 
against other debtors who are also liable. In that respect, the English expert pointed out that the Ergo decision of the 
CJEU illustrates the difficulty in the definition of “subrogation”. If party D1 is non-contractually liable to a creditor, but 
their insurer E discharges the liability to the creditor pursuant to E’s contractual obligation to D1, E’s right to contribution 
from co-debtor D2 is (according to the CJEU) not covered by the law governing D1’s non-contractual obligation but 
by a much more complex analysis. If subrogation put E into D1’s shoes for choice of law purposes, D2’s liability to 
make contribution would be governed by the same law irrespective of whether D1 or E discharged the liability. The 
English expert also reported some uncertainty surrounding the question whether subrogation involves the subrogating 





The Romanian expert reported difficulties for courts to apply Art. 19, and resulting inconsistency in caselaw. The 
majority of cases refer to truck accidents, and courts experience difficulties to tell the difference between the third’s 
party right to subrogate into the victim’s rights and the extent to which this third party is entitled to compensation. The 
Greek and Slovenian experts each reported one case where Art.19 was erroneously applied by the court, regarding 
the law applicable to the statute of limitation of the claim for compensation. 
No specific recommendations 
 
Multiple liability (Art. 20) 
Among the stakeholders consulted, 9% are of the opinion that Art. 20 “works well”, however the satisfactory level may 
also be linked to a general unfamiliarity with the provision as only 15% of the stakeholders refer to it frequently in their 
practice. 
 German doctrine debates whether the term "same claim" in Art. 20 applies broadly (it is neither a prerequisite that the 
claims are subject to the same law nor that the claims are based on the same legal ground), or if Art. 20 applies only 
if the same law applies to all of the claims against the debtors. Additionally, it is also disputed in German and Polish 
doctrine how the applicable law is determined for liability exemptions of various debtors who have agreed amongst 
themselves to contribute if the creditor has not yet been satisfied.  
The partial nature of the rule in Art. 20 has generated much discussion in England, where questions of contribution are 
often addressed between defendants at the trial (before any of them has satisfied the claimant).  
Conclusions: 
It would be desirable to clarify what law applies in cases when the obligations of the individual defendants are 
governed by different laws. 
 
Concept of “habitual residence” (Art. 23) 
Art. 23 ranked high in the list of provisions most referred to in practice, with 29% of the consulted stakeholders 
declaring frequent use of the provision. Respondents did not report any specific difficulties, apart from one respondent 
noting divergence between domicile and habitual residence under Brussels I bis and Rome II respectively. 
Domestic caselaw did not reveal particular difficulties with the application of the provision, however national literature 
reports some areas of uncertainties. The definition of the habitual residence of companies and other bodies (corporate 
or unincorporated), namely their place of central administration, is criticized in Bulgarian legal literature. By 
differentiating “central administration”, i.e. where the decisions about the company are taken from “main place of 
operations/activity”, Bulgarian authors argue that very often the exact place of central administration, especially for 
big companies operating globally, is difficult to locate as it is more “inner” information of the companies and not so 
visible for the public, whereas the place(s) where the company operates and has its activity is more easily identifiable. 
Additionally, French and Portuguese doctrine both raise questions as to how 23(2) applies, respectively in case of loss 
caused to secondary victims, and when damages are caused by persons acting otherwise than in the course of 
business. 
Conclusions: 
Commentators noted some remaining uncertainty regarding the definition of the concept for individuals not acting in 
the course of business. 
 
Exclusion of renvoi (Art. 24) and States with more than one legal system (Art. 25) 
Both the legal and empirical studies did not reveal specific issues regarding the application of Arts. 24 and 25. Both 





and 6% of the stakeholders refer to Arts. 24 and 25 in their work, and Arts. 24 and 25 ranked last in the list of provisions 
of Rome II “in need of improvement”.  
One expert from the United Kingdom nonetheless reported issues arising in practice as a result of the existence of the 
different legal systems with the United Kingdom: for instance, in relation to the application of Article 4(2) where parties 
have their habitual residence in different parts of the United Kingdom. 
No specific recommendations 
 
Public policy (Art. 26) 
28% of the stakeholders refer regularly to Art. 26 in their practice, and 9% are of the opinion that the provision is in 
need of improvement. Two respondents highlighted difficulties where the applicable law conflicts with public policy of 
the forum, including the state’s ability to limit the amount of damages. The issue of damages was also highlighted by 
the expert for France, who noted the uncertainty brought by Recital 32 of Rome II (punitive damages will be contrary 
to public policy where the award of punitive damages is “of an excessive nature”). The expert for Luxembourg raised 
two issues with Art. 26: the extent to which Member States are free to apply various doctrines to limit its operation (effet 
atténué, ordre public de proximité, etc…), and the uncertainty regarding the meaning of the limitation introduced by 
the term “manifestly”. 
One expert in business and human rights suggested a mechanism similar to Article 26 of Rome II (public policy) but 
specifically adapted to human rights abuses. The CJEU recognised in Krombach v Bamberski that the public policy 
exception in the Brussels Convention could be invoked “in exceptional cases where the guarantees laid down in the 
legislation of the State of origin and in the Convention itself have been insufficient to protect the defendant from a 
manifest breach of his right to defend himself before the court of origin, as recognised by the ECHR”. However, the 
Renault v. Maxicar decision from the ECJ rendered in the context of the Brussels I Regulation limited the scope of 
application of the public policy exception by providing that it is not sufficient, to invoke a public policy exception, that 
a court considers the provisions of the applicable foreign law as wrong in their substance and conclusion. Additionally, 
in Jabir and others v KiK , the public policy argument was discarded, even though the Higher Regional Court of Hamm 
admitted that “a one-year limitation period, in particular in the event of death, is a very short limitation period which 
is, as far as can be seen, unknown in the European legal area”. It appears then that even though considerable 
differences might exist between legal systems as to statutes of limitations or level of damages, those differences do not 
automatically justify the intervention of public policy. As such, Art. 26, even tailored to corporate human rights abuses, 
does not appear as an efficient option for such cases. Relying on mandatory due diligence and overriding mandatory 
provisions might be more efficient (see above, Overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)). 
No specific recommendations 
 
Interaction with other EU and international legal instruments (Recital 7, Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 







The consultation reveals general satisfaction as to how Rome II interacts with Rome I and Brussels I.  
There is a debate in the Austrian and German literature as to exactly which provisions of Union law are covered by 
Art. 27. It is discussed whether Art. 27 only applies to other Union law containing conflict-of-law rules or whether it 
applies to all other substantive Union law. In this context it is also disputed under what circumstances a provision can 
be identified as a conflict-of-laws rule. Some German scholars argue that provisions defining the territorial scope, such 
as Art. 3 GDPR, are also conflict-of-law rules. 
German doctrine reports some uncertainties with regard to the delineation of Art. 12 Rome II and Rome I: in cases 
involving the violation of precontractual disclosure obligations, damage suffered by the conclusion of a contract that 
does not meet the expectations of one party as it was based on wrong information, and the liability of an agent without 
authority. 
The Polish expert reported some uncertainty regarding the interplay of Rome II with Regulation 2017/1001 on the 
European Union trademark. The English expert added that there was a lack of clarity about possible differences 





• Article 28: Relationship with existing international conventions 
 
Several national rapporteurs reported uncertainty as to the practical interaction of Rome II with other international 
instruments. The Belgian expert reported some cases where courts, when faced with potential conflict of instruments, 
between the Berne Convention for the protection of Literary and artistic works (the “Berne Convention") and Rome II 
in particular, tend to avoid an analysis of the hierarchy between the instruments. The French expert notes uncertainty 
regarding the interaction between Art. 8 of Rome II and the Berne Convention as well, and with other international 
instruments such as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. The Luxembourg expert reported a 
specific issue of coordination with the Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property, creating uncertainty as to whether 
the Rome II Regulation applies at all. The relationship between the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Products Liability and Rome II has sometimes proven difficult for Slovenian courts.  
In the responses gathered through the consultation, numerous comments referred to ‘uncertainty’ and ‘confusion’ under 
the current system, describing the relationship between the Hague Conventions and Rome II as ‘unclear’. Several 
respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the ‘two track system’ for parties and non-parties to the Conventions, as it 
results in different legal treatment of the same fact in different parts of the Union, and encourages forum shopping. One 
stakeholder proposed including specific mention of relevant international instruments in Rome II. Another suggested 
improving the drafting of Art. 28 Rome II to make even clearer that it encompasses Conventions to which not all 
Member States are party. This is supported by the national rapporteurs from Belgium, Slovenia and Hungary, who 
suggest that Art. 28 is not sufficient and that additional guidance, with explicit referral to the international instruments 
in question, should be provided in Rome II.  
When considering international conventions more broadly, one participant advocated for more coordination at the 
EU and international level to address modern developments, such as in the field of technologies. 
Conclusions: 
- Art. 27: there is a debate in the Austrian and German literature as to exactly which provisions of Union law 
are covered by Art. 27, and whether applies to all other substantive Union law or only Union law containing 
conflict-of-law rules. 
- Art. 28: it is suggested by both practitioners and national experts that the provision should be amended to 
include specific guidance on the interplay between Rome II and other international instruments (in particular 






Traffic accident cases and the impact of the application of the 1971 Hague 
Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on legal certainty  
72% of respondents think that Rome II lays down an effective set of rules to regulate personal injury claims, in particular 
road traffic accidents, while 28% would prefer special rules. Amongst those who have been involved in cases where 
Rome II has been applied to personal injury claims, a higher proportion (33%) calls for special rules. One respondent 
suggested relying on the ‘closest connecting factor’ rule rather than the general rule in Art. 4(1). Other respondents 
suggested applying either the law of the forum or the victim’s ‘home law’ where to do so would be more favourable 
to the victim. One noted difficulties created by separating material damage, dealt with under Rome II, from interests, 
addressed by national law. 
Participants and national experts also suggested specific areas that could benefit from special rules, including: rules 
on indirect victims and claims by family members, for example in wrongful death cases; rules on multi-vehicle 
accidents, to which Art. 4 seems ill-suited, for example because it leaves unanswered whether Art. 4(2) applies where 
a driver injures multiple pedestrians from different countries; product liability rules, which could be more consumer-
friendly; rules on automated traffic control in, for example, shipping and aviation, where current laws inappropriately 
emphasise master’s liability; rules on particular issues in assessing loss and damage, including the extent of damages 
to be recovered for long-term health problems; rules on interest; special insurance rules, including a suggestion of 
limiting amounts of compensation payable and a reference to the Commission Proposal to amend the Motor Insurance 
Directive; and harmonisation of limitation periods, with reference to the EU Added Value Assessment on the 
Harmonisation of Limitation Periods for Claims Arising out of Cross-Border Road Traffic Accidents, although another 
respondent was of the opinion that limitation is better addressed by applying the rule of the place of residence. 
Additionally, claims involving multiple parties caused concern for three respondents, including whether a single 
applicable law or the mosaic approach should apply where Rome II’s general rule prima facie indicates different laws 
for different victims. 
• The application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents (the “1971 Hague 
Convention”) 
40% of the respondents from Contracting Parties to the 1971 Hague Convention answered that issues emerged from 
the interplay between Rome II and the 1971 Hague Convention.  
According to such respondents, the applicability of the Hague Convention over Rome II is sometimes overlooked. One 
respondent noted that this is a particular habit of German lawyers in Austrian courts, the latter state being a party to 
the 1971 Hague Convention and the former not. Another respondent qualified the issue by observing that most of the 
cases of which they are aware where Rome II was erroneously applied would have resulted in the same outcome 
under either instrument. The Luxembourg, Slovakian, Slovenian and Spanish experts also note that the application of 
the Hague Convention can be easily overlooked by parties, attorneys, and judges alike. The Luxembourg and 
Slovakian experts report some cases where the Rome II Regulation was wrongly applied instead of the 1971 Hague 
Convention. However, in the Luxembourg cases, the application of the Rome II Regulation did not lead to the 
application of a different law than the one that would have been applied under the 1971 Hague Convention. 
The Austrian, Croatian and Dutch doctrine noted that the fact that the criteria for the determination of the applicable 
law under the 1971 Hague Convention and the Rome II Regulation differ in some respects leads to the possibility of 
forum shopping within the EU. This is heavily criticised by the doctrine because of its impact on the uniformity of law in 
Europe and in the incentive it gives for a “race to the court”. One respondent also raised the risk of forum shopping, 
the interplay between the two instruments in some circumstances giving the victim the unfair advantage of being able 
to select the forum that entails application of the law most favourable to them. 
Confusion is expressed regarding the parallel systems, in particular where a co-driver claims against the driver 
responsible for the accident. Some respondents call for harmonisation of rules amongst Member States or 
abandonment of the Hague Convention altogether. Croatian authors argue that it would be possible to resolve issues 
arising out of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention by harmonizing or at least unifying its rules with the Rome 
II Regulation. To that end, special conflict-of-law rules should be introduced, similar to those existing for other types of 





simultaneously diminishes some of the main objectives of the Rome II Regulation: creating foreseeability and legal 
certainty within a uniform system. 
Conclusions: 
- Experts and practitioners indicate that the applicability of the 1971 Hague Convention is frequently 
overlooked. 
- Experts and practitioners argue that the parallel system creates a risk of forum shopping and negatively 
impacts legal certainty. 
- Suggestions for improvement include the introduction of special conflict-of-laws rules in certain areas such as 
indirect victims, multi-vehicle accidents, damage assessment for long-term health problems, interests, 
insurance, limitation periods. 
 
Suitability of the mosaic approach 
Criticism of the mosaic approach is mainly doctrinal and theoretical, except for Austrian courts and other Austrian legal 
professionals, who characterised the mosaic approach as not only impractical, but also as creating significant and 
sometimes insurmountable difficulties. 
Finnish doctrine finds that the mosaic approach leads to “strange” situations. German doctrine emphasises the danger 
of different assessments of an act due to the application of different legal systems and the additional effort for persons 
operating in several states who have to base their actions on several legal systems. Italian doctrine finds that the mosaic 
approach fails to consider that the law of torts is not only concerned with the consequences of a tort (which might in 
fact express themselves in several countries, and thus be reasonably submitted to the laws of such countries, 
distributively), but also to the bases of tort: the latter call as such for a unitary assessment, which the mosaic approach 
might well frustrate. Polish doctrine highlighted issues regarding differences in assessment of the same state of facts and 
potential risk of incorrect application of the foreign law. Slovenian literature considers that the mosaic approach could 
prove problematic in certain cases involving the use of Internet. Swedish doctrine contains residual opinions 
considering that the mosaic approach is problematic as it increases the costs and duration of proceedings, and that a 
general possibility to apply the law of the place where the event leading to the damage occurred (similarly to Art. 7) 
would be better.  












1. Introduction  
1.1 Context and Objective of the Study 
In reply to the EU Commission’s Request for service number JUST/2019/JCOO/FW/CIVI/0167, BIICL 
carried out a Study to support the preparation of a report on the application of Regulation (EC) No. 
864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), (hereafter, the “Study”). 
The Study conducts a legal analysis and assessment of the practical experiences and interpretation 
problems with the Rome II Regulation. 
Alongside a comprehensive analysis of the Regulation the Study specifically addresses the questions 
identified by the Commission (the” Questions”): 
1. characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations"  
2. the suitability of the rule on financial market torts (Art. 4) 
3. difficulties with the rule on product liability (Art. 5) and the interaction with the application of the 1973 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability in some Member States 
4. difficulties with specific provisions on torts such as: 
• unfair competition 
• environmental damage  
• infringement of intellectual property rights 
5. difficulties with the operation of the Rome II Regulation on unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio and 
culpa in contrahendo 
6. reasons which would justify the need to rethink the rule on freedom of choice (Art. 14)  
7. practical application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
8. specific problems with the application of the rules dealing with the direct action against the insurer of 
the person liable, subrogation and multiple liability (Arts. 18 et seq.)  
9. the treatment of the traffic accident cases, including limitation periods, quantification of damages, and 
the impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents 
on legal certainty 
10. difficulties arising out of differences between Member States’ rules on cross-border violations of 
personality rights, including defamation. The study needs also to consider the interplay with the 
treatment of data protection and the relevance of “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation” 
(SLAPPs)  
11. to what extent Rome II duly tackles corporate abuses against human rights; 
12. the impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation 
13. practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, 
in specific areas such as environmental damage, intellectual property rights or data protection 
14. other practical problems, including but not limited to the application and treatment of foreign law, and 







The Study comprises a legal part and an empirical part, which have been drafted based on desk research, 
national reports and an empirical study. 
BIICL has involved several experts on the Rome II Regulation from across the EU in the present Study. These 
experts intervene as National Rapporteurs, Expert Advisors or Pro-Bono Experts. The List of National 
Rapporteurs and Experts are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
In addition, BIICL’s team was able consult a specialist Advisory Board on Private International Law which 
comprises the following highly respected academics and practitioners:  
• The Rt Hon Lord Mance, former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (London)  
• The Rt Hon Lord Collins, former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (London)  
• Professor Linda Silberman, New York University.  
• Prof. Michael Bogdan (Lund)  
• Prof. Andrea Bonomi (Lausanne)  
• Prof. Adrian Briggs (Oxford)  
• Prof. Javier Carrascosa González (Murcia)  
• Prof. James Fawcett (Nottingham)  
• Prof. Andreas Furrer (Luzern)  
• Prof. em .Trevor Hartley (London)  
• Adam Johnson, Partner Herbert Smith (London)  
• Alexander Layton QC, Essex Court Chambers (London)  
• Prof. em. Ulrich Magnus (Hamburg)  
• Prof. Horatia Muir-Watt (Paris)  
• Prof. Yuko Nishitani (Japan)  
• Pippa Rogerson (Cambridge)  
• Prof. Luboš Tichý (Prague)  
 
In the implementation of the framework contract between the Commission and the Justice and Consumers 
Evaluation Consortium (JCEC), experts and National Rapporteurs are not considered sub-contractors. The 
role of the Rapporteurs is to gather information regarding their assigned Member State(s) to inform the final 
study.  Experts gave advice at different stages of the Study and carried out quality control. Full responsibility 
for the final written report will clearly rest with BIICL within the JCEC led by Civic Consulting. Experts and 







Table 3. List of Experts  
 
Team Member Affiliation Role in team 
Alexander Layton, QC Twenty Essex 
Advice during drafting, comments on all report 
stages  
Prof Andrew Dickinson University of Oxford 
Marie Louise Kinsler, QC 2 Temple Gardens 






Table 4. List of National Rapporteurs 
 
National Rapporteur Affiliation Member State(s) 
Prof Matthias Lehmann University of Bonn, University of Vienna Austria, Germany (AU, GER) 
 
Prof Marta Pertegás Sender 







Dr. Valentina Bineva  Oracle Czech Republic Bulgaria (BG) 
Dr. Paula Poretti University of Osijek, Croatia Croatia (HT) 
Dr. Kostas Rokas  University of Nicosia Cyprus, Greece (CY, GR) 
Prof Monica Paukneróva 
Prof. Magdalena Pfeiffer 
Charles University Prague Czech Republic, Slovakia (CZ, SK)   
Martin Ebers University of Tartu Estonia (EE) 
Lina Tornberg University of Helsinki Finland (FI) 
Dr Duncan Fairgrieve BIICL, Université Paris Dauphine France (FR) 





Marie Louise Kinsler QC Barrister, 2TG United Kingdom, Ireland (UK, IE) 
Prof. Pietro Franzina Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore  Italy (IT) 
Inga Kačevska University of Latvia, Riga Latvia (LV) 
Solveiga Palevičienė Glimstedt, Vilnius Lithuania (LT) 
Prof Gilles Cuniberti  University of Luxemburg Luxembourg  
Jean Pierre Gauci BIICL Malta (MT) 
Xandra Kramer University of Rotterdam  Netherlands (NL) 
Marta Zamorska UNIL Poland (PL) 
Rafael Vale e Reis University of Coimbra Portugal (PT) 
George Trantea Filip & Company Romania (RO)  
Dr Jerca Kramberger  University of Ljubiljana Slovenia (SI) 
Prof Elisa Torralba University Autonoma Madrid Spain (ES) 






1.2.1 Desk Research 
BIICL’s team (Eva Lein, Sara Migliorini, Constance Bonzé and Sarah O’Keeffe) conducted thorough desk 
research comprising an analysis of the decisions of the CJEU, of the relevant studies and the main literature 
on the Rome II Regulation. 
The desk research also focused on three areas of special interest (Artificial Intelligence, Business and Human 
Rights and SLAPPs). 
Intermediate drafts were reviewed by specialised BIICL colleagues, the Expert Board and in-House Experts. 
 
1.2.2 National Reports 
The National Rapporteurs were charged with analysing the case law and doctrine in light of the Questions 
on which this study is based and identifying practical problems with the application of the Regulation in their 
respective Member States.  
They carried out intensive desk research on the use of the Rome II Regulation in their respective Member 
States. This includes an analysis of relevant judgments delivered in the Member States. They also collected 
and analysed all other available materials, which is notably relevant for topics where no case law exists.  
They further assessed whether the non-coverage of certain areas (eg privacy claims) created problems and 
whether new themes (such as Artificial Intelligence) need to be more specifically addressed.  
Their research also covered statistics for the calendar period 2009-2020, where available.  
National Reports follow the structure below: 
Executive Summary 
1. Introduction 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded matters 
(Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts. 31-32) 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital (7)) 
2.2 Chapter II – Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 





a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art. 4(1) 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art. 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art. 4(3), and 
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
2.3 Chapter III – Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict in 
Art. 4. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
2.4 Chapter IV – Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
2.5 Chapter V – Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art. 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of the 
substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual obligations. 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16) 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18) 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19) 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art. 20) 
2.6 Chapter VI – Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art. 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art. 24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art. 25) 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems 






27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach 
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that emerged 
in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in cross-
border situations 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
 
1.2.3 Empirical Study 
BIICL organised a consultation of relevant stakeholders.  
Stakeholders comprise: 
• judges, and claimant and defendant lawyers with relevant experience on tort cases and cross-
border tort litigation under the Rome II Regulation 
• relevant bodies representing both the legal profession (law societies and bar councils) 
• academics with relevant experience on the Rome II Regulation 
Stakeholders have been identified using BIICL’s and the consortium’s network and the National Rapporteurs. 
National Rapporteurs have submitted to BIICL a list of at least 5 experts per Member State who are expert 
in the application of the Regulation in their respective Member States.  
This consultation collected information on the practical problems deriving from the application of the 
Regulation and to describe how the Rome II Regulation is perceived to work in practice. It served to identify 
gaps in the Regulation and make recommendations for future action during the review process. 
Potential respondents contribute via two different methods: 
 E-Survey: An online questionnaire, tailored to the aims of the project, was drafted by BIICL and 
reviewed by the Commission, and was made accessible to a wide range of legal practitioners, 
businesses, organisations representing claimants and defendants and authorities across all Member 
States that are involved in tort cases. We asked the National Rapporteurs for key contacts to 
guarantee qualified responses.  
The questionnaire included a mix of yes/no and multiple-choice questions, as well as open 
questions where these are required. It addressed concerns of all classes of stakeholders involved 
as well as all relevant aspects of this study.  
To adequately address the areas of special interest (Artificial Intelligence, Business and Human 
Rights, SLAPPs), BIICL included a more targeted part of the questionnaire focusing mainly on open 
questions in such particular areas, giving plenty of opportunity for comments.  
The collected data were processed through the online system SurveyMonkey 
(www.surveymonkey.com) to ensure an objective and reliable outcome. BIICL already has a select 





 A series of semi-structured, qualitative individual interviews: these were conducted by telephone or 
video-link from the above-mentioned categories of individuals and entities involved in tort litigation 
and the application of Rome II. 
Interviews followed the survey structure but with more flexibility as to open questions and the 
possibility of in-depth discussion. Using the questionnaire as an interview guide allows for a 
coherent evaluation of all findings. After the interviews had been written up, they were fed into 
SurveyMonkey and processed electronically.  
This allowed for a coherent presentation of the findings across countries and across questions and 
issues they raised. In depth findings were evaluated manually. This dual procedure, tested in earlier 
studies, allows for a broader range of views and a higher turnout of responses within a short 






2. Legal Study 
2.1 Overview of the Regulation and decisions of the CJEU 
Article 3(2) TEU lists the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) for all EU citizens 
as one of the goals of the EU. The AFSJ is based on the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition. In 
order to establish the AFSJ, the EU legislator has implemented two series of secondary acts: those favouring 
the mutual recognition of decisions and their free circulation within the EU, and measures that are directed 
at harmonizing key aspects of national law, which enhance the trust among the Member States and thus 
also contribute to the establishment of the AFSJ. 
The Rome II Regulation is part of the latter group of measures. By providing for the uniformization of rules 
identifying the applicable law to extra-contractual obligations, the Rome II Regulation pursues the 
predictability of the outcome of litigation and fosters legal certainty within the AFSJ. From this perspective, 
the Rome II Regulation is a trust-enhancing measure that guarantees that all Member States’ courts will apply 
the same conflict-of-laws rule to the same question. This, in turn, limits practices such as forum shopping and 
other tactics that endanger the project of ensuring justice for all citizens. 
In 2002, the Commission launched a public consultation, and it submitted a first proposal for a Rome II 
Regulation in 2003, and a second proposal in February 2006. The draft was heavily discussed within the 
Council and the UE Parliament. The established Conciliation Committee reached an agreement on a final 
text in 2007 and on 11 July 2007 the European Union adopted Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 on the 
law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (the ‘Rome II Regulation’), harmonizing the Member 
States’ rules of conflict of laws regarding noncontractual obligations. The Rome II Regulation has been 
applied since 11 January 2009 in the Member States, with the exception of Denmark. 
The Rome II Regulation applies in situations involving a conflict-of-laws. i.e. in situations that are connected 
to two or more countries, including non-EU Member States (Art. 1(1) Rome II). The material scope of the 
Regulation covers non-contractual obligations that have arisen or are likely to arise in civil and commercial 
matters (Arts. 1(1) and 2(1) Rome II). The law designated by the Rome II Regulation need not be the law of 
a Member State (Art. 3 Rome II). 
The Rome II Regulation includes different sets of provisions. A series of provisions lay downs rules for the 
resolution of conflict-of-laws (Arts. 4 to 14, Art. 18 of the Rome II Regulation). Alongside a general conflict-
of-laws rule, the Rome II Regulation includes rules for specific types of torts. The Rome II Regulation also 
leaves room for freedom of choice under certain conditions (Art. 14 Rome II). Another series of provisions 
concerns the scope of the applicable law and certain specific issues that are covered (Art. 15 to 22 of the 
Rome II Regulation). Other provisions list limitations to the operation of the conflict-of-laws rules, such as 
ordre public and overriding mandatory provisions (Arts. 16 and 26 Rome II). Other provisions discipline 
the interaction of the Rome II Regulation with other provisions issued by EU law, national law and 
international law (Arts. 25, 28, 29 Rome II). 
The CJEU has rendered 8 decisions on the Rome II Regulation. In addition, some decisions regarding the 
Rome I and Brussels Ibis Regulations are also of interest for the purposes of interpreting and applying the 
Rome II Regulation.  





• The need for consistency in the interpretation and application of the Rome II, Brussels Ibis and Rome I 
Regulations  
In ERGO,1 the CJEU affirmed that the definitions of ‘contractual obligation’ and ‘non-contractual’ obligation 
are autonomous notions of EU law, which determine in a coordinated way the respective scopes of 
application of the Rome I and II Regulations. In order to interpret such notions, the CJEU affirmed this, and 
that account should be taken of the aim of consistency in the reciprocal application of those regulations, 
and the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
In Da Silva,2 with respect to overriding mandatory provisions, the Court found that, though the Rome II 
Regulation does not define them, such definition could be found in Art. 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation, under 
which overriding mandatory provisions are “provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a 
State for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an 
extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise 
applicable to the contract under that regulation”. The CJEU relied on its previous decision in ERGO (see 
below), where it had found that consistency in the application of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations 
supports the harmonisation wherever possible of the interpretation of the concepts used by those two 
regulations which are, “in functional terms, identical” (par. 28).  
• The respective scopes of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations: 
In ERGO, the CJEU reviewed the established definition of contractual and non-contractual obligations in 
light of its previous decisions in order to address the specific question in the case, i.e. in order to determine 
the law or laws applicable in third party disputes. The claim was brought by the insurer of a tractor unit, 
which compensated the victim of an accident caused by the driver of that vehicle against the insurer of the 
trailer which, at the time of the accident, was coupled to that vehicle. The CJEU concluded that an insurer’s 
obligation to cover the civil liability of the insured party with respect to the victim resulting from contract of 
insurance concluded with the insured party, and that the conditions under which the insurer may exercise 
the rights the victim of the accident has against the persons responsible for the accident depend upon the 
national law governing that insurance contract, as determined in accordance with Art. 7 of the Rome I 
Regulation. However, the law applicable to the determination of the persons who may be held liable and 
the allocation of responsibility between them and their respective insurers remains subject, in accordance 
with Article 19, to Article 4 et seq. of the Rome II Regulation. 
In Amazon,3 the CJEU ruled on the respective scopes of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations regarding 
actions brought by consumers against unfair contract terms. The CJEU had to adjudicate on the law 
applicable to tort under the Rome II Regulation for the purposes of determining the law or laws applicable 
to an action for an injunction within the meaning of Directive 2009/22. The CJEU interpreted the respective 
scopes of the Rome I and II Regulations as complementary and distinguished between two kinds of actions. 
On the one hand, the CJEU stated that where the action for an injunction aims to prevent unfair terms from 
being included in consumer contracts in order to create contractual obligations, the law applicable to the 
assessment of the terms must be determined in accordance with the Rome I Regulation. The CJEU found that 
non-contractual liability extends also to the undermining of legal stability by the use of unfair terms, which it 
is the task of consumer protection associations to prevent. Hence, an action for an injunction under Directive 
2009/22 relates to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict within the meaning of Chapter 
 
 
1 C‑359/14 and C‑475/14, ERGO Insurance and Gjensidige Baltic, EU:C:2016:40.  
2 Case C‑149/18, Agostinho da Silva Martins v Dekra Claims Services Portugal SA ECLI:EU:C:2019:84 





II of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular Art. 6(1) providing for a special rule relating to non-contractual 
obligations arising out of an act of unfair competition.  
• Temporal Scope of the Rome II Regulation 
In Homawoo,4 the Court had to determine whether Arts. 31 and 32 of the Regulation, read in conjunction 
with Article 297 TFEU, must be interpreted as requiring a national court to apply the Regulation only to 
events giving rise to damage occurring after 11 January 2009, or if other dates (i.e. the date on which the 
proceedings seeking compensation for damage were brought and the date on which the applicable law 
was determined by the court seised) have any bearing on this issue. The CJEU referred to the established 
principles of interpretation of EU law relating specifically to the entry into force of secondary acts and looked 
at the literal meaning of the Rome II Regulation. It concluded that the Rome II Regulation applies only to 
events giving rise to damage occurring after 11 January 2009, and that the other two mentioned dates do 
not have any impact on the application of the Rome II Regulation. 
• The notion of ‘damage’ and ‘indirect consequences’ 
In Florin Lazar,5 the CJEU had to adjudicate on the law applicable to the question of who is entitled to claim 
compensation for indirect damage arising out of a traffic accident. In particular, the CJEU had to decide if 
the damage arising from the death of a person in a traffic accident sustained by close relatives of the 
deceased falls within the notion of ‘damage’ or as ‘indirect consequences’ of that accident within the 
meaning of Art. 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation. The CJEU noted that Article 4(1) designates the law of the 
country in which the ‘damage’ occurs, irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred, and irrespective of the country or countries in which the ‘indirect consequences’ of that event 
occur, as the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation. The ‘damage’ to be taken into account in 
order to determine the place where the damage occurred is the direct damage and, in the event of physical 
injuries caused to a person, the county of the place where the direct damage occurs is the country of the 
place where the injuries were suffered. Hence, in the case of a road traffic accident, the place where the 
direct damage occurred is the relevant connecting factor for the determination of the applicable law, 
regardless of the indirect consequences of that accident. The CJEU also stated that such an interpretation 
was confirmed by Art. 15(f) of the Rome II Regulation, which includes the determination of which persons 
are entitled to claim damages within the scope of the applicable law.  
• The notion of ‘Overriding Mandatory Provisions‘ 
In Da Silva, disregarding some differences between the language versions of the Rome II Regulation and 
the language used in the Rome I Regulation, the CJEU considered that ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ 
was a concept common to the two Regulations and that it had to be interpreted consistently. As the CJEU 
put it: overriding mandatory provisions, falling within the meaning of Art. 16 of the Rome II Regulation, fall 
within the definition of ‘lois de police’ (‘overriding mandatory provisions’), within the meaning of Art. 9 of 
the Rome I Regulation. As a consequence, the CJEU’s interpretation applying to one must necessarily apply 
to the other. The CJEU also relied on its decision in UNAMAR (related to the Rome I Regulation),6 to affirm 
that overriding mandatory provisions must be interpreted strictly and that the national court shall also take 
into account its general structure and all the circumstances in which that law was adopted, and determine 
whether its aim is to protect an interest judged to be essential by the Member State concerned. Then, the 
CJEU looked at whether the type of national provision at issue could be considered an overriding mandatory 
provision under this interpretative criterion. The national provision at stake laid down a limitation period for 
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an action seeking compensation for damage resulting from an accident. The CJEU found that such a type of 
provisions could be considered ‘overriding mandatory’ within the meaning of Art. 16 of the Rome II 
Regulation only after identification of a particularly important reason, such as a manifest infringement of the 
right to an effective remedy and to effective judicial protection arising from the application of the law 
designated as applicable. 
• Functioning and interpretation of special rules: 
In Nintendo,7, the CJEU had to interpret Art. 8 of the Rome II Regulation, laying down a conflict rule 
applicable to unitary EU intellectual property rights (IPR). The CJEU was asked to clarify the notion of 
‘country in which the act of infringement was committed’ within the meaning of Article 8(2) of the Rome II 
Regulation. As a preliminary point, the CJEU explained that the case at issue regarded the application of 
sanctions for infringement of IPR provided for by Arts. 88(2) and 89(1)(d) of Regulation No 6/2002 on 
Community design. Nevertheless, such sanctions refer to national law, including national private 
international law. As a consequence, Art. 8 of the Rome II Regulation was applicable and relevant in the 
case. The CJEU then interpreted Art. 8 of the Rome II Regulation, looking at its spirit and aims, and also 
compared different language versions. The CJEU found that the ‘country in which the act of infringement 
was committed’ within the meaning of Art. 8(2) of the Rome II Regulation refers to the country where the 
event giving rise to the damage occurred. In the case at issue, a single entity was accused of various acts of 
infringement in various Member States. The Court clarified that, in such circumstances, the ‘event giving rise 
to the damage must not be identified by reference to each alleged act of infringement, but by making an 
overall assessment of the defendant’s conduct in order to determine the place where the initial act of 
infringement at the origin of that conduct was committed or threatened by it. 
In ERGO, the CJEU was asked how to interpret the Rome I and II Regulations and Directive 2009/13 in an 
insurance claim, and found that the Directive did not contain any conflict-of-laws rule. It then analysed the 
Rome II and I Regulations to determine which rules were applicable (see supra).  
In Da Silva, the CJEU ruled on the Interpretation of Art. 28 of Directive 2009/103, protecting the victims 
of accidents of motor vehicles, and its relationship to Rome II. Relying on its previous decision in ERGO (see 
below, this Annex) the CJEU also ruled that  Article 28 of Directive 2009/103, as transposed into national 
law, does not constitute a provision of EU law which lays down a conflict-of-law rule relating to non-
contractual obligations, and that takes precedence over the rules of the Rome II Regulation within the 
meaning of Art. 27. In addition, the CJEU stated that though Art. 28 of Directive 2009/103 allows the 
adoption of rules that are more favourable to those victims than those required under the same Directive, 
such possibility concerns solely the transposition into legislation of a Member State and does not concern 
the question of whether, in a specific case, those more favourable rules are to be applied rather than the 
rules of other Member States. 
In Amazon, the CJEU also gave some indications regarding the interpretation of Art. 6(1), clarifying that 
unfair competition within such a provision covers the use of unfair terms inserted into general terms and 
conditions, as this is likely to affect the collective interests of consumers as a group and hence to influence 
the conditions of competition on the market. In addition, the ‘country in which the collective interests of 
consumers are affected’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Rome II Regulation is the country of 
residence of the consumers to whom the undertaking directs its activities and whose interests are defended 
 
 







by the relevant consumer protection association by means of that action. The CJEU also clarified that in the 
case at hand the exception to the rule, provided in Art. 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation, was not relevant.  
In Prüller-Frey,8 the CJEU had to decide on the issue of whether, under Art. 18 of the Rome II Regulation, a 
person who has suffered damage is entitled to bring a direct action against the insurer of the person liable 
to provide compensation, where such an action is provided for by the law applicable to the non-contractual 
obligation which forms the basis of the claim for damages, regardless of the provision made by the law that 
the parties have chosen as the law applicable to the insurance contract. The CJEU reasoned that Art. 18 of 
the Rome II Regulation does not constitute a conflict-of-laws rule with regard to the substantive law 
applicable to the determination of the liability of the insurer or the person insured under an insurance 
contract, but merely makes it possible to bring a direct action where one of the laws to which it refers 
provides for such a possibility. As such, the law applicable to the insurance contract cannot be a bar to a 
direct action being brought — should that be possible — on the basis of the law applicable to the non-
contractual obligation. As a consequence, the CJEU held that a direct action against the insurer of the person 
liable to provide compensation can be brought, where such an action is provided for by the law applicable 
to the non-contractual obligation and regardless of the provision made by the law that the parties have 
chosen as the law applicable to the insurance contract. 
 
2.2 Legal Analysis of the areas of particular interest 
BIICL, supported and advised by the In-House Experts, has been working on the 3 areas identified by the 
Commission as areas of special interest for the Study, i.e. the interface between the Rome II Regulation and 
Artificial Intelligence, Business and Human Rights and SLAPPs.  
 
2.2.1 Artificial Intelligence 
Artificial intelligence (‘AI’) has already developed to the point where it touches almost every aspect of our 
lives, from health, to employment, transport, shopping, banking, predictive policing, judicial sentencing, 
social status, romantic relationships and military weapons. Nonetheless, familiarity with how AI works 
remains low, and (with some notable exceptions) there has been very little case law on the topic. Analysing 
the application of Rome II to AI therefore depends on conjecture about several unknowns: how AI and its 
uses are likely to continue evolving, how domestic legal systems will respond, and how Rome II and other 
conflicts rules will likely be applied in such cases. 
This legal research section will explore in detail the realistic possible future developments of AI and the laws 
applied to it, while providing a solid understanding of AI’s core functions and capabilities. This should ensure 
that any resulting legislative change squarely addresses the most probable immediate and medium-term 
challenges, whilst being built on an accurate foundation enabling responsiveness to the (inevitable) 
emergence of currently unforeseen issues. This promotes the European Parliament’s goal of ‘principle-based 
and future-proof [AI] legislation.’9 
Our AI findings rely more heavily on desk research than our other areas of study, due to the relatively low 
levels of AI-specific responses from National Reporters and expert empirical study participants. This is to be 
expected, given the novelty of AI as a field of legal study. 
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Of note is the European Parliament’s resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the 
Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence (‘the AI Civil Liability Resolution’).10 This 
Resolution, made under Art 225 TFEU, asks the Commission to propose legislation along the lines of the 
‘Draft Regulation’ suggested therein. While the Commission retains its prerogative to propose legislation 
along those lines or otherwise, there is a reasonable prospect that the AI sector will be subject to substantive 
regulation at the EU level. It is also expected that the Commission will adopt in April 2021 a Regulation on 
a new framework for AI. Given the variety and underdeveloped nature of most existing substantive AI 
regulation, this section will consider the Draft Regulation as a potential model of how substantive AI 
regulation might look. This will facilitate discussion of how conflicts rules might apply. Commentators have 
also noted that, if adopted by the Commission verbatim, the Draft Regulation would (perhaps accidentally) 
introduce a conflicts rule superseding Rome II on matters within its scope, by virtue of Art. 27 Rome II.11 This 
possibility will be briefly addressed. 
Section 1 will introduce AI and some key concepts. Section 2 will explain the practicalities of how AI can 
cause damage. Section 3 addresses the EU principles guiding regulation of AI, which should be considered 
in all relevant EU legislative processes. Section 4 explains the potential impact of the Draft Regulation, both 
substantively and on conflict of laws, as an example of what future EU legislative change might do. Section 
5 then examines the unique considerations raised by AI in applying each Rome II article, through examples 
of specific AI applications. This Rome II analysis will proceed on the basis of the law as it currently stands, 
disregarding any future unilateral conflicts rules that may be legislated for AI. 
Section 1: AI and key concepts 
As a recent phenomenon, the language of AI is still establishing itself in society. Particular care must be taken 
to ensure that terms are ascribed the same meaning when they are used, to avoid the risk of speaking at 
cross-purposes. To that end, this Section sets out what is meant by several key AI terms and concepts as 
used in this Study, drawn from definitions used in previous EU documents where possible. 
Definition of AI 
AI is notoriously difficult to define in concrete terms.12 The EU White Paper on Artificial Intelligence observes 
that, ‘[i]n any new legal instrument, the definition of AI will need to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
technical progress while being precise enough to provide the necessary legal certainty’,13 but ‘[s]imply put, 
AI is a collection of technologies that combine data, algorithms and computing power.’14 The AI Civil 
Liability Resolution simply states that ‘the notion of AI-systems comprises a large group of different 
technologies, including simple statistics, machine learning and deep learning.’ 15 Art. 3(a) of the Draft 
Regulation defines an AI system as ‘a system that is either software-based or embedded in hardware 
devices, and that displays behaviour simulating intelligence by, inter alia, collecting and processing data, 




10 2020/2014(INL) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0276_EN.html  
11 Jan von Hein, ‘Forward to the Past: A Critical Note on the European Parliament’s Approach to Artificial Intelligence in Private 
International Law’ (Conflictoflaws.net, 22 October 2020) <https://conflictoflaws.net/2020/forward-to-the-past-a-critical-note-
on-the-european-parliaments-approach-to-artificial-intelligence-in-private-international-law/> 
12 The Parliamentary Research Service Briefing, ‘EU guidelines on ethics in artificial intelligence: Context and implementation’, 
notes at fn1 that ‘[t]here is no commonly agreed definition for AI’, and refers to Philip Boucher’s 2019 EPRS briefings on ‘How 
artificial intelligence works’ and on ‘Why artificial intelligence matters’ for an overview of the difficulty defining it. 
13 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission-white-paper-artificial-intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf 16 
14 Ibid 2 
15 AI Civil Liability Resolution F 





Further detail can be found in the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence’s (‘HLEG’) definitional 
document for AI.17 For now, it suffices to note the HLEG’s comment that AI refers to intelligence, which is ‘a 
vague concept’; so, instead of using the term “intelligence”, ‘AI researchers use mostly the notion of 
rationality’, understood as ‘the ability to choose the best action to take in order to achieve a certain goal, 
given criteria to be optimised and the available resources.’  The ‘core’ feature of an AI system is its 
reasoning/information processing module, which suggests an output or decision based on a data input. As 
such, depending on the legal instrument or context, it may be more helpful to think of an AI system’s 
component parts (‘sensors’, ‘reasoning/information processing module’ and ‘actuator’, according to the 
HLEG; or ‘data’ and ‘algorithms‘, according to the EU White Paper). Some laws may be best targeted at a 
concrete process or commodity, and others at the more abstract notion of AI. 
Automated decision-making 
The AI Civil Liability Resolution suggests that ‘using the term “automated decision-making” could avoid the 
possible ambiguity of the term AI’, where ‘“automated decision-making” involves a user delegating initially 
a decision, partially or completely, to an entity by way of using software or a service’, and ‘that entity then 
in turn us[ing] automatically executed decision-making models to perform an action on behalf of a user, or 
to inform the user’s decisions in performing an action.’18 
AI system components and parties 
AI systems are complex in part due to their multiple component elements (supra). These elements also have 
several sub-elements; for example, information processing units may comprise multiple different codes 
interacting with each other and with hardware. From a legal perspective, this is significant because 
identifying ‘which code, input or data have ultimately caused the harmful operation’19 can be extremely 
challenging. This will be explained further in Section 2. 
Also legally significant is that different parties may be ‘in control of the risk associated with’20 different 
elements and sub-elements of such systems. Indeed, the ‘multitude of actors involved’21 in developing and 
operating AI systems is widely cited as undermining effective attribution of liability. The AI Civil Liability 
Resolution labels the parties who may be involved in an AI system, listed below, with definitions from the 
Resolution where possible. While the Resolution is not a legislative proposal, it sets out an analytical structure 
for different elements and sub-elements of AI, relevant parties and liability. This section therefore adopts the 
Resolution’s language where possible, in the interests of promoting terminological consistency for AI. 
• Affected person: ‘any person who suffers harm or damage caused by a physical or virtual activity, 
device or process driven by an AI-system, and who is not its operator.’22 
• User: ‘the person that utilises the AI-system.’23 This person may be a consumer or a professional.24 
• Operator: one who ‘exercises a degree of control over a risk connected with the operation and 
functioning of an AI-system.’25 There could be systems and situations involving more than one 
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18 AI Civil Liability Resolution G; Draft Regulation Recital (6) 
19 AI Civil Liability Resolution H; Draft Regulation (3) 
20 AI Civil Liability Resolution H; Draft Regulation (3) 
21 AI Civil Liability Resolution Para 6; Draft Regulation (3) 
22 AI Civil Liability Draft Regulation Art. 3(h) 
23 AI Civil Liability Draft Regulation Recital (11) 
24 Eg AI Civil Liability Draft Regulation Recital (18) 





operator.26 Art. 3(d) excludes from the Draft Regulation’s notion of ‘operator’ anyone who qualifies 
as a producer under the Product Liability Directive.27 
• Frontend operator: a ‘natural or legal person who exercises a degree of control over a risk 
connected with the operation and functioning of the AI-system and benefits from its operation.’28 
They will generally appear ‘as the person who ‘primarily’ decides on the use of the AI-system.’29 
• Backend operator: a ‘natural or legal person who, on a continuous basis, defines the features of 
the technology and provides data and an essential backend support service and therefore also 
exercises a degree of control over the risk connected with the operation and functioning of the AI-
system.’ 30 While the frontend operator may be more readily apparent, the backend operator 
‘could in fact have a higher degree of control over the operational risks.’31 
• Producer: ‘the producer as defined in Article 3 of [the Product Liability] Directive 85/374/EEC.’32 
The Resolution calls on the Commission to review whether to include manufacturers, developers, 
programmers, service providers and backend operators in the Product Liability Directive’s definition 
of “producer”.33 
• Insurer: insurers will play a special role in the proposed EU AI civil liability regime, which proposes 
a mandatory insurance scheme for operators of high-risk AI.34 
• Interfering third party35: eg a hacker. May be untraceable or impecunious. 
• (Other) third party: someone other than an affected person, user, operator or producer.36 
Key to understanding some of these definitions is the notion of ‘control,’ defined as ‘any action of an 
operator that influences the operation of an AI-system and thus the extent to which the operator exposes 
third parties to the potential risks associated with the operation and functioning of the AI-system; such actions 
can impact the operation at any stage by determining the input, output or results, or can change specific 
functions or processes within the AI-system; the degree to which those aspects of the operation of the AI-
system are determined by the action depends on the level of influence the operator has over the risk 
connected with the operation and functioning of the AI-system.’37 
The Resolution and Draft Regulation are clear that a party may occupy more than one of these roles with 
respect to any given operation, such as the producer also being the backend operator38 or the user also 
being the affected party.39 
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Other terms useful to understand when regulating AI 
• Device40: a physical object that incorporates (for these purposes) an AI system. Generally, devices 
fit readily into existing notions of products and (physical) causation of harm. AI systems that do not 
form part of a device are more challenging, as explained in Section 2. 
• High-risk: ‘a significant potential in an autonomously operating AI-system to cause harm or damage 
to one or more persons in a manner that is random and goes beyond what can reasonably be 
expected; the significance of the potential depends on the interplay between the severity of possible 
harm or damage, the degree of autonomy of decision-making, the likelihood that the risk 
materializes and the manner and the context in which the AI-system is being used.’41 The Draft 
Regulation proposes a strict liability regime for high-risk AI systems, accompanied by stronger 
oversight mechanisms (see Section 4). 
• Open source software: ‘combines copyright and a licence to grant users the freedom to run the 
software, to study and modify it, and share the code and modifications with others.’42 
• Regulatory sandbox43: a tool for testing AI systems. They ‘enable a direct testing environment for 
innovative products, services or business models, pursuant to a specific testing plan, which usually 
includes some degree of regulatory lenience combined with certain safeguards.’44 
• Version control: the practice of tracking and managing changes to software code. One difficulty of 
establishing liability where dynamic algorithms cause damage is that the version that now exists 
may not be the same as the version that operated to cause damage. Version control could be a 
way to record iterations of an AI system as it learns, helping affected persons get access to 
information they may need for a claim. 
Section 2: how AI can cause damage 
For the purposes of the Rome II Regulation, AI is of interest insofar as it leads to breaches of non-contractual 
obligations in civil and commercial matters that cause damage. This Section describes the main ways in 
which AI systems can cause damage from a practical perspective. This lays a foundation for Sections 4 and 
5, which involve analysing how AI systems causing damage can breach obligations. 
(1) AI used intentionally to cause damage 
AI systems may be used to cause damage where that damage is the desired outcome of its operation. An 
example may be a machine learning algorithm that has been programmed to transfer currency or 
cryptocurrency from a bank account or crypto wallet, into the bank account or crypto wallet of the 
operator.45 A classic case is that of a hacker.46 As an intentional tort, it should be relatively straightforward 
to determine the responsible party as an abstract matter of law, although practical difficulties may remain.47 
(2) AI does what it is designed to do, but causes unforeseen damage 
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AI systems may achieve the desired outcome, but also cause damage as an unintended consequence. For 
example, if a company uses a dynamic pricing algorithm to set prices in response to price changes of 
competing goods, one may assume that it will maximise profit by undercutting competitors to steal customers. 
However, the algorithm may “learn” to collude, including with other algorithms, leading to higher prices in 
the market. 48 In this situation, the AI system itself functions without error, because it achieves its programmed 
objective of maximising the company’s profit. However, it would have the unintended consequence of 
restricting competition on the market, breaching the company’s obligation to compete fairly. It is difficult 
conceptually to identify a responsible party, as the “learning” was to a large extent autonomous.49 
AI systems are more likely to produce unintended consequences when used for applications for which they 
were not initially designed.50 
(3) AI fails to do what it was designed to do 
An error may arise in the AI system, such that it does not produce the intended output in response to a 
particular input. For example, an autonomous vehicle may swerve off the road when there was no need for 
it to do so. Such system errors can arise in many ways: 
(a) Faulty sensors 
AI systems process data collected by sensors.51 If the sensors are faulty or substandard, the processing unit 
will be fed the wrong data, and generate the wrong output. For example, the camera on a self-driving 
vehicle may be unable to perceive certain objects in sun glare, so information about traffic signals might not 
be fed to the processing unit.52 Factual responsibility may lie with the sensor component manufacturer, the 
car producer, any operator responsible for ensuring the sensor’s software is maintained, or any user or third 
party who otherwise damages the sensors. The sensors may also be damaged by accident. 
(b) Bugs 
There are on average 1-25 bugs or defects per 1000 lines of code, which may produce unexpected outputs 
from the data inputs. Bugs have caused a number of high-profile, unpredicted tragedies in automated 
systems53, and while due diligence over debugging software is always improving, bugs remain an inevitable 
part of coding. Responsibility for bugs may lie with a backend operator, or whomever is tasked with auditing 
the code, although such audits are currently best practice rather than a legislative requirement. Otherwise, 
it may be difficult to identify the (factually) responsible party, particularly where code is compiled from 
multiple sources or worked on by multiple people. Some bugs only arise as an unforeseen consequence of 
codes interacting with each other in unpredictable ways.54 
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(c) Data bias 
Data is the driving force of AI, particularly AI systems that include machine learning elements. Training a 
machine learning algorithm on flawed data will teach it to apply rules that produce incorrect or undesirable 
outcomes. Individuals may label training data or select features in ways that reflect their own (conscious or 
subconscious) biases, while sampling data that is underrepresentative or influenced by historical biases may 
cause societal bias to be replicated by the algorithm.55 As a simplified example, an autonomous vehicle 
may include code instructing it to avoid running people over. Consider that, at the feature selection stage, 
a programmer might select two arms and two legs as “relevant features” of a person, reflecting ableist bias 
and resulting in less accurate avoidance of people with different numbers of limbs. At the sampling stage, 
racial bias in automated identification of humans due to homogenous data sets is well-documented.56 
It may be conceptually and practically difficult to identify whether biased labelling, feature selection, or 
poor quality data is the cause of biased outcomes in a particular AI system, particularly where different 
parties may contribute to different stages of the data compilation and machine training process. 
Significantly, machine learning algorithms are designed to spot patterns that humans might miss, so it is often 
difficult or impossible to code bias errors out of the system. Even if particular features (such as race) are 
explicitly labelled “irrelevant”, ‘redundant encoding’ often leads to these features being tracked by proxy, 
producing the same result.57 
(4) Damage to AI components and in the broader AI landscape 
As AI becomes more prevalent, the shift in cases engaging Rome II will not be limited to instances of damage 
caused by AI systems. More AI also means more data collection and storage,58 using more servers and 
processing devices, 59 and increasing reliance on at-distance or automated processes. Many of these 
changes can be dealt with effectively by existing legal tools. Some, however, give rise to new 
considerations. 
For instance, as data becomes more valuable and more sensitive data is held, the incentives towards 
hacking and data theft (whether the hacker uses an AI system or more traditional methods) become much 
stronger. In particular, as it becomes easier to infer sensitive and/or valuable data from general data, with 
better algorithms and by fusing a wider range of data, the potential damage (especially to privacy and 
other fundamental rights) from previously low-risk data increases.60 The potential material ramifications of 
a hack also become greater as more transactions and critical infrastructures rely on technology. As virtual 
assets like cryptocurrencies become more trusted and valuable, they too become more of a target for theft 
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722; Philipp Hacker, ‘Teaching Fairness to Artificial Intelligence: Existing and Novel Strategies Against Algorithmic Discrimination 
Under EU Law’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 1143, 1146-1150 
58 The EU White Paper on Artificial Intelligence predicts that the volume of data produced in the world will grow from 33 
zettabytes in 2018 to 175 zettabytes in 2025: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission-white-paper-artificial-
intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf 4 
59 With a move away from cloud computing to computing devices working at the edge of the network: EU White Paper on 
Artificial Intelligence ibid 1 





and fraud.61 The security and robustness of algorithms and the servers that host them will be of paramount 
importance. 
There is currently little consensus on the appropriate standards of robustness in coding, so it may be difficult 
to identify a party at fault for a particular weakness in a system. This may be exacerbated where a system is 
made up of combining various codes, and where weaknesses may only arise from the interaction between 
them. 
(5) Updates 
With all error types (1)-(4), they do not only arise due to flaws or defects in the design or use of a product, 
but may also arise due to negative action, such as a failure to take reasonable care in design or a failure to 
provide appropriate updates. The need for (or possibility of) updates renders AI systems dynamically 
modifiable and is another differentiator between them and more traditional products.62 Failure to install 
recommended updates can therefore be as causally significant as initial design, which is why the AI Civil 
Liability Draft Regulation assigns responsibility to operators to ensure that all available updates are regularly 
installed.63 
Section 3: AI and EU Principles 
The EU White Paper on Artificial Intelligence sets the goal of establishing an ecosystem of excellence and 
trust. From a regulatory perspective, a common framework should complement actions to promote Europe’s 
competitiveness in AI, while ensuring optimal outcomes and compliance with EU legislation, principles and 
values. EU principles and rights (fundamental rights, consumer protection, product liability, effective access 
to justice64) therefore apply. In this context, the HLEG has identified 7 requirements for trustworthy AI,65 
welcomed by the Commission’s Communication Directorate and cited with approval in the White Paper: 
• Human agency and oversight: AI systems should enable, rather than hamper, fundamental rights; 
users should be given the tools to comprehend, make informed decisions about, interact with, and 
challenge the decisions of AI systems, including where AI influences subconscious processes; 
human oversight and public enforcers should ensure that AI systems do not undermine human 
autonomy or cause other adverse effects. 
• Technical robustness and safety: AI systems should be developed with a preventative approach to 
risks, so that they reliably behave as intended while minimising unintentional and unexpected harm, 
and preventing unacceptable harm; AI systems’ software and hardware should be protected 
against vulnerabilities that can be exploited, eg by hacking, and unintended applications should 
be guarded against; they should have safeguards that enable a fallback plan; inaccurate 
classifications and predictions should be minimised and the accuracy rate indicated; and the results 
of AI systems must be reproducible and reliable across a range of inputs and situations. 
• Privacy and data governance: privacy and data protection must be guaranteed for both input and 
output data, bearing in mind the possibility of AI systems inferring sensitive information from 
ordinary information; data sets must be compiled, tested and documented to minimise biases, 
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63 See eg AI Civil Liability Draft Regulation Art. 8(2) 
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inaccuracies and errors; organisations handling individuals’ data should put protocols in place to 
govern who can access data and under what circumstances. 
• Transparency: traceability requires the documentation of the data sets and processes leading to an 
AI system’s decision, to enable identification of the reasons why an AI decision was erroneous; 
explainability requires that both the technical processes of an AI system and related human 
decisions can be understood and traced by humans; users should be informed that they are 
interacting with an AI system and of its limitations (eg accuracy levels), and where fundamental 
rights are concerned, users should be allowed to opt for human interaction instead. 
• Diversity, non-discrimination and fairness: bias should be removed from data sets to prevent 
discriminatory outcomes; AI should not be used to exploit subconscious biases; oversight processes 
should be introduced to prevent bias being introduced through programming and development; 
the hiring of people from diverse backgrounds should be encouraged; systems should be user-
centric and designed in a way that allows all people to access AI products and services, regardless 
of age, gender, abilities or characteristics; stakeholders who may directly or indirectly be affected 
by the AI system should be consulted throughout its life cycle. 
• Societal and environmental wellbeing: AI systems and their supply chains should be assessed as to 
their environmental friendliness, impact on people’s mental and physical wellbeing, and impact on 
institutions, democracy and society at large. 
• Accountability: AI systems should be auditable, in that their algorithms, data and design processes 
should be capable of assessment; applications affecting fundamental rights and safety-critical 
applications should be able to be independently audited; negative impacts should be minimised 
and be capable of being reported, with protection for whistle-blowers or other relevant entities; 
decision-makers must be accountable for any trade-offs between the above requirements when 
developing AI systems, and systems requiring unacceptable trade-offs should not proceed; 
accessible mechanisms should facilitate redress for adverse impacts of AI, with particular attention 
paid to vulnerable persons or groups. 
If AI does not meet this standard of trustworthiness, it can pose challenges to the effectiveness of EU 
legislation, principles and values. In particular, inaccurate, biased or malfunctioning AI can lead to uniform 
errors or harms being entrenched on a much larger scale than randomised human error or bias.66 The cause 
of these harms can be difficult to identify and prove in court as a practical matter, particularly where AI is 
opaque (“black box”), overly complex, protected as intellectual property or damages non-monetary goods 
(eg privacy).67 Inadequate design and implementation of AI systems can considerably impede access to 
justice for harms caused. 
The AI Civil Liability Resolution ‘encourages the promotion of the Union standards on civil liability at an 
international level’68, and the Commission framework proposal anticipated in April is expected to be largely 
based on the HLEG trustworthiness standards. However, legal claims will often arise where AI systems do 
not comply with best practice or legislative requirements. In a conflict-of-laws context, it is also relevant that 
different legal systems globally may adopt different standards.  
 
 
66 Note discussion of systematic differences in rates at which different groups experience errors in Solon Berocas and Andrew 
Selbst, ‘Big Data's Disparate Impact’ (2016) 104 California Law Review 671; and analysis of uniformity of errors triggering the 
flash crash in Erik Gerding, ‘Contract as Pattern Language’ (2018) 88 Washington Law Review 1323 
67 See further challenges in AI Civil Liability Draft Regulation Recital (3) 





Conflicts rules themselves, both under Rome II and otherwise, must therefore ensure that the rules for 
deciding which law to apply to breaches of non-contractual obligations can deal effectively with all AI 
systems, whether they are “trustworthy” or not. Rules should be chosen that promote legal certainty, 
foreseeability, and justice in individual cases, and strike a fair balance between claimant and defendant,69 
in the context of both “less trustworthy” (opaque, untraceable) and “more trustworthy” AI. 
Section 4: the AI Civil Liability Draft Regulation 
Art. 27 Rome II states that the ‘Regulation shall not prejudice the application of provisions of Community law 
which, in relation to particular matters, lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to non-contractual 
obligations.’70 The AI Civil Liability Draft Regulation in its current form could introduce such a unilateral 
conflicts rule.71 Both to understand the scope of what could be excluded from Rome II, and to provide a 
concrete example of a potential civil liability regime for AI, it is worth reviewing the provisions of the Draft 
Regulation before turning to its impact on conflict of laws.  
(1) The proposed substantive regime 
The Draft Regulation contains a civil liability regime for AI which, in brief, would create two sets of rules for 
claims against operators of AI systems. 
(a) High-risk AI systems 
The first applies to high-risk AI systems, which classification is to be determined and reviewed by a 
Commission standing committee72 according to the severity of the possible harm or damage, the degree of 
autonomy of decision-making, the likelihood of the risk materialising, and the manner and context in which 
the AI system is being used.73 The Commission would exhaustively list such systems in an annex to the 
proposed Regulation, and review new and existing AI systems on a regular basis to ensure that the list 
remains up to date.74 Operators of high-risk systems would have strict liability for harm or damage caused75, 
subject only to force majeure.76 The Draft Regulation also sets out maximum compensation amounts77, 
methods for calculating the extent of compensation78, and limitation periods79, while subjecting operators 
of high-risk systems to a mandatory insurance regime.80 The AI Civil Liability Resolution also suggests that, 
under certain circumstances, AI systems that have caused harm or damage may be classified as high-risk 
with retroactive effect.81 
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(b) Other AI systems 
The second set of rules applies to AI systems not deemed high-risk. Art. 8 establishes a regime where fault-
based liability is presumed, unless one of the grounds in Art. 8(2) applies82, or in the case of force majeure. 
The operator would also be liable for harm or damage caused by untraceable or impecunious interfering 
third parties.83 Compensation and limitation would be governed by the laws of the Member State where the 
harm or damage occurred.84 The Draft Regulation also imposes a duty on the producer to cooperate with 
and provide information to requesting operators and affected persons in order to facilitate the identification 
of liabilities.85 
(2) Subject matter and scope 
Art. 1 establishes that the Regulation would only apply to claims against operators. Recital (9) explicitly 
states that claims against interfering third parties can in most cases be sufficiently dealt with by the ‘existing 
fault-based liability law of the Member States,’86 and leaves claims against producers to the Product Liability 
Directive.87 As that Directive currently stands, it is unclear whether AI systems without a physical component 
(ie not devices) fall within the definition of a product.88 Recital (23) of the Draft Regulation therefore stresses 
the importance of coordinating review of the Product Liability Directive closely with the introduction of any 
proposed Regulation, while Para 8 of the Resolution specifically draws attention to the Directive’s definitions 
of ‘products’, ‘damage’, ‘defect’ and ‘producer’ for consideration. 
(3) Conflicts rules 
In terms of the Draft Regulation’s potential impact on conflict of laws, Art. 2(1) could be interpreted as 
establishing a unilateral conflicts rule,89 leading to its application ‘on the territory of the Union where a 
physical or virtual activity, device or process driven by an AI-system has caused harm or damage to the life, 
health, or physical integrity of a natural person, to the property of a natural or legal person or has caused 
significant immaterial harm resulting in a verifiable economic loss.’ This is not a certainty: the Draft Regulation 
does not explicitly purport to introduce a new conflicts rule. Therefore, it may be possible to interpret Art. 
 
 
82 ‘(a) the AI system was activated without [the operator’s] knowledge while all reasonable and necessary measures to avoid such 
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2(1) in a way that allows for the operation of Rome II. Alternatively, Art. 2(1) may be conceptualised as a 
‘substantive corrective’, as is arguably the case with Art. 3(2) of the e-Commerce Directive, although in such 
a form it would have an indirect influence on conflict of laws.90 It is also open to any future legislative 
proposal to make a different provision. In any event, it is worth discussing the potential ramifications of such 
a rule that may emerge from future legislation (whether intentionally or otherwise) to ensure due regard is 
paid to the possible consequences. 
On the view of Art. 2(1) as introducing a lex loci damni rule,91 it would apply where the conditions in Arts. 
1 and 2 are satisfied. Note that, while Art. 1 qualifies the personal scope of the Regulation, of against whom 
claims can be brought, Art. 2(1) restricts the type of damage to which the Regulation applies. For instance, 
immaterial harm that does not qualify as ‘significant’92 would fall outside the scope of the Draft Regulation 
and be subject to the rules of Rome II. Art. 2(3) of the Draft Regulation also specifies that the Regulation 
would be ‘without prejudice to additional liability claims’ resulting from contract, product liability, consumer 
protection, anti-discrimination, labour law, environmental protection law, or any other claim under Union 
or national law. 
The lex loci damni would also determine the application of Art. 9, whereby claims brought under Art. 8(1) 
(against non-high-risk operators) would have limitation periods and compensation amounts determined 
according to ‘the laws of the Member State in which the harm or damage occurred.’ 
That said, there remains the possibility that this view of the Draft Regulation’s conflicts provisions will never 
reach legislative form. It has been criticised as favouring operators over consumers in adopting the lex loci 
damni approach of Rome II Art. 4(1)’s general rule, without providing any exception93, escape clause94, 
or facility for agreement95; or considering whether a cascade approach as in Rome II’s Art. 5 (product 
liability) may be more appropriate.96 The dominance of lex loci damni may also not be the most suitable 
solution for purely virtual harms, where the place of damage has no physical location. 97  While the 
Regulation defines ‘harm or damage’ by reference to life, health, physical integrity, property and significant 
immaterial harm98, concepts such as property are currently expanding (eg to include cryptocurrencies held 
on decentralised blockchains – see Section 5 below), which increases the likelihood of harm or damage to 
goods that cannot readily be associated with a physical location. One commentator has noted99 that Rome 
II was not included in the list of provisions to which the European Parliament had regard in drafting its 
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For the purposes of Rome II, it will be important to observe how any future AI-specific legislation develops, 
and monitor how the instruments fit together. 
Section 5: AI and Rome II 
Under the law as it currently stands, Rome II applies to claims involving AI. It will continue to do so even 
after any new legislation in cases that fall outside such new legislation’s scope. This Section therefore 
analyses Rome II’s application to AI cases under the status quo. 
AI may pose particular challenges when applying the Rome II connecting factors where parties seek redress 
for damage caused by AI systems or to components of AI infrastructure. This Section will illustrate, through 
(real and hypothetical) examples, how each relevant article of Rome II might apply to cases involving AI. In 
general, the challenges in applying Rome II will not necessarily be new or unique to AI, but will involve 
increasingly complex incidences of familiar problems, often in combination. 
(i) Localisation 
The first key type of difficulty involves localising damage or effect. Many rules in Rome II direct us to identify 
‘the country in which the damage occurs,’101 ‘the country where the market is… affected,’102 ‘the country 
where the action is to be… taken,’103 or similar.104 Some AI systems have tangible outputs in identifiable 
geographic places, triggering the turn of a valve or switching on of a lamp. Others, however, have purely 
digital outputs, which may only (directly) affect a virtual space.105 One example would be an AI that 
“scrapes” data from one website and uses it automatically to generate content on another website.106 
Changes to virtual spaces, while not being tied to a particular location, may have consequences in many 
places at once. 
The courts have grappled with this problem in cases involving the internet, settling on a ‘mosaic’ approach 
in the defamation jurisdiction case of Shevill concerning Brussels I bis, which allows claimants to bring claims 
in any jurisdiction where damage occurs, limited to the portion of damage caused in that Member State.107 
This has been accompanied by an alternative doctrine, allowing the claimant to bring a claim for the full 
damage wherever it has its ‘centre of interests.’108 Through the principle of common interpretation, the 
mosaic approach also governs the concept of where damage occurs under Rome II, requiring the court to 
segment the damage by where it occurred and apply the law of each country to its relevant portion.109 
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The mosaic approach may conflict with Rome II principles of certainty and sound administration of justice 
by requiring defendants to comply with all international laws for content available online; and may conflict 
with the principle of proximity by exposing defendants to liability simply because of the tenuous connection 
created by the content being accessible there.110 Courts may as a result opt for the escape clause in Art. 
4(3) where possible. It seems that the ‘centre of interests’ approach has yet to be applied in a choice of law 
context, at least by the ECJ, but has been criticised in the context of jurisdiction.111 
For cases involving ‘information society service providers’112 established in the EU, Art. 3(1) and Recital 
(23) of the eCommerce Directive113 create a rule by which they may not be subjected to more onerous laws 
of other Member States than those which operate in their own country of establishment, justified by the trust 
placed in regulatory systems within the EU. 114  If an AI system producer or operator qualifies as an 
information society service provider, it may only be subject to the laws of its Member State of establishment, 
which would avoid the difficulties of localising a virtual space. Otherwise, however, AI producers and 
operators may be subject to overlapping laws with which they are only tangentially connected. These 
challenges may not be unique to or universal across AI systems, but the growth of AI will see them engaged 
more often and in a broader range of contexts. 
(ii) Negative Liability Gaps 
The second key difficulty is the potential of negative liability gaps, particularly where it is unclear which of 
several parties is responsible for causing damage. As explained in Section 1, AI systems typically involve 
contributions from multiple parties, who may be responsible for different aspects of (inter alia) its design, 
training, operation, application or monitoring. The preceding Sections 1-3 demonstrate the factual difficulty 
of pinpointing exactly why an AI system has gone wrong, and proving which party (or parties, where due 
to the interaction of multiple elements) caused the malfunction. The issue of multiple parties contributing to 
damage is not new, but AI involves particularly complex relationships between the various economic actors 
coupled with difficulties establishing factual causation and understanding what went wrong as a technical 
matter. 
In areas where fault is difficult to prove as a matter of fact, but justice requires redress, legal systems may 
respond with a default rule allocating strict liability to one of the parties who could be responsible, perhaps 
because they are the most efficient minimiser of loss (the “cheapest cost avoider”), the most able to bear the 
financial burden, or the most likely to be at fault as a matter of (insufficiently provable) fact.115 As legal 
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systems attempt to determine the optimal allocation of strict liability for AI, the best solution will not always 
be obvious and there may be a range of “right” answers,116 so we are likely to see different regimes 
allocating responsibility differently. A national regime may even allocate responsibility to the AI system itself, 
although little support now remains for granting algorithms legal personality.117  
This fragmentation could lead to negative liability gaps, where claimants who have been wronged and 
suffered damage caused by an AI system have no redress, even if all countries involved have allocated 
responsibility at a national level in such a way that a claim with no cross-border element would succeed in 
any one of them. For example, consider a conflicts rule that indicates the country of origin of the person 
claimed to be liable. In this example, the operator of an AI system has their origin in State A, and the 
producer in State B. The law of State A assigns strict liability to producers of AI systems, but only fault-based 
liability to operators.118 State B, by contrast, assigns strict liability to operators but only fault-based liability 
to producers.119 Assume that an affected person can establish that there has been fault somewhere in the 
process, but the opacity of the processes involved renders it impossible as a practical matter to pinpoint 
whether the producer or operator is responsible. A claim against the operator would fail as, applying the 
law of State A, the claimant would fail to establish the operator’s fault. Similarly, a claim against the 
producer would fail as, applying the law of State B, the claimant could not establish the producer’s fault. 
Claimants with both operator and producer in a single country would be able to claim redress against 
whichever of these parties to which the State had opted to allocate the burden of strict liability: the producer 
in State A, and the operator in State B. The only reason for the failure of the claim is reliance on the country 
of origin criterion in a situation where the producer and operator originate in different countries. This kind of 
negative liability gap would be inimical to the principles of legal certainty and the need to do justice in 
individual cases that underpin Rome II.120 
These two key difficulties will recur in the discussion of specific Rome II articles that follows. 
Art. 1: Scope 
Note in particular that ‘violations of privacy’ are excluded from the scope of Rome II under Art. 1(2)(g). 
While no case law conclusively determines the issue, it is likely that violations of privacy includes breaching 
obligations related to the processing of personal data, 121 despite the law in this area broadly having 
developed in the context of freedom of press and of expression. This is a type of breach that an AI is at risk 
of committing. 
Art. 4(1): The General Rule 
Art. 4(1) establishes the general rule, that ‘the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of 
a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the [direct] damage occurs.’ This rule can apply in the 
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usual manner to AI systems with an output engaging a physical component. However, AI systems that do 
not have tangible, physical outputs may face difficulties of localisation to a particular country (supra). When 
the AI system itself is damaged, it may also be difficult to connect the damage to a country if the AI has only 
a virtual presence. 
Art. 4(2): Exception to the General Rule 
Art. 4(2) establishes an exception to the general rule, ‘where the person claimed to be liable and the person 
sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same country’, applying the law of that country. 
As a matter of substantive law, it may be challenging to identify which party is legally capable of being held 
liable.122 If, for example, they have masked their identity, it may also be difficult to identify them as a 
practical matter. That said, once an individual has been identified and a claim brought against them, the 
mechanics of applying Art. 4(2) to identify the applicable law should be straightforward. The biggest risk is 
that of a negative liability gap arising from Art. 4(2)’s interaction with Art. 4(1) (see supra, and the medical 
care example below). 
Art. 4(3): Escape Clause 
Art. 4(3) indicates the law of a country which is ‘manifestly more closely connected with’ the breach of 
obligation, for example because of a pre-existing relationship between the parties. While this escape clause 
appears to be broad enough to consider matters particular to AI, 123  the Commission Explanatory 
Memorandum accompanying the Rome II Proposal emphasises that Art. 4(3) must reflect ‘the centre of 
gravity of the situation’, and must ‘remain exceptional’ because it ‘generates a degree of unforeseeability 
as to the law that will be applicable.’124 It has been convincingly argued that Art. 4(3) cannot be engaged 
simply because to do so would result in a more just outcome in the circumstances of the case.125 Therefore, 
while Art. 4(3) may avoid the negative liability gap problem where the facts independently indicate a 
manifestly closer connection, it is by no means a reliable solution. A schema where the default rule produces 
principled and predictable answers in AI cases would be more consistent with the Rome II desiderata than 
a heavy reliance on Art. 4(3).  
Art. 4 example: medical care 
AI could be used in many aspects of medical care, including diagnosis, predicting developments of an 
illness, assisting with surgery, and incorporation into medical implants. A range of substantive law solutions 
have been suggested to respond to these issues, including existing regimes like product liability and medical 
malpractice depending on the AI system in question and how the human actors interact with the AI126; and 
new solutions including integrated systems based on enterprise liability 127; with others suggesting that 
medical practitioners should retain ultimate legal responsibility128. This example will address the simple case 
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of an AI system that diagnoses patients based on medical imaging, making the assumption that the claim is 
a tort claim under Art. 4(1), rather than for example an Art. 5 claim for product liability.129 
An AI system, “Dr Blotson”, diagnoses a respiratory illness by comparing lung images to a bank of lung 
images belonging to people with and without the illness (a training dataset). In State A, where the training 
data was gathered, Dr Blotson was shown to be 75% accurate in diagnoses. Dr Blotson is used by a hospital 
in State B, where it fails to diagnose a patient. It is discovered that the illness presents differently in people 
with different genetic makeups, such that Dr Blotson is only 50% effective in diagnosing illnesses in people 
of ethnicities other than the one dominant in State A. Had the hospital not relied on the AI system, the human 
doctors would have correctly diagnosed the patient and started treatment. However, because human 
doctors are typically only 70% effective at diagnosing this illness, the hospital relied upon Dr Blotson. Dr 
Blotson’s failure to diagnose the illness has caused the patient’s lungs to suffer permanent damage. 
This is an example of sampling bias causing error.130 Fault may lie with a producer,131 such as the party 
responsible for collecting underrepresentative data, or the party who chose to train the AI system on 
underrepresentative data; or with a frontend operator, such as the hospital that implemented an AI system 
unsuitable for diagnosing patients in its geographical location. Whether any of these parties was at fault 
may depend on the respective knowledge of, and degree of care exercised by, each of them. The national 
legal systems of States A and B may adopt fault-based or strict liability regimes for each of these parties. 
Assuming the breach is of a non-contractual obligation, the lung damage is physical, so prima facie the 
place of damage under the Art. 4(1) general rule is State B.132 
If the patient habitually resides in State B, Art. 4(2) would lead to application of State B’s law in any claim 
against the hospital. If we presume that the producer(s) reside in State A, Art. 4(2) would not be engaged. 
However, application of Art. 4(1) would still most likely result in application of State B’s laws. 
If the patient was instead a habitual resident of State A, who was visiting parents in State B when she went 
to hospital, Art. 4(2) would not apply to any claim against the hospital, so the law of State B would again 
govern. However, the law applicable as against the producer(s) would be the law of State A. 
If the law of State B makes producers but not operators strictly liable, while the law of State A does the 
reverse, a patient habitually resident in State A would encounter a negative liability gap if she is unable to 
establish fault: she could not claim against the hospital under the laws of State B (place of damage), and 
could not claim against producers under the laws of State A (shared habitual residence), even though both 
domestic legal systems assign strict liability to one or other of the parties who may be responsible. 
In such a case, the court may be tempted to use the escape clause in Art. 4(3), applying the law of the 
country with a manifestly closer connection to the claim. However, it is not clear from the facts that one 
country is more closely connected to the dispute than the other. Any contractual or quasi-contractual 
 
 
129 Note that, if the Product Liability Directive is amended as proposed by the AI Civil Liability Resolution, this example would 
likely constitute a product. The current position is unclear: see supra. 
130 See Section 2(3)(c) 
131 For the purposes of this simplified example, it is presumed that these parties are producers rather than non-producer backend 
operators 
132 Recital (17) Rome II: ‘in cases of personal injury […] the country in which the damage occurs should be the country where the 
injury was sustained’, which includes damage likely to occur (Art. 2(3)(b)). Art. 2(1) defines damage as covering ‘any 
consequence arising out of’ a breach of non-contractual obligation. See also Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws 
(5th supp, 15th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) 32-054. This is subject to the caveat that, if the patient leaves State B after the 
misdiagnosis but before deterioration of the condition, a question may arise as to whether the deterioration is the direct damage 
or merely an indirect consequence. While there is no ECJ authority on this point, see the English case of Henderson v Jaouen 
[2002] EWCA Civ 75; [2002] 1 WLR 2971; see also discussion in Andrew Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The Law 





relationship between the patient and the hospital could probably not influence the law applicable to a claim 
against the producer(s). Arguments could be made concerning where the data was gathered, where the 
system was implemented, or which law a patient could expect to apply; however, none of these seem to 
point to a manifestly closer connection to one country or another. This means that Art. 4(3) could not be 
invoked in a way that promotes the Rome II desideratum of certainty, under which conditions the other 
desideratum of justice between the parties could not be sufficient alone to justify a departure from the rules 
in Arts. 4(1) and 4(2).  
Art. 4 example: automated investment AI 
AI and machine learning have grown rapidly in financial services, including robo-advisors133 and chatbots 
informing human decision-makers, and algorithmic trading through automated systems. 134  Automated 
systems are particularly dominant in forex trading. 
A forex trading AI system, “AFTAS”, is driven by a machine learning algorithm that spots previous patterns 
in market data indicating an imminent rise in currency. AFTAS Ltd is the producer and operator of AFTAS. 
As a marketing strategy, AFTAS Ltd starts publishing some free investment tips on their website when they 
are above 80% likely to lead to a value increase, promising more tips for people who sign up as paid 
members. One day, AFTAS Ltd’s CEO negligently introduces a virus into its code when illegally 
downloading a television show onto a work computer. The virus corrupts certain files, with the result that 
AFTAS starts automatically posting tips with only 40% likelihood of investment success. One user, in reliance 
on the 80% accuracy AFTAS Ltd advertises, invests as the tips suggest and loses €50,000 as a result. There 
is no contract: the parties have not voluntarily assumed obligations towards one another. However, the user 
wishes to bring a claim against AFTAS Ltd for breach of a non-contractual obligation. Assume that AFTAS 
Ltd is based in State A. Assume that the user is in State B when they see the online post, invests while in State 
C, then returns to their place of habitual residence in State D. The user’s banks account is located in State E. 
In this case, it is clear that AFTAS Ltd is the relevant defendant.135 It may be different if, for example, AFTAS 
relies on a public data source about currency information, an error in which external source causes the 
incorrect predictions. It may also be different if the algorithm begins posting lower probability investments 
because it “learns” to do so as a result of unforeseeable consequences of its programming, such as where 
an instruction to maximise profit for users leads it to redefine its own probability parameters as it encounters 
more data of profit resulting from high-risk investments. 
In the core example, however, applying Art. 4(1), there are multiple options for the place where the 
economic damage occurred, as opposed to indirect consequences of that damage. Cases could be made 
for State B, as the place of receiving negligent advice; State C, as the place of making the damaging 
investment; State D, as the place where the user suffers from reduced funds in practice; and State E, as the 
place where the quantity of the user’s money is actually reduced. Such difficulties associated with purely 
economic damage are familiar in the case law under both Rome II and Brussels I bis.136 Dicey suggests the 
approach to be taken is to ‘identify and locate the facts which represent the outward consequences of the 
defendant’s conduct – or of an event for which the defendant is claimed to be legally responsible – and 
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then to treat as the relevant “damage” those consequences which are directly linked to that conduct’.137 
Similarly, Dickinson analyses domestic case law requiring a ‘concrete transaction’, and suggests as useful 
the concept of ‘reversibility’, ie that the relevant damage occurs when (and where) the damaging 
consequences of the relevant conduct become irreversible or unavoidable.138 These solutions, if adopted, 
would indicate State C (the place of investment). 
What if an AI system automatically invests the user’s money? Here, the irreversible transaction would be 
made virtually, so has no obvious physical location (see localisation problem discussion supra). Perhaps 
one could refer back to the last place the user made a decision to delegate transactional authority to the AI 
system, although this does not satisfy the reversibility requirement because the user could remove such 
authority at any point until the automated transaction is executed. 
Note also the possibility of investment in cryptocurrencies, rather than traditional forex. Cryptocurrencies 
are held on decentralised blockchains, in other words, a network of computers holds the information relating 
to the owner’s asset. Unlike, for instance, a traditional bank account, which can be associated with a 
physical location, the network of computers making up a decentralised blockchain network can be spread 
across the world, can change dynamically as computers join and leave the data verification (“mining”) 
system, and could be difficult to reduce down to anything akin to a place of administration or centre of 
interests of the blockchain. That said, blockchains may be owned or operated by companies that are 
incorporated in a particular country, although using that as a connecting factor is arguably tenuous. 
The most complex scenario would be where the AI system itself operates on a decentralised blockchain, 
where both the AI code and the blockchain network are open source such that nobody claims ownership of 
either. 
Art. 4 example: hacking a data server139 
Consider in the AFTAS example that the algorithm was instead changed by an interfering third party hacker. 
AFTAS Ltd or the user may wish to bring a claim against the hacker for an intentional tort. This time, imagine 
that AFTAS Ltd and the user both habitually reside in and have made all material decisions in State A. AFTAS’ 
server is located in State B. The third-party hacker habitually resides in and conducted the hack from State 
C. 
For AFTAS Ltd, the place of direct damage appears to be State B where the server is located: any 
consequences for the company in State A seem indirect. However, connecting factors relying on the place 
of the server have been rejected by the ECJ as too tenuous in other cases140 (see also discussion in localising 
damage supra), and would not indicate an answer if the AI system is hosted on a decentralised blockchain. 
Dickinson argues that the tenuous nature of the connection should be relevant only as an Art. 4(3) escape 
clause consideration, although note also the risks of uncertainty associated with overreliance on Art. 4(3) 
(supra). 
For the user, the place of direct damage may be State A. Matters may vary as in the previous example 
where the factual scenario is more complicated, such as where decisions are automated or different parts 
of the investment process occur in different countries. 
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Art. 5: Product Liability 
For discussion of substantive legal issues that may arise as to whether an AI system qualifies as a product, 
see Sections 1 and 4 supra. In terms of Rome II’s provisions, the Regulation does not define the term 
‘product’, but it has been suggested that the understanding in the Product Liability Directive should guide an 
autonomous interpretation.141 This Section focuses on the application of Rome II’s cascade of connecting 
factors where the claim is established as one for product liability. 
Art 5(1): ‘marketed in that country’ 
Whether an AI product is marketed in a particular country should pose no more difficulties for AI products 
than for other products. 
One issue that exists in a non-AI context is whether products marketed in different countries with slight 
differences, eg in packaging, is one product or several. 142  The dynamic nature of AI may lead to 
exacerbated challenges in determining when a product is the same, or when it counts as a different product. 
For example, is an AI system that has undergone an update still the same product? Short of a complete 
rewrite of the code, what degree of change must be brought about through updates in order for the AI 
system to qualify as a new product? Similarly, is a machine learning algorithm trained on one dataset the 
same underlying product as that algorithm trained on a different dataset, or are they sufficiently different in 
function and internal structure to count as different products? 
Consider a product which relies on AI to shut down when components overheat. A company may produce 
a core machine learning algorithm for such a system and train it on data from State A, a hot country, for one 
version of the product. The company uses data from State B, a cold country, for the version of the product 
marketed in State B. A person habitually resident in State B sustains damage from a version of the product 
trained on State A data. If the differently trained systems are the same product, Art. 5(1)(a) will indicate 
State B’s law. If the versions constitute different products, Art. 5(1)(a) will not apply and subsequent stages 
in the cascade must be considered. 
Art 5(1)(b): ‘the country in which the product was acquired’ 
AI systems bought at distance face the same difficulties as other at-distance transactions, in that the place of 
acquisition is unclear when the places of receipt and distribution are different.143 AI systems are likely to be 
purchased at distance, particularly where they are purely virtual. More significantly, it may not even be 
possible to identify a physical place of either dispatch or receipt for virtual products, hosted in a virtual 
marketplace for use in a virtual space, without resorting to fictions (see localisation discussion supra). 
Art 5(1)(c): ‘damage’ 
See discussion of localisation and Art. 4(1) supra. 
Art 5: ‘could not reasonably foresee the marketing of the product, or a product of the same type’ 
Barring the difficulties in discerning whether each iteration of a machine learning AI is the same product or 
different, the main difficulty with the foreseeability clause does not arise where an AI system is marketed, but 
where it is responsible for marketing another product. A marketing AI may autonomously decide, perhaps 
because of exposure to more global data or in response to a market shift, that it would be more 
advantageous to target its marketing at consumers in a new country. On one view, the manufacturer should 
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foresee marketing by an online AI system anywhere in the world unless designated as impermissible in the 
AI’s code. Narrower interpretations could limit the regions foreseeable for marketing by the AI related to 
the language of the advert, any geographical restrictions on places of sale of goods with physical presence, 
or geographical restrictions on virtual goods subject to geoblocking.144 
Art 5(2): ‘manifestly closer connection’ 
See discussion of Art. 4(3) supra. 
Art. 6: Unfair Competition and Acts Restricting Free Competition 
Substantive competition law will be significantly affected by the growth of AI. It must respond to the growth 
of non-price and multi-sided data markets; increasing competition for rather than on markets, particularly 
as data monopolisation generates network effects that tip markets in favour of dominant players; automated 
algorithmic collusion without human agreement (or even intention) to collude; new ways to exploit patterns 
of consumer behaviour through individualised targeting, including self-preferencing145 and individualised 
dynamic pricing;146 and increasingly complex relations between upstream and downstream competitors 
that leverage market power in new ways.147 As different competition law regimes respond differently to 
these new challenges, this may create complexities in determining whether an allegedly anticompetitive act 
falls within the (autonomously defined) scope of Art. 6. 
As for the Art. 6 connecting factors, Art. 6(1)’s reference to ‘collective interests of consumers’, particularly 
since interpretation in VKI as concerning directing activities to that Member State,148 may give rise to a 
mosaic of applicable laws.149 The most unique challenge in AI cases may lie in identifying whether, for the 
purposes of Art. 6(3), a country’s market ‘is, or is likely to be, affected,’ where the market for AI systems or 
components is non-price and/or multi-sided. 
If, for example, a social media company in State A gathers data on citizens of State B in exchange for use 
of the social media platform, and another State A company buys that data to train an individualised dynamic 
pricing AI targeting State B, is State B a relevant market for the purposes of a claim against the social media 
company, or the pricing company, or neither? Assuming that this is not excluded from the scope of Rome II 
by virtue of Art. 1(2)(g)150, the answer may depend on whether competition law harms are treated narrowly, 
as restricted to price effects for consumers; or as incorporating broader considerations as part of quality of 
goods.151 
Art. 7: Environmental Damage 
AI has great potential to help the environment, including through analysing data in manufacturing, resource 
extraction, utilities and agriculture to identify the most resource-efficient ways to organise business 
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processes, and to minimise environmentally harmful by-products and accidents. The industrial Internet of 
Things increasingly allows for automated real-time improvements based on inputs gathered across all 
devices on a network, not just a single economic operator.152 However, it also means that these mechanisms 
become open to risks of algorithmic error or cybersecurity threats, meaning that the cause of environmental 
damage may not be the economic actor (frontend operator), but a party involved in the development or 
remote operations (producer or backend operator) of the AI system. 
Art. 7 itself relies on Art. 4(1), so its application could be affected by the same considerations discussed in 
the relevant section above. Its second connecting factor, ‘the law of the country in which the event giving 
rise to the damage occurred’, raises unique considerations. As environmental damage by definition has a 
physical component, it could be tied to a country by interpreting ‘event giving rise to the damage’ as 
meaning the first location where the AI system has a physical output. However, if the system is operated 
remotely or if the defect lies in the system’s development, this interpretation might not be the most efficient 
way to deter environmental damage. The Commission Rome II Proposal153 emphasises that the purpose of 
Art. 7 is to ensure a high level of legislative protection by ensuring that the polluter pays, particularly as it 
typically derives economic benefit from allowing the environmental harm. If an AI backend operator or 
producer saves costs by implementing a system, in ways that the user does not understand, the deterrent 
may be more efficiently and justly targeted at the backend operator, which could perhaps be achieved by 
treating the ‘event’ as the algorithmic error or defect. This would align with Kainz, where the court held that 
the event giving rise to damage in product liability is manufacture rather than sale.154 However, it may be 
difficult to localise the virtual event (supra). 
Art. 8: IP Infringement 
As AI develops, IP law faces many new challenges. Automated IP infringement is now possible through, for 
example, “crawling” and “scraping” websites to extract data,155 for purposes ranging from publication156 
and passing off157 to training new machine learning AIs. AI systems can create content, giving rise to the 
question of whether an AI’s output can be copyrighted158 or benefit from analogous protection.159 The 
protection afforded to AI systems themselves is also complicated, as IP law must draw an appropriate 
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distinction between algorithms as natural mathematical functions incapable of protection, and AI 
applications that attract a legal response.160 
The Rome II connecting factors for IP infringements indicate ‘the law of the country for which protection is 
claimed’ for intellectual property rights;161 and for unitary Community intellectual property rights, where not 
identified by a specific instrument, 162  ‘the law of the country in which the act of infringement was 
committed.’163 The former will depend very much on how substantive laws develop to respond to the 
challenges identified above.164 The latter may face the difficulty of localising acts of infringement to a 
particular country if the copyright infringement occurs purely in a virtual space (supra). 
Art. 9: Industrial Action 
The law applicable to industrial action is ‘the law of the country where the action is to be, or has been, 
taken.’165 From Recital (27), it appears that whether an act is an industrial action is to be determined by the 
domestic law, rather than given autonomous interpretation.166 
This example will consider DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks, a common form of “hacktivism” 
which overloads a company’s server with traffic to stop that company from being able to function efficiently. 
It is possible that, in future, countries might develop national legislation treating DDoS attacks as a legitimate 
form of protest.167 If so, they may even be deployable as part of industrial action, including AI-driven DDoS 
attacks.168 If these developments occur, there may be a challenge in localising industrial action that occurs 
in a virtual space. Dickinson suggests, in the context of more traditional applications of Art. 9, that ‘[t]he 
connecting factor should be taken to refer to the country in which the acts of the workers collide with the 
interests of the employer,’ such that if one protests by staying at home, the place where the action is should 
be understood as where one is causing disruption by absence, namely the usual workplace. This should 
provide a solution in many instances of DDoS-driven industrial action, for example if the attack disrupts the 
company’s performance of tasks in a physical location. If, however, the industrial action impacts a company 
producing virtual outputs, perhaps where work is usually remote, this hurdle may be difficult to clear. 
Art. 10: Unjust Enrichment 
While unjust enrichment is difficult to define comprehensively, particularly in an autonomous way, AI systems 
will undoubtedly cause unjust enrichments. One ready example is through mistaken automated payment, 
which may occur as a result of errors such as those outlined in Section 2. Of particular note are “smart 
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contracts”, which technically speaking are not contracts at all,169 but rather codes capable of executing 
contractual promises once a programmed condition is met, often held on a decentralised blockchain ledger. 
This may lead to the release of funds under inappropriate circumstances, such as where a force majeure 
clause is not encoded into the programme but nonetheless would absolve a party of an obligation to perform 
by a particular date; or where a faulty sensor misrecords rainfall as part of a farming insurance scheme and 
pays out in error. 
Art. 10(1) indicates that, where non-contractual obligations arising out of unjust enrichment concern 
relationships ‘existing between the parties… closely connected with that unjust enrichment’, the law 
governing that relationship shall apply. “Smart contract” payment mechanisms will typically form part of a 
broader scheme of contractual agreement. However, they may be made operational before the parties 
have voluntarily assumed responsibilities to each other, so mistaken “smart contract” mechanism execution 
could in theory occur even where no contract has been formed. Other types of erroneous automated 
payment could also fall outside the rule in Art. 10(1). 
Art. 10(2) identifies the place where the parties habitually reside, which should present no conceptual 
difficulties, although it may be practically difficult to identify parties engaged in virtual transactions, 
particularly where anonymous systems like blockchain and cryptocurrencies are being used. Art. 10(3) 
identifies the law of the country in which the unjust enrichment took place, which again may create difficulties 
of localisation if the enrichment is virtual. For considerations to do with Art. 10(4), see discussion of Art. 4(3) 
supra on manifestly closer connection. 
Consider the Ethereum DAO (Decentralised Autonomous Organisation) hack. 170 In 2016, a hacker171 
identified a weakness172 in a “smart contract” that Ethereum, a prominent blockchain, had introduced to 
facilitate collective investment of cryptocurrency (“Ether”). The hacker sent a command to the “smart 
contract” that prompted it to repeatedly transfer Ether into the hacker’s personal wallet. If a member of the 
DAO could sue Ethereum for mistakenly paying out their money to the hacker,173 the rule in Art. 10(1) would 
probably apply, such that the law governing the relationship between the DAO member and Ethereum 
would govern the claim. The law governing the contract would likely be found in the DAO/Ethereum terms 
of service, although if no law is specified, the place of the virtual contract between the parties may be difficult 
to localise. 
A claim against the hacker may fall under the general rule in Art. 4 as an intentional tort. If unjust enrichment 
is engaged, however, one could resort to Art. 10(2) if the claimant and hacker habitually reside in the same 
country. Practical difficulties of traceability may be significant: the DAO hacker has still not been identified, 
despite having published communications with the Ethereum network. Given that it is possible to freeze 
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cryptoassets,174 there may conceivably be a situation in which disputed cryptoassets are located and held, 
but the new holder not identified, such that the country of habitual residence cannot be identified. If Art. 
10(2) does not apply, Art. 10(3) would ask in which country the unjust enrichment took place. Blockchain 
systems are decentralised, hosted on multiple servers across the world, and available to anyone to access 
through the internet. If the enrichment is treated as taking place in the virtual space, it is difficult to localise 
to an individual geographic location (see supra).  
Art. 11: Negotiorum Gestio 
Negotiorum gestio may involve AI if the intervention in favour of the beneficiary is carried out by an AI 
system. This could occur if, for instance, the AI executes transactions that were not the intended output of the 
AI but are nonetheless in the beneficiary’s interest; or if the intervener implements an AI system to carry out 
a transaction that is not authorised by the beneficiary. It is important to bear in mind that the intervener 
remains the human deployer of the AI system. If an AI system teaches itself to go beyond its authorised remit, 
there must be a question of how foreseeable that development was to someone in the intervener’s position. 
Unless AI systems are attributed legal personality of their own (unlikely – see supra), they cannot be treated 
as an agent. 
As Art. 11 follows the same structure of connecting factor rules as Art. 10, the possible AI-related issues are 
broadly the same. Presumably, interventions are less likely to happen anonymously than in unjust enrichment 
cases, so there should be fewer practical difficulties in identifying habitual residence for the purposes of Art. 
11(2). As for Art. 11(3), negotiorum gestio also seems less likely to be limited to virtual benefits, so the 
difficulties of Art. 10(3) are less likely to arise. 
Art. 12: Culpa in Contrahendo 
Culpa in contrahendo is an autonomous concept limited to breaches of non-contractual obligation with a 
‘direct link with the dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract’, such as violating the duty of disclosure 
and breakdown in contractual negotiations.175 AI is impacting the world of pre-contractual dealings through 
the nascent development of automated negotiating tools, which currently operate as chatbots within limits 
set by the operating company, that make contact with potential clients and conclude deals on the company’s 
behalf. 176  Errors of the sort set out in Section 2 may result in the negotiating chatbot making 
misrepresentations about the company.177 
Art. 12(1) indicates the law of the contract, or the law that would have been applicable to the contract had 
it been entered into. In most cases, this should not pose particular AI-related difficulties, as the law of the 
contract will likely be specified and is not obviously different based on whether it was concluded through 
an AI or through human actors.178 Provisions 12(2)(a)-(c) mirror the connecting factors identified in Arts. 
4(1)-(3), and the pre-contractual context does not appear to cause any significant differences in 
application, so the same analysis as above will apply to these provisions. 
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Arts. 16 and 26: Overriding Mandatory Provisions and Public Policy of the Forum 
AI engages significant human rights considerations. As described above, personal data used to train 
machine learning algorithms raises significant privacy concerns, particularly as methods of inferring more 
sensitive information develop with advances in AI and the increasing breadth of data stored. Algorithmic 
bias can result in discriminatory results drawn on lines of protected characteristics, even where the AI system 
is instructed not to discriminate on excluded features, because of redundant encoding and discrimination by 
proxy. AI systems can facilitate mass surveillance, including by state authorities and other entities; track and 
analyse people’s daily habits, including to retrace and de-anonymise data about individuals; and influence 
public discourse and electoral processes, for example by prioritising information seen by users of online 
platforms.179 These concerns tend naturally towards being the subject of overriding mandatory provisions in 
domestic and EU legislation, and to engaging the public policy of the forum. As such, we may see more 
instances of these provisions applying to AI cases than we do for other subject matters.  
Conclusion 
The growth of AI brings with it many legal challenges for substantive regimes, but the biggest issues for the 
application of Rome II lie in localising intangible damage, particularly involving virtual assets or virtual 
spaces; and the risk of liability gaps due to complex and opaque relations between components and parties. 
Rome II may be a limited tool in addressing this issue, particularly given the desideratum of uniform 
application, and the current unpredictability around how substantive AI law will develop in domestic systems 
and EU legislation. When deciding how Rome II should adapt to the rise of AI, we should consider the 
practicalities of how AI causes damage, how national and international legislation is likely to develop, and 
the EU principles governing this sector. 
 
2.2.2 Business and Human Rights 
Over the past decades, transnational corporations have increasingly extended their activities yet the 
possibility to hold them accountable for human rights abuses is met with many obstacles, including the 
conflict-of-laws rules.180  
In the European Union, courts dealing with cross-border tort cases apply the Rome II Regulation to determine 
the applicable law.  
The provisions of Rome II developed here are the ones relevant to business and human rights litigation and 
have been discussed either in literature, case law, or by the respondents to the consultation.  
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• EU developments on mandatory corporate human rights due diligence 
On 11 September 2020, the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament published a report 
containing a draft directive on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability (“Draft Directive”).181 
Between October 2020 and February 2021, the European Commission carried out a public consultation 
for an Inception Impact Assessment on Sustainable Corporate Governance. 182 The initiative intends to 
“promote compliance with all relevant obligations under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and ensure 
the coherence of the EU’s internal and external policies in the area of human and labour rights”.183 As part 
of the initiative, two studies were commissioned: one on human rights and environmental due diligence in 
the supply chain,184 and one on board duties and sustainable corporate governance.185 On 10 March 
2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution with recommendations to the Commission on 
corporate due diligence and corporate accountability (2020/2129(INL)). 186  The findings and 
recommendations that are relevant to the provisions of Rome II are detailed below (see in particular “Article 
16: overriding mandatory provisions).  
Another relevant development in the field is the restrictive sanctions regime adopted by the European Union 
on 7 December 2020 to address serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide – the EU Global 
Human Rights Sanctions Regime. This sanctions regime comprises two legal acts: Council Decision (CFSP) 
2020/1999187 and Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998188. This sanctions regime comprises two types 
of measures applicable all persons, entities and bodies under EU jurisdiction: financial sanctions and 
restrictions on movement (travel ban). The EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime has been welcomed 
as a positive step toward human rights protection and accountability, although some academics point out 
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• Article 4(1): lex loci damni 
In transnational cases involving human rights abuses, under the general rule of Article 4(1) of the Rome II 
Regulation, the applicable law is the law of the country where the damage happened (lex loci damni).  
When multinational corporations carry out cross-border activities, human rights abuses committed by their 
subsidiaries or suppliers in developing countries (host states) will then usually be governed by the law of the 
host state. Although the advantage or disadvantage of the lex loci dami for the claimant depends on the 
host state involved, it can mean that the law applicable will be the law of a state with weak regulatory 
standards, poor rule of law or governance structures.190  The content of the foreign applicable law will not 
in itself necessarily be less protective or elaborated regarding human rights, but the enforcement 
mechanisms may be lacking, the amount of damages available may be lower, and the statute of limitations 
to bring a claim might also be considerably shorter.191 
For example, when considering the case of Jabir and others v KiK, which had been brought before the 
German courts, a study requested by the European Parliament pointed out that the fact that the law of the 
host State (Pakistan) was the applicable law under the general rule of Rome II “created major hurdles” for 
the claimants because of the lower health, safety and labour standards, weaker governance structure and 
enforcement mechanisms, and shorter statutes of limitation provided by Pakistani law.192 In the 2020 Draft 
Directive on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability, the European Parliament concluded that 
“the application of the general rule in Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation can lead to significant problems 
for claimants who are victims of human rights abuses, particularly in cases where the companies are large 
multinationals operating in countries with low human rights standards, where it is almost impossible for them 
to obtain fair compensation.”193 
• Article 4(3): escape clause 
If the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a specific country, Article 4(3) allows for the 
application of the law of that country. In business and human rights cases, the escape clause of Article 4(3) 
will usually not allow a departure from the lex loci damni, as illustrated by the Jabir and others v KiK case: 
the Dortmund court discarded the claimants’ argument that German law was applicable under the escape 
clause of Article 4(3) of Rome II. According to the court, there was a significantly closer connection of the 
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case to Pakistani law than to German law because both the place of the tort and the claimants’ habitual 
residence were located in Pakistan.194 
Article 4(3) cannot be used to escape the application of the general rule of the place of injury even if the 
applicable foreign law violates fundamental human rights.195 Such issues are to be determined with the 
intervention of overriding mandatory provisions (Article 16) or the public policy of the forum (Article 26). 
• Article 7: the environmental damage exception 
Article 7 allows claimants to choose between the lex loci damni and the law of the country in which the 
event giving rise to the damage occurred. Environmental damage such as water pollution or emission of air 
pollutants usually implies a cross-border impact, and Article 7 tackles the ubiquitous nature of environmental 
damage by considering both the place of the act and the place of the result. The “principle of ubiquity” 
extended in Article 7 has been commented on as adequately ensuring that the private interests of the victims 
coincide with the highest level of environmental protection, all the while limiting the incentive for a strategic 
implantation of polluting companies at the border of jurisdictions with laxer rules.196   
Similarly, in the context of human rights abuses, applying exclusively the law of the place where the damage 
is sustained might give operators incentive to opt for subsidiaries or suppliers incorporated in countries where 
regulatory rules or enforcement mechanisms are laxer (such has been specifically pointed out by 20% of 
the consulted stakeholders who are experts in business and human rights). A conflict-of-laws rule similar to 
Article 7 and designed for business and human rights cases could adequately deter harmful activities of EU-
based multinational corporations in host countries.197 On the other hand, the principle of ubiquity has also 
been criticised as resulting in legal uncertainty for companies.198  
In the Akpan v Shell case, a farmer and fisherman living in a village in Nigeria claimed that his livelihood 
had been harmed as a result of oil leaking from an installation operated by a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Royal Dutch Shell Plc (headquartered in the Netherlands).199 The ratione temporis requirement of Rome II 
was not met so the Dutch court applied Nigerian law as a result of the application of its domestic conflict-
of-laws rules. Initially, the liability of the subsidiary was established but not the one of the parent company 
as Nigerian law did not allow for parent company liability in the particular circumstances. If Rome II had 
been applicable, Article 7 would have offered to the claimant the possibility to choose the law of the country 
in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred, namely Dutch law. Whether the application of Dutch 
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law would have created different results as to liability remains however debated. 200  On appeal, the 
approach adapted by the Court of Appeal of the Hague differed. The Court inter alia referred to past cases 
on foreign direct liability, to the recurrence of oil spills and of legal actions over the last 60 years, and to 
the increased attention towards the consequences of these oil spills on humans and the environment, to 
conclude that it must have been “reasonably foreseeable” for the parent company that they would have 
had liability.201 The Court ordered Shell to produce several documents for inspection, “assuming for now 
the possibility under Nigerian law under (very) special circumstances of a parent company’s liability for 
violation of a duty of care”.202  On January 29, 2021, applying Nigerian law, the Court of Appeal of the 
Hague held Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary liable for the damage resulting from the leakage of the pipelines, 
and ordered the subsidiary to compensate farmers for damage to their land. The amount of the 
compensation has yet to be determined in a follow-up procedure. 203  
In their 2020 Draft Directive on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability, the European 
Parliament noted that “while the Rome II Regulation provides for special provisions in relation to certain 
sectors, including environmental damage, it does not include any special provision in relation to business-
related human rights claims”.204 The Draft Directive suggested that a new article 6a should be inserted in 
Rome II “so as to allow victims of business-related human rights violations to choose between the law of the 
country in which the damage occurred (lex loci damni), the law of the country in which the event giving rise 
to the damage occurred (lex loci delicti commissi) and the law of the place where the defendant undertaking 
is domiciled or, lacking a domicile in the Member State, where it operates.”205 The European Parliament 
resolution of 10 March 2021 however does not contain the suggested amendment, and opted for the 
overriding mandatory provision approach (see below at Article 16).  
• Article 14(1): choice of law 
Under Article 14(1), the parties may agree to submit non-contractual obligations to the law of their choice: 
(a) by an agreement entered into after the event giving rise to the damage occurred; (b) or where all the 
parties are pursuing a commercial activity, also by an agreement freely negotiated before the event giving 
rise to the damage occurred. 
In Jabir and others v KiK, claimants argued that previous out-of-court negotiations amounted to an implied 
choice of German statute of limitations law under Article 14(1)(a) of Rome II. The Dortmund court rejected 
the implied choice of law by pointing out that at the time, neither the parties nor their representatives were 
aware of the limitation periods applicable under Pakistani law. The court laid as a requirement that parties 
must be aware of all the implications of their choice for such choice to be valid. The Higher Regional Court 
of Hamm confirmed the conclusion of the Dortmund Court but developed its argumentation closer to the 
drafting of Rome II, referring to the requirement that an implied choice of law must be “demonstrated with 
reasonable certainty by the circumstances of the case”.206 
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• Article 16: overriding mandatory provisions  
Article 16 provides for the possibility, in exceptional circumstances, of applying the provisions of the law of 
the forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the non-
contractual obligation. Overriding mandatory provisions are to be understood as “national provisions with 
which compliance has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic 
order in the Member State concerned as to require compliance therewith by all persons present on the 
national territory of that Member State and all legal relationships within that State”.207 
Overriding mandatory provisions may play a part in business and human rights litigation and have been 
described as “promising” in that respect. 208  The recent national legislative initiatives on a mandatory 
corporate duty of care regarding human rights and the environment, as well as the discussions about 
mandatory due diligence at the European level, are of particular interest here. France is among those at the 
most advanced stage with the adoption of the “Duty of Vigilance” Law n° 2017-399, which came into 
effect in 2017. The French due diligence law implemented in the French Commercial Code the new article 
L.225-102-5 under which companies can be found liable if they breach their duty of care for human rights 
abuses and environmental damage. Whether this provision could intervene as an overriding mandatory 
provision under Article 16 of Rome II is debated.209 The French bill initially provided for a penalty of up to 
10 million euros (that could be tripled if the liability of the company was engaged on the basis of a breach 
of its obligations which caused damage). The French Constitutional Council deemed the provision 
unconstitutional and deleted it. Without this punitive feature, some authors are of the opinion that the French 
due diligence law will not qualify as an overriding mandatory provision.210  
Due diligence initiatives gained momentum in other European countries: 
In Switzerland, under the Swiss public referendum system of direct democracy, a coalition of civil society 
organisations launched the Responsible Business Initiative (RBI) in 2015, to include mandatory human rights 
due diligence as a fiduciary duty for companies within the Swiss constitution Between 2017 and 2020, the 
Council of States and the National Council (respectively the Swiss Parliament's upper and lower houses) 
made a number of counterproposals to the initiative, including limitations on its scope of application and 
liability regime. 211 The Swiss Parliament ultimately adopted the Council of State’s bill, which scales back the 
initial initiative.212 The bill would apply to companies which, alone or together with one or more domestic or 
foreign companies controlled by them, exceed two of the following values in two consecutive financial 
years: a balance sheet total of 40 million Swiss francs, sales of 80 million Swiss francs, and 500 full-time 
positions on an annual average. The liability regime only applies to the damage to life and personal integrity 
or to the violation of the right to property. The liability of managers and directors of a company is expressly 
excluded. Liability for companies effectively controlled abroad is not regulated. Mandatory due diligence 
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is limited to the sectors of conflict minerals and child labour, and takes the shape of an obligation to report. 
In light of the limitations contained in the bill, the Civil society organisations did not support the bill, and did 
not withdraw their initiative. The RBI was rejected by a majority of cantons after a nationwide vote on 
November 29, despite winning the popular vote. The Council of State’s bill will thus become law. 
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Senate adopted the Child Labour Due Diligence Law in 2019.213 The Dutch 
law applies to companies that sell or supply goods or services to Dutch end-users, including companies 
registered outside the Netherlands.214 Such companies are under the obligation to determine whether there 
is a reasonable suspicion that child labour occurs in the supply chain, and to develop and implement an 
action plan is such a suspicion exists.215 Companies must also issue a due diligence statement on their 
investigation and action plan. 216  A regulator is appointed, and is responsible for publishing the due 
diligence statement and filing complaints from victims and other stakeholders. 217 If there are concrete 
evidence that the company failed to comply, the Dutch law imposes a fine of EUR 4,100. Repeated non-
compliance can lead to fines of up to EUR 870,000 (or alternatively 10% of the annual turnover) and 
criminal liability. 
In September 2020, the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER), the Dutch government's 
main advisory body for social and economic policy, issued an advisory report called “Working together 
for Sustainable Supply Chain Impact”, calling for mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence 
legislation. The report encourages in particular “the broadest and deepest possible application of these 
Guideline (the OECD Guidelines and UNGPs): for the broadest possible group of companies (including 
SMEs) and as deeply as possible at all stages of the due diligence process (including addressing identified 
risks and contributing to access to redress and remedy).”218 In October 2020, the Dutch Minister for Foreign 
Trade and Development Cooperation, addressed a memorandum to the parliament setting out the results of 
the current policy in the field of international corporate social responsibility and presenting the new policy. 
The new policy contains a broad due diligence obligation, and replaces the transparency obligation of the 
current policy which held a limited effect on international corporate social responsibility. It is not yet been 
introduced as legislation. 
In Germany, the government announced their intention to start working on a mandatory due diligence law 
in December 2019. On 3 March 2021, the Federal Cabinet passed an official government Draft Bill on 
corporate due diligence in supply chains (“Sorgfaltspflichtengesetz”),219 which entered the parliamentary 
procedure on 22 April 2021. Under the Draft Bill , companies based in Germany with 3,000 or more 
employees must take steps to prevent human rights violations in their supply chains, establish complaint 
mechanisms, and report on their due diligence activities. The initial intent to establish civil liability in case of 
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breach of the obligations did not make it to the Draft Bill. However, violations of the obligations set forth in 
the Draft Bill will be sanctioned with fines, which can amount to up to 2% of the average annual turnover for 
companies with more than 400 million euros annual turnover. 
 
In Norway, the government appointed the Ethics Information Committee in 2018 to assess the adoption of 
a Supply Chain Transparency Act. The Committee issued a report in February 2020, followed by the draft 
proposal for an Act regulating companies’ transparency about supply chains, duty to know and due 
diligence.220 On 9 April 2021, the Norwegian government proposed a new legislation, Proposition 150 L 
(2020-2021) “Act on business transparency and work with fundamental human rights and decent work”,221 
that would require around 8000 Norwegian companies to disclose what measures they take to ensure the 
protection of human rights in their value chains. If the Act is adopted, companies will be under the obligation 
to disclose the negative impacts and risks the company has identified through its due diligence activities, 
and the measures taken to cease or prevent negative impacts and mitigate risks of such impacts. Failure to 
comply with the disclosure obligation can lead to fines.  
In Belgium, on 22 April 2021, the Federal Parliament voted in favour of a due diligence bill proposal to 
establish a duty of vigilance and a duty of responsibility for companies throughout their supply chains.222 
Under the Belgian bill, companies are required to adopt mechanisms that allow them to continuously 
identify, prevent, stop, minimize and remedy any potential and / or effective violation of human rights, and 
labour and environmental standards throughout their supply chains. The obligation also applies to their 
subsidiaries. Failure to comply with the obligations set forth in the bill may result in criminal penalties and / 
or exclusion from public procurement. 
Mandatory provisions are typically applied in exceptional circumstances on a case by case basis, and their 
exact potential in corporate human rights abuses cases remains to be seen. 223 National initiatives on 
mandatory due diligence are positive efforts towards corporate accountability, but they also result in a 
fragmented legal framework leading to legal uncertainty and an uneven playing field for businesses.224 In 
the 2020 European Commission study on due diligence requirements through the supply chain, almost all 
the companies consulted were in favour of a policy change to introduce a general standard at the EU 
level.225 In that respect, some authors were in favour of classifying the provisions of the European Parliament 
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Draft Directive as imperative, and thus as overriding mandatory provisions in the meaning of Article 16 of 
Rome II, to ensure their application irrespective of the otherwise applicable law. 226 This approach was 
adopted in the European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2021.227  
• Article 17: rules of safety and conduct 
Under Article 17, in assessing the conduct of the person claimed to be liable, account shall be taken, as a 
matter of fact and in so far as is appropriate, of the rules of safety and conduct which were in force at the 
place and time of the event giving rise to the liability. Although “account shall be taken” of the rules of safety 
and conduct, the application of article 17 is discretionary and the rules of safety and conduct shall be 
considered “as a matter of fact”, i.e. they cannot be applied as law.228 
In transnational business and human rights cases, rules of safety and conduct may play a role as the court 
would be allowed to take into account its domestic behavioural standards that may be more stringent than 
those of the host state, even if the law of the latter if applicable.229 Taking account of the rules does not mean 
they will apply and replace the applicable law. Safety and conduct rules are to be treated as a matter of 
fact to assess, for instance, “the seriousness of the fault or the author’s good or bad faith for the purposes of 
the measure of damages”.230 
The practical application (and potential efficiency) of Article 17 to business and human rights cases is “an 
avenue worth exploring” but still remains to be seen.231 Article 17 cannot be used to establish an alternative 
connection to the place where the event giving rise to the damage happened in case of corporate human 
rights abuses.232 
• Article 26: public policy 
Under Article 26, the application of a provision of the law of any country specified by the Rome II Regulation 
may be refused if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the 
forum. The public policy exception requires the court to engage in an examination of the applicable foreign 
law to determine whether it is “manifestly” incompatible with the public policy of the forum. Regarding 
business and human rights cases where the law of the host state is applicable, the public policy exception 
might work as a “minimum guarantee” of protection as human rights principles are part of the public policy 
of the forum.233 All EU Member States must be a party to the ECHR and the European Social Charter, and 
will bound by customary international law. In Krombach v Bamberski, the CJEU recognised that the public 
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policy exception in the Brussels Convention could be invoked “in exceptional cases where the guarantees 
laid down in the legislation of the State of origin and in the Convention itself have been insufficient to protect 
the defendant from a manifest breach of his right to defend himself before the court of origin, as recognised 
by the ECHR”.234 
A decision from the CJEU rendered in the context of the Brussels I Regulation limits the scope of application 
of the public policy exception by providing that it is not sufficient, to invoke a public policy exception, that 
a court considers the provisions of the applicable foreign law as wrong in their substance and conclusion.235 
In Jabir and others v KiK, the claimants submitted that the limitation rules under Pakistani law were 
incompatible with the public policy of the German and European legal systems. Additionally, the claimants 
concluded that a limitation period of only one year led to an infringement of the claimants’ fundamental 
national and European rights to a fair trial and effective legal protection. The Dortmund court discarded the 
public policy argument, pointing out that the German legal system provided for similarly short or even shorter 
limitation periods for certain claims.236 Although the Higher Regional Court of Hamm confirmed the findings 
of the Dortmund court, it admitted that “a one-year limitation period, in particular in the event of death, is a 
very short limitation period which is, as far as can be seen, unknown in the European legal area”.237  
In Hamad Begum v Maran, on application of Article 4 Rome II, the law of Bangladesh applied. A non-
extendible one-year limitation period under Bangladeshi law rendered the claim statute-barred. The Court 
of Appeal however agreed that the question of whether it would cause undue hardship to impose the shorter 
limitation period under Bangladeshi law should be determined as a preliminary issue, allowing the claimant 
to rely on Article 26.238 The English court seemed to extend the category of “public policy” to include “undue 
hardship” by reference to a statute (Foreign Limitation Periods Act) that did not apply in that case (being 
displaced by Rome II). 
The practical application of the public policy exception to transnational business and human rights cases 
remains uncertain. Even though differences might exist between legal systems as to statutes of limitations or 
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Civil society organizations240  and the EU Parliament241 have called upon the EU Commission to take actions 
to fight against Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs). The Commission Work Programme 
2021 announced “action to protect journalists and civil society against strategic lawsuits against public 
participation” in the form of an initiative against abusive litigation targeting journalists and civil society 
(legislative or non-legislative), in the last quarter of 2021242. A call to constitute an expert group has been 
made. 
As instructed by the EU Commission, the present Study addresses the specific issue of the law applicable to 
claims in tort for defamation when they are used as SLAPPs. It draws conclusions as to the best way to tackle 
the issue against the backdrop of the Rome II Regulation. 
 
Introduction and Definitions 
The term SLAPPs was first coined in the late ’80s by Canan and Pring.243 In its original sense, the term only 
designated suits against citizens petitioning the government regarding a matter of public interest or concern. 
The right to “petition the government” is enshrined in the 1st Amendment of the US Constitution and is 
generally thought to encompass any actions directed at attempting to promote or discourage governmental 
action, and in most cases relates to activity that is also protected by the right to free speech, such as sit-ins 
or advocacy actions of different kinds. In later literature, especially outside of the US, SLAPPs has been 
extended to mean any suits that target citizens individually, or civil society organizations that are actively 
engaging in activities for the public interest.  
In the EU context, SLAPPs have been defined as “groundless or exaggerated lawsuits and other legal forms 
of intimidation initiated by state organs, business corporations and individuals in power against weaker 
parties – journalists, civil society organisations, human rights defenders and others – who express criticism 
or transmit messages uncomfortable to the powerful, on a public matter”.244 
Typical examples of victims of SLAPPs are journalists, protestors, activists and campaigners in matters of 
corruption, environmental protection, cultural and minority rights and other issues of public interest.  
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While SLAPPs can take many different forms, including non-purely legal strategies, a great majority of them 
involves claims in defamation. The purpose of such claims is to discredit the victim with the primary intent to 
weaken and ultimately shut down their actions on matters of public interest.  
In addition, while most SLAPPs originate in a domestic context, the actual claim can take a cross-border 
dimension. This can happen as part of the claimant’s strategy to make it more difficult and costly for the 
victim to defend (e.g. by suing them in a different jurisdiction, in a different language and/or based on the 
law of a different country), and also to take advantage of the law or practice of a country which may be 
more favourable to the claimant than the one that would be applied in the victim’s home country.  
 
SLAPPs and the Rome II Regulation 
EU law does not regulate SLAPPs and no Member States have specific rules on the topic.245 The Rome II 
Regulation does not cover defamation.  
Therefore, lacking any PIL or substantive EU measure on the matter, in cross-border SLAPPs based on 
defamation, each Member State resorts to its own conflict-of-laws rules and to the applicable substantive 
law, the content of which is different across jurisdictions. In addition, as highlighted by the Malta National 
Report, because defamation is covered by the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but is excluded from other rules that 
determine the applicable law (the Rome Regulations), this has inadvertently facilitated forum shopping in 
matters relating to defamation. 
In some cases, SLAPPs may be submitted to third-country laws, which may lead to unsatisfactory outcomes 
with respect to EU standards of freedom of speech and other fundamental rights.246  
Therefore, the current EU legal context allows ample room for manoeuvre regarding forum and law 
shopping tactics on the part of plaintiffs in cross-border SLAPPs.  
Given this unsatisfactory situation, it seems that an EU unified approach to the conflict-of-laws in SLAPPs 
based on defamation could mitigate the difficulties of victims in a cross -border context.  
As called from different actors,247 defamation in itself, including outside the context of SLAAPs, should be 
included in the Rome II Regulation and a preference should be given to the law designating the law of the 
victim's habitual residence, without prejudice to Art. 14.248 
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This solution would hinder plaintiffs in SLAPPs to artificially create the conditions for submitting the claim to 
a law of a country with which the victim is not familiar. In addition, because the rule seems to be appropriate 
for any claim in defamation, it does not require the victim to prove that the claim is a SLAPP, which is arguably 
a very difficult proof to provide. Furthermore, since the rule would be uniform across Europe, it would also 
contribute to reduce forum shopping within the EU. Finally, unlike other proposals for a unified rule on 
SLAPPs, this rule would have the advantage of being generally acceptable in the EU and also possible to 
implement procedurally.249  
By contrast, a few open issues would remain. First, as it has been argued, victims of SLAPPs should qualify 
for a specific PIL protection as they are the “weak party“ in the relationship250 (i.e., the claim). For some 
weak parties, such as consumers251 and commercial agents252, the EU provides a certain protection also 
with regard to the application of the law of a third-country laws, when it undermines the protection granted 
by EU law to the weaker party. The proposed solution would not include such a “special” protection for 
SLAPPs victims, which would be particularly relevant should the EU adopt specific anti-SLAAPs legislation. 
Second, the rule does not cover SLAPPs based on torts other than defamation, which are nonetheless, 
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• The Rome II Regulation is the subject of extensive discussion in Austrian courts and academia. In general, the 
Regulation is perceived as a balanced and appropriate legal instrument for determining the applicable law. 
• With regard to the Regulation’s scope, further clarification seems useful. In particular, contracts having a 
protective effect in favour of third parties should be clearly assigned to either the Rome I or the Rome II 
Regulation (see Q 3). 
• Concerning the determination of the law applicable to purely financial losses, legal certainty and 
predictability could be improved by expressly defining the respective connecting factors within the 
Regulation. In this context, it should also be considered whether a uniform determination of the applicable 
law is possible in the case of mass or dispersed damages. (see Q 6 a.). 
• In case of a reform of Rome II, it also seems advisable to clarify whether the determination of the applicable 
law according to Art. 5 Rome II only concerns such situations where the damage has occurred due to a 
defective product or whether damages caused by faultless products are also covered (see Q 7). 
• From the Austrian point of view, a reform should also address the interaction of the Rome II Regulation with 
other legislative acts of the European Union. Despite the provision of Art. 27 of the Rome II Regulation, the 
relationship to the e-Commerce Directive (see Q 8) and the GDPR (see Q 29, 30) remains largely unclear. 
• With regard to the law applicable to environmental damage, an explicit provision appears to be useful to 
specify whether Art. 7 Rome II Regulation also covers claims for pure financial loss (see Q 9). 
• The uniform application of the Regulation would also be promoted by including an autonomous definition of 
the concept of intellectual property. (see Q 10). 
• The relationship between Art. 4 and Art. 12 of Rome II could be simplified by adding a more precise 
definition of the scope of application of these provisions (see Q 14). 
• Explicit rules defining the requirements for the validity and form of a choice of law under Art. 14 Rome II are 
lacking (see Q 15). 
• In the absence of an explicit rule in Art. 16 Rome II Regulation, it is unclear whether, which and how foreign 
overriding mandatory rules can be taken into account (see Q 19). 
• The relationship between the Rome II Regulation and the Hague Convention on Traffic Accidents is unclear 
in some cases and could be further clarified by more comprehensive rules (see Q 22). A reform of the Rome II 
Regulation could also consider how the issue of forum shopping might be addressed (see Q 26). 
1. Introduction 
In Austria, the Rome II Regulation is a much applied and familiar legal text to most practitioners, specifically to those 
engaged in cross-border legal issues. Larger businesses that are involved in much cross-border trading and generally 
have considerable expertise in legal questions are also aware of the Rome II Regulation. Among smaller businesses 
and ordinary citizens, the Rome II Regulation is largely unknown. 
In legal practice, the Rome II Regulation is applied constantly. The “Rechtsinformationssystem des Bundes,” where all 
of the judgments of the final instance court – the Austrian Supreme Court (OGH) – are published, contains over 200 
judgments featuring the word “Rom II”. Given this rather huge amount of cases for a final instance court, it can be 
inferred that the Regulation is applied constantly. Nevertheless, there are no reliable statistics on this matter. 
In academia, the picture is mixed. Some commentaries already contain a section on the Rome II Regulation, such as 
the “KBB Kurzkommentar zum ABGB” which is widely used among practitioners. There is also more specific literature, 





Beig/Graf-Schimek/Grubinger/Schacherreiter. However, major commentaries such as the Schwimann/Kodek 
“ABGB Praxiskommentar” or the “ABGB-Kommentar” by Rummel/Lukas are still missing the Rome II Regulation. 
There have been some doctrinal discussions in Austria with regard to the Rome II Regulation. Most of them are specific 
to individual articles and therefore presented in detail below. One major issue concerns the relationship of the 1971 
Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents and the Rome II Regulation. The parallel existence of the 
two with the precedence of the Hague Convention, as allowed in Art. 28(1) Rome II, is often seen critically.253 The 
1971 Hague Convention is a very complicated instrument which also deviates from the Rome II Regulation and thus 
enables forum shopping within the EU. Moreover, the lack of uniformity in EU law is criticised. 
On the political level, the Rome II Regulation has not caused noteworthy debates. 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
In Austria, the interpretation is recognised as being carried out autonomously, in accordance with the Rome I and the 
Brussels I Regulation (recast); the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the 
Brussels I Regulation (recast) may also be consulted.254 
The notion of “civil and commercial matters” constituting the outer limit of the material scope is seen as emphasising 
the demarcation to public law.255 The concept of “civil and commercial matters” does not cover official and state 
liability, including the personal liability of those acting on behalf of the state (acta iure imperii). However, claims 
attributable to private economic activity of the state in question are covered by the material scope of the Rome II 
Regulation (acta iure gestionis). 
Furthermore, in the demarcation of the scope of application of the Rome I Regulation and in the sense of the Tacconi 
decision, there is agreement that claims should be classified as non-contractual if they result from obligations which 
were not voluntarily assumed.256 
Unusual for the German-speaking country, Austrian scholars consider contracts with protective effect for the benefit of 
third parties to fall within the material scope of the Rome II Regulation.257 This conclusion is being supported by the 
argument that the obligations incurred are based on a legal order – as it is the case for the law of tort.  
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts. 31-32) 
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First, disputes arise as to which facts are covered by the Rome II Regulation from a temporal perspective. To this extent, 
the German language version of Arts. 31 and 32 of the Rome II Regulation is not precisely drafted and hence 
interpreted differently by Austrian academics. However, this concerns only the dogmatic construction of the temporal 
scope, but not the temporal scope as such. In the latter respect, the Austrian literature follows the CJEU, who has ruled 
that the Rome II Regulation applies to situations occurring after 11 January 2009.258 
Second, for the types of claims covered by Rome II, it is discussed in detail what is to be seen as the event giving rise 
to the damage on which Art. 31 of Rome II is based for determining the scope of Regulation. In the case of negotiorum 
gestio, for which the applicable law is determined in accordance with Art. 11 Rome II, the Austrian Supreme Court 
decided that the point in time to be taken into account is the time at which the relevant effort was made or the action in 
question was taken.259 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
Whether an obligation is to be classified as non-contractual is to be determined by way of an autonomous 
interpretation.260 In any case, those categories of claims which are expressly listed in Art. 2(1) Rome II and regulated 
in the subsequent provisions are classified as claims arising from a non-contractual obligation.261 
The classification of a legal relationship as a non-contractual obligation is guided by the case law of the CJEU, in 
particular on European civil procedural law, and is based on the question whether the claims arise from an obligation 
that was undertaken voluntarily or not.262 For example, the injunction of a consumer protection association against the 
use of general terms and conditions is classified as a tort.263 In detail, however, the classification as a contractual or 
non-contractual obligation is disputed, such as the classification of a contract with protective effect for third parties.264 
This legal institution gives a third party a contractual claim against the debtor of a contract, although the third party is 
not a party to the contract. 
Further, there are also obligations which are neither covered by Rome I nor Rome II even though they are not excluded 
under Art. 1(2) Rome I or Art. 1(2) Rome II but are not considered as an obligation. Examples for these types of 
obligations are the challenge of creditors in the case of insolvency of the debtor265 or the liability of the transferee of 
the business or assets266. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
There are no relevant unanswered questions in Austrian practice or academia with regard to Art. 3 of the Regulation. 
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5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital 
(7)) 
In Austria, the interpretation of the Rome II Regulation is based on the principles developed for secondary Union law. 
This means that terms are to be interpreted independently of the lex fori or lex causae, thus autonomously.267 
It is further recognised that the interpretation of Rome II must also take into account the interpretation of corresponding 
terms in other regulations. Hence, on the one hand the Rome II Regulation should be interpreted in such a way that the 
material scope of application of the Brussels I Regulation (recast), the Rome I Regulation and the Rome II Regulation 
are harmonised.268 On the other hand - also with reference to Recital 7 of the Rome II Regulation -, for the interpretation 
of the terms contractual and non-contractual obligation, recourse is made to the principles developed by the CJEU in 
relation to Art. 7 of the Brussels I Regulation (recast).269 
2.2 Chapter II – Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art. 4(1) 
No cases have been reported on this provision. There seem to be no practical problems in applying Art. 4(1) Rome II. 
Two references for preliminary rulings regarding the localisation of financial loss submitted by Austrian courts in the 
context of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) have been decided upon by the CJEU (see below d). These decisions might 
have an incidence on the determination of the applicable law under Art. 4(1) Rome I (see Preamble 7 Rome II). 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art. 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
There seem to be no practical problems in applying this provision. No cases have been reported. 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art. 4(3), and 
Austrian courts tend to interpret the escape clause in Art. 4(3) strictly. This is illustrated by a decision of the Austrian 
Supreme Court of 2019.270 The case concerned the liability of a notary who had issued wrong certificates regarding 
the stock in a deposit of gold. Although there was some – not identified – connection to Switzerland, the Austrian 
Supreme Court held that the case must be decided under the law of Austria. A manifestly closer connection to 
Switzerland was ruled out on the ground that the notary had issued the certificates to a bank in Austria and the claimant 
made the investments in question in Austria. 
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts 
Two references for preliminary rulings regarding the localisation of financial loss have been submitted by Austrian 
courts in the context of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) and were decided upon by the CJEU.271 In both cases the 
Austrian court favoured the localisation of economic or financial loss at the domicile of the investor. The rulings of the 
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CJEU, however, were more nuanced. The court held that the damage occurs at the domicile of the investor only where 
this place coincides with the place of establishment of the bank which manages the investor’s account.272  
The transfer of these rulings to the Rome II Regulation in line with the principle of parallel interpretation (see Recital 7 
Rome II) risks causing a considerable fragmentation of the applicable law. Two Austrian authors who have dealt with 
this problem think that it can be solved through the use of Art. 17 Rome II Regulation.273 In their view, this provision 
allows for the application of public law standards regarding prospectuses, whether they originate from the EU or third 
countries. Where the standards are complied with, any liability should be excluded according to the authors. If the 
prospectus has been published in several markets, including those of a third country, the result would be a “multilateral 
connection” of prospectus law. The two authors do not find this result problematic, as it corresponds to the mosaic 
theory which can also be found in other areas of the law. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
Austria has not signed the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, so Art. 5 Rome II 
applies before Austrian courts. The Austrian Supreme Court had to deal with the burden of proof regarding the 
connecting factors listed in Art. 5(1) 1 lit. (a)–(c) Rome II.274 It ruled that this burden has to be borne by the party 
alleged to be liable. 
The literature discusses whether the conflicts rules of Art. 5 Rome II only apply to defective products or also to damage 
resulting from functioning products. In light of the purpose of the provision, a restrictive interpretation in the first sense 
is suggested.275 If this should indeed be the view of the EU legislator, a clarification to this effect would be helpful. 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
The interpretation of Art. 6(1) Rome II and its relation to the E-commerce Directive is the subject of diverging opinions 
by two different chambers of the Austrian Supreme Court. Without mentioning the Rome II Regulation, the seventh 
chamber of the Court has ruled in 2012 that the country-of-origin principle underlying the E-commerce Directive and 
the transposing Austrian Act (the “E-Commerce Act”276) would govern the civil liability of a host provider.277 In the 
view of the chamber, in Austrian law this principle would have a conflict-of-laws dimension despite the CJEU’s ruling 
in eDate Advertising278 to the contrary.  
In two rulings, the fourth chamber of the same court, which is specialising in intellectual property law, has taken a 
decidedly different position.279 In its view, Art. 6 of the Rome II Regulation takes precedence over the E-commerce 
Directive and the transposing Austrian Act. The law applicable to behaviour on the internet allegedly amounting to 
unfair competition would therefore be the law of the market affected and not that of the country of origin of the e-
commerce service provider.  
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The dispute, which has not yet been resolved until this day, illustrates the continuing struggle to elucidate the relationship 
between the Rome II Regulation and the E-commerce Directive. A clarification of this relation in the text or the Preamble 
of the Regulation would be welcome. 
The Austrian Supreme Court furthermore had to address the interpretation of Art. 6(2) Rome II in a case in which a 
company had used the engineering drawings of a competitor and presented them as its own to potential customers.280 
The question arose whether Art. 6(2) in conjunction with Art. 4(1) Rome II would point to the law of the affected market 
and therefore result in the application of the same law as Art. 6(1) Rome II or not. The result in the specific case would 
have been either the application of Brazilian law as the law of the affected market or the application of Austrian and 
Swiss law as the laws where the victims of the alleged unfair competition were based. Despite Recital 21, according 
to which “[t]he special rule in Article 6 is not an exception to the general rule in Article 4(1) but rather a clarification 
of it”, the Austrian Supreme Court took the view that Arts. 6(1) and 4(1) Rome II would not lead to identical results. 
The main argument of the court was that otherwise it would have sufficed for the EU legislator to merely refer to Art. 4(2) 
and (3) in Art. 6(2) Rome II. Instead, the court opined that Art. 6(2) in conjunction with Art. 4(1) would point to the law 
of the place of business of the competitor claiming damage from unfair competition.281 This interpretation is sufficiently 
aligned with the text of the Regulation and therefore does not seem to require an explicit clarification via a reform. 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
No cases have been reported with regard to that provision, the application of which does not seem to have raised 
problems in practice. 
The literature discusses the question whether behaviour affecting an environmental resource may fall under this 
provision where such behaviour has caused pure economic loss but not ecological damage.282 An example case 
would be economic damage caused by noise, such as the economic cost of installing noise protection. The answer to 
this question remains open and could be clarified through a reform of Art. 7 or a Recital. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
The application of this provision in practice only caused minor problems. The Austrian Supreme Court has ruled that it 
is for the claimant to clarify the question for which country it claims protection.283 In case of doubt, it shall be assumed 
that protection is claimed only for domestic infringements.284 
The Austrian literature takes the view that preliminary questions regarding the existence and reach of intellectual 
property rights must be decided under national conflict rules.285 It is not sure whether this interpretation is in line with 
the intention of the Regulation’s drafters. Some clarifying words either in the text or in the Preamble of the Regulation 
are in order. 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
No cases have been reported with regard to that provision, the application of which does not seem to have raised 
problems in practice. 
2.3 Chapter III – Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
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12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
The rule on unjust enrichment has not caused major problems in Austrian legal practice.286 Nevertheless, the precise 
scope of the concept “unjust enrichment” is sometimes unclear. For example, In the Austrian literature, the prevailing 
view is that Art. 10 applies to recourse claims of a party that has voluntarily settled debt of a third party.287 Others 
stress that internationally, these cases are sometimes treated using the rules of subrogation.288  
It is also unclear in which cases a “relationship existing between the parties” can be found. The prevailing view among 
scholars is that maintenance, inheritance and property obligations qualify as a relationship in this sense. 289 
Furthermore, it is stressed that the relationship can also be void or just of a precontractual nature.290 With regard to the 
word “existing” relationship, it is discussed whether this condition is met where the relationship between the parties, 
such as a contract or a tort, arises in the same moment the unjust enrichment occurs.291 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
The application of Art. 11 was largely trouble-free. Only minor problems occurred. In the case law, the relationship 
between the exclusion of certain areas in Art. 1(2) Rome II with Art. 11 seems to be unclear. The Austrian Supreme 
Court applied Art. 11 to a pro rata recovery against the other spouse for loan instalments paid for the marital home, 
although Art. 1(2) lit. (a) of this Regulation excludes non-contractual obligations arising out of family relationships.292 
Consequently, the judgment has been criticised by some scholars.293 
In parallel to Art. 10, there is also considerable controversy as to how the word "existing" legal relationship should be 
interpreted. Some argue in favour of applying the rule to relationships which arise in the same moment as the 
negotiorum gestio.294 
According to Art. 11(3) in cases where the law applicable cannot be determined on the basis of Art. 11(1) or (2), the 
law of the country in which the act was performed shall be applied. In this context it is discussed whether this means 
the country where the action took place or the country of fulfilment.295 Scholars arguing in favour of the country where 
the action took place run into problems when determining this country in cases of multiple actions. Some refer to the 
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country of the first action, others argue in favour of the country where the most relevant actions took place and again 
others apply a different law for every action.296 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
With regard to the rule on culpa in contrahendo, some minor debates exist. One of them concerns the relationship 
between Art. 12 Rome II and Art. 4 of this Regulation, which is rather unclear.297 Most scholars differentiate in the way 
that Art. 12 applies if a breach of duty was related to a duty specific to the transaction and Art. 4 applies if the duty 
was rather related to the general integrity of one’s right.298 
Furthermore, the relationship of the different alternatives in Art. 12(2) Rome II are debated. One could argue that they 
are of equal rank as the wording suggests. Contrary to the wording, some scholars argue, however, that the 
alternatives are not equal. To support this thesis, scholars point to the systematic context and the rationale of Art. 12.299 
2.4 Chapter IV – Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
The freedom of choice clause has been generally welcomed in practice and academia as it fits well with the general 
principles of private international law. Nonetheless, some minor uncertainties remain. 
In the context of the choice of law, the meaning of “freely negotiated” in Art. 4(1) lit. (b) Rome II is unclear. It is 
discussed whether standard clauses or general terms and conditions can be classified as freely negotiated, and if so, 
under what circumstances.300 
The Rome II Regulation itself does not contain any provisions dealing with the validity and form of the choice of law. 
Also, the standards for such assessments are not clear. Consequently, it is disputed whether Art. 3(5), (10), (11) and 
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Furthermore, it is discussed whether the choice of law can only refer to the entire non-contractual obligation or whether 
it can also be restricted to parts of it, such as the amount of damages.302 
2.5 Chapter V – Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art. 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
The scope of the exclusion in Art. 1(3) Rome II Regulation and its relation to Arts. 21 and 22 Rome II Regulation is 
barely discussed in Austria. 
In general, the practical relevance of Art. 21 Rome II Regulation is doubted in Austrian literature.303 
Art. 22 Rome II Regulation is in principle interpreted broadly by Austrian scholars. Under Art. 22 Rome II Regulation, 
the lex causae determines substantive legal presumptions and the distribution of the burden of proof and assertion and 
the legal consequences of non liquet. Whether the possibility of prima facie evidence is also based on the lex causae 
is disputed.304 However, under Art. 1(3) Rome II Regulation procedural presumptions are excluded from the scope of 
application of the Rome II Regulation. 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
If Austrian judges reach the conclusion that foreign law is applicable to the matter in question, they have to determine 
the foreign law ex officio in accordance with § 4(1) IPRG.305 
For the purpose of determination of the foreign law § 4(1) IPRG mentions the cooperation of the parties involved, 
information from the Federal Ministry of Justice and expert opinions as permissible aids. 
In addition to the legal text, Austrian judges have to consult the relevant case law for the purpose of determination, as 
the foreign law is to be applied in accordance with the practice of the respective member state.306 
If it is not possible to determine the foreign law within a reasonable period of time, Austrian substantive law may be 
applied in accordance with § 4(2) IPRG. The reasonable period of time is to be measured generously, if the urgency 
of the individual case does not dictate the opposite (e.g. preliminary injunctions).307 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
There is no reported Austrian case law on this provision. The literature identifies problems caused by the strongly 
diverging length of the limitation periods within the Member States of the European Union.308 It is bemoaned that this 
would cause legal uncertainty.309 A reform of the Rome II Regulation is unlikely to change this situation. The only 
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possible remedy would be a harmonisation of substantive laws, which seems to be however outside the competence 
of the European Union. 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16) 
The importance of overriding mandatory provisions for non-contractual obligations is considered rather low in the 
Austrian literature. 
In this context, Art. 16 Rome II Regulation is examined in particular with regard to the parallel provision in Art. 9 Rome 
I Regulation. Especially, the legal definition of the overriding mandatory rule in Art. 9(1) Rome I Regulation is used in 
addition to the case law of the European Court of Justice to determine whether there is an overriding mandatory rule 
within the meaning of Art. 16 Rome II Regulation.310 
However, amongst Austrian scholars it is still unclear whether and how foreign overriding mandatory rules that are not 
covered by Art. 16 Rome II Regulation can be taken into account and whether overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
causae are always invoked by means of the reference of the Rome II Regulation.311 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18) 
Pursuant to the principle of the most favourable law, the damaged party can bring a direct action against the insurer, 
if the statute applicable to either the tort claim or the insurance contract allows for such an action.312 However, Austrian 
literature unanimously supports the view that a choice of law concerning the tort claim can only affect the insurer if he 
agrees to this choice.313 Yet, only the possibility of direct action is regulated by the Rome II Regulation, whereas the 
objections the insurer can raise if and when he is sued (e.g. the maximum liability or the right to refuse payment) are 
determined by the law governing the insurance contract according to Art. 7 of the Rome I Regulation.314 
Although Art. 18 Rome II was primarily intended for road traffic accidents, its practical use – at least for intra-European 
cases – was questioned due to the introduction of Directive 2000/26/EC315, in which the possibility of direct action 
in insurance contracts became compulsory according to Art. 3.316 
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21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19) 
The application of the rule on subrogation in Art. 19 has not led to any problems in Austrian practice or academia. The 
rule has inter alia been applied to cases of liability insurer as well as to motor vehicle insurers.317 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art. 20) 
With regard to the application of Art. 20 there is far-reaching consensus in Austrian literature and practice. The phrase 
the “same claim” in Art. 20 Rome II is interpreted in such a way that it is neither required that the claims are based on 
the same legal ground nor that they are subject to the same law. However, they must be of equal rank.318 
As Austria is part of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents, the interplay between the 
Hague Convention and Art. 20 Rome II must be determined. The question of a right to compensation of one debtor 
against the other debtor is regulated only under Rome II. With regard to Art. 20 the question arises as to whether “the 
law applicable to that debtor's non-contractual obligation towards the creditor” is to be determined according to the 
Hague Convention which governs the claim or according to the hypothetical law applicable under the Rome II 
Regulation. The applicable law under Rome II is only hypothetical in this case as Art. 28(1) Rome II grants priority to 
the Hague Convention in these cases. The Austrian Supreme Court has not answered this question so far.319 Most 
scholars prefer the solution referring to the Hague Convention.320 
2.6 Chapter VI – Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art. 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business 
In Austrian literature, the concept of habitual residence is interpreted autonomously.321 The place of habitual residence 
is generally understood to be the place where a person has his actual centre of life, with the actual and expected 
duration of the residence being of particular importance.322 In this respect, it is disputed whether recourse to Recital 7 
of the Rome II Regulation and to the existing case-law of the CJEU is possible.323 In any case, it is agreed that each 
person may have only one habitual residence.324 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art. 24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art. 25) 
The application of Art. 24 and of Art. 25 Rome II Regulation has not caused any problems in Austria and there have 
been no relevant cases so far. 
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Even though Art. 24 Rome II Regulation excludes the private international law of the lex causae from the scope of 
reference, Austrian scholars assume that, where the parties choose the applicable law by way of choice of law, they 
are allowed to choose a legal system including its private international law. However, it is considered that this question 
is of limited practical relevance.325 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
No major difficulties in the application of Art. 26 Rome II Regulation have so far arisen in the Austrian literature. 
With regard to the scope of application of Art. 26 Rome II, there is broad consensus that, in view of the wording of the 
German version ("obviously incompatible") and Recital 32 of the Rome II Regulation, high requirements must be met 
for the existence of an infringement of the ordre public of the lex fori.326 
The scope of application of Art. 26 of this Regulation is further limited by the caselaw of the CJEU and the requirements 
of the law of the European Union, although Art. 26 serves to protect the fundamental principles of the lex fori.327 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
With regard to Art. 27 Rome II Regulation, there is a debate in the Austrian literature as to exactly which provisions of 
Union law are covered by it. This discussion is closely linked to the general question in European private international 
law of the relation of the Rome Regulations to substantive Union law. In this context, it is discussed whether Art. 27 
Rome II only applies to Union law with a special conflict rule or whether a provision defining the territorial scope of 
application within unified substantive Union law is already sufficient.328 
Art. 28 Rome II Regulation is of particular practical importance in Austria. According to this provision, the 1971 Hague 
Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents ratified by Austria is to be applied as a matter of priority over the 
Rome II Regulation.329 This allows forum shopping to a certain extent on the basis of the different jurisdiction provided 
for in Arts. 4(1), 7(2) and 13(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast). However, courts of States that have not ratified 
the Hague Convention apply the conflict-of-laws rules of the Rome II Regulation instead of the Hague Convention. The 
laws that the Rome II Regulation declares as applicable partially diverge from those designated by the Convention.330 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
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27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
As Austria is one of the EU states that has ratified the 1971 Hague Convention, Austrian courts do not apply the Rome II 
Regulation with respect to traffic accidents, even if all affected countries are EU Member States.331 Since the criteria 
for the determination of the applicable law under the Hague Convention and the Rome II Regulation differ in some 
respects, the possibility of forum shopping still exists within the EU.332 This is heavily criticised because of its impact on 
the uniformity of law in Europe, 333  particularly due to the lack of a central court deciding on matters of the 
convention,334 and in the incentive it gives for a “race to the court”.335 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach 
Austrian courts consistently apply the mosaic theory, according to which, dispersed damage need to be adjudged 
separately according to the law of the country in which the damage occurs, on Art. 4336 and Art. 6337 and Art. 8.338 
Additionally, Austrian literature is also in favour of applying said theory on dispersed damages in the scope of 
application of Art. 9.339 For the courts and other legal professionals, this situation is not just impractical, but poses 
significant and sometimes insurmountable difficulties.340 In spite of that, a uniform assessment of the case under one 
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law is only permitted by the Austrian courts, if the damage cannot be separated, in which case the strictest law 
applies.341 
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope of the 
Rome II Regulation under Art. 1(2) lit. (g) Rome II Regulation is criticised in Austrian literature.342 With regard to this 
exclusion, in particular the disadvantages of a divergence of the conflict-of-laws provisions and the applicable law 
are emphasised in the case of an assault by a physical act. In this situation, the physical act may lead to both physical 
injury and violation of personal rights.343 By excluding violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, different 
conflict-of-law provisions and thus possibly different laws are applicable to the case. This may lead to problems of 
adaptation, which must be solved by means of private international law. 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
The interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data protection is only rarely discussed 
in Austria. Insofar as this relationship is examined in more detail, the debate is focused on the question whether Art. 3 
GDPR can be classified as a conflict-of-laws rule and an overriding mandatory rule. The relationship between the 
GDPR and the general European conflict-of-laws rules is also addressed.344 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
This question does not seem to have caused practical problems in Austrian court litigation nor a debate in the Austrian 
literature. 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
Questions concerning artificial intelligence are just coming up and have therefore not played an important role in 
practice yet. Also, in academia scholars are just starting to do research with regard to the relationship of private 
international law and artificial intelligence. In the future, more research can be expected, particularly with regard to 
the identification of the tortfeasor in cases involving artificial intelligence, the applicability of Art. 5 Rome II to artificial 
intelligence and questions relating to a choice of law. 
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4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to decision 
of the Court of Justice 
if applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
OGH 4 Ob 225/14p 11.8.2015 Art. 1 Determination of the relevant 
facts ex officio; perception of 
errors in appeal proceedings 
against the will of the parties 
 
OGH 6 Ob 233/18k 24.1.2019 Art. 4 Narrow interpretation of 
Art. 4(3), particularly given 
the foreseeability for the 
author of an audit report that 
it can lead to investments in 
other countries 
 
OGH 3 Ob 8/14v 8.4.2014 Art. 5 Burden of proof concerning 
the exception stipulated in 





2 Ob 204/14k 





Referral to CJEU (C-191/15 
VKI/Amazon); separation of 
the right of injunction itself 
(Art. 6 Rome II) and the 
justification for it in the 
contractual inadmissibility of 








OGH 17 Ob 6/11y 9.8.2011 Art. 6 Application of the mosaic 
approach with the 
application of several laws if 
the market of several 
countries is affected; 
application of the strictest 
law in the case of indivisibility  
 
OGH 4 Ob 82/12f 10.7.2012 Art. 6 Necessity of orientation 
towards a country’s 
consumers for affecting the 
market in this country in the 




OGH 4 Ob 12/11k 20.9.2011 Art. 6 and 31 Reference in Art. 6(2) is not 
the market location, but the 
relevant main or branch 
office; temporal scope of 
application of the Rome II 
Regulation on actions for 
injunctive relief 
This case deals with two different aspects: The 
first issue is what the reference to Art. 4 in 
Art. 6(2) actually means. The court finds that 
should not be understood as referring to the 
country of the affected market, as the reference 
to Art. 4 would be useless in that case or a 
reference to specific sections of Art. 4 would 
have sufficed. Rather, it must refer to the main or 
branch office that was affected by the act of 
unfair competition. 
The second issue that arose was the temporal 
application of the Rome II Regulation for 
injunctive relief. As a claim for injunctive relief is 
has a forward-looking orientation, it is not 





causing the risk of recurrence happened after the 
11.1.2009. 
OGH 7 Ob 189/11m 9.5.2012 Art. 6 Classification of Art. 3 of 
directive 2000/31/EC as a 
rule of conflict of laws 
 
OGH 4 Ob 29/13p 23.5.2013 Art. 6 Correction of 7 Ob 
189/11m, classification of 
Art. 3 of directive 
2000/31/EC as a 
substantive norm 
After the CJEU decided that Directive 
2000/31/EC does not require its 
implementation as a rule of conflict of laws, the 
Austrian Supreme Court nevertheless classified 
the Austrian norm that implemented the directive 
as such. It then overturned the jurisprudence this 
judgment and saw it as a substantive norm. In 
effect, this means that the Rome II Regulation 
determines the choice of laws. Only afterwards, 
it is checked that the applied law does not 
impose stricter rules than the laws in the country 
of origin. Rules in the applicable law according 
to the Rome II Regulation which are more lenient 
than the ones in the law of the country of origin 
would nevertheless be applied. 
OGH 6 Ob 29/15f 27.5.2015 Art. 11 and 31 Rejection of marriage as a 
closer connection in the 
sense of Art. 11; relevant 
criterion for temporal 
applicability of the Rome II 
Regulation in the case of 
negotiorum gestio 
 
OGH 2 Ob 71/18g 16.5.2018 Art. 15 Scope of the applicable law 






requirement of a direct 
causal relationship to the 
legal violation 
OGH 2 Ob 40/15v 21.10.2015 Art. 16 Classification of norms 
regulating the compensation 
of victims if they cannot claim 




OGH 2 Ob 35/15h 21.10.2015 Art. 19 Limits on the applicability of 
the 1971 Hague Convention 
regarding the recoveries 
from insurers and between 
the parties 
 
OGH 3 Ob 42/14v 21.5.2014 n/a Determination when offset is 









• The findings of this National Report are based on reported caselaw: due to the absence of a comprehensive 
publicly available caselaw database, the findings of this National Report may not have taken into account all 
judgments rendered by Belgian courts and tribunals on the Rome II Regulation (see Introduction, p. 3)  
• There appears to be sufficient awareness in Belgian legal practice about the relevance of the Rome II Regulation 
and about its rules (see Introduction, p. 3). 
• There is no statistical information about the application of the Rome II Regulation in Belgium (see Introduction, p. 
3). 
• It is contested whether the Belgian law on unfair market practices should apply as an overriding mandatory 
provision under Art 16 Rome II. We are of the view that this approach no longer holds sway pursuant to Art 6 
Rome II Regulation (see p. 4). 
• Among the limited amount of reported cases where Belgian courts have engaged with the general rule in Art 4 of 
the Rome II Regulation, only a few instances show an insufficient understanding of the relationship between its 
three paragraphs (see p. 4). 
• There are instances where Belgian courts have disregarded the primacy of the special rules of the Rome II 
Regulation, in particular in cases dealing with copyright infringements (p. 8). 
• The rules on non-contractual obligations in the 2004 Belgian Code of Private international Law provided an 
important source of inspiration for the drafting of the Regulation. As a possible consequence, the articulation 
between the two instruments does not seem to have caused significant difficulties in practice (p.10).  
• There are instances, however, where Belgian courts sequentially refer to several instruments on conflict of laws 
(for instance, a joint reference to an article of the Rome II Regulation and a corresponding provision of the Belgian 
Code of Private International Law) (p. 7-9).  
• Belgian courts are familiar with the application of the 1971 Hague Traffic Accidents Convention and its 
prevalence on the conflict rules of the Rome II Regulation (p. 10).    
1. Introduction 
How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State? 
It is difficult for us to assess accurately whether practitioners and private stakeholders are aware of the Rome II 
Regulation based on a desktop review of the relevant case law and literature. The relatively limited applications of the 
Regulation in court decisions indicate that whenever necessary, parties do plead about the relevant points under the 
Rome II Regulation. Moreover, there is nothing in the sources we consulted that suggested that there is a blind spot in 
terms of the knowledge about the Rome II Regulation: its entry into force has been reported widely in both academically 
and practically oriented journals, and its basic structure has been outlined extensively. 
Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
Importantly, it should be noted that our survey had to deal with the limits of the Belgian court organisation: decisions 
are not published systematically (yet) by the Belgian government (G Van Calster, M Poesen, ‘Optional Choice of Court 
Agreements in Belgium: Legal Uncertainty despite a Modern Legal Framework’ in M Keyes, Optional Choice of Court 
Clauses (2019 Springer) 87-88), and judgments are generally succinct - containing little general, theoretical 
information. Cases that are deemed of interest to legal science are usually picked up either by law reviews that are 
only available to those who have a paying subscription, or by IPR.be/DIP.be - an open access journal dedicated to 
private international law. Of course, this modus operandi does not warrant that cases are published systematically. 
Recently, the Belgian courts launched a new platform, “Juportal” (https://iubel.be/home/welkom), which for now 
only duplicates the limited database contained in its predecessor “Juridat”, but will be expanded in the future to include 






According to the findings of our survey of Belgian databases, Belgian courts are generally aware of the Rome II 
Regulation. However, they sometimes appeared to be misguided about the interplay between the Regulation and other 
instruments, such as the 2004 Belgian Code of Private International Law or international treaties (see below). 
Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in your Member State?  
Although Belgium keeps basic statistical data about the number of new, pending, and finished cases in its courts, there 
are no data about the application of the Rome II Regulation specifically. Our survey of Belgian databases suggests 
that Rome II cases take up a limited share in the work of the Belgian courts. Remarkably, we were unable to find any 
Supreme Court (Hof van Cassatie/Cour de Cassation) jurisprudence on the Rome II Regulation 
How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
The entry into force and basic layout of the Regulation have been reported on extensively in Belgian literature. 
However, the doctrinal debate is rather limited. Decisions of the CJEU are most frequently commented on in legal 
literature, while Belgian case law features less prominently.  
Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political level? 
Over the span of the Rome II Regulation’s life, two topics have drawn attention in Belgian legal scholarship. Firstly, the 
law applicable to unfair market practices under Art 6(1) Rome II. Secondly, the characterisation/qualification of pre-
contractual liability/culpa in contrahendo. 
Unfair competition received relatively extensive attention because this area of the law traditionally has been strictly 
regulated in Belgium. Given the strict Belgian legislative framework in this area, national courts had often promoted 
the relevant legislation to the status of loi de police/ overriding mandatory law before the entry into force of the Rome 
II Regulation (P Wautelet, ‘Quelques observations sur la protection internationale du consommateur en Europe et la 
détermination de la loi applicable à une pratique anticoncurrentielle’ [2006] Tijdschrift voor Belgisch 
handelsrecht/Revue de droit commercial belge 993, para 2). Most of the examples predate the Rome II Regulation, 
we found one case in which a Belgian court indeed accepted the Belgian law on unfair market practices applied as 
an overriding mandatory provision under Art 16 Rome II. Wautelet and others observed that this approach no longer 
holds sway in the context of the Rome II Regulation (see below, Art 6 Rome II). 
Culpa in contrahendo has been studied and commented on by Bart Volders (Afgebroken Contractonderhandelingen 
in het Internationaal Privaatrecht (2008 Larcier)). Yet this research was not conducted due to specific issues in Belgian 
practice. The commentator approved of the accessory attachment to the putative lex contractus taken in Art 12 Rome 
II, because this rule is easy to apply and promotes legal certainty (B Volders, ‘Culpa in Contrahendo in the Conflict of 
Laws’ (2007) 9 Yearbook of private international law 127, 133). Limited case law in Belgium seems to confirm the 
ease of application of Art 12 Rome II (see below). 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to : 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, Arts 31-32) 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
Our review of Belgian case law and doctrinal writings did not reveal particular difficulties with the characterization of 





are excellent illustrations of an articulated application of the Rome II application in, for instance, a case of culpa in 
contrahendo where the seised court (the Commercial Tribunal of Dendermonde) sets out the steps to identify Article 12 
Rome II as the relevant article and applies it with regards to the intended contractual relationship between the parties, 
i.e. a prospective sales agreement (Kh. Dendermonde, 29 December 2011).  
However, difficulties may arise out of the uncertain demarcation of civil liability for jurisdictional purposes in recent 
times. The CJEU case law on the dividing line between Article 7(1) and 7(2) Brussels Ibis has indeed experienced 
some remarkable oscillations and this may consequently affect the characterisation of an international civil liability 
case for the determination of the applicable law. For instance, in an unpublished judgment of 9 May 2019 
(2016/AR/1478), the Antwerp Court of Appeal held that an actio pauliana (an anti-avoidance action as provided 
by the Belgian civil code) was subject to the Rome II Regulation. In doing so, the judgment deviated from the CJEU’s 
Reichert case law on Art 7(2) Brussels Ibis, according to which the action paulienne (a similar French anti-avoidance 
action) was not a matter relating to tort, for it did not turn on the defendant’s liability. Nor does the judgment consider 
C-337/17 Feniks, according to which an actio pauliana under Polish law was contractual in nature for the purpose 
of Art 7(1) Brussels Ibis insofar as it protected the claimant’s contractual interests. The judgment did not entertain why 
it did not accord any weight to the Reichert or Feniks decisions. It is unclear whether the court was aware of Recital 7 
of the Rome II Regulation, which provides for the consistency of interpretation between Brussels Ibis and Rome II. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation)(Recital 
(7)) 
(See question 3 above). 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of : 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties 
or claims 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and  
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial 
market torts  
Within the limited amount of cases having been reported where Belgian courts have engaged with the general rules in 
the Rome II Regulation, there are a few instances of straightforward application of the relevant connecting factors, in 
accordance with the CJEU´s case-law understanding of relevant notions (as for instance, Tribunal de commerce 
d’Eupen, 19 September 2013: interplay of Articles 4(1) & 4(3); Non-contractual liability of a bank arising from 
banking operations; location of damage; rejection of arguments on a “manifestly closer connection”). However, there 
are also examples of problematic engagement with the general rules in the regulation. 
Firstly, we have found 2 instances of major misunderstanding/misapplication of Arts. 4(1) & 4(3), where the general 
rule of Rome II should either not have been applied to begin with, or else the specific rule in Art. 8 should have been 
applied instead. Both cases feature significant misunderstandings of the way private international law, public 
international law and EU law operate, notably when it comes to the interplay of sources (they involve the interplay with 
the Berne Convention), they resemble somewhat on a factual basis, and come from the same court (For further details, 
please see the answer to question 10 below and the relevant case summaries). 
Additionally, we have found an unpublished decision of 9 May 2019 (see above), where the Antwerp court of appeal 
located the ‘place of direct damage’ under Art 4(1) of an actio pauliana in the location where the detrimental effects 





company brought an actio pauliana against the share purchase agreement, alleging the applicability of French law. 
The Court held that the ‘direct damage’ occurred in Belgium, since this is the location where the Belgian company’s 
assets were diminished to the detriment of the French creditor. Not entirely convincingly, the judgment also applied Art 
4(3) Rome II by observing that the action had the closest link to Belgium anyway. The judgment therefore did not seem 
to be aware of the exceptional nature of Art 4(3) Rome II. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on Article 5. Moreover, Belgium is not a 
party to the 1973 Hague Product Liability Convention. 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6)  
There have been a number of cases about unfair competition, two of which are particularly interesting: 
Rechtbank van Koophandel Antwerpen 7 April 2017: Here, Nike had repudiated a Belgian distributor. The distributor 
then pursued Nike in Belgium for breach of competition law (refusal to make contract, abuse of dominant position). 
Nike alleged that Dutch law applied under a choice of law clause in its General Terms and Conditions (GTCs). The 
commercial court held however that the GTCs only applied to contracts concerning specific orders that were placed 
by the Belgian distributor, but not to the distributor’s competition claim. Consequently, the commercial court held that 
Belgian law applied to the claim pursuant to Art 6(3) Rome II. Of course, the commercial court could have entertained 
the choice of law issue more briefly: Art 6(4) Rome II does not allow a choice of law in matters covered by Art 6 Rome 
II. 
Cour d’appel de Liège, 23 April 2013 (see tribunal de commerce de Namur 10 March 2010): The court of appeal 
held that a consumers association´s action against an airline company's terms and conditions (TCs) is a non-
contractual matter. The judgment considered the relevant Belgian legislation on unfair market practices as an overriding 
mandatory rule (Art 16 Rome II) and even if that was not the case, it still considers Belgian Law as applicable by virtue 
of Art 6(1) Rome II. Unlike the CJEU later in Amazon v Henkel, the court of appeal did not consider the aspect of the 
action concerning the validity of the TCs against the backdrop of the Rome I Regulation. 
Thalia Kruger (T Kruger, Tribunal de commerce Namur 10 March 2010 (note) [2011] Droit de la consommation - 
Consumentenrecht 59, para 30) raised an interesting point of reflection about Art 6(1) Rome II. She observed that the 
unfairness of the TCs of airline companies indeed impacted on the Belgian market, but also on other markets. Does this 
mean that national courts should apply a so-called ‘mosaic approach’, according to which they must apply multiple 
laws at once? Kruger noted that the Rome II Regulation does not provide a solution for a situation in which the markets 
of multiple countries are affected by unfair market practices. She also raised that Belgian courts must not accept too 
lightly that a loi de police/overriding mandatory provision in the sense of Art 16 Rome II displaces the multilateral 
conflict rule of Art 6 Rome II. As Wautelet observed (P Wautelet, ‘Concurrence déloyale et actes restreignant la libre 
concurrence’ [2008] Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht/Revue de droit commercial belge 502, 509), Belgian 
courts traditionally have accepted that the Belgian legislation covering unfair market practices was overriding 
mandatory law (see Wautelet [2006], supra, para 2). However, the EU legislature preferred to adopt a multilateral 
rule for unfair competition exactly in order to avoid the use of unilateral conflict of laws techniques such as overriding 
mandatory law. Belgian courts therefore must not have recourse to Art 16 Rome II too lightly. 
The other cases we found related to acts of unfair competition that only harmed one competitor, which were 
straightforward applications of Art 6 Rome II (burgerlijke rechtbank Brussel 20 April 2018; rechtbank van koophandel 
Dendermonde 24 January 2014). 
Wauthelet discussed an issue of delineation between unfair competition (Art 6(1) - (2) Rome II) and the restriction of 
free competition (Art 6(3) Rome II). He gave the example of the Belgian provision concerning the refusal to sell. Such 
a refusal constitutes both an unfair market practice and a violation of competition law under Belgian law (Wautelet 
[2008], supra, 507-508). He argued that one must look at the substance of an action to decide whether it concerned 
unfair competition or a restriction of free competition. In doing so, he rejected drawing a distinction according to 
whether the legal basis relied on aims protecting the competitiveness of markets as opposed to protecting private 
businesses from unfair practices by competitors. In a similar vein, the method of enforcement of a legal basis 






9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
Our search did not yield any results with regard to the application of Article 13. In other words, there are no reported 
cases where an infringement of intellectual property rights arose in the context of acts other than torts or delicts.  
Article 8, on the other hand, gave rise to a few interesting judgments: 
The Brussels Court of Appeal decided that Belgian law was applicable to a trademark infringement claim based on a 
Benelux trademark. it invoked Article 8(1) Rome II and left undiscussed whether the Regulation prevailed on the 
Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property Rights on the basis of Article 28(2) of the Rome II Regulation. According 
to the Brussels Court, Belgian law was applicable because the protection sought by the claimants covered the Benelux 
territory and was requested from the Belgian courts. It went on to assess that the referred Benelux Convention was part 
of Belgian law and as such applicable to the substantive questions on alleged trademark infringement (Brussels, 31 
January 2011). 
A judgment of the Brussels Court of Appeal of 5 May 2011 arising from a claim filed by Copiepresse (i.e. a Belgian 
association in charge of collecting revenues from copyrights) against Google Inc. for an alleged infringement of 
copyrights held by authors represented by Copiepresse by Google’s news service and the use of “cache”. With regard 
to the governing law, this judgment is quite interesting as it takes the view that the Berne Convention contains conflict 
rules and, as such, can be used to determine the applicable law to this situation. According to the Court, the relevant 
provision would be Article 5(3) of the Berne Convention. Priority to more specific international treaties containing 
choice of law provisions is fully in line with Article 28 Rome II but it is a controversial issue whether the Berne Convention 
contains relevant rules on the law applicable to the infringement of copyrights. Perhaps because of such controversy, 
the Brussels Court went on to refer to the Rome II Regulation, but rather Article 4 and not Article 8. The latter provision 
is explicitly ruled out by the Brussels Court because it is formulated in similar terms to the Berne Convention and, as 
such, is considered of little additional guidance. The Brussels Court concludes that Belgian law is applicable pursuant 
to Article 4(3) as it is with Belgium that this case has the closest connection. 
The Brussels Court applied Article 5(3) of the Berne Convention again to decide the applicable law to an alleged 
copyright infringement by a Luxembourgish company in a case filed before the Belgian courts by the Belgian right 
holder (Brussels, 3 October 2013).   
In both instances, the Brussels Court appears to see Article 5(3) of the Berne Convention as a conflict of law rule, which 
is debatable.  If, in accordance with the prevailing view, Article 5(3) of the Berne Convention is void of relevance for 
the determination of the applicable law, the Rome II Regulation emerges as the relevant legal source, provided the 
Regulation is ratione temporis applicable, which does not appear to be the case for the 2011 judgment.   
Where applicable, Article 8(1) Rome II prevails on the general rule of Article 4 Rome II. Using the general rule of the 
Regulation for copyright infringement cases does not take into account the hierarchy between specific conflict of law 
rules and the general rule of the Regulation. 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 





14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
Our analysis of the reported cases reveals no problems on the application of Article 12. Quite to the contrary, as stated 
above (in response to question 3), there are examples of excellent applications of this sophisticated provision by the 
Belgian courts (see, for instance, Kh. Dendermonde, 29 December 2011 with adequate consideration to the primacy 
of EU Regulations over the Belgian Code, the distinction between Chapter II and III of the Regulation and the interplay 
between Rome I and Rome II with regard to precontractual liability. 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
It is interesting to note that Belgian conflict of laws accepts freedom of choice in cases of non-contractual obligations 
that fall outside the scope of application of Rome II. Indeed, Article 101 of the Belgian Code of Private International 
Law allows for a choice of law agreed upon by the parties provided three conditions are met: 1) the choice occurs 
once the dispute has arisen; 2) the choice is explicit and 3) the rights of third parties are not prejudiced by the choice. 
The rule in Article 14 Rome II Regulation is quite in line with Article 101 of the Belgian Code. Consequently, freedom 
of choice under the referred conditions appears to be accepted by case law and doctrinal writings in Belgium (see, 
for all, M. Traest, “Het recht van toepassing (...)” in Kluwer, 2018). We are unaware of discussions recommending a 
revisited Art. 14, either to limit its application or to expand it. 
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
The two core cases involving overriding mandatory provisions (Cour d’appel de Liège, 23 April 2013 and Tribunal 
de commerce de Namur, 10 March 2010, referred to above, in question 8, and reprised in further detail in the case 
summary) are socially significant but are in general relatively straightforward in their understanding and application of 
the notions, even if they did so in diverging senses. (The appeals level court overturned the trial-level decision on this 
point, finding that the relevant legislation amounted to overriding mandatory provisions, while the trial-level court had 
not done so: see the doctrinal criticism levelled against this decision above). 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18) 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
21. The application of the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
In line with other case law, Belgian courts (e.g. the Antwerp Police Tribunal) tend to avoid an analysis of conflict of 





sequentially to both instruments. Fortunately, the specific rule on subrogation in Art. 19 Rome II and Art. 107 of the 
Belgian Code on legal subrogation use the same connecting factor (“the law which governs the third person's duty to 
satisfy the creditor”), so both determine that Belgian law is applicable to a case of legal subrogation between a Belgian 
agency (as subrogated party) and the Belgian victim further to a traffic accident that occurred in Germany (Antwerp 
Police Tribunal, 13 May 2015). 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
To the best of our knowledge, there were no relevant resources available on this topic. 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
Possible conflict of instruments (e.g. between international legal instruments in the area of intellectual property and the 
Rome II Regulation, see Answers to Q6 and Q10) tend to be addressed by avoiding an analysis of the hierarchy 
between such international instruments.  
Insufficient attention for the rule on Article 28 of the Rome II Regulation may be remediated by a new provision on the 
articulation between other international instruments and the Rome II Regulation. Several policy choices will have to be 
made: should priority still be given to international instruments such as the HCCH Conventions on Traffic Accidents or 
Product Liability? Should a Benelux IP Treaty with specialised provisions on governing law be treated differently 
because it does not affect non-EU Contracting States? It seems to the drafters of this Report that further work is needed 
on the articulation of different conflict of laws schemes applicable in Belgium and other Member States.    
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
 The Belgian ‘police tribunals’ (politierechtbank/tribunal de police - which have jurisdiction over the civil and criminal 
claims arising out of traffic accidents) faithfully apply the 1971 Hague Convention over the Rome II Regulation in those 
cases falling in the Convention’s scope of applicability. (See Politierechtbank West-Vlaanderen, Afdeling Brugge 18 
June 2014; Politierechtbank Brugge 27 January 2012; Politierechtbank Brugge 16 September 2011).   
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  





3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
Legal scholarship in Belgium has qualified the exclusion of violations of privacy or defamation as a ‘political choice’ 
(B. VOLDERS, ‘Europees conflictenrecht voor niet-contractuele verbintenissen’ in Nieuw internationaal privaatrecht: 
meer Europees, meer globaal (2009 Kluwer 2009) para 7). The Belgian courts continue to apply the provisions of 
residual private international law contained in the 2004 Code of Private International law (a translation of which can 
be found here). However, we have not been able to trace any application in practice. Interestingly, the Code contains 
a bespoke conflict rule for defamation and libel (Article 99, § 2). This provision is generous. It allows the victim to rely 
on either the lex delicti commissi, or the lex loci damni. The latter option is subject to a limitation, though. A victim cannot 
rely on the lex loci damni if the person who caused the damage could not have foreseen that the damage would occur 
in that location. 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
Research in the core Belgian case-law databases has not provided any result involving both so-called "SLAPPs" and 
the Rome II Regulation. 
However, some preliminary evidence on an extremely small sample of SLAPP cases against Belgian NGO and civil 
society actors pursued in other jurisdictions can be found on the internet. Publicly available information on these cases 
is insufficient to ascertain whether choice-of-law issues had any bearing in having these cases "forum shopped" 
towards other jurisdictions. The two examples found are the following: X v. Shipbreaking Platform (Brussels-based 
NGO), SLAPP introduced in India in 2017345 ; and SOCFIN v. FIAN Belgium, SOS Faim Belgique, and others, SLAPP 
introduced in Luxembourg in 2019346 .  
Furthermore, we found references on the internet to a threatened lawsuit that was meant to be introduced in Belgium 
by Sandstone (private intelligence firm based in Luxembourg) against the EUobserver in 2020347. However, it has not 
been possible to ascertain whether the threat has been fulfilled. 
As regards academic resources, research in the three main Belgian legal databases has not yielded results on private-
international-law aspects of SLAPPs. However, one of the authors of this report has recently published a working paper 




345 Greenpeace European Unit (O. Reyes, rapporteur), "Sued into silence - How the rich and powerful use legal  tactics 
to shut critics up", Brussels, July 2020, p. 26 (https://storage.googleapis.com/planet4-eu-unit-
stateless/2020/07/20200722-SLAPPs-Sued-into-Silence.pdf, accessed on October 15th 2020): "[...] 
Shipbreaking Platform, a Brussels-based NGO that campaigns for clean and safe  ship recycling, is one such example. 
In 2017, a €12.5 million case was lodged in an Indian court against the NGO, in addition to receiving legal threats 
in the US and Belgium. The case is brought against Shipbreaking Platform itself, a number of current and ex staff, 
individual board members in the US and India, and two organisations that are members of the Shipbreaking Platform’s 
network. This targeting of individuals as well as organisations is typical of SLAPP cases. [...]."] 
346  http://www.fian.be/Des-ONG-de-solidarite-Nord-Sud-et-de-defense-des-droits-humains-denoncent-les-
1373?lang=fr, accessed on October 15th 2020 - Defamation lawsuit introduced in Luxembourg, place of the 
corporation´s domicile against 11 defendants (both NGOs and individuals), all of which but one (SOS Faim 
Luxembourg) would seem to be domiciled in Belgium. 





31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
Research in the core Belgian case-law databases has not provided any result involving both so-called "transnational 
human-rights litigation" against corporate actors and the Rome II Regulation.  
However, one of the authors of this report, due to his professional involvement in the matter, is aware of the imminent 
introduction of a climate-change lawsuit by a Belgian NGO against a private corporation before the Belgian courts. 
This lawsuit will involve the application of the Rome II Regulation. 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
For the purposes of this question, we understood artificial intelligence (AI) to refer to “systems characterized by the 
simulation of intelligent behaviour in computers”. It is indeed a hot topic in many areas of (EU) law and, as such, should 
be addressed in (EU) Private International Law (and in the context of the Rome II Regulation for the purposes of this 
report). 
The interface between EU PIL rules and artificial intelligence is bi-directional: it can be meant to refer to whether  the 
use of AI driven devices has triggered difficulties in the application of the rules that such EU PIL instruments contain 
(here, the Rome II regulation specifically) or it could also refer to  the use of AI technology in order to facilitate the 
application of EU PIL. It is understood that this answer should focus on the first aspect. 
We are unaware of case law developments relating to AI-driven torts and have not found Belgium-based literature 







4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to decision 
of the Court of Justice 
if applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
Hof van beroep 
Antwerpen 
2016/AR/1478 9 May 2019 Art 4(3) Actio pauliana 
French creditors file an actio pauliana  to reverse 
the sale of stocks by a Belgian company. The 
direct damage is located in Belgium and, as a 
consequence, Belgian law applies.. 
Cour d'appel de 
Bruxelles (9e ch.)  
S.A. R.T.L. Belgium, 
Société de droit 
luxembourgeois 
C.L.T.-U.F.A. et I.B.S.R. 
/ D. 
3 October 2013 8; 4(1) Territorial scope of authors’ 
rights; interplay between the 
Bern Convention and Rome II. 
The decision shows poor understanding of PIL, 
amongst other problems: i) it considers that Art. 5 
of the Bern Convention contains choice-of-law 
rules (which Belgian academics consider not to be 
the case: M. Fallon, "La relation du règlement 
Rome II avec d’autres règles de conflit de lois" 
referred in the literature review); ii) it goes on to 
suggest that should the Bern Convention not be 
sufficiently clear to solve the conflict of laws, then 
Rome II would apply (thus, incoherent: if the Bern 
Convention had had choice-of-law provisions 
then resort to Rome II would not have been 
possible); iii) ends up suggesting the application 
of Art. 4(1) Rome II because (allegedly) Art. 8 
Rome II would not be sufficiently clear in cases of 





(N. B. Refers to the judgment of C.A. Brussels, 11 
May 2011, mentioned below) 






23 April 2013 16; 6(1) Overriding Mandatory 
provisions; Act of unfair 
competition affecting 
consumers in the Belgian 
market. 
A consumers association´s action against a 
company´s terms and conditions is a non-
contractual matter; the judgment considers the 
relevant Belgian legislation as an overriding 
mandatory rule (Art. 16 Rome II) and even if that 
was not the case, it still considers Belgian Law as 
applicable by virtue of Art. 6 Rome II. 






11 July 2013 8(1) Territorial scope of authors’ 
rights; interplay with residual 
private international law and 
Bern Convention. 
Composer A of musical piece deposited work with 
Belgian composers association (SABAM). Other 
composer B plagiarises piece. Composer A’s 
work is not protected abroad though. He argues 
that SABAM should have taken the necessary 
measures to ensure that the musical piece was 
protected abroad. Court held that protection of 
authors’ rights is strictly territorial. Refers to Art 93 
CODIP, Art 8(1) Rome II (which does not seem to 
be applicable here, plagiarism happened in the 
1990’s), and Art 4(2) Bern Convention. Confirms 
explicitly that Art 4(2) Bern Convention contains a 
‘conflict rule’. 
Cour d'appel de 
Bruxelles (9e ch.) 
 
Google Inc. c.  
Copiepresse,  Société 





5 May 2011 8; 4(1); 4(3) Territorial scope of authors’ 
rights; interplay between the 
Bern Convention and Rome II 
& the Belgian Code on 
Private International Law. 
Dispute between Belgian press-related entities 
and Google in respect of Google news. Court 
considers that : i) Art. 5 of the Bern Convention 
contains choice-of-law rules (which Belgian 
academics consider not to be the case: M. Fallon, 
"La relation du règlement Rome II avec d’autres 
règles de conflit de lois" referred in the literature 
review); ii) it goes on to suggest that should the 
Bern Convention not be sufficiently clear to solve 
the conflict of laws, then Rome II would apply 





choice-of-law provisions then resort to Rome II 
would not have been possible); iii) ends up 
suggesting the application of Art. 4(1) or even Art. 
4(3) Rome II because Art. 8 reprises the same 
"terms" as the Bern Convention. 
 
Hof van Beroep 
Antwerpen 
NV D./ NV M. 
2009/AR/2316 
25 March 2010 4(2); 4(3); 6(2) Act of unfair competition 
affects exclusively the interests 
of a specific competitor. 
Belgian company D. sued Belgian company M. 
for unfair competition. In a letter, M.’s Danish 
lawyer disclosed a judgment, which was handed 
down in D.’s disadvantage, to a Danish customer 
to convince the customer not to make a contract 
with D. Company D. asked Court for injunction 
with the aim of forbidding company M. to further 
spread the disadvantageous judgment. 
D. argued that the Belgian Market 
Practices Law applied to its claim. The Court 
applied Art 6(2) Rome II, according to which Art 
4 Rome II applies if the act of unfair competition 
affects only one competitor. Then it applied Art 
4(2) Rome II: Belgian law was applicable since 
company D. and M. are both incorporate in 
Belgium. The Court swept company M.’s 
argument that Danish law should be applied the 
dispute has a closer connection with Denmark (Art 
4(3) Rome II) off the table. Even though the 
lawyer who sent the letter and the customer were 
both located in Denmark, the lawyer acted on 
behalf of Belgian company M., the action de 
cessation is brought in Belgium, and an eventual 





Hof van beroep 
Antwerpen  
NV C./NV H., BVBA 
J., BV P. and NV AXA 
Belgium 
2006/AR/2468 
18 May 2009 2(1) Characterisation of action 
directe 
The factual constellation here is the same as 
Handte v TMCS. The Court applied the Rome 
Convention to an action directe (under the Belgian 
law on sales of goods) brought by the sub-buyer 
against the manufacturer. The case predates the 
entry into force of the Rome Regulations, but the 






7 April 2017 6(3) Choice of law in general 
terms and conditions; law 
applicable to unfair 
competition 
Nike repudiated Belgian distributor. Distributor 
pursues Nike in Belgium for breach of competition 
law (refusal to make contract, abuse of dominant 
position). Court held that Belgian law applied to 
the claim pursuant to Art 6(3) Rome II. Nike 
alleged that Dutch law applied under a choice of 
law clause in its GTC’s. Court held however that 
GTC only applied to specific orders that were 
placed by the Belgian distributor, not to the 




B.I. & B.A. v. A&A.G. 
(tijdschrift@ipr.be 
2018, nr. 2, p. 33) 
20 April 2018 6(2) Act of unfair competition 
affects exclusively the interests 
of a specific competitor 
Company B provided services to customer E of 
company A. At one point, A started providing 
services to E after a company reshuffle, without 
formally rescinding the agreement it had made 
with B. A had attracted the employees of B, thus 
benefiting from the know-how they had acquired 
when working for B. 
The Court held that this was a case of unfair 
competition in the sense of Art 6 Rome II. 
However, as the anti-competitive behaviour only 
affected one competitor, it applied the general 
conflicts rule of Art 4 Rome II pursuant to Art 6(2) 















4(1) ; 4(3) Non-contractual liability of a 
bank arising from banking 
operations; location of 
damage; rejection of 
arguments on a “manifestly 
closer connection” 
A corporation tries to engage the tortious liability 
of a bank as regards certain bills of exchange 
issued by one of the bank’s clients. Since the 
payment of the instruments by the bank was 
generally made to the creditor's Belgian account, 
the damage resulting from the lack of payment 
occurred in Belgium. Straightforward application 
of Art. 4(1). Discussion on Art. 4(3): the court 
considers that alleged “manifestly closer 
connections” to Austria have not been 




N.V. Luxafoil v. B.V. 
De KOCK Glasfolie 
Nr.A/12/0904 
24 January 2013  6(2) Act of unfair competition 
exclusively affects the interests 
of a specific competitor. 
French company in the glazing industry spread 
negative publicity about a Belgian competitor 
over the internet (including Dutch and Belgian 
websites). The latter started proceedings in the 
Belgian courts, alleging unfair competition. As the 
negative publicity exclusively targeted the Belgian 
company, the court held that Art 6 Rome II was 
not applicable. It hence applied Art 4(1) Rome II 
instead, concluding that Belgian law was 




BVBA N. t/ 
Vennootschap naar 




12 Precontractual information 
duty 
The law governing the contract is applicable to 
such claim pursuant to Art. 12(1) Rome II. 
Tribunal de 
Commerce de Namur 
(3e ch.) 
A.S.B.L. Test-Achats / 
Easyjet 
   
[Reference not 
published in academic 
journal]  
10 March 2010 16; 6(1)  Overriding Mandatory 
provisions; Act of unfair 
competition affecting 
consumers in the Belgian 
market.  
A consumers association´s action against a 
company´s terms and conditions is a non-
contractual matter; the judgment does not 
consider the relevant Belgian legislation as an 
overriding mandatory rule (Art. 16 Rome II) [Cf. 





 Belgian Law as applicable by virtue of Art. 6 
Rome II. 











13 May 2015 
 
19 Subrogation of government 
agency into rights of traffic 
accident victim 
Flemish agency for people with a disability 
(VAPH) is subrogated into rights of traffic accident 
victim. Brings recourse action against tortfeasor’s 
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• Prior to 2005, when Bulgarian Private International Law Code (BPILC) entered into force, non-contractual 
obligations in international civil and commercial matters were regulated with many conflict-of-law provisions 
spread in various legislative acts. 
• The Bulgarian Private International Law Code, which is strongly influenced by Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations ("ROME II")/* 
COM/2003/0427 final - COD 2003/0168 */348 and with almost identical provisions, has been the first 
comprehensive legislative act in the field of International Private Law, including non-contractual obligations, 
in Bulgaria. 
• With the Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (hereafter, the Rome II Regulation) entering into force, the 
application of the BPILC was limited only to cases and matters which fall outside the scope of the Rome II 
Regulation. Nevertheless, the BPILC together with the Rome II Regulation are considered as key milestones in 
reformation of Bulgarian Private International Law on non-contractual obligations349. 
• The Rome II Regulation is known to both Bulgarian legal scholars and practitioners. 
• In general, Bulgarian doctrine supports the approach of the European Union legislator regarding the 
applicable law in non-contractual obligations. Additionally, a few suggestions for improvement of the rules 
have been discussed in the legal literature, namely: 
o Bulgarian versions of Art. 7, 8 and 14 need to be aligned with the versions in other languages. More 
details can be found in the respective paragraphs of this report. 
o Lex communis habitationis as per Art. 4 (2) could lead to unjust outcome in cases involving multiple 
parties or claims some of them with habitual residence in the same, and some – in different countries. To 
avoid this, it has been suggested in these cases Art. 4 (1) to apply i.e. lex loci damni instead of lex 
communis habitationis. 
o An amendment of the Regulation is recommended in the sense that under Art. 4 (2) lex communis 
habitationis would be the one of the person who suffered the damage and the person who directly 
caused the damage i.e. “the person claimed to be liable” to be replaced by “the person who caused 
the damage”. 
o It has been suggested that in the definition of Art. 23 of the Rome II Regulation of the habitual residence 
of companies and other bodies (corporate or unincorporated), the approach of the EU legislator i.e. 
“place of central administration” is criticized and the alternative option “main place of 
operations/activity” is proposed as a more suitable one.  
• More details about these proposals can be found in the respective paragraphs of this report. 
• Bulgarian courts are well aware of the existence and the content of the Rome II Regulation, and have applied 
it in multiple cases. When interpreting the provisions of the Rome II Regulation, the courts in Bulgaria often 
refer to the relevant case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which reveals certain level of knowledge 
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• How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State? 
• Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
• Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
• Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political 
level? 
The review of the relevant Bulgarian legal publications and case law, performed for the purposes of this report, has 
revealed that Bulgarian legal scholars and practitioners are certainly aware of the existence and the content of the 
Rome II Regulation. 
A few extensive commentaries and books on the Rome II Regulation have been published350 and they contain detailed 
and critical analysis of the provisions of the Regulation together with recognition of both actual and potential problems 
of their application in the practice, which will be discussed later in the report. 
Despite the lack of official statistics on the application of the Rome II Regulation in Bulgaria, other reliable sources of 
relevant case law information confirm awareness also among the judges across the country which have applied the 
provision of the Rome II Regulation in multiple cases351. The majority of judgements are related to damages caused in 
road accidents. 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
Bulgarian legal literature and case law do not identify any particular difficulties for defining the scope of the Rome II 
Regulation. It is considered that the following hypotheses fall outside the scope of the Rome II Regulation: 
- The relations arising out of events or actions taking place on the ship or related to her, on a high sea or on a 
waterway, in which no country exercises sovereignty, shall be regulated by the law of the flag (i.e. lex 
banderae) - Art. 13 of Bulgarian Merchant Shipping Code352. 
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Regional Courts. 
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- If the collision occurs on high sea or a waterway in which no country exercises sovereignty, the law of the 
country shall apply before the court or the arbitration of which the dispute is considered (i.e. lex fori) - Art. 14 
(2) of Bulgarian Merchant Shipping Code. 
Whether or not the Rome II Regulation revoked these special provisions is a disputable topic in the legal publications. 
Some authors do not exclude a broader interpretation of the provisions of the Regulation in the sense that these special 
provisions of the Bulgarian Merchant Shipping Code have been revoked by the Rome II Regulation. The authors even 
consider that preliminary ruling on this matter may be needed and expected353. Other authors see the above provision 
as special law to the general law of the Rome II Regulation (and the Bulgarian Private International Law Code)354. 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, Arts 31-32) 
This aspect of the Rome II regulation does not seem to have raised any particular problems so far. Bulgarian legal 
authors are in accord that the Bulgarian Private International Law Code shall apply to all events with international 
aspect giving rise to damages that occurred prior to 11.01.2009, whereas the Rome II Regulation shall govern 
relevant events that occurred after 11.01.2009355. 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
No particular difficulties related to the concept of non-contractual obligations and their distinction from contractual 
obligation have been described and discussed either in Bulgarian legal doctrine or in case law. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
The universal application of the Rome II Regulation means that its rules apply regardless of whether the relevant event 
is related to any Member State in personal (i.e. parties involved have habitual residence in the EU) or territorial aspect 
(the act or damage occur in the territory of the EU). This also means that the rules of the Regulation may refer to the 
law of a non-Member State as applicable to the non-contractual obligation356. 
Some legal scholars, though, express doubts about the competence of the European Union (the EU) to regulate 
obligations related to tort and delict that occurred outside the territory of the EU and give as an example of such 
potential problematic application acts causing damage between a Bulgarian citizen and citizen of Libya that occurred 
on Libyan territory. 
Furthermore, pursuant Art. 18 (1) of Bulgarian Private International Law Code the Bulgarian courts shall have 
jurisdiction over actions on damage sustained as a result of a tort or delict save in the cases covered under Art. 4 of 
the Code and where the harmful act was committed in the Republic of Bulgaria or where the damage or part thereof 
occurred in the Republic of Bulgaria. Some concerns were expressed in the legal literature that it is unclear what part 
of the damages must have occurred in Bulgaria for justifying the competence of Bulgarian courts. The legal authors 
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Outside the scope of the Rome II Regulation are the obligations arising out of a violation of rights relating to the 
personality and rights related to protection of personal data by the mass communication media to which Art. 108 (1) 
of Bulgarian Private International Law Code would apply358. 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital 
(7)) 
Bulgarian authors make with confidence reference to the ECJ case law, namely C-292/05, in order to explain that 
outside the scope of the Rome II Regulation fall claims that are neither civil nor commercial, hence the Brussels I 
Regulation (R 44/05) would not be applicable to them as well. It has been clarified that the solution in this ECJ case 
law was announced prior to the Rome II Regulation, which has reconfirmed it 359. 
Furthermore, it is reaffirmed that the Rome II Regulation shall not prejudice the application of international conventions 
to which one or more Member States are parties at the time when this Regulation is adopted and which lay down 
conflict-of-law rules relating to non-contractual obligations (Art. 28 (1)). However, it is deemed that the Regulation 
shall, as between Member States, take precedence over conventions concluded exclusively between two or more of 
them in so far as such conventions concern matters governed by this Regulation (Art. 28 (2))360. 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
Bulgarian legal doctrine accepts positively this legislative approach as it is associated with the modern trends in the 
liability for tort/delict, namely that the liability no longer has characteristics of and aim at punishing person that 
committed the tort/delict, but has compensatory character, i.e. to rectify the damage361. It is beneficial for persons that 
suffered damage when the damage is rectified/compensated in the place where they occurred362. 
Furthermore, as the Regulation does not contain provisions for situations when the damage occurred in more than one 
country, therefore Bulgarian authors suggest that so called “distributive principle” would apply to such scenario, 
namely liability and damages will be defined in each of countries independently/separately. The argumentation for 
this approach has been taken from ECJ case law C-68/98 regarding Art. 5 (1) p.3 of Brussels Convention, replaced 
by Regulation 44/01)363. 
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Finally, some Bulgarian scholars understand locus damni under Art. 4 (1) as locus injuriae364. 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
Bulgarian legal authors suggest that the application of Art. 4 (2) could lead to unjust outcome in cases involving multiple 
parties or claims, some of them with habitual residence in the same, but the others in different countries (due to 
differences in applicable law, some of the parties may be treated more favourably than the others). To avoid this, it is 
suggested in the above described cases Art. 4 (1) to apply, i.e. lex loci damni instead of lex communis habitationis 
365. 
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the citizenship of the involved parties plays no role for deciding on the 
applicable law. What is relevant for this matter is where parties have their “habitual residence”, as defined in Art. 23 
of the Rome II Regulation366. Irrelevant are however the facts that (i) the habitual residence is illegal367, (ii) the factual 
duration of the residence is very short provided all the circumstance affirm undoubtedly the intention of the party to 
reside longer term in the particular place (for instance if the person rented a flat and found a job in a certain city, it is 
shown as intention of this person to have this city as their habitual residence)368. 
In addition, the authors indicate that pursuant Art. 4 (2) “the person claimed to be liable” is a broader concept than 
the concept of a person who caused the damage, as it includes also the situation in which one person bears liability 
for another person who actually caused the damages (i.e. a parent for acts of minors)369. This solution of the Rome II 
Regulation however is criticized by some Bulgarian scholars who suggest an amendment of the Regulation in the sense 
that under Art. 4 (2) lex communis habitationis would be the one of the person who suffered the damage and the 
person who actually caused the damage i.e. “the person claimed to be liable” to be replaced by “the person who 
caused the damage”  370. Arguments for this suggestion are taken from: Art. 15 (g) of the Rome II Regulation pursuant 
which the law applicable to non-contractual obligations under the Regulation shall govern also the liability for the acts 
of another person; furthermore, the person suffered damages would expect to receive the same remedy regardless the 
damage is cause by a person action on their own behalf or on behalf of someone else and finally, the person who 
takes benefits from the fact that someone else is acting on their behalf must take also the risks arising from these acts 
and of these risks is the application of the law of the person who directly caused the damage and the person who 
suffered the damage371. 
Often lex communis habitationis is actually also lex fori, which decreases the administrative and financial burden of 
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The definition of Art. 23 of the Rome II Regulation of the habitual residence of companies and other bodies (corporate 
or unincorporated), namely their place of central administration, is criticized in Bulgarian legal literature. By 
differentiating “central administration”, i.e. where the decisions about the company are taken from “main place of 
operations/activity”, the authors argue that very often the exact place of central administration, especially in big 
companies operating globally, is difficult to find as it is more “inner” information of the companies and not so visible 
for the public, whereas the place(s) where the company operates and has its activity is more easily identifiable373. 
Finally, Bulgarian authors that distinguish the moment of injury from the moment of occurring of damage, suggest 
restrictive interpretation of the Art. 4 (2) when it comes to the wording “at the time when the damage occurs”, i.e. in 
the sense this is the moment of injury, no matter that the damage may occur later374. The time of the act that caused the 
injury/damage is irrelevant375. 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), 
Until recently lex proxima was unknown to Bulgarian legislation of delicts that recognized lex loci delicti (lex loci 
damni) and lex communis habitationis, however the approach has been well known among Bulgarian legal 
scholars376. 
In general, the arguments “Pros” lex proxima summarized in Bulgarian doctrine are: the approach provides flexibility 
and neutrality; and arguments “Cons” – the approach causes unpredictability, which increases legal uncertainty, 
leaves a room for “forum shopping” and increases probability of applicability of lex fori (as courts tend to apply the 
law they know the best). Nevertheless, it is considered that in Art. 4 (3) of the Rome II Regulation these advantages 
and disadvantage of lex proxima are well balanced377. 
The view is that the approach will have very limited application in the practice. There are two hypotheses in which the 
Art. 4 (3) will apply, namely: (i) when the delict is connected with another (pre-existing) legal relationship between the 
parties (“accessory connection mechanism”) existing either by contract or by law. Examples of application when the 
tort/delict is connected with a contract378 are: for delict between employees of one and the same employer or between 
partners in a company, contract for carriage of travellers or cargo (in accordance with the international transport 
conventions CMR, COTIF, CIV, CIM), or a sale contract when the damage is caused by the subject matter of the 
contract (in which case Art. 4(3) will derogate Art. 5 of the Rome II Regulation)379 and even hitch-hike contract380; 
examples when the law applicable to the legal relationship based on the law will be applicable also to the tort/delict 
are: delict between spouses or between parents and children381 or when the delict is connected with another delict382, 
(ii) other cases “manifestly more closely connected” – in these cases pursuant Art. 4 (3) lex loci delicti (lex loci damni) 
and lex communis habitationis could be replaced by lex loci actus or lex communis patriae383. 
 
 
373 Mouseva, Boryana Delict in private international law, Sofia, Sibi, 2011, p.65-67 
374 This position is accepted also in the case law - Judgement 8048/ 30.11.2017, civil case 3593/2017 Sofia City 
Court 
375 Mouseva, Boryana Delict in private international law, Sofia, Sibi, 2011, p.68 
376 Mouseva, Boryana Delict in private international law, Sofia, Sibi, 2011, p.72-74 
377 Mouseva, Boryana Delict in private international law, Sofia, Sibi, 2011, p.74-75 
378 Todorov, Todor Private International Law: The European Union and the Republic of Bulgaria 3rd revised. and 
extended edition, Sofia: Sibi, 2010, p.412 
379 Stancheva-Mincheva, Vesela Commentary on the Code of Private International Law: comparison with acts of 
European law, Sofia: Sibi, 2010, p.511-512; Mouseva, Boryana Delict in private international law, Sofia, Sibi, 
2011, p.79-80 
380 Mouseva, Boryana Delict in private international law, Sofia, Sibi, 2011, p.80 
381 Stancheva-Mincheva, Vesela Commentary on the Code of Private International Law: comparison with acts of 
European law, Sofia: Sibi, 2010, p.512 
382 Mouseva, Boryana Delict in private international law, Sofia, Sibi, 2011, p.81 






Furthermore, legal authors express the opinion that when assessing the connection between the tort/delict and certain 
law, legal expectations of the involved parties about the law applicable to their relationship should be taken into 
consideration384. It may happen that the country with which the tort/delict is “manifestly more closely connected” is 
the country where the event giving rise to the damage occurred (lex loci delicti commissi)385. 
The Art. 4 (3) would be applied by the courts ex officio386. 
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts 
No particular difficulties related to the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other 
financial market torts have been described and discussed either in Bulgarian legal doctrine or in case law. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
As is known, the legislation of the EU Member States regarding the product liability is now harmonized387, therefore, 
Bulgarian doctrine takes the view that the conflict-of-law provisions of the Rome II Regulation would be applicable 
only to non-harmonized cases388. 
Traditionally, even prior to the transposition of Directive 85/374 into Bulgarian legislation, in Bulgarian legal doctrine 
and case law the liability for damage caused by defective product has been qualified as delict liability (not as a 
contractual one)389. 
Although the Rome II Regulation does not explicitly state a requirement, the product caused the damage to be 
defective, the systematic interpretation of its provision in connection with the provisions of Directive 85/374 leads 
some Bulgarian authors to the conclusion that such a requirement should exist, i.e. the product should not provide safety 
expected under the circumstances390. 
Furthermore, there is an opinion in the legal literature that Art. 5 of the Rome II Regulation would apply to both B2C 
and B2B delicts, i.e. the person sustaining the damage could be consumer or trader391. 
Bulgaria is not a party to the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, however the 
Convention influenced the product liability provision of the Bulgarian Private International Law Code (Art. 106)392. 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
The Rome II Regulation does not contain a definition of unfair competition, yet per argument of para. 11 of the 
Preamble, it can be concluded it must be an autonomous concept, i.e. not connected with the legal theory of any 
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particular Member State. Some Bulgarian authors therefore suggest referencing to the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property Art. 10 bis (2) and (3) as an autonomous definition for unfair competition393. 
When it comes to the concept of restriction of free competition, some authors consider para 23 of the Preamble of the 
Rome II Regulation providing clear guidance on the content of this concept, and additionally clarify that the list of 
hypotheses of restriction of competition in the paragraph, which refer to Art. 81 and 82 of the Treaty of EC (Art.101 
and 102 of the TFEU) or by the law of Member States, is not exhaustive394. 
The approach chosen by the European Union legislator, i.e. the law of the affected market (lex loci competitionis) to 
be the default for claims for unfair competition is supported in Bulgarian legal doctrine as it takes into consideration all 
interests that competition law aims to protect, namely of interests of competitors, of consumers and of market itself395. 
In the hypothesis of Art. 6 (2) of the Rome II Regulation, when only one competitor is affected, for instance in case of 
illegally obtaining confidential information of competitor, solicitation of competitor’s employees, influencing clients to 
terminate their contracts with the competitor, the applicable law will be lex proximus, lex communis habitationis or lex loci 
delicti (pursuant Art. 6 (2) in connection with Art. 4). 
When the affected market actually covers more than one country, among which could be also non- Member States396, 
then lex fori of the seized court could apply (Art. 6 (3) b). 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
There are three points regarding the environmental damage worth mentioning, namely: 
Firstly, as per the opinion in legal doctrine if the Bulgarian law is applicable, the claim for damages and the claim for 
injunction (to cease the breach and rectify the pollution) can be cumulatively brought even though each one of them 
could be governed by different law, for example if a Greek claimant sues a Bulgarian pollutant for cross-border 
pollution, then the claim for damages governed by Greek law (lex loci damni) can be joint with the claim for ceasing 
the breach, to which Bulgarian law will apply397. 
Secondly, some Bulgarian authors emphasize a variation between Bulgarian and English/German wording in the Art. 
7 of the Rome II Regulation. More specifically, Bulgarian wording states that “увреждане на околната среда или 
претърпени имуществени или неимуществени вреди в резултат на такова увреждане” (“environmental damage 
or pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage as a result of such damage”), whereas the English version speaks about 
“environmental damage or damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage”, and the German 
one – “Umweltschädigung oder einem aus einer solchen Schädigung herrührenden Personen- oder Sachschaden”398. 
The variation in the language versions is obvious and must be taken into consideration in law application as it could 
cause practical problems. 
And finally, traditionally in Bulgarian Law the liability for environmental damage is a fault one (Art. 170 of the 
Environment Protection Law), whereas pursuant the Rome II Regulation it seems to be strict liability399. This leads to 
different legal regimes depending on whether the liability is only for “domestic” pollution or for cross-border one. 
Bulgarian legal doctrine supports amendment of domestic law and changing the fault liability to a strict one, same as 
under the Rome II Regulation. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
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The rule is lex loci protectionis, i.e. law of the country for which protection is claimed (Art. 8 (1)), and this approach is 
accepted and supported in Bulgarian legal doctrine as it follows the principle of territorial protection of Intellectual 
Property (IP) rights400. 
When a non-contractual obligation arises from an infringement of a unitary Community intellectual property right (see 
Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union 
trade mark), the law applicable shall, for any question that is not governed by the relevant Community instrument, be 
the law of the country in which the act of infringement was committed, i.e. lex loci actus. 
According to some authors, the Bulgarian version of Art. 8 of the Rome II Regulation differs from versions in other 
languages, i.e. English and German, namely Bulgarian version states “правото на държавата, в която се търси 
закрилата на тези права” (“law of the country in which protection is claimed”), whereas the English version states 
“the law of the country for which protection is claimed”. The Bulgarian version may lead to the incorrect conclusion 
that the law is lex fori (where the claim has been brought), which would be against the Rome II Regulation rule401. 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
This rule would be applicable in cases similar to the example given by the legal author, namely for a claim for damages 
caused by the strike of personnel of a Bulgarian port to a foreign buyer whose goods were not loaded to the ships on 
time402. 
Lex loci actus is the default, however it can be derogated by lex communis habitationis or by the law chosen by the 
parties (pursuant Art. 14) when certain conditions are met403. 
Lex loci actus would be applied ex-officio by the courts404. 
According to Bulgarian authors, Art. 9 of the Rome II Regulation deviates three time from the principle of autonomous 
concepts under the Regulation, namely: (i) the legal status of trade unions or of the representative organisations of 
workers is provided by the law of the Member States – para. 28 of the Preamble; (ii) the concept of industrial action, 
such as a strike action or lock-out, is governed by each Member State’s internal rules – para. 27 of the Preamble, and 
(iii) the conditions relating to the exercise of such [industrial] action are in accordance with national law – para. 28 of 
the Preamble405. 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
Per argument of para. 11 of the Preamble of the Rome II Regulation, for the purposes of this Regulation some concepts 
in it should be understood as autonomous concepts. Bulgarian authors however express doubts about how this would 
work in practice, given that, for instance Bulgarian courts know only the Bulgarian concept of non-contractual 
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obligation, unjust enrichment, etc., and they would tend to apply only those concepts. This could result in application 
of the Bulgarian law for qualification of an event as unjust enrichment, when assessing the applicability of the conflict-
of-law provision of Art. 10 of the Rome II Regulation406. 
Art. 10 of the Rome II Regulation have already been invoked in a couple of Bulgarian cases407.  
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
No particular difficulties related to the specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) have been described and discussed 
either in legal doctrine or in case law408. 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
Culpa in contrahendo is also considered an autonomous concept and for its definition a reference to the ESJ case law 
(namely, C-334/00) is made in Bulgarian legal literature409. 
Some authors share the view that Art. 12 (1) of Rome II Regulation represents actually a reference to Regulation 
593/08 (Rome I) and 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations410. 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which would 
justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
This concept has very limited impact in the legal practice – almost no application411. The probable explanation is that 
once the damage has occurred, and if the involved parties have a will to reach an agreement, they would settle their 
dispute on damages directly rather than first concluding an agreement on choice of law412. 
Some authors criticize the naming of Chapter IV (and Art. 14) of the Rome II Regulation (version in Bulgarian), i.e. 
“Свобода на договаряне” (which means “Freedom of contract”). They suggest “Свобода на избор” (“Freedom of 
choice”) would be correct as freedom of contract and freedom of choice are two different concepts and the latter is 
the relevant one for the international delicts413. 
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Although the Rome II Regulation does not explicitly state so, in Bulgarian legal doctrine it is accepted that the Regulation 
allows the parties of delict relationship to choose only state law (rules enacted by state authorities), but not  soft law. 
Nevertheless, it is supported opinion that the freedom of choice could entail also the right of parties to choose, within 
the limits set by overriding mandatory provisions of the chosen applicable law, also soft law, such as the Principles of 
European Tort Law414. 
Legal authors foresee practical difficulties caused by the requirement of the freedom of choice not to be applied in in 
prejudice of the rights of third parties (Art. 14 last para.). This may create a “split” of the rules applicable to the delict, 
namely one set of legal rules will be applicable between the parties (the law they have chosen) and another set of 
rules would apply to the relationships between the parties and any third parties (such as insurers, family 
members/heirs, creditors, etc.). In this situation, the court hearing the case could face difficulties to establish and apply 
multiple legal regimes to one and the same delict415. 
Finally, some authors suggest interpretation by analogy in law of the Rome II Regulation in the sense that the freedom 
of choice cannot have as a result to deprive the weaker party of the protection afforded to them by provisions that 
cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law that, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable 
(analogy in law with Art. 6 para. 2 and Art. 8 para.1 of the Rome I Regulation)416. 
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
The position taken in Bulgarian doctrine is that burden of proof and presumptions are governed by the law applicable 
to the delict (i.e. by substantive law), whereas all other procedural aspects of evidences are governed by lex fori i.e. 
procedural law of the seized court417. 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
Bulgarian Private International Law Code contains provisions on establishment of content of foreign applicable law, its 
interpretation and application as well as some special rules on public policy mandatory rules and reciprocity. 
Pursuant Art. 43 of BPILC the court or another authority applying the law shall of its own motion establish the content 
of the foreign law. The said court may resort to the methods provided for in international treaties, may request 
information from the Ministry of Justice or from another body, as well as request opinions from experts and specialized 
institutions418. The parties may present documents establishing the content of the provisions of foreign law on which 
they base their motions or objections, or otherwise assist the court or another authority applying the law. Upon choice 
of applicable law, the court or another authority applying the law may order the parties to assist in the establishment 
of the content of the said law. The party that invokes foreign law bears the expenses for its establishment. As these are 
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proceeding expenses, they can be imposed on the other party, if they lose the case419. Not only the foreign law rules, 
but also relevant foreign case law must be established420.  
Furthermore, according to Art. 44 of BPILC the foreign law shall be interpreted and applied as it is interpreted and 
applied in the state which created the said law. Non-application of a foreign law, as well as its misinterpretation and 
misapplication, shall be a ground for appeal.  
In addition, Art. 45 of BIPLC states that a provision of a foreign law determined as applicable by the Code shall not 
apply only if the consequences of such application are manifestly incompatible with Bulgarian public policy. 
Incompatibility shall be evaluated while taking account of the extent of connection of the relationship with Bulgarian 
public policy and the significance of the consequences of application of the foreign law. Where an incompatibility 
referred to in previous paragraph is established, another appropriate provision of the same foreign law shall be 
applied. In the absence of such a provision, a provision of Bulgarian law shall apply, if necessary for settlement of the 
relationship.  
When it comes to special mandatory rules, Art. 46. (1) BPILC provides that the provisions of the Code shall not affect 
the application of the mandatory rules of Bulgarian law which, considering their subject matter and purpose, must be 
applied notwithstanding the referral to a foreign law. The court may have regard to the mandatory rules of another 
state with which the relationship has a close connection if the said rules, according to the law of the state that created 
them, must be applied notwithstanding what law has been determined as applicable by a conflict of laws rule of the 
Code. To decide whether to take into account such special mandatory rules, the court must have regard to the nature 
of the said rules and the subject matter thereof, as well as to the consequences of the application or non-application 
thereof.  
And finally, Art. 47 of BPILC proclaims that the application of a foreign law shall be independent of any requirement 
of reciprocity. In case a statutory instrument requires reciprocity, the existence of such reciprocity shall be presumed 
until the contrary is established. 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
The very broad scope of Art. 15 aims at: (i) identical outcome of judgement for the same factual situations regardless 
of whether they are domestic or with international aspect (ensuring legal certainty); (ii) international harmonisation of 
judgement – regardless of seized court (of which country) the applicable law will be the same; (iii) taking into 
consideration the legal expectation of the parties involved (that all aspects of the delict will be governed by the 
applicable law as a whole, not only some of the aspects). 
There are two practical obstacles for this very broad scope – so called “preliminary questions” that may be governed 
by the law different from the law applicable to the delict (for instance, the questions about the ownership of the 
good/product that caused the damage, which will be governed by lex rei sitae) and the concurrence between 
contractual and delict liability421. 
The list of topics in Art. 15 of the Rome II Regulation is not exhaustive and it includes: 
a) the basis and extent of liability, including the determination of persons who may be held liable for acts performed by 
them – according to Bulgarian legal literature this entails also the questions about unlawfulness of the act caused 
damage422, type of liability (strict or fault), definition of fault423, causal link between event and damage424, ability to bear 
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delict liability (“деликтоспособността”) that would be governed by the law applicable to the delict, not by the law 
applicable to the person liable for delict 425; 
(b) the grounds for exemption from liability, any limitation of liability and any division of liability – legal authors list in 
this category force majeure, fundamental change of circumstances, fault of victim or third parties; 
(c) the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy claimed – more specifically, whether it 
includes pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage, direct damage, loss of profits, exemplary or punitive damages, claim 
for which can be rejected based on public order considerations (see para 32 of the Preamble), etc.; 
(d) within the limits of powers conferred on the court by its procedural law, the measures which a court may take to 
prevent or terminate injury or damage or to ensure the provision of compensation – for example – levy, injunction426; 
(e) the question whether or not a right to claim damages or a remedy may be transferred, including by inheritance – 
some authors however think that the circle of heirs will be governed by the law applicable to the inheritance of the 
deceased, and not by the law applicable to the delict427; 
(f) persons entitled to compensation for damage sustained personally - the preliminary questions whether a person has 
a status of a spouse, born or adopted child will be governed by the law under which this relationship occurred and 
not as per lex loci delicti428; 
(g) liability for the acts of another person; 
(h) the manner in which an obligation may be extinguished and rules of prescription and limitation, including rules 
relating to the commencement, interruption and suspension of a period of prescription or limitation - the set-off is not 
covered by the provisions of the Rome II Regulation, therefore Bulgarian doctrine suggests that it will be governed by 
the law applicable to the “passive claim”429. Agreements for debt remission or settlement will be governed by the Rome 
I Regulation430. The eligibility of agreements of exclusion or limitation of liability for damage caused by the delict must 
be governed by the law applicable to the delict, however the agreements themselves (their conclusion, validity, 
interpretation and performance) will be governed by the law chosen by the parties or by the Rome I Regulation431. 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16) 
No particular difficulties related to the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16) have been described and 
discussed either in Bulgarian legal doctrine or in case law. 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18) 
Art. 18 governs only the right of the person having suffered damage to bring his or her claim directly against the insurer; 
to insurer’s liability the law applicable to the insurance contract will apply432. This provision is very often used in practice 
and there is a plenty of judgements in this regard in Bulgarian court practice. 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19) 
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No particular difficulties related to the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19) have been described and discussed either 
in Bulgarian legal doctrine or in case law433. 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20) 
No particular difficulties related to the specific rule on multiple liability (Art. 20) have been described and discussed 
either in Bulgarian legal doctrine or in case law. 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business 
As mentioned above, lex communis habitationis as per Art. 4 (2) could lead to unjust outcome in cases involving 
multiple parties or claims some of them with habitual residence in the same and some – in different countries. To avoid 
this, it has been suggested in these cases Art. 4 (1) to apply i.e. lex loci damni instead of lex communis habitationis. 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
No particular difficulties related to these specific rules have been described and discussed either in Bulgarian legal 
doctrine or in case law. 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
This provision has very limited practical importance and is rarely used in the legal practice434. Theoretically, it could 
be applied and the public policy argument could be invoked when: (i) the claim aims at results different from 
compensation of damages suffered, i.e. in case of punitive or exemplary damages; (ii) for extremely long prescription 
period or even for lack of prescription period, or (iii) to protect rights and freedoms from the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms435. 
A Bulgarian court invoked this clause when the law applicable to the delict, i.e. (Greek law) provided for a maximum 
cap of the compensation for non-pecuniary damage, whereas such did not (and still does not) exist in the relevant 
Bulgarian law. The court assessed the compensation cap as manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum 
and did not apply it436. 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
The available sources do not indicate any practical problems in Bulgaria with regards to the interaction between the 
Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments in the mentioned specific areas. 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
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Bulgaria is not a party to the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on legal certainty. 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach 
The available sources do not indicate such practical problems in Bulgaria. 
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope of the 
Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in cross-border 
situations 
As mentioned above, the obligations arising out of a violation of rights relating to the personality and rights related to 
protection of personal data by the mass communication media are governed by Art. 108 (1) of Bulgarian Private 
International Law Code , which is influenced by the initial Proposal of the Regulation from 2003 that contained similar 
provision.  
The available sources do not contain information about invoking in practice the provision of Art. 108 (1) of Bulgarian Private 
International Law Code therefore it is difficult to assess its suitability to tackle cross-border situations of violations of personal 
rights. 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
The available sources do not contain information about the application, in Bulgarian practice, of the provisions of the 
Rome II Regulation to cases of defamation and data protection, therefore it is difficult to comment this topic. 
Regarding SLAPPs, on 20 April 2021 an article entitled "Dogan, Peevski, Borisov, Bulgartabak, smuggled tobacco 
and money for terrorism"437 was published on the website for investigative journalism Bivol (www.bivol.bg) (“the 
Article”). The Article was making a reference to a secret report,438 which according to the publication, could be dated 
around the end of 2016 or the beginning of 2017 and appeared to be a work of a powerful institutional or private 
intelligence body with access to impressive intelligence resources and unlimited amounts of sensitive trade information 
(“the Report”). In the Article it was stated that, even though the Bivol acquired the Report some time ago from reliable 
sources abroad, it was published only now as time was required for verification of certain attributes and data in the 
report so its status as a legitimate document could be confirmed and it would be established as fit for publication.  
In summary, the article described that under guidance from certain Bulgarian political leaders  (Ahmed Dogan and 
Delyan Peevski), a Bulgarian tobacco holding company Bulgartabac Holding Group (“Bulgartabac”) developed a 
complex financial, legal and logistical system for the manufacturing and distribution of cigarettes and, even though the 
merchandise was officially shipped to legitimate destinations, it was in fact distributed as contraband goods in the 
Middle East: in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. Allegedly Bulgartabac’s smuggling network covered mainly Bulgaria, 
Dubai and a dozen ports in the Black Sea and Mediterranean, also making use of traditional smuggling channels in 
the Middle East. Their illegal trafficking and murky exports contributed to the financing of organisations listed as terror 
ones in Turkey, NATO and the European Union.  
Further in the Article it was stated that according to the Report a Bulgarian bank - the First Investment Bank (“FIB”) was 
involved in these operations and to certain extend due to this, it had a growing public image of a “mafia bank”. 
On 23 April 2021 Bivol website published parts of an official letter, sent by an UK law firm on behalf of FIB to them, 
with which letter Bivol was asked to remove the Article from its website or anywhere it may have been published and 
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to confirm no later than 17:00 (CET) on 23 April 2021 that the Article had been removed from the website and would 
not be published by Bivol or anyone acting on its behalf to any third party by any means. Additionally in the letter it 
was stated that should Bivol failed to removed/take down the Article and provide that confirmation, FIB would take 
legal action seeking court orders compelling Bivol to do so as well as damages. 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
The available sources do not contain information about applying in practice the provisions of the Rome II Regulation 
to corporate abuses against human rights, therefore it is difficult to comment this topic. 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
The development of artificial intelligence (AI) and its impact on human life and society, including liability for damages, 
has already being discussed in Bulgaria, yet the discussion is mainly theoretical (i.e. drafting of strategies, academic 
conferences, etc.)439 .  
The available sources do not contain information about invoking in practice the provisions of the Rome II Regulation in 
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4. List of national case law 
 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to decision 
of the Court of Justice 
if applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
Sofia City Court 8048 30.11.2017 Art.3 
Art.4 (1) 
Road accident Rome II Regulation led to application of law of a 
non-Member State (Serbia) 
Regional Court - 
Russe 






Between parties with permanent residence in 
Bulgaria for accident abroad (Romania) 




Bulgarian law would apply to a claim for 
damage of worsen health, when injury was 
caused by a car accident in Belgium, but 
deterioration of health status occurred at later in 
Bulgaria 




Subrogation of the insurer that paid expense for 
medical treatment of person suffered damages in 









Temporal application of Bulgarian Private 
International Law Code and Rome II Regulation 




Taking into consideration prices and fees on the 
market where the damage occurred when 
defining the compensation i.e. car accident 
occurred in Bulgaria, car reparation was done 
in Germany. The compensation for damage was 
based on average market prices of materials 
and labour fees in Bulgaria (where the damage 
occurred)  




Opposite to Judgement 16198 – not taking into 
consideration prices and fees on the market 
where the damage occurred when defining the 
compensation i.e. car accident occurred in 
Bulgaria, car reparation was done in the 
Netherlands. The compensation for damage 
was based on actual prices of materials and 
labour fees paid for the reparation in the 
Netherland not as per average prices in 
Bulgaria (where the damage occurred) 
District Court - 
Dobrich 
500 28.08.2020 Art. 11  Claim against owners of apartments in a building 
for due expenses for maintenance of jointly used 
parts of the building falls outside the scope of the 
Rome II Regulation 
Sofia City Court 8091 21.12.2018 Art. 19 Rome II 









Sofia City Court 963 23.05.2019 Art.10 Unjust Enrichment Unjustified bank transfer 
Sofia City Court 179 13.01.2020 Art.10 Unjust Enrichment Unjustified bank transfer 
Supreme Court of 
Cassation  
48 23.07.202 Art. 14 (1) Ship accident, Freedom of 
choice 
Accident with tour boat on lake Ohrid (the North 
Macedonia), but that parties chosen Bulgarian 
law as applicable 
Court of Appeal - 
Sofia 
1555 13.07.2015 Art. 2 (3) Damage that is likely to occur As a defence against rei vindication, the 
defendant invoked Rome II Regulation and claim 
for future damage. 
The Commission for 
Protection of 
Competition 
391 29.03.2011 Art.6  Opinion in pubic consultation initiated by the 
Commission on collective action for injunction 
and damages  
Sofia City Court 1478 28.02.2019 Art.26  A cap of non-pecuniary damage incompatible 







• There is a different level of awareness of legal practitioners, businesses and citizens in Croatia of the Rome 
II Regulation. While legal practitioners (particularly judges) have knowledge about its application, citizens 
are unaware of the existence of such an EU instrument.  
• Due to Croatia’s late accession to the EU in 2013, the operation of the Rome II Regulation in Croatian courts 
is limited to a few categories of disputes while in others, court practice is still in very early stages of 
development. The Rome II Regulation is often applied in traffic accidents while in categories such as 
environmental damage, product liability, unfair competition etc. there is either no cases, or a single case or 
few cases recorded.  
• Another major problem with acquiring an insight into court practice in which the Rome II Regulation was 
applied is caused by the fact that there is no systematic approach to collection of relevant data or statistics 
regarding application of EU instruments, including the Rome II Regulation in Croatia, which is accessible. 
The collected case law for this Report can be used as a representative sample, since it concerns cases which 
were collected by the largest Croatian courts (Municipal Civil court and Commercial court in Zagreb).  
• The doctrinal discussion in Croatia recently engaged in a discussion on the application of the Regulation to 
specific areas and highlighted certain trends and issues (mainly concerning the application in the field of 
traffic accidents, unfair competition and violations of privacy). One issue which has not been sufficiently 
discussed in the legal literature, but it is obvious from the case law that there are difficulties in its understanding 
is the interaction between the application of the Rome II Regulation and the 1971 Hague Convention on the 
law applicable to traffic accidents to disputes involving citizens of MS and third country citizens.  
• At a political level, there is no relevant debate on the application of the Rome II Regulation in Croatia. At a 
doctrinal level, there has been some discussion on the application of the Rome II Regulation to areas 
excluded from the scope of its application (such as violations of privacy) under Croatian Private International 
Law Act (PIL Act).    
• Judges do not report any difficulties with respect to applying the category of “civil and commercial matters.” 
(see1) However, the legal literature questions and debates the appropriateness of the exclusion from the 
scope of the Rome II Regulation of the same categories, which were excluded from the Rome Convention. In 
addition, legal theorists raise an issue about the effect of the decision of the Croatian legislator to widen the 
scope of application of the provisions of the Rome II Regulation to categories of disputes excluded from its 
scope (Art. 1(1)-(2)). Since for now, there is no court practice, it is impossible to predict the range of possible 
benefits or problems related to it.  
• When the Rome II Regulation was first introduced, there was criticism from the legal theory that ratione 
temporis application was regulated by two opposite concepts of “application in time” and “date of 
application” (see 2 ). As to current state and the practical application, there are still issues judges face in the 
determination of the temporal scope of the Rome II Regulation. This is obvious from the cases presented in 
the Report (see 2), that are representative of situations in which the courts are uncertain of the temporal scope 
of the Rome II Regulation or the representative of the parties (lawyers) appeal without ground, claiming 
erroneous application of the substantive (applicable) law due to the misinterpretation of the provision on the 
temporal scope of the Rome II Regulation.  
• There are difficulties arising out of the interpretation of the concept of non-contractual obligations, where 
there are both elements of contractual and non-contractual obligation. The Regulation does not bring any 
guidelines how to differentiate between them. Since Croatian judges are left to interpret the concept of non-
contractual obligation by relying on lex fori (national law), difficulties may arise in its understanding. Namely, 
in comparison to the new Croatian PIL Act, the previous Croatian PIL Act (ZRS) provided for a narrower 





• The interpretation of the Rome II Regulation and its relationship with other EU instruments is challenging for 
Croatian legal practitioners. In example, judges will not always be aware that determination of the 
substantive scope and the differentiation between obligationes quae ex contractu nascitur and obligationes 
quae ex delicto nascitur also requires the judge to consider the interpretation of the term tort (delict) in case 
law of the CJEU on Brussels I and Brussels I Recast. The quality of the translation of EU instruments, including 
the Rome II Regulation is additionaly burdensome for legal practitioners.  (see 5)  
• Although in the initial stages of the application of the Rome II Regulation in Croatia, there were doubts 
whether legis loci damni will result in inflexible or insufficiently flexible legal solutions in the future practice, 
there seems to be no problem with the application of the general rule provided in Art 4. (see 6) 
• The Croatian legal theory warns of the problems caused by the application of a specific rule on unfair 
competition (Art 6) in regard to compensation of damage sought in a follow-up procedure. National court 
would be bound by a decision of the EC or a national public entity of a MS on the liability for the act of 
unfair competition. However, if the EC or a national public entity of a MS does not render a decision 
establishing liability, but instead decides that conditions for initiating the procedure were not met, there is still 
a possibility for the claimant to initiate a separate national procedure for protection of his subjective rights 
caused by the act of unfair competition. As prescribed under Art 58/1/13 Croatian Act on the protection 
of market competition, it is possible for the national court to decide that there was no distortion of competition 
in such a case. Although the Act on the protection of market competition allows the national entities to decide 
that there was no violation of national law on unfair competition as well as violation of EU legislation on 
unfair competition, this would be contrary to the EU competition law and the case law of CJEU.  The case 
AZTN v Hrvatski Telekom is illustrative of this problem. (see 8) 
• There is insufficient insight into the case law on application of Rome II Regulation to environmental damage 
cases and no relevant legal literature revealing the practical issues. Hence, the conclusion on the smooth 
operation of Art 7 can be given at the level of a presumption. (see 9)   
• Given the strict nature of the provision of Art 8 Rome II Regulation, there is no possibility to choose the law 
under Art 14 Rome II Regulation and apply it to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of 
an intellectual property right, or to apply the provision, which allows the application of lex firmae habitationis 
communis or the escape clause. Hence, according to Croatian legal theory the EU legislator should 
deliberate allowing the choice of law in cases of infringement of an intellectual property rights (except 
concerning establishing unlawfulness), especially in situations where the infringement involves parties from 
multiple MS. (see 10) 
• Similar to the non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of an intellectual property right, the 
judges report no issues with the operation of the specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10). and there is no 
relevant legal literature highlighting the practical issues. The available case described in detail, provides for 
the same conclusion. (see 12) 
1. Introduction 
• How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State? 
Legal practitioners, particularly judges are well aware of the Rome II Regulation, businesses are aware to some extent, 
but Croatian citizens overall have little knowledge of the EU instruments applicable in cross-border cases. Although 
judges are well aware of the Rome II Regulation, it is applicable to a small number of cases and only concerning few 
categories of disputes.  
• Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
The Rome II Regulation is generally known and applied by courts. But, it is obvious from the available case law that its 
application is limited to certain areas while in others, court practice is still in very early stages of development. This is 
connected to Croatia’s late accession to the EU in 2013. Namely, judges estimate that the full application of the Rome 
II Regulation at Croatian courts did not begin before 2016 and many complex cases are probably still pending. The 





The Rome II Regulation is often applied in traffic accidents. In comparison, there is no available case law on unfair 
competition or violations of privacy (to which under Croatian law the provisions of the Rome II Regulation also 
apply).440 Namely, the private law implementation of competition law, which assumes a request for damages, is still 
not common in Croatia. However, the legal theory warns that the occurrence of such cases in near future should not 
be dismissed easily.441 
• Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
In Croatia, there is no systematic approach to collection of relevant data or statistics regarding application of EU 
instruments, including the Rome II Regulation. The collected case law for this Report can be used as a representative 
sample, since it concerns cases, which were collected by the largest Croatian courts (Municipal Civil court and 
Commercial court in Zagreb). It is obvious that there is not a large number of cases in which the Rome II Regulation 
was applied before Croatian courts. Still, official statistics confirming such a conclusion is unavailable.   
• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
The Croatian legal theorists followed closely the introduction of the Rome II Regulation and there are mainly papers 
on its general characteristics. Few recent papers engage in a discussion on the application of the Regulation to specific 
areas and highlight certain trends and issues (mainly concerning the application in the field of traffic accidents, unfair 
competition and violations of privacy). One issue which has not been sufficiently discussed in the legal literature, but it 
is obvious from the case law that causes problems is the interaction between the application of the Rome II Regulation 
and the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents to disputes involving citizens of MS and 
third country citizens.  
• Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political 
level? 
There is no debate at a political level. At a doctrinal level, there have been recent discussions on the application of the 
Rome II Regulation to violations of privacy under Croatian Private International Law Act442 (hereinafter: PIL Act).    
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to : 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
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Judges do not report any difficulties with respect to applying the category of “civil and commercial matters”. However, 
legal theorists warn that although the exclusion of certain categories of matters which arise from contractual obligations 
was inspired by the Rome convention, this was not equally appropriate in regard to the Rome II Regulation. In some 
categories, such as non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies, maintenance obligations or 
succession the escape clause enables court to apply the same law to the non-contractual obligation and the basic 
legal relationship.443 In example, in some MS the intentional avoidance of the obligation of maintenance may cause 
non-contractual obligation. If there was no exception, the judge would apply the general rule of the Rome II Regulation 
and apply the same national law to maintenance and request for damages, on the basis of the escape clause.444  
From January 2019 and the beginning of the application of the new PIL Act, Croatian legislator decided to widen the 
scope of application of the provisions of the Rome II Regulation to categories of disputes excluded from its scope (Art. 
1(1)-(2)). 445  
The new Croatian PIL Act establishes conflict-of-laws rules. Its aim is to simplify the ratione materiae application of the 
diverse legal sources of private international law that are in effect in Croatia. Croatian PIL Act has an explicit provision, 
which directs the courts to apply the Rome II Regulation to determine the applicable law in disputes over non-
contractual obligations that fall within the scope of application of the Regulation. Moreover, according to the PIL Act, 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations that fall outside the scope of the application of the Rome II 
Regulation, and are not governed by another provision of national or international law in force in Croatia, is also 
determined according to the provisions of the Rome II Regulation.446 The explanation, which followed the introduction 
of the PIL Act, did not contain any reasoning of the decision of the Croatian legislator, the consequence of the 
application of the general rule (especially to violations of privacy). The reason behind it, according to legal theory, 
can be found in the lack of court practice, which could raise a doubt on the appropriateness of the chosen connecting 
factor.447   
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts 31-32) 
When the Rome II Regulation was first introduced, there was criticism from the legal theory as to the manner in which 
the temporal scope of the Regulation was envisaged. It was argued that ratione temporis application was regulated 
by two opposite concepts of “application in time” and “date of application”. According to Art. 31 “Regulation shall 
apply to events giving rise to damage which occur after its entry into force” which means twenty days after the 
publication in the Official Journal on 31 July 2007 and according to Art. 32 “Regulation shall apply from 11 January 
2009, except for Article 29, which shall apply from 11 July 2008”. The latter date was considered more appropriate 
given the vacatio legis period. Also, it is relevant that the date of the “events giving rise to damage” was considered 
relevant instead of the date when the actual “damage occurred”. Hence it was possible to change the status of some 
civil torts which could occur before and after 11 July 2009 (for example, permanent ecological damage).448 
Croatia became a MS on 1 July 2013, and since then the Rome II Regulation has had precedence over national 
conflict-of-laws rules that coincide with its scope of application. For the purpose of the transitory provisions of the 
Regulation, the date of Croatia’s accession is treated as the day when the Regulation entered into force in Croatia and 
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it applies to events occurring after 1 July 2013 (Article 31 Rome II Regulation). The law applicable to events that 
occurred prior to that date is determined according to the rules of the earlier Croatian PIL Act (ZRSZ) and other rules 
of internal Croatian private international law.449 
As to the practical issues in the determination of the temporal scope of the Rome II Regulation, there were difficulties 
before Croatian courts in interpreting whether the Rome II Regulation or the 1971 Hague Convention should apply. 
The cases presented below are representative of situations in which the courts are uncertain of the temporal scope 
and/or the representative of the parties (lawyers) appeal without ground, claiming erroneous application of the 
substantive (applicable) law.  
Issue 1 Determining whether the Rome II Regulation applies at the time before Croatia became a MS 
In Gžx-452/2014-3 County court in Split was correct to conclude that, although both Croatia and Republic of 
Slovenia are MS where the Rome II Regulation applies, it cannot be applied to the case at hand. Namely, the events 
giving rise to the damage occurred in 1982, long before the entry into force of the Rome II Regulation and its 
application would be contrary to Art 31 Rome II Regulation.   
In case 2 Gž-1340/13 County court in Dubrovnik (as second instance court) confirmed the position of the municipal 
court, that the law applicable to a traffic accident which occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatian 
citizens is determined according to Art 3 1971 Hague Convention. Namely, as the County court explained, the Rome 
II Regulation cannot be applied since at the time when the accident occurred, Croatia was not a MS. Also, ZRSZ is not 
applicable, since both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia are Members to the 1971 Hague Convention, which 
takes precedence over the application of the national private international law rules.  
Issue 2 Determining that the Rome II Regulation applies at the time after Croatia became a MS  
In case Gž-1552/2019-2 the County court in Rijeka confirmed (inaccurately) the position of the municipal court that 
the Rome II Regulation applies to a traffic accident which occurred in Republic of Serbia and in which both the claimant 
and the defendant have their habitual residence/seat in Croatia. The court explained that the Rome II Regulation is 
applicable in Croatia, since it became a MS on 1 July 2013 and it has precedence over the application of 1971 
Hague Convention. The court even held the defendant’s referral to the differencing position of the Supreme Court and 
County courts in regard to the application of the 1971 Hague Convention as irrelevant, since it dated to the time prior 
to the introduction of the Rome II Regulation.  
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
Although for the purposes of the Rome II Regulation, the concept of non-contractual obligations should be understood 
as an autonomous concept, in some cases legal practitioners have difficulties to understanding and defining it.  
Difficulties arise where there are both elements of contractual and non-contractual obligation and the Regulation does 
not bring any guidelines how to differentiate between them. Hence, the application of the Regulation will be left to the 
judge’ s understanding and the interpretation of the concept of non-contractual obligation which arises from lex fori 
(national law). Some argue that this enhances legal uncertainty and may discourage parties from addressing the court 
and initiating proceedings.  
The difficulties in the interpretation of the concept of non-contractual obligations in Croatia may arise from the fact that 
the previous Croatian PIL Act (Zakon o rješavanju sukoba zakona s propisima drugih zemalja u određenim odnosima, 
hereinafter: ZRS) provided for a narrower concept of a “tort statute” (Art 28 ZRS). Namely, in comparison to the 
concept of non-contractual obligations, the concept of tort statute under Croatian PIL law did not include quasi-delict 
(Art 27 ZRS).450  
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
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There are no problems with the application of the provision. The judges in Croatia understand the meaning of the 
concept of universal application and apply it properly.  
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital 
(7)) 
It is important to point out that for judges from Civil law countries such as Croatia, who are not used to defining and 
interpreting certain legal terms through the lens of interpretations given by the CJEU in its ruling, it might be challenging 
to understand the relationship of the Rome II Regulation and other EU private international law instruments. Namely, 
judges will not always be aware that determination of the substantive scope and the differentiation between 
obligationes quae ex contractu nascitur and obligationes quae ex delicto nascitur also requires the judge to consider 
the interpretation of the term tort (delict) in case law of the CJEU on Brussels I and Brussels I Recast.451  
Another issue, which additionally complicates the interpretation in the context of Croatian legal practice, is the quality 
of the official translation of the Regulations to Croatian language. The basic provision of Art 6 (3) Rome II Regulation 
which determines the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a restriction of competition instead 
of “the law of the country where the market is, or is likely to be, affected” is translated as “the law of the country where 
the act of unfair competition affected the market or is likely to affect it”.  It is clear from several official language versions 
(law of the country where the market is, or is likely to be, affected, njem. Das Recht des Staates anzuwenden, dessen 
Markt beeinträchtigt ist oder wahrscheinlich beeinträchtigt wird, franc. la loi du pays dans lequel le marché est affecté 
ou susceptible de l'être, tal. la legge del paese sul cui mercato la restrizione ha o potrebbe avere effetto, španj. la ley 
del país en el que el mercado resulte o pueda resultar afectado, slov. pravo države, na katere trgu ima, ali bi lahko 
imela, taka omejitev učinek) that the translation in Croatian does not capture the intended meaning of the provision. A 
similar mistake was made with the Croatian translation of the criteria for jurisdiction on tort (delict) in Brussels I recast. 
It is obvious that the translation detects locus actus instead of locus damni as a basic solution. This enhances difficulties 
for Croatian judges to interpret the Rome II regulation and to understand its relationship to other EU private international 
law instruments properly, where relevant452.  
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1). 
As mentioned, the available case law on the application of Rome II Regulation is reduced to several categories of 
cases. Since there was a small number of cases in which Art 4 (1) was applied, it seems that for now there were no 
difficulties with respect to its application. In this sense, the question introduced with the beginning of application of the 
Rome II Regulation in Croatian legal theory, whether legis loci damni will result in inflexible or insufficiently flexible 
legal solutions in the future practice could for now be answered in the negative.453   
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and  
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
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Rules not relevant for Croatian court practice. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
Rules not relevant for Croatian court practice. 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
The application of a specific rule on unfair competition (Art 6) raises doubts concerning its application to establishing 
tort liability, its prohibition and the claimed compensation for damage.  In cases where (only) compensation of damage 
was sought, the national court is to establish tort liability as a preliminary matter in order to decide on the claim. If 
compensation damage was sought in a follow-up procedure, national court would be bound by a decision of the EC 
or a national public entity of a MS on the liability for the act of unfair competition. Such a decision of national entity of 
a MS is prima facie evidence, if the law of the MS does not prescribe otherwise. Under Croatian law such a decision 
is considered presumtio iuris tantum. If the EC or a national public entity of a MS does not render a decision establishing 
liability, but instead decides that conditions for initiating the procedure were not met, there is still a possibility for the 
claimant to initiate a separate national procedure for protection of his subjective rights caused by the act of unfair 
competition. Also, it is possible for the national court to decide that there was no distortion of competition, as prescribed 
under Art 58/1/13 Act on the protection of market competition. Although the Act on the protection of market 
competition allows the national entities to decide that there was no violation of national law on unfair competition as 
well as violation of EU legislation on unfair competition, this would be contrary to the EU competition law and the case 
law of CJEU.   
Such a case was AZTN v Hrvatski Telekom (High Administrative Court, judgment USll-8/15-10 from 29 September 
2015 in which AZTN initiated the procedure under both Art 13 Act on the protection of market competition and Art 
102 TFEU. In the case at hand an issue was discussed of the effect of a decision according to which no conditions for 
conducting the procedure were met, because there was no evidence of distortion of competition. After the amendments 
to the official translation of the Regulation, the High Administrative court changed its practice.  
This also raises question of the effect of such a decision before national court in cases in which compensation of damage 
is sought. Under the Croatian Act on the procedures for compensation of damage caused by acts of unfair competition 
only effects of a positive judgment, establishing the liability for the act of unfair competition are prescribed. Argumentum 
a contrario, courts are not bound by a negative judgment in a same manner as they are bound by a positive judgment. 
In the context of legal certainty and consistency of application of national law on unfair competition, it is questionable 
should the courts be bound in the same manner by a negative judgement as they are bound by a positive one.454  
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
Again, there are not many cases of environmental damage before Croatian courts. In an environmental damage case 
brought before Commercial court in Split in 2015, case no. 10 P-927/15 the claimant was a Croatian company from 
Split against a Dutch insurance company and another Croatian company from Split for payment of cost of removal of 
damage caused by the defendant(s). As one of the defendants was a Dutch insurance company, the court properly 
detected a cross-border element, established its jurisdiction based on Brussels I recast and applied Croatian law, 
based on Art 7 Rome II Regulation to determine Croatian law as the law applicable to the liability of the defendant for 
environmental damage.   
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
The strict nature of the provision of Art 8 Rome II Regulation adheres to the aim of guarantee of legal certainty and the 
efficiency of cross-border protection of intellectual property. Hence, there is no possibility to choose the law under Art 
14 Rome II Regulation and apply it to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of an intellectual 
property right, or to apply the provision, which allows the application of lex firmae habitationis communis or the escape 
clause. Art 8 also applies to non-contract obligations arising out of infringements of an intellectual property rights (Art 
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13).  In this sense, Croatian legal theory raises the question of allowing the choice of law (except concerning 
establishing unlawfulness), especially in situations where the infringement involves parties from multiple MS.455 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
Rules not relevant for Croatian court practice. 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
Although only one case (P-442/11-27 Municipal court in Pula) was reported in which the Rome II Regulation was 
applied to unjust enrichment, it seems that there are no difficulties in its application. Namely, in the case at hand, the 
claimant requested the return of the monetary funds which she inherited after the death of her brother, which were 
unjustly taken by the defendant (the daughter of the deceased), who claimed that she was the only heir to the 
succession. The court established that there was unjust enrichment on the part of the defendant, who was habitually 
resident in the Netherlands. Namely, after the decision on the succession O-505/10, (11 May 2010) it was clear 
that the amounts withdrawn from the bank account by the defendant represent unjust enrichment. This event giving rise 
to the damage occurred after the Rome II Regulation came to force. Since there was a cross-border element in the 
case, and at the time the proceedings were conducted Croatia was a MS, the Rome II Regulation was applicable. The 
court relied on Art 10 para 1 Rome II Regulation and decided that the law applicable to the unjust enrichment is 
Croatian law, because the payment of amounts wrongly received, as requested by the claimant, concerns a 
relationship existing between the parties on the basis of the succession, which was decided under Croatian law.  
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
Provisions not relevant in Croatian legal system. 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
Croatian legal theory questions the appropriateness of the solution according to which the provision on freedom of 
choice is placed after the general and specific rules on the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out 
of a tort/delict or a specific act (unfair competition, environmental damage etc.) According to legal practitioners, from 
the order of the said provisions, it is not clear that the freedom of choice has precedence over the former rules.   
Legal theory also discussed the lack of a provision on freedom of choice from the 1971 Hague Convention on the law 
applicable to traffic accidents in comparison to the Rome II Regulation. Since there is no explicit exclusion of freedom 
of choice from the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents, they argue that due to the 
enhanced importance of the party autonomy and freedom of choice in contemporary Private International Law, a 
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judge could consider to fulfil the lacunae in the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents 
with the application of Art 14 Rome II Regulation.456  
From the Croatian perspective, it is to be noted that in none of the cases analysed has the court considered a choice 
of law under the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents. It is rather unlikely that the 
Croatian courts would allow such a choice given that this is not expressly regulated in the Convention. On the other 
hand, the parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law is allowed in the Rome II Regulation, but is limited to the time 
after the event giving rise to the damage incurred. Even though party autonomy is not expressly envisaged by the 
Convention, allowing it would contribute to the uniform resolution of non-contractual disputes within the EU. 
Another problem legal theorists point to, are difficulties judges face in the interpretation of different stages (temporal 
deadlines) in which the choice should be expressed or demonstrated under a general choice of law and special choice 
of law provisions. Namely, the moment of choice determinates the form and the validity of the choice of law and in this 
sense, there should be more uniformity in the manner in which judges should interpret it.457 
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)   
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
Provisions not relevant in Croatian court practice.  
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business    
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
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26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
Provisions not relevant in Croatian court practice.  
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
The issues regarding the application of both 1971 Hague Convention and Rome II Regulation on the law applicable 
to traffic accidents are of importance for Croatian legal practice. Due to the possibility for the applicant to rely on Art 
4 Brussels I bis (courts of the MS of the domicile) or Article 7 para 2 Brussels I bis (courts for the place where the 
harmful event occurred or may occur), the plaintiff may choose the court, depending whether the 1971 Hague 
Convention or Rome II Regulation would apply (forum shopping).458  
For Croatian legal practitioners it is particularly burdensome to abandon the previous system of resolving disputes 
arising from traffic accidents with cross-border element and adapt to simultaneous application of both instruments, 
since Croatia is a MS of the EU and of the Convention. Some authors argue that it would be possible to resolve issues 
arising out of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention by harmonizing or at least unifying the rules of the Rome 
II Regulation and the Convention. To that end, special conflict-of-law rules should be introduced, similar to those 
existing for other types of damages in Rome II Regulation. Other possible solution would be to conclude an agreement 
with Member States to the 1971 Hague Convention, which are not MS of the EU that the Convention does not apply 
to intra-European relations.459    
Another issue, also highlighted in the legal literature, is a situation where only one vehicle is involved in the accident 
and it is registered in a State other than that where the accident occurred. The internal law of the State of registration 
is applicable to determine liability towards a victim who is a passenger and whose habitual residence is in a State 
other than that where the accident occurred (Art 4a 1971 Hague Convention). Croatian court practice questioned if 
the same exception should also apply to liability towards indirect victims (family members of the person who was killed 
in a traffic accident). The systematic, teleological and historical interpretation of the Convention favour the application 
of the exception to such cases. This leads to the conclusion that the law of the state of registration applies instead of the 
law of the state where the traffic accident occurred.460  
Other issues raised in the court practice are best illustrated by the following cases. 
In case Gž-1857/2019-2  County court in Split misinterpreted the provision of Art 28 para 2 Rome II Regulation and 
held that the municipal court was wrong to apply Art 2 1971 Hague Convention instead of the Regulation. It relied on 
the fact that the habitual residence of the claimant and the seat of the defendant was in Croatia at the time of the 
accident, which occurred in the Republic of Serbia. Since Croatia is a MS and there is a close connection of both 
parties to it, the court assumed that the Rome II Regulation has precedence in MS over the 1971 Hague Convention.  
In comparison, in case Gž-6/2016-2 County court in Bjelovar confirmed that the municipal court was wrong to apply 
the provisions of the ZRSZ to determine the applicable law instead of the 1971 Hague Convention. The County court 
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also explained that although the Rome II Regulation does apply to traffic accidents in MS, it has no precedence in 
those countries in which the 1971 Hague Convention applies.  
In case 42-Pn-1527/13-58 Municipal court in Zagreb decided that the law applicable to a traffic accident which 
occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina between a car registered in Croatia and a car registered in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is determined under Art 3 1971 Hague Convention (lex loci commissi). The court excluded the possibility 
to invoke Art 4 1971 Hague Convention, since all cars were not registered in the same country. The court also 
explained that contrary to the claimant’s position, ZRSZ could not be applied since the Convention has precedence 
over the national law according to the Croatian Constitution. The claimant also relied on the provisions of Rome II 
Regulation. However, as the court explained, the Regulation at the time was not applicable in Croatia as non-MS (in 
2010). Even if Croatia were a MS at the time, still the 1971 Hague Convention would apply because both Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina are members of the Convention.  
In case Gž-2957/2017 County court in Rijeka questioned whether in the case at hand the municipal court accurately 
decided between the application of the Rome II Regulation and 1971 Hague Convention. It confirmed the 
interpretation of the municipal court that in the case of a traffic accident which occurred in the Republic of Serbia 
between Croatian nationals, the Rome II Regulation applies. The court (incorrectly) argued that because Croatia is a 
MS, the Rome II Regulation has precedence over 1971 Hague Convention according to Art 28 Rome II Regulation. 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
In the explanation following the Proposal of the new Croatian PIL Act, the legislator did not offer any reasoning behind 
the widening of the scope of the Rome II Regulation to matters excluded from its application (exclusion of violations of 
privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation) or the consequences of the solution under which the 
general rule applies to violations of privacy. However, there is no recorded case law from which it would be obvious 
whether the chosen approach was appropriate.461 Since violations of privacy and rights relating to personality are 
excluded from the scope of Rome II Regulation, in other MS provisions of the national Private International Law apply.   
Prior to the introduction of the new Croatian PIL Act, provisions of the “previous PIL Act” or the ZRSZ applied which 
contained Art 28 on the law applicable to violations of privacy. The problem occurred with the interpretation of the 
term damage, which included both direct and indirect damage, although in the context of cross-border disputes, only 
direct damage is taken into account. The Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia confirmed that the provisions of the 
ZRZS include both categories of damage. Also, the position of the defendant under the SRSZ was more favourable 
than under the provisions of the new Croatian PIL Act.   
The SRSZ contained a rule under which the court would make a choice of the law favourable for the defendant between 
lex loci delicti commissi, lex loci damni (direct damage) or lex loci damni (indirect damage) ex officio. However, the 
rules of the ZRSZ also enabled the victim to request damage, which occurred in states in which the defendant’s act was 
not illegal. This caused legal uncertainty for the defendant.  
The new PIL Act introduced more legal certainty and a better position for the defendant in terms of the predictability of 
the applicable law.  It does not contain a specific conflict-of-law rule, but instead provision of Art 26 para 2 applies, 
according to which rules of the Rome II Regulation also apply to the matters outside its scope. In this sense, the law 
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applicable to the violations of privacy is the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country 
in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect 
consequences of that event occur (lex loci damni), unless there was a choice of law. In cases of violations of privacy 
lex loci damni is the law of the country where there was a public display of the content harmful for the victim, which 
changed his public image. The media in Croatia criticised the choice of the connection, which is more favourable for 
the victim, as unpredictable. They failed to take into account that unlike the media who choose when and where an 
information will be made public and are aware where the consequence for the victim might occur, the victim is usually 
unaware that the information will be published. Also, the victim does not know where the seat or residence of the 
publisher is. Still, according to Croatian legal theory there should have been a more detailed approach, which would 
enable the court to localize where the damage occurred. Although the current wording provides for more flexibility, 
there is a risk that different courts will detect the place of damage to rights to privacy differently. Also, the approach 
opens the possibility that laws of several countries might be applicable. Hence, the law of the country of habitual 
residence of the victim is suggested as a more appropriate choice.462      
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
In the previous period, there was approximately 1000 lawsuits against journalists in Croatia. In this sense, SLAPP has 
become a problem, which negatively affects media freedom in Croatia. The specific aspect of the SLAPPs in Croatia is 
that the procedures were started by the public service media company, and by a state authority (the police). The high 
number of lawsuits initiated by HRT against its employed journalists raises the suspicion that a political interest group 
had captured the public service media.463 
There is a diversity in the national approaches towards defamation, which could be harmonised by way of an EU 
Directive. Due to the fact that defamation is excluded from the scope of the Rome II Regulation, the journalist can only 
rely on the lowest standard of press freedom available in the laws which might be applied to a potential dispute. If a 
rule would be introduced to Rome II Regulation, according to which the law of the country in which a publication is 
made available would apply, this would bring more legal certainty to the journalists, but also activists and citizens.  
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
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4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to decision 
of the Court of Justice 
if applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
County court in Split Gžx-452/2014-3 11.09.2014. Article 31 Application in time County court in Split was correct to conclude 
that, although both Croatia and Republic of 
Slovenia are MS where the Rome II Regulation 
applies, it cannot be applied to the case at hand. 
Namely, the events giving rise to the damage 
occurred in 1982, long before the entry into 
force of the Rome II Regulation and its 
application would be contrary to Art 31 Rome II 
Regulation.   
County court in 
Dubrovnik 
2 Gž-1340/13 23.06.2016. Articles 31, 32 Application in time; date of 
application 
County court in Dubrovnik (as second instance 
court) confirmed the position of the municipal 
court, that the law applicable to a traffic accident 
which occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
between Croatian citizens is determined 
according to Art 3 1971 Hague Convention. 
Namely, as the County court explained, the 
Rome II Regulation cannot be applied since at 
the time when the accident occurred, Croatia 





since both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia 
are Members to the 1971 Hague Convention, 
which takes precedence over the application of 
the national private international law rules.  
County court in Rijeka Gž-1552/2019-2 13.09.2019. Article 31  Application in time County court in Rijeka confirmed the position of 
the municipal court that the Rome II Regulation 
applies to a traffic accident which occurred in 
Republic of Serbia and in which both the 
claimant and the defendant have their habitual 
residence/seat in Croatia. The court explained 
that the Rome II Regulation is applicable in 
Croatia, since it became a MS on 1 July 2013 
and it has precedence over the application of 
1971 Hague Convention. The court even held 
the defendant’s referral to the differencing 
position of the Supreme Court and County courts 
in regard to the application of the 1971 Hague 
Convention as irrelevant, since it dated to the 
time prior to the introduction of the Rome II 
Regulation. 
Municipal court in 
Pula 
P-442/11-27 22.07.2013. Article 10/1 Unjust enrichment  The claimant requested the return of the 
monetary funds which she inherited after the 
death of her brother, which were unjustly taken 
by the defendant (the daughter of the 
deceased), who claimed that she was the only 
heir to the succession. The court established that 
there was unjust enrichment on the part of the 
defendant, who was habitually resident in the 
Netherlands. Namely, after the decision on the 
succession O-505/10, (11 May 2010) it was 





account by the defendant represent unjust 
enrichment. This event giving rise to the damage 
occurred after the Rome II Regulation came to 
force. Since there was a cross-border element in 
the case, and at the time the proceedings were 
conducted Croatia was a MS, the Rome II 
Regulation was applicable. The court relied on 
Art 10 para 1 Rome II Regulation and decided 
that the law applicable to the unjust enrichment 
is Croatian law, because the payment of 
amounts wrongly received, as requested by the 
claimant, concerns a relationship existing 
between the parties on the basis of the 
succession, which was decided under Croatian 
law.  
County court in Split Gž-1857/2019-2   4.03.2020. Article 28/2 Relationship with other 
international conventions 
County court in Split misinterpreted the provision 
of Art 28 para 2 Rome II Regulation and held 
that the municipal court was wrong to apply Art 
2 1971 Hague Convention instead of the 
Regulation. It relied on the fact that the habitual 
residence of the claimant and the seat of the 
defendant was in Croatia at the time of the 
accident, which occurred in the Republic of 
Serbia. Since Croatia is a MS and there is a 
close connection of both parties to it, the court 
assumed that the Rome II Regulation has 
precedence in MS over the 1971 Hague 
Convention. 
County court in 
Bjelovar 
Gž-6/2016-2 13.12.2016. Article 28  Relationship with other 
international conventions 
County court in Bjelovar confirmed that the 
municipal court was wrong to apply the 





applicable law instead of the 1971 Hague 
Convention. The County court also explained 
that although the Rome II Regulation does apply 
to traffic accidents in MS, it has no precedence 
in those countries in which the 1971 Hague 
Convention applies. 
Municipal court in 
Zagreb 
42-Pn-1527/13-58 7.03.2016. Article 28, 31 Relationship with other 
international conventions; 
application in time  
Municipal court in Zagreb decided that the law 
applicable to a traffic accident which occurred 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina between a car 
registered in Croatia and a car registered in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is determined under Art 
3 1971 Hague Convention (lex loci commissi). 
The court excluded the possibility to invoke Art 4 
1971 Hague Convention, since all cars were not 
registered in the same country. The court also 
explained that contrary to the claimant’s 
position, ZRSZ could not be applied since the 
Convention has precedence over the national 
law according to the Croatian Constitution. The 
claimant also relied on the provisions of Rome II 
Regulation. However, as the court explained, the 
Regulation at the time was not applicable in 
Croatia as non-MS (in 2010). Even if Croatia 
were a MS at the time, still the 1971 Hague 
Convention would apply because both Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina are members of 
the Convention. 
County court in Rijeka Gž-2957/2017 25.10.2018. Article 28  Relationship with other 
international conventions 
County court in Rijeka questioned whether in the 
case at hand the municipal court accurately 
decided between the application of the Rome II 





confirmed the interpretation of the municipal 
court that in the case of a traffic accident which 
occurred in Republic of Serbia between 
Croatian nationals the Rome II Regulation 
applies. The court (incorrectly) argued that 
because  Croatia is a MS, the Rome II Regulation 
has precedence over 1971 Hague Convention 






• Cyprus is a legal order where cases affected with internationality elements are not very frequent. Thus, the 
interest in relation to the Rome II Regulation is minor.  
• There have not been any final decisions where the Rome II Regulation has effectively been applied in Cyprus. 
The Regulation has been invoked (eg. articles 4 and 10 of the Regulation) only in the context of interim 
judgments in 8 different cases. In none of these cases was the application of the Regulation crucial for the 
resolution of the main problems that arose. The main focus of the courts was on international jurisdiction. 
• So far, the way Rome II is invoked before Cypriot courts reveals two main issues. The first concerns the 
localization of the place where the direct damage occurred in cases where this damage is of financial nature. 
The second concerns the use of the escape clause. There has not been so far an explicit application of the 
escape clause. However, there have been some indications from one at least case that Cypriot judges might 
be tempted to give a broader and less rigid interpretation of the way the escape clause works than it is 
perceived in the text of the Regulation, in the preamble and according to the most prevailing opinions. The 
fact that Cyprus is a mixed legal system, influenced greatly by common law, could be the reason for this 
observation.  
1. Introduction 
• How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State? 
As a general observation we can note that Cypriot judges and practitioners are aware of the Rome II Regulation and 
of its provisions. It also results from the cases examined that where the Regulation was invoked, no major problems 
arose as regards the understanding of the instrument. There have been however a few cases where the way that 
attorneys pleaded the application of the rules of Rome II revealed a lack of understanding of the system created by 
this instrument and its provisions.  
• Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
The Rome II Regulation was invoked only in a handful of cases. However, and as observed above the Regulation 
seems to be generally known.  
• Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
There are no relevant statistics as to the application of the Rome II Regulation kept centrally or in the courts.  
• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
There is practically no doctrinal discussion as to the Rome II Regulation in Cyprus. This should not be interpreted 
however as an indication of lack of interest as regards to the Regulation. It can partly be explained by the fact that law 
studies at University level in Cyprus have been developed during the last 20 years. Besides that, the gap in doctrinal 
discussion in Cyprus is partially covered by the fact that there is a developed doctrine in Greece (both countries are 
Greek speaking). Thus, some of Cypriot law professors contribute in the doctrinal discussion by writing in legal journals 
and books published in Greece (e.g. Professor Emilianides, dean of the Law school of the University of Nicosia, is a 
contributor to the Greek commentary on Rome II Regulation). Apart from the above parameters, it has to be added 
that there are only a few cases where issues of private international law arise. 
• Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political 
level? 
There have not been any specific issues that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political level so far in Cyprus.  
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2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to : 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
No difficulties have emerged in that respect. 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, Arts 31-32) 
No difficulties have emerged in that respect. In all the cases where the Regulation has been invoked, judges arrived to 
the right conclusion as regards the temporal scope of application of the Regulation, although without an explicit 
reference to the appropriate provisions. 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
No difficulties have emerged in that respect. See however also our observations under 2.1.5. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
There has been no problem as regards the universal application of the Regulation. Moreover, an explicit reference to 
the universal application of the Regulation suggests that judges are aware of its exact meaning. (District court of 
Limassol, application number 2989/2016, Reverta AS and 1. Bolmeno Commercial LTD et al.,11.05.2017. All 
Cypriot case law can be retrieved by the open data base http://www.cylaw.org/  in greek). 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital 
(7)) 
There have not been any specific issues or difficulties in relation to the interpretation of the Rome II Regulation. In one 
case, both the Rome I Regulation and Rome II Regulation have been invoked but without further analysis. In one case, 
judges mistakenly considered the contractual and non-contractual liability as mutually exclusive. In this case, the issue 
arose in the context of an interim judgment (District court of Larnaka, application number, 2650/2015, Geniki 
Taxydromiki and Nan Global, 22.12.2015). And although the claimant sought provisional measures both on the basis 
of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations, judges have considered the issue only under the basis of contractual liability. 
If Rome II Regulation were deemed to be applied, it would lead to the application of Cypriot law, as the direct damage 
had occurred in Cyprus.   
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
The number of cases brought before Cypriot Courts do not permit to identify a general trend in relation to the 
implementation of the Rome II Regulation. There are however some general observations we could make. More 
precisely, there are some cases which raise doubts as to the way judges identify the place where the direct damage 
occurred (District court of Nicosia, application no 6078/15, Alterra International Holdings Limited and 1.Bank of 
Communications Co. Ltd,  2. China Xinyongan Futures Company Ltd, 17.11.2017; District court of Nicosia, 
application no 6077/2015, Romstron Holdings Limited and 1. United Overseas Bank Limited 2. EKA Maju Mining 
Pte Limited, 27.09.2017; contra District court of Nicosia, application no 6075/15, Vaimicus Estates Limited, and 1. 
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Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited 2. Khoo Kim Guang, 17.04.2018) . The cases concern damages of financial 
nature. In these judgments the resolution of the applicable law was incidental as we are in all of them in the context of 
interim judgments (the term interlocutory judgment has also been used mostly in the past in order to describe this 
procedural phase before Cypriot courts) . Characteristic of a doubtful or insufficiently explained approach as to the 
determination of the place of direct damage is the Alterra International Holdings case (District court of Nicosia, 
application no 6078/15, Alterra International Holdings Limited and 1. Bank of Communications Co. Limited, Hong 
Kong Branch 2. China Xinyongan Futures Company Limited, 17.11.2017). The judges' approach could be understood 
given that they declined their jurisdiction based on the forum non conveniens theory. Concluding that Cypriot law was 
not applicable had been one of the arguments supporting the defense of forum non conveniens according to which 
Cypriot courts were not appropriate to hear the case. The difficulty as to the determination of the place of the damage 
is due to the fact that this damage was financial. The damage was the result of the transfer of funds from one bank 
account held in Cyprus to another bank account held in Hong Kong, China. Judges have identified as the place of the 
direct damage Hong Kong in China. They have tried to reinforce their argumentation as to the applicability of the law 
of Hong Kong on the basis of article 4 (3) of the Regulation as this provision is interpreted by English courts (Pickard 
Marshall and others (2017) EWCA Civ 17; in this judgment judges express their view in favor of a flexible 
interpretation of article 4(3)). The demonstration of a manifestly closer connection of the tort with Hong Kong is not 
sufficiently substantiated. The elements showing a closer connection with this legal order were the seat of one of the 
defendants (the seat of the other defendant was in Shanghai) and the fact that the violation of the duties of the 
defendants had to be appreciated according to Hong Kong’s legislation. According to the latter argument, the laws 
applicable to the duties of the defendants, who were banks, were the ones of Hong Kong where their seat was located. 
However, there were also elements showing a connection with Cyprus such as the fact that the claimant was located 
in Cyprus and his money was in a bank account held in Cyprus. Judges did not consider these elements as crucial and 
found that the law of Hong Kong was applicable. They reached the same conclusion as to the determination of the 
applicable law also on the basis of unjust enrichment although they did not specify the exact provision of article 10 
that served as basis for the designation of applicable law. They identified however clearly, Hong Kong as the place 
of the unjustified enrichment. Their conclusion could better be explained on the basis of article 10 (3) of the Regulation. 
The above findings as to the applicable law are linked in this specific case with the resolution of the problem of the 
international jurisdiction of Cypriot courts.  
Difficulties as to the determination of the place of the direct damage emerged as well in another case (District court of 
Nicosia, application no 4662/16, Nibulon S.A., and 1. BSC GmbH, 24 April 2017). In this one the defendants in 
the principal action challenge the jurisdiction of Cypriot courts in the context of an interim procedure. The interim 
judgment rejected the request of the applicants for dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction of Cypriot courts. The 
defendants claimed that Cypriot law was not applicable in order to demonstrate that Cypriot courts were not 
appropriate to hear the case. The damage was in this case of financial nature. The claimants accused the defendants 
for fraudulently depriving one of the companies implicated in a financial transaction of its assets by increasing 
artificially its debts towards other entities of the same group of companies. As a result of this fraudulent behavior the 
claimants could not enforce two decisions rendered in the context of a GAFTA arbitration. A lack of understanding as 
to the function of the Regulation is obvious in the way the litigants plead the application of the Rome II Regulation and 
try to identify the place of direct damage. Their argument as to the place of the damage is connected with the place in 
which the events giving rise to the damage occurred. The center of interests of the claimant is not envisaged as the 
place of direct damage. On the contrary, an argument formulated on behalf of the claimant could better be understood 
on the basis of the escape clause of art. 4 (3). The issue of the applicable law has not been resolved by the court 
because it was not deemed necessary in this procedural stage. However, this case is also indicative of the difficulties 
of determination of the place of direct damage of financial nature and of the respective difficulty of attorneys to 
understand the specific conditions of application of the rules of the Regulation.  
In another similar case (District court of Nicosia, application no 6077/2015, Romstron Holdings Limited and 1. United 
Overseas Bank Limited 2. EKA Maju Mining Pte Limited, 27.09.2017) the tort was also based on an illegal transfer of 
funds from a bank account held in Cyprus to a bank account held in Singapore. The Cypriot judge stated that Cypriot 
law is not applicable because the issues to be examined presented a closer connection with Singapore and therefore 
the law of Singapore had to be applied. In this case as well the examination of applicable law is invoked as an 
argument reinforcing the position according to which the Cypriot court was not the appropriate forum to judge this 
case (forum non conveniens). There is no detailed analysis neither as to the place where the damage occurred nor as 
to the provision of Rome II Regulation that would determine the applicable law. The court just considers as crucial 
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information in that respect the fact that the funds were transferred to Singapore. In the same sense, the court argues 
that the appreciation as to an eventual violation of duties of the bank had to be governed by the law of Singapore 
which governs the obligations of this banking institution as the law of its seat.   
In contrast to the aforementioned cases, judges reached a different conclusion as to the place where the damage had 
occurred in a case where also the tort allegedly committed implicated  a transfer of funds from a bank account held in 
Cyprus to a bank account held in China (District court of Nicosia, application no 6075/15, Vaimicus Estates Limited, 
and 1. Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited 2. Khoo Kim Guang,17.04.2018). In that case, contrary to the previous 
ones, judges held that the place of the damage was in Cyprus where the bank account was held. As in the 
aforementioned cases the central issue here was that of the determination of the international jurisdiction of Cypriot 
courts. Again, the examination of the applicable law is an argument among others that are taken into consideration to 
determine whether Cypriot courts are appropriate to rule on the case. The judges don’t have in the end to determine 
the applicable law but they explicitly recognize that the place where the damage occurred was Cyprus. A substantial 
difference in this case in relation to the aforementioned ones (Alterra, op.cit. and Romstron, op.cit.) is that the applicant 
claiming that the jurisdiction should be dismissed openly admits that the place where the damage occurred was Cyprus.  
Finally, difficulties as to the determination of the place of direct damage emerged indirectly from another case which 
dealt with a fraudulent Bankruptcy (District court of Limassol, application number 2989/2016, Reverta AS and 1. 
Bolmeno Commercial LTD et al.,11.05.2017. All Cypriot case law can be retrieved by the open data base 
http://www.cylaw.org/ ). Nonetheless, no lesson can be drawn from this case because the determination of the 
applicable law did not play a crucial role in the judgment. Besides that, the court does not provide in its examination 
of the applicable law any explanation neither as regards the provision it applied to reach to its conclusion nor as 
regards the arguments that led it to decide which law would have been applicable. The examination of applicable 
law was only incidental in the context of an application for the grant of provisional measures (the applicant sought, 
among others things, a freezing order and a Norwich Pharmacal order) and its determination was not the main reason 
for which the aforementioned application was rejected. The Court proceeded in this case only to a prima facie 
examination of the probability of success of the main action and it considers it as insufficiently founded. For the needs 
of this interim decision judges did not get into detail in the determination of applicable law. 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
There has not been any decision applying this rule. 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and 
There has been one decision where this rule is explicitly invoked (District court of Nicosia, application no 6078/15, 
Alterra International Holdings Limited and 1. Bank of Communications Co. Limited, Hong Kong Branch 2. China 
Xinyongan Futures Company Limited, 17.11.2017, see supra). The argument of the application of the escape clause 
has been invoked as well in some other cases. Parties do not seem to be fully aware of the conditions of recourse to 
the exception. It appears as if the argument based on article 4 par. 3 stem from a result-oriented approach of the 
advocates. In another case, it seems that the escape clause could have been envisaged by the parties, but this did not 
happen. The above could indicate a lack of understanding as to the proper function of the escape clause (District court 
of Nicosia, application no 6077/2015, Romstron Holdings Limited and 1. United Overseas Bank Limited 2. EKA 
Maju Mining Pte Limited, 27.09.2017). However, the judges dismissed this case on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. It 
seems that practitioners don’t always understand the proper function of conflict of laws rules of the Rome II Regulation 
(in that sense see also Alterra, op.cit.).  
The escape clause has also been invoked in another case (District court of Nicosia, application no 4662/16, Nibulon 
S.A., and 1. BSC GmbH, 24 April 2017). However, the judge issues in this case an interim judgment and thus did not 
have to decide at that stage about the applicable law.  
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
  There has not been any decision applying this rule. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
 There has not been any decision applying this rule. 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
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There has not been any decision applying this rule. 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
There has not been any decision applying this rule. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
There has not been any decision applying this rule. 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
There has not been any decision applying this rule. 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
There has been one decision envisaging the application of this rule (District court of Nicosia, application no 6078/15, 
Alterra International Holdings Limited and 1. Bank of Communications Co. Limited, Hong Kong Branch 2. China 
Xinyongan Futures Company Limited, 17.11.2017), but such application was not determinant for the resolution of the 
case. In two other interim judgments article 10 has also been invoked in connection with article 4 of Rome II Regulation 
but without any further reference (District court of Nicosia, application no 6075/15, Vaimicus Estates Limited, and 1. 
Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited 2. Khoo Kim Guang, 17.04.2018; District court of Nicosia, application no 
6077/2015, Romstron Holdings Limited and 1. United Overseas Bank Limited 2. EKA Maju Mining Pte Limited, 
27.09.2017). In these two cases neither the parties nor the court develop specific arguments in relation to the 
application of article 10.  
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
There has not been any decision applying this rule. 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
 There has not been any decision applying this rule. 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
There has not been any decision applying or case envisaging the application of the choice of law rule as regards an 
extracontractual obligation.  
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
The issue was not raised before the courts. 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
Cyprus as all common law countries consider the determination of the content of the foreign applicable law as a fact 
that has to be proven by the litigants and their advocates. There has not been any difference in that respect in decisions 
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where Rome II Regulation has been invoked (District court of Larnaka, application no. 2650/2015, Geniki 
Taxydromiki Ltd and Nan Global Ltd, 22.12.2015). 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above 
The judges in one case ignored the fact that provisional measures based on non-contractual liability are governed by 
the Regulation and by the law determined according to its rules. (Art. 15 (d), District court of Larnaka, application no. 
2650/2015, Geniki Taxydromiki Ltd and Nan Global Ltd, 22.12.2015).  
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16) 
There has not been any decision applying an overriding mandatory provision in decisions relative to extra-contractual 
obligations. However, in two cases involving in one of them the liability of a bank situated in Hong Kong, China, and 
in the other one of a bank located in Singapore, judges considered that the rules applied to the diligence banks have 
to comply with in their business had to be the ones of their seat, i.e. Hong Kong in the first case and Singapore in the 
second one (District court of Nicosia, application no 6078/15, Alterra International Holdings Limited and 1. Bank of 
Communications Co. Limited, Hong Kong Branch 2. China Xinyongan Futures Company Limited, 17.11.2017; District 
court of Nicosia, application no 6077/2015, Romstron Holdings Limited and 1. United Overseas Bank Limited 2. 
EKA Maju Mining Pte Limited, 27.09.2017). In these two cases the Court found as well that the aforementioned 
countries were the place where the direct damage had occurred. Therefore, the law of these countries would apply 
generally to the tort and to the rules the banks had to comply with. However, in another case (Vaimicus, op.cit.) judges 
reached a different conclusion as regards the place of direct damage that would lead to the application of Cypriot 
law to the tort. We believe that even in this case where judges would apply the law of the forum to the tort, it would be 
reasonable to apply the law of the country where the bank had its seat (in China in Vaimicus) as regards its obligations 
of diligence on the basis of articles 16 and 17 of the Regulation. Such reasoning could rely on the consideration of 
those rules as foreign overriding mandatory provisions. In any case, we have to clarify that in the aforementioned 
interim judgements the court did not have to apply any foreign rules. It took into consideration the applicability of these 
rules to the activities of the banks as an argument showing that the Cypriot courts were not appropriate to hear the 
cases.  
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
There has not been any decision applying this rule. 
21. The application of the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19) 
There has not been any decision applying this rule. 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
There has not been any decision applying this rule. 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
There has not been any difficulty in respect to the habitual residence for the needs of the application of the Rome II 
Regulation. 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
There has not been any difficulty in respect to the renvoi for the needs of the application of the Rome II Regulation. 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
There has not been any difficulty in respect to the public policy exception for the needs of the application of the Rome 
II Regulation. 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 




There has not been any case involving such interaction. 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
Cyprus is not a signatory party to the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents.  
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
No other practical problems have emerged from the examination of the case law.  
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
There has not been any such issue in that respect. 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
No comment. 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
There have not been any cases involving corporate abuses against human rights.  
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 





4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to decision 
of the Court of Justice if 
applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
Nicosia District Court 
Orino Limited 
and 




No specific article of 
the regulation has 
been invoked.  
Parties have 
generally invoked 
Rome II Regulation 
The main issue in this case was 
the international jurisdiction of 
Cypriot courts. Judges did not 
apply any article of the Rome 
II Regulation. 
The applicants tried in this context to contest the 
international jurisdiction of Cypriot courts in a case 
dealing both with contractual and extra-
contractual liability. Rome II Regulation is only 
indirectly invoked in this case. One of the main 
points raised by the applicants is that all the 
relevant acts that could be the basis of the liability 
have taken place outside of Cyprus (Russia) while 
only some of the defendants in the initial action had 
their seat in Cyprus and the first defendant was a 
company with its seat to British Virgin Islands. The 
court considered the case as premature and 
abstained from resolving the issue of jurisdiction. 
Nicosia District Court 
Vaimicus Estates 
Limited, and 1. Bank of 
China (Hong Kong) 
Limited 2. Khoo Kim 
Guang, 
17.04.2018 1,2,3 4 (1), 10 
The main issue in this case was 
the international jurisdiction of 
Cypriot courts. The applicable 
law to the tort is examined as 
an argument connected with 
the issue of the international 
jurisdiction.  
An action is filed against two Chinese banks on the 
basis of a wilful misconduct implicating the transfer 
of funds from a bank account held in Cyprus to 
China. The defendants lodged an application to 
request the dismissal of this action on the basis of 
the forum non conveniens theory. They argued in 
support of their application firstly, that the seat of 
the defendants is in China and secondly, that the 
defendants are bound by the rules of the country 
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where they are registered. The Court rejected the 
forum non conveniens defence. It considered that 
the Cypriot courts do have a sufficient connection 
with this case for a number of reasons. Some of the 
witnesses are in Cyprus. The main elements of the 
tort of the willful misconduct have taken place in 
Cyprus. And finally the Court identified Cyprus as 
the country where the damage occurred. Such 
localization is based on the fact that the bank 
account, from which the money was transferred to 
China, was held in Cyprus.  
Nicosia District Court Alterra International 




2.    China Xinyongan 
Futures Company Ltd 
 
17.11.2017 1, 2, 3, 4, 4(3), 10 The main issue in this case was 
the international jurisdiction of 
Cypriot courts. In this context 
the court dealt also with the 
determination of the place of 
direct damage (damage of 
financial nature). 
An action is filed against two Chinese banks before 
Cypriot courts on the basis of wilful misconduct 
and/or fraud and/or unjust enrichment. The 
defendants attempted in this case to have the action 
dismissed on the basis of the forum non conveniens 
theory. They invoked in support of their position the 
fact that the law applicable to such action should 
have been the law of Hong Kong. This assertion 
was based on the assumption that the legal order 
where the tort had taken place is Hong Kong. 
Judges invoked both articles 4 (1) and 4 (2) of the 
Regulation to reach the conclusion that the law of 
Hong Kong would have been applicable. The 
application is successful and the Cypriot courts 
suspend the examination of the action initially filed.   
Nicosia District Court 
Romstron Holdings 
Limited and 1. United 
Overseas Bank Limited 
2. EKA Maju Mining 
Pte Limited, 
27.09.2017 1,2,3,  10 
The main issue in this case was 
the international jurisdiction of 
Cypriot courts. The Regulation 
served as one of the bases of 
the application. Applicable 
law is only an argument in 
The court is seized in the context of a request for the 
annulment of notifications, required for the 
establishment of the international jurisdiction of 
Cypriot courts. The request is based on the forum 
non conveniens theory. The action against which 
this application has been lodged, sought damages 
due to the transfer of funds from a bank account 
 
179 
support of the forum non 
conveniens defence. 
held in Cyprus to a bank account held in 
Singapore. The applicant argued that the law of 
Singapore is applicable because Singapore has a 
closer connection with this case. A main argument 
supporting the position of the applicants is that the 
defendants are banking institutions which have 
their seat in Singapore and thus have to abide by 
the rules of this country. In addition to that it is 
argued that the defendants had no activity 
whatsoever in Cyprus. The Courts have accepted 
that Cypriot courts did not have jurisdiction without 
entering into the consideration of applicable law. 
Nicosia District Court 
Waipred Financial 
Co. and  
Fbme Bank Ltd 
16.06.2017 
No reference to any 
articles of Rome II 
Regulation 
The main issue in this case was 
the international jurisdiction of 
Cypriot courts. Judges did not 
apply any article of the Rome 
II Regulation. The Regulation 
served as one of the bases of 
the application.  
The applicant contested an ex parte decision 
issued against it for a tort that allegedly has taken 
place (misappropriation of funds). The applicant 
sought the annulment of the decision arguing 
among other things the lack of international 
jurisdiction of Cypriot courts due to the existence of 
a jurisdiction clause in favour of the Courts of 
Tanzania. The ex-parte decision is annulled 
because of an improper notification to the 
defendant.  
Limassol District Court 
Reverta AS and 1. 
Bolmeno Commercial 
LTD et al./ 
11.05.2017 3 
Examination of the applicable 
law as an argument against 
the granting of a freezing 
order. Judges did not examine 
explicitly any articles other 
than article 3 of Rome II 
Regulation.  
The case arose in the context of an application for 
a freezing order and other provisional measures. 
The respondents invoked against the freezing order 
that the law applicable to the initial action lodged 
against them was Russian law and that according 
to that law the claimants had no valid claim. The 
applicants in this case were of the opinion that the 
law applicable was Cypriot law. The Court 
rejected altogether the application for the different 
provisional measures because it concluded that the 
claimants did not manage to sufficiently 
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substantiate their claim and thus demonstrate that 
they had valid case.  
Nicosia District Court 
Nibulon S.A. 
and 
1.   BSC GmbH,  
2.   Carpentaria 
Trading Limited et al. 
24.04.2017 4 (1), 4(3) 
The main issue in this case was 
the international jurisdiction of 
Cypriot courts. The court dealt 
as well with the determination 
of the place of direct damage 
(damage of financial nature). 
In this case the defendants in the principal action 
challenged the jurisdiction of Cypriot courts in the 
context of an interim procedure. Parties invoked at 
this stage an argument in relation to the applicable 
law so as to support their respective view as 
regards jurisdiction. For the applicant it is the law 
of Ukraine which is applicable because Ukraine is 
the place where the tort took place whereas for the 
respondent it is the Cypriot law which is applicable 
on the basis of the exception clause. The interim 
judgment rendered by court rejected the request of 
the applicants for dismissal of the action for lack of 
jurisdiction.  
Larnaka District Court Geniki Taxydromiki 
and Nan Global 
22.12.2015 1,3, [4 (1) and15  
(d) :not explicitly] 
Article 4 (1) is indirectly 
invoked by the parties 
An application for provisional measures is filed. 
The court rejected the application for provisional 
measures considering that the difference is in its 
substance contractual and the parties have 
submitted their differences from the contract to 
arbitration and have chosen as applicable to those 
differences Greek law. Judges did not explain 
sufficiently the reasons for which they excluded the 
application of Rome II Regulation. A difficulty as to 
the interaction of Rome I and Rome II Regulations 





Czech Republic  
Executive Summary 
• Czech courts are familiar with the Rome II Regulation and do not have significant difficulties applying its rules. 
In the majority of the analysed case law the courts have determined Czech law as applicable establishing 
thus the concurrence of forum and ius.  
• But it is evident from the analysed case-law that in particular the courts of first instance repeatedly neglect 
cross-border aspects of cases, applying Czech law without any prior assessment based on relevant conflict 
of laws rules. In most of such cases it is indeed the Czech law that applies, and higher courts confirm the tacit 
determination of Czech applicable law of low courts by citing the relevant conflict rules in the reasoning of 
their decision. In most cases the cross-border aspect is linked to the neighbouring Slovak Republic, therefore 
the cross-border aspects are not necessarily perceived by courts because of the joint history of the two 
countries. 
• The most often used conflict provision is the general conflict rule in Art. 4 (1) Rome II Regulation, followed by 
special rule for law applicable to unjust enrichment in Art. 10. Although is some cases the general rule was 
also applied to alleged unjust enrichment.  
• There seem to be some difficulties with respect to the application of the 1971 Hague Convention which is 
binding for the Czech Republic. There are both cases when the courts apply correctly the convention that 
shall take precedence over Rome II Regulation in the Member States that are bound by it and cases when 
courts apply Rome II Regulation to determine the law applicable to lawsuits filed compensation of damages 
as a result of a car accident that occurred in the territory of the Czech Republic. The double regime for 
determination of law applicable to traffic accidents in the EU due to the absence of specific conflict rule for 
traffic accidents in the Rome II has been criticized in the Czech doctrine.  
• No case law is available to the Reporters that concerns the area of defamation and data protection (including 
the relevance of SLAPPs), the issue of corporate abuses against human rights, nor artificial intelligence. 
1. Introduction 
From the information available to the Reporters, there is a general awareness of the Rome II Regulation among 
practitioners partly thanks to the fact that the course of Private International Law constitutes an obligatory subject in the 
curricula of all the Law Faculties at the Universities in the Czech Republic. It is difficult to judge if there is any awareness 
at all of the Rome II Regulation among citizens and businesses (with the exception of in-house lawyers). The Czech 
Commentary on Rome II was published in 2018 by Prof. Luboš Tichý, but it mostly draws upon German doctrine and 
case-law. There is a brief analysis of the Regulation to be found also in both Czech commentaries on Czech Private 
International Law Act (Act. No. 91/2012 Coll.) in connection with the conflict rule that applies for non-contractual 
obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation in its Sec. 101. 
The most recent publication is the Czech national report on the application of Rome II Regulation by courts that was 
published last year in the book by Intersentia “Rome I and Rome II in Practice”.464 
As apparent from the analysed case-law, Rome II Regulation is generally known and applied by the courts in the 
Czech Republic. But it is clear from the case-law that a number of courts of first instance neglect the cross-border aspect 
of the case and apply Czech law without further considerations and reasoning. In those cases, the appeal court mostly 
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To the knowledge of the Reporters, there are no relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation 
publicly accessible in the Czech Republic. 
The doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in the Czech Republic is marginal. 
The Reporters are not aware of any specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a 
doctrinal or political level. 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
In the analysed case-law, the courts excluded the application of Rome II in cases where the subject-matter of the 
proceedings was an action for compensation for non-material loss suffered due to unlawful custody (56 Co 
113/2018, 39 Co 408/2017), unlawful prosecution (39 Co 408/2017) or unlawful enforcement proceedings (39 
Co 381/2017) against the Czech Republic/Ministry of Justice. In all these cases the claimants were Slovak nationals 
claiming compensation for the non-material loss suffered due to unlawful custody, unlawful prosecution or unlawful 
enforcement proceedings on the territory of the Czech Republic. The lower courts did not deal in its reasoning at all 
with applicable law, the appeal courts stated that as claims arising out of acta iure imperii were excluded from the 
scope of Rome II, and no applicable conflict rule was included in the bilateral Czech-Slovak treaty on legal assistance, 
national conflict rule anchored Sec. 15 of the then effective Act on Private International Law465 applied and determined 
Czech law as applicable.  
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts 31-32) 
In the analysed case-law, the courts excluded the application of the Rome II Regulation in cases where the traffic 
accident or unjust enrichment (events giving rise to damage) occurred before January 11, 2009 (23 Cdo 4210/2013 
- Rome II just briefly mentioned, it did not apply as the traffic accident in question occurred in August 2006, 33 Cdo 
3752/2009 – The court just briefly mentioned that Rome II did not apply as the claimed unjust enrichment in question 
had taken place in 1993-4.). 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
No difficulties indicated in the analysed case-law. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
The majority of the analysed cases are of an intra-EU cross-border nature. Only in one case the Czech courts applied 
the law of Texas according to Art. 10(4) (30 Co 178/2019 – The claimant was a company with a seat in the USA 
and the alleged unjust enrichment occurred in connection with a transport of a horse from Europe to Texas, housing, 
food and care.). 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital 
(7)) 
The consistency with the Brussels I bis Regulation does not represent any problems in the analysed case-law.  
 
 




With respect to the Rome I Regulation, in one case the court based the application of Czech law on alternatively Rome 
I and Rome II Regulations stating that the subject of the action was a claim arising out of a contract to make up work, 
possibly a claim arising out of unjust enrichment (30 Co 259/2017 - The Court of Appeal set aside the decision of 
the Court of the First Instance, inter alia because the court did not consider the cross-border aspect of the case. The 
case was subject to Czech laws based on Art. 4 (1), Art. 19 Rome I or Art. 10 (1), (3) and Art. 23 (1) Rome II.). 
Similarly, in the case of a claim by a Slovak national domiciled in Slovakia for compensation of damage caused to a 
rented car (breach of contractual obligations) the court stated that Slovak law was applicable pursuant to Art 4(1) lit. 
b) Rome I Regulation adding that the same conclusion could be reached also by applying Art. 4(1) and 4(3) Rome II 
Regulation (14 C 168/2017). 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
No difficulties indicated in the analysed case-law. 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
In the analysed case-law there was no case where the court applied Art. 4(2). 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and 
In one case the Czech court determined Czech law as applicable referring to both Art. 4(1) and 4(3) without further 
reasoning. The claimant (Slovak national domiciled in Slovakia) sued for compensation of costs incurred in connection 
with towing of a damaged rented car that was not returned and parked in Slovakia after the lease contract expired 
(14 C 168/2017). In another case the courts applied Czech law based on Art. 4 (3) in a lawsuit filed by a German 
national to obtain compensation of damages caused by a Czech attorney by agreeing to a court settlement in Czech 
court proceedings regarding liquidation of matrimonial property regime without consent of the client (25 Cdo 
3453/2018).  
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
Among the analysed case-law there was no case of prospectus liability or any other financial market torts. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
Czech Republic is not a contracting party to the 1973 Hague Convention. None of the analysed cases involved 
product liability.  
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
Only one of the analysed cases involved unfair competition, no difficulty indicated (32 C 47/2018 - The claimants 
were companies with seat in Germany and Slovakia. The defendants were allegedly distributing TV channels of the 
claimant without authorization of the holder of the rights to the programme for its distribution. The Municipal Court 
qualified the dispute as dispute regarding protection of copyright and protection against unfair competition and 
decided based on Czech law. In its reasoning the court merely states that as regards the applicable law the claimant 
refers to Art. 4, Ar. 6 and Art. 8 of the Rome II Regulation). 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
None of the analysed cases involved environmental damage. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
Only one of the analysed cases involved infringement of copyright, no further difficulty indicated (32 C 47/2018 - 
The claimants were companies with seat in Germany and Slovakia. The defendants were allegedly distributing TV 
channels of the claimant without authorization of the holder of the rights to the programme for its distribution. The 




competition and decided based on Czech law. In its reasoning the court merely states that as regards the applicable 
law the claimant refers to Art. 4, Ar. 6 and Art. 8 of the Rome II Regulation). 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
No case-law available to the Reporters. 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio and Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
Alleged unjust enrichment as subject-matter appears in a number of analysed cases. The courts applied Art. 10(2) 
when both parties had their habitual residence in the same country at the relevant time period (39 Co 114/2017 – 
the defendant was a Slovak national and the subject-matter was and alleged loan agreement, 30 Co 146/2018 – 
the claimant sued her ex-partner for repayment of what she had invested into a reconstruction of house owned by his 
parents, the Court of Appeal confirmed the tacit  determination of Czech law as the law applicable to the case by the 
Court of the First Instance and stated that as both claimant and defendant had their habitual residence in the Czech 
Republic at the time relevant for the claim, the applicable is determined pursuant to Art. 10 (2) Rome II Regulation, 19 
Co 157/2018 - the Regional Court stated that in the case of alleged unjust enrichment the law applicable is the law 
of the Czech Republic in accordance with Art. 10 (2) Rome II as both claimant and defendant are habitually resident 
in the Czech Republic (defendant – Slovak national). In one case, where the claimant was from Barbados, the court 
applied Art. 10(3) to determine the law applicable to alleged unjust enrichment stating in its reasoning that the 
Regulation is, as part of Czech legal order, applicable to cases where only one party has its seat in the territory of the 
Czech Republic and that the necessity to apply Rome II can be derived from the fact that the Czech Act on PIL deals 
only with non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including 
defamation (22 Co 535/2016). In one case, where the applicant was domiciled in Germany and the defendant in 
the Czech Republic, the court determined the application of Czech law based on Art. 10(3) in connection with Art. 
4(1) as the alleged unjust enrichment or damage occurred in the territory of the Czech Republic (18 Co 304/2019).  
In one case, where the claimant was domiciled in Iceland, the court applied Czech law based on Art. 10(4) as the 
unjust enrichment occurred in connection with a foundation of a Czech legal person (30 Co 104/2018). In some 
cases, despite unjust enrichment, the courts applied Czech law pursuant to Art. 4 (30 Co 360/2017 – the Court of 
Appeal stated In its reasoning that the Court of First Instance applied correctly Czech law as applicable as it 
corresponded with Art. 4 of the Rome II Regulation but it was clear from the wording, that the Court of the First Instance 
had not considered the cross-border aspect of the case not establishing its international jurisdiction, neither determining 
applicable law, 46 Co 203/2014 - the District Court applied Art. 4 (1) of the Rome II, ignoring the special rule in Art. 
10 for unjust enrichment in a case where the claimant that was domiciled in Italy transferred money to the defendant 
for the purpose of founding a Czech limited company but the defendant failed to finalize the necessary steps and the 
company was not founded). 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
No case-law available to the Reporters. 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
No case-law available to the Reporters. 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 




No case-law available. The Reporters are not aware of any discussion carried out in connection with Art. 14. 
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
In none of the analysed cases the courts made any reference to the above-mentioned articles. 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
The vast majority of analysed cases is subject to Czech law. When foreign law applies, it is mostly Slovak law that is 
very similar to Czech law and easily accessible to Czech courts. 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
No relevant case-law available to the Reporters. 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
No case-law available to the Reporters. 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
Among the analysed case-law there were two direct actions against the insurer. In one case the court applied Czech 
law as applicable based on Art. 4(1), (2) and (3) stating that the harmful event occurred in the Czech Republic and 
both the claimant and the defendant had their habitual residence in the Czech Republic (19 Co 66/2019). In the 
other case the court applied the Rome II Regulation because the damage occurred in the Czech Republic without 
mentioning of any of its provisions (39 Co 92/2019). In both cases the damage occurred as result of a traffic accident 
and the courts kept silent on the application of the 1971 Hague Convention.  
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
No case-law available to the Reporters. 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
No case-law available to the Reporters. 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
In the reasoning of the analysed case-law the courts did not elaborate in detail on how the habitual residence was 
ascertained. In one case where legal persons were involved, the court referred to Art. 23 (1), but without further 
reasoning (30 Co 178/2019 – The claimant was a company with seat in the USA). 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
No reference in the analysed case-law with respect to the exclusion of renvoi. In one of the cases the court applied 
directly the law of Texas without any further reasoning or reference to Art. 25 (30 Co 178/2019). 




In one of the cases the Czech Supreme Court was deciding on the recognition of a judgment delivered by the Supreme 
Court of Arizona in Maricopa County granting punitive damages. The Supreme Court concluded that the public policy 
reservation can only be applied if the amount of punitive damage granted is manifestly disproportionate to the injury 
that is to be compensated. Czech law does not know the concept of punitive damages. This interpretation of the 
Supreme Court in connection with recognition will most probably be also respected by courts when assessing whether 
the provisions of foreign applicable law regarding punitive damages could be contrary to Czech public policy (30 Co 
3157/2013).  
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
No reference to Art. 27, 28, 29 in the given areas. Art. 29 is mentioned in connection with the 1971 Hague 
Convention (18 Co 319/2017). 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
The Czech Republic is bound by the 1971 Hague Convention. In two of the analysed cases the courts correctly applied 
the Convention that takes precedence pursuant to Art. 28 and Art. 29(1). In both cases the cross-border aspect was 
linked to Ukraine and in both cases the traffic accident (the event giving rise to the damage) and the damage occurred 
in the Czech Republic. The courts applied Czech law based on Art. 3 of the Convention (18 Co 176/2017 – in this 
case a Ukrainian national sued the Czech Office of Insurers and the Municipal Court stated in the reasoning that due 
to the fact that Czech Republic notified the Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents, that was binding to 
both the Czech Republic and Ukraine, in accordance with Art. 29 (1) Rome II, the law applicable should be determined 
pursuant Art. 3 of the Convention and applied Czech law, 18 Co 319/2017 – the Municipal Court as court of appeal 
stated that Czech law applied pursuant Art. 3 of the Convention, declaring the reference of the court of first instance 
to Art. 2 point 5 of the Convention that excludes its application as incorrect, as the action had been brought against 
the person allegedly liable for the damage). In other cases, the courts ignored the existence of the 1971 Hague 
Convention and in actions for compensation of damages in connection with traffic accidents applied Art. 4 of the Rome 
II Regulation (19 Co 66/2019 – in a direct action against the insurer of the person liable for the damage of a car 
registered in Estonia court of both instances applied Czech law based on Art. 4 (1), (2), (3) and Art. 18 of the Rome 
II as the harmful event occurred in the Czech Republic, the claimant had its habitual residence and the defendant  its 
seat in the Czech Republic, without any mention of the 1971 Hague Convention, 21 Co 157/2019 – in this case 
where a UK national with habitual residence in the Czech Republic brought an action for compensation of non-material 
loss due the death of relatives the court stated Czech law applied pursuant to Art. 4 (1) Rome II Regulation as the traffic 
accident occurred in the Czech Republic, 25 Co 234/2015 – in this case a Belgian national sought compensation 
for damage to health and courts of both instances determined Czech law as applicable in accordance with Rome II 
Regulation as the damage had occurred in the Czech Republic). The absence of specific conflict rule for traffic 
accidents in the Rome II and the fact that the 1971 Hague Convention takes precedence over Rome II in the MS that 
are bound by the Convention and the resulting double regime for determination of law applicable to traffic accidents 
in the EU is viewed rather critically in the Czech doctrine as it leads to forum shopping that is not excluded thanks to 
the formulation of the Brussels Ibis jurisdiction provisions.466 
 
 





28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
No case-law available to the Reporters. 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
No case-law available to the Reporters. 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
No case-law available to the Reporters. 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 






4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to decision 
of the Court of Justice 
if applicable 
Date  
Article(s) of Rome 
II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
Regional Court in 
Ostrava 
11 Co 153/2019  September 24, 
2019  
Art. 10 (1)  unjust enrichment 
(defendant domiciled in 
Austria) 
Gas supply after the death of the contracting 
party. The Regional Court did not consider the 
fact that the defendant is domiciled in Austria 
and applied Czech law without prior conflict of 
laws analysis. The Regional Court confirmed the 
application of Czech substantive law pursuant to 
Art. 10 (1) Rome II.  
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
12 Co 112/2018 June 19, 2018 Art. 4 (1) the Court of Appeal decision 
on the decision of the District 
Court Prague 10 Ref. No. 46 
C 203/2014 
The Appeal Court confirmed the decision of the 
Court of First Instance including the application 
of Art. 4 (1) of the Rome II to determine the law 
applicable to unjust enrichment. 
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
12 Co 217/2017 October 3, 2017 Art. 4 the Court of Appeal’s 
decision on the decision of 
the District Court for Prague 
4 Ref. No 21 C 71/2015 
The Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of 
the Court of the First Instance. In the reasoning of 
the court there is no mention of the cross-border 





District Court in 
Přerov 
14 C 168/2017 July 31, 2018 Art. 4 (1), (3) compensation of damages 
due to breach of contractual 
obligations 
(claimant – Slovak national 
domiciled in Slovakia) 
The District Court dismissed the claim for 
compensation of damage caused to a rented car 
due to prescription. The court stated that the law 
applicable is Slovak law pursuant to Art 4 (1) lit. 
b) Rome I Regulation adding that the same 
conclusion can be reached also by applying Art. 
4 (1) and (3) of the Rome II Regulation, 
concluding there is no reason to apply other law 
that Slovak substantive law. 
Municipal Court in 
Prague  
17 Co 115/2018  December 13, 
2018 
 compensation for damages 
allegedly suffered by the 
claimant following the 
depreciation of share price 
and non-repayment of a 
loan by the defendant with 
seat in Germany 
The Municipal Court annulled the decision and 
referred the case back to the District Court 
concluding that the court of first instance has to 
establish its jurisdiction first, and then deal with 
the determination of applicable law. 
 
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
18 Co 131/2017 May 17, 2017 Art. 14 (1) lit. g defendant with seat in 
Germany, choice of law 
Additional costs incurred as a result of breach of 
contractual duty (the defective delivery of 
vehicles by the defendant). 
No further reasoning regarding the choice of 
law. 
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
18 Co 176/2017 May 31, 2017 Art. 3 of the HU 
Convention 
traffic accident in the territory 
of the Czech Republic 
(claimant – Ukrainian 
national, defendant – Czech 
Office of Insurers) 
The Municipal Court stated in the reasoning that 
due to the fact that Czech Republic notified the 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic 
Accidents, that is binding to both the Czech 
Republic and Ukraine, in accordance with Art. 
29 (1) Rome II, the law applicable shall be 
determined pursuant Art. 3 of the Convention 




Municipal Court in 
Prague 
18 Co 181/2019 August 28, 2019 Art. 4 (1) traffic accident that occurred 
in the Czech Republic  
(claimant with seat in 
Germany, the right of 
recourse, German social 
insurer seeking recovery of 
sums - invalidity pension - 
paid in accordance with 
German law)  
 
The Municipal Court stated that Art. 4 (1) Rome 
II applies to determine the applicable law. With 
respect to Art. 4 (3) the Court concluded that the 
closest connection due to the fact that the traffic 
accident occurred in the Czech Republic, both 
the insurer and the person claimed to be liable is 
to the Czech law. The payment of invalidity 
pension as a manifestation of indirect 
consequence of the accident has no impact on 
applicable law and it is not possible to judge the 
partial consequences of the harmful event based 
on where they occurred.  
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
18 Co 2/2017 February 1, 2017 Art. 10 (1) unjust enrichment (defendant 
domiciled in Germany) 
Payments based on invalid promissory contract. 
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
18 Co 304/2019 November 13, 
2019 
Art. 10 (3)  
Art. 4 (1) 
unjust enrichment, 
(applicant domiciled in 
Germany, defendant 
domiciled in the Czech 
Republic) 
The Municipal Court confirmed the application 
of Czech law pursuant to Art. 10 (3) in 
connection with Art. 4 (1) of Rome II as the 
alleged unjust enrichment or damage occurred 
in the territory of the Czech Republic. 
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
18 Co 319/2017 October 25, 2017 Art. 3 of the 
Hague 
Convention 
traffic accident in the territory 
of the Czech Republic, 
compensation for damages 
to health 
(defendant is a Ukrainian 
national) 
The Municipal Court stated in the reasoning that 
due to the fact that Czech Republic notified The 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic 
Accidents in accordance (Art. 29 (1) Rome II), 
that is binding to both the Czech Republic and 
Ukraine, the law applicable shall be determined 
pursuant Art. 3 of the Convention and apply 
Czech law. The reference of the court of first 
instance to Art. 2 point 5 of the Convention that 




was brought against the person allegedly liable 
for the damage.  
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
18 Co 34/2017 March 29, 2017 Art. 4 (1) compensation for damages 
in respect of breach of 
general duty to prevent 
damage (claimants - legal 
persons with seats in the 
USA, Switzerland and 
various EU Member States) 
The defendant was the tenant, operator and 
administrator of the marketplace in Prague, 
subletting sales premises to individual traders 
who infringe intellectual property rights of the 
claimants by selling counterfeit goods. The 
Municipal Court stated that Art. 4 (1) Rome II 
applies and the dispute is subject to Czech law 
as the damage occurred in the Czech Republic. 
Regional Court in 
Prague 
19 Co 157/2018 September 3, 2018 Art.10 (2) unjust enrichment, both 
claimant and defendant 
habitually resident in the 
Czech Republic (defendant 
– Slovak national) 
The Regional Court stated that in the case of 
alleged unjust enrichment the law applicable is 
the law of the Czech Republic in accordance 
with Art. 10 (2) Rome II.  
Municipal Court of 
Prague 
19 Co 66/2019 April 3, 2019 Art. 4 (1), (2), (3), 
Art. 18 
traffic accident in the Czech 
Republic, direct action 
against the insurer of the 
person liable 
(damaged car registered in 
Estonia) 
The Appeal Court confirmed the decision of the 
Court of the First Instance, that states in its 
reasoning the application of Czech law based 
on Art. 4 (1), (2), (3) and Art. 18 of the Rome II 
as the harmful event occurred in the Czech 
Republic, the claimant has its habitual residence 
and the defendant has its seat in the Czech 
Republic. No mention of the 1971 Hague 
Convention. 
District Court for 
Prague 4 
21 C 71/2015 April 19, 2017 Art. 4 ski accident in the Czech 
Republic, non-material 
damages for pain, loss of 
amenity, loss of income, 
reimbursement of 
The court stated that the law applicable to the ski 
accident is Czech law, as the damage occurred 
in the Czech Republic, based on Art. 4 of the 




costs incurred in 
connection with the accident 
(defendant domiciled in 
Germany) 
Regional Court in 
Prague 
21 Co 157/2019 May 13, 2020 Art. 4 (1) traffic accident, 
compensation of non-
material loss due to the death 
of grandparents/mother and 
father/mother and father in 
law (the claimants shared a 
household with them) 
(claimant – UK national with 
habitual residence in the 
Czech Republic) 
The court stated that the case is subject to Czech 
law pursuant to Art. 4 (1) Rome II Regulation as 
the traffic accident occurred in the Czech 
Republic. 
Regional Court in 
Prague 
22 Co 535/2016 November 30, 
2016 
Art. 10 (3) unjust enrichment in the 
Czech Republic 
(claimant is a company with 
seat in Barbados) 
The Court of Appeal stated that the Court of First 
Instance determined the law applicable to the 
alleged unjust enrichment pursuant to Art. 10 (3) 
of Rome II Regulation and elaborated that the 
Regulation is, as part of Czech legal order, 
applicable to cases where only one party has its 
seat in the territory of the Czech Republic. And 
added that the necessity to apply Rome II can be 
derived from the fact that the Czech Act of PIL 
deals only with non-contractual obligations 
arising out of violations of privacy and rights 
relating to personality, including defamation. 
Supreme Court of 
the Czech Republic 
23 Cdo 4210/2013 December 15, 
2015 
Art. 4 and  
Art. 32 
traffic accident, damages, 
insurance 
Rome II just briefly mentioned, it does not apply 




(CZ x D) 
District Court for 
Prague 5 
24 C 95/2017 July 19, 2018 Art. 4 (1), Art. 4 
(3) 
compensation of damages 
due to the insolvency 
administrator’s breach of 
legal obligations, liability of 
the defendant for the 
material loss in connection 
with performing his duties as 
insolvency administrator 
(defendant domiciled in 
Slovakia) 
The District Court stated  that the law applicable 
is Slovak law the Slovak law, as it is clear from 
the facts of the case that the alleged breach of 
the defendant’s legal obligations is significantly 
linked to his obligations as an insolvency 
administrator of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate 
pursuant to Slovak law.  
Supreme Court of 
the Czech Republic 
25 Cdo 1510/2019 May 28, 2020 Art. 4 (1) in 
connection with 
Art. 15 lit. h) 
traffic accident in the territory 
of the Czech Republic 
(the owner of the damaged 
car was a German national) 
The Bayerischer Versicherungsverband 
Versicherungsaktiengesellschaft as the Insurance 
Provider of the injured party filed a lawsuit 
against The Czech Bureau of Insurers for 
obtaining compensation from the Guarantee 
Fund for damage caused by an uninsured car. 
The disputed issue was the alleged limitation of 
the claim. The courts determined Czech law as 
applicable pursuant to Art. 4 (1) in connection 
with Art. 15 lit. h) Rome II Regulation.  
Supreme Court of 
the Czech Republic 
25 Cdo 3453/2018 May 13, 2020 Art. 1 (1), Art. 2 
(1), Art. 4 (3), Art. 
24 
compensation of damages 
caused by a Czech attorney 
by agreeing to a court 
settlement in Czech court 
proceedings regarding 
liquidation of matrimonial 
property regime without 
consent of the client  
The Supreme Court stated that the law 
applicable was Czech law pursuant to Art. 1 (1), 
Art. 2 (1), Art. 4 (3) and Art. 24 of the Rome II 
Regulation. The reference to Art. 24 on exclusion 




(the client was a German 
national) 
Regional Court in 
Prague 
25 Co 124/2013 October 30, 2013 Art- 4 damages, compensation for 
loss revenue and material 
damage to rented premises  
(claimant is UK national 
domiciled in UK) 
The Regional Court stated that the case is subject 
to Czech law in accordance with Art. 4 Rome II 
Regulation. 
Regional Court in 
Prague 
25 Co 131/2013 July 9, 2013 no reference traffic accident in the Czech 
Republic, claim of the 
Insurance Company of the 
party that suffered the 
damage  
(claimant – Czech Insurance 
Company, defendant – 
Slovak national with habitual 
residence in the Czech 
Republic) 
Czech law applicable in accordance with Rome 
II Regulation – the Appeal Court does not state 
any Rome II provision, but refers to the “correct 
and detailed” reasoning of the Court of First 
Instance. 
Regional Court in 
Prague 
25 Co 234/2015 December 8, 2015  traffic accident in the Czech 
Republic, compensation for 
damage to health (pain, loss 
of amenity, costs for medical 
care, loss of income) 
(claimant – Belgian national) 
The Court Appeal confirms the application of 
Czech law in accordance with Rome II 
Regulation, as the damage occurred in the 
Czech Republic and refers to the reasoning of 
the Court of First Instance. 
Supreme Court of 
the Czech Republic 





Art. 2 (1), Art. 10 




(defendant of Georgian 
nationality with habitual 
The Supreme Court concluded that the Appeal 
Court applied national conflict rules to determine 
the law applicable where Rome II should have 
been applied. According to the Supreme Court, 




residence in the Czech 
Republic) 
defendant have their habitual residence in the 
Czech Republic, Czech law applies pursuant to 
Art. 10 (2) Rome II. 
Supreme Court of 
the Czech Republic 
30 Cdo 3157/2013  
 
 
August 22, 2014 Art. 26, recital 32 punitive damages, public 
policy of the forum 
It is possible to raise a conflict reservation with 
the Czech public policy in relation to the 
recognition of a decision imposing punitive 
damages only if the amount of the penalty for 
damages is manifestly disproportionate to the 
damage it is intended to compensate.  
Regional Court in 
Prague 
30 Co 104/2018 May 30, 2018 Art. 10 (4) unjust enrichment 
(claimant domiciled in 
Iceland) 
The Court of Appeal stated that unjust enrichment 
is considered a non-contractual obligation 
according to Art. 2 (1) and therefore the alleged 
enrichment that occurred in connection with a 
foundation of Czech legal person shall be 
subject to Czech law pursuant to Art. 10 (4) 
Rome II. The Court of First Appeal applied 
correctly Czech law, but without any reasoning.   
Regional Court in 
Prague 
30 Co 146/2018 September 5, 2018 Art. 10 (2) unjust enrichment 
(claimant domiciled in 
Slovakia) 
The Court of Appeal confirms the tacit  
determination of Czech law as the law 
applicable to the case by the Court of the First 
Instance and states that as both claimant and 
defendant had their habitual residence in the 
Czech Republic at the time relevant for the claim, 
the applicable is determined pursuant to Art. 10 
(2) Rome II Regulation. The claimant sued her 
ex-partner for repayment of what she had 
invested into a reconstruction of house owned by 




Regional Court in 
Prague 
30 Co 178/2019 November 27, 
2019 
Art. 10 (2), (3) unjust enrichment 
(claimant – company with 
seat abroad - USA) 
The Court of Appeal confirms the determination 
of the law of Texas as applicable, but pursuant 
to Art. 10 (2) and (3) of the Rome II Regulation. 
The alleged unjust enrichment occurred in 
connection with a transport of a horse from 
Europe to Texas, housing, food and care.  
Regional Court in 
Prague 
30 Co 259/2017 November 1, 2017 Art. 10 (1), (3), 
Art. 23 (1) 
unjust enrichment 
(claimant – legal person with 
seat in UK) 
The Court of Appeal set aside the decision of the 
Court of the First Instance, inter alia because the 
court did not consider the cross-border aspect of 
the case. In its reasoning the Court of Appeal 
stated that the subject of the action is a claim 
arising out of a contract to make up work, 
possibly claim arising out of unjust enrichment. 
The case is subject to Czech laws based on Art. 
4 (1), Art. 19 Rome I or Art. 10 (1), (3) and Art. 
23 (1) Rome II. 
Regional Court in 
Prague 
30 Co 360/2017 October 11, 2017 Art. 4 unjust enrichment 
(claimant – Slovak national) 
The Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of 
the Court of First Instance in case of alleged 
unjust enrichment. In its reasoning stated that the 
Court of First Instance applied correctly Czech 
law as applicable as it corresponds with Art. 4 
of the Rome II Regulation. It is clear from the 
wording, that the Court of the First Instance did 
not consider the cross-border aspect of the case 
and did not establish its international jurisdiction, 
neither determined applicable law. 
Municipal Court 
Prague 
32 C 47/2018 March 27, 2019 Art. 4, Ar. 6 and 
Art. 8 
infringement of copyright, 
claim for reasonable 
reparation 
The defendants were allegedly distributing TV 
channels of the claimant without authorization of 
the holder of the rights to the programme for its 




(claimants are companies 
with seat in Germany and 
Slovakia) 
dispute as dispute regarding protection of 
copyright and protection against unfair 
competition and decided based on Czech law. 
In its reasoning the court merely states that as 
regards the applicable law the claimant refers to 
Art. 4, Ar. 6 and Art. 8 of the Rome II Regulation.  
Supreme Court of 
the Czech Republic 
33 Cdo 3752/2009 August 31, 2011  unjust enrichment Rome II just mentioned, the Regulation does not 
apply as the claimed unjust enrichment took 
place in 1993-4.  
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
39 Co 114/2017 31. 5. 2017 Art. 10 (2) unjust enrichment (defendant 
is Slovak national) 
Alleged loan agreement. 
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
39 Co 159/2018 October 17, 2018 Art. 4 (1) compensation for material 
loss due to unlawful interim 
relief (claimants domiciled in 
Slovakia, defendant 
domiciled in the Czech 
Republic) 
The Municipal Court confirmed the application 
of Czech law pursuant to Art. 4 (1) Rome II as 
the alleged damage occurred in the territory of 
the Czech Republic (ruling of Czech District 
Court on interim relief). 
 
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
39 Co 16/2018 February 28, 2018 Art. 4 (1) traffic accident in the Czech 
Republic, compensation of 
damages to health 
(claimant is a Slovak 
national, defendant is 
Insurance Company 
Generali)  
According to the reasoning of the Municipal 
Court the law applicable is determined pursuant 
with Rome II. As the damage occurred in the 
Czech Republic, the liability relations are in 
accordance with Art. 4 (1) subject to Czech law. 
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
39 Co 92/2019 June 7, 2019 no provision cited traffic accident in the Czech 
Republic, direct claim 
against the insurer, 
The Municipal Court as court of appeal 
confirmed that Czech law applies based on 




compensation of damages to 
health (pain, loss of amenity, 
loss of income) 
(claimants domiciled in 
Slovakia) 
occurred in the Czech Republic (no mention of 
any provision of the Rome II Regulation, no 
mention of the 1971 Hague Convention). 
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
39 Co 303/2018 February 6, 2019 Art. 4 (1), Art. 4 
(3) 
the Court of Appeal’s 
decision on the decision of 
the District Court for Prague 
5 Ref. No 24 C 95/2017 
The Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of 
the Court of the First Instance and with respect to 
the applicability of Slovak law consented in the 
reasoning that the case was subject to Slovak 
substantive law.  
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
39 Co 357/2017 January 10, 2018 Recital 9, Art. 1 
(1) 
compensation for the non-
material loss suffered due to 
unlawful criminal 
prosecution in the Czech 
Republic 
(claimant is a Slovak 
national, defendant the 
Czech Ministry of Justice) 
The Municipal Court stated that as claims arising 
out of acta iure imperii are excluded from the 
scope of Rome II, and as no applicable conflict 
rule is included in the bilateral Czech-Slovak 
treaty on legal assistance, national conflict rule 
in Sec. 15 the then effective Act on Private 
International Law applies, determining Czech 
law as applicable. 
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
39 Co 381/2017 February 28, 2018 Recital 9, Art. 1 
(1) 
compensation for damages 
suffered as a result of 
unlawful enforcement 
proceedings (one of the 
claimants – Slovak national, 
defendant – Ministry of 
Justice of the Czech 
Republic) 
The Municipal Court stated that the lower court 
did not deal in its reasoning at all with applicable 
law. The Municipal Court stated further that as 
claims arising out of acta iure imperii are 
excluded from the scope of Rome II, and no 
applicable conflict rule is included in the bilateral 
Czech-Slovak treaty on legal assistance, 
national conflict rule applies. 
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
39 Co 389/2016 January 11, 2017 Art. 4 (1) traffic accident that occurred 
in the Czech Republic 
No account has been taken by the District Court 




(one of the defendants is a 
Slovak national) 
national. The Municipal Court stated that the 
dispute is subject to the law of the Czech 
Republic as the damage occurred in its territory. 
Municipal Court in 
Prague 
39 Co 408/2017 February 21, 2018 Art. (1) Recital 9 compensation for the non-
material loss suffered due to 
custody and unlawful 
prosecution on the territory of 
the Czech Republic 
(claimant – Slovak national, 
defendant Czech Ministry of 
Justice) 
The Municipal Court stated that the District Court 
in its reasoning did not deal with applicable law 
despite the fact that the claimant was not a 
Czech national. The Regional Court stated 
further that as claims arising out of acta iure 
imperii are excluded from the scope of Rome II, 
and as no applicable conflict rule is included in 
the bilateral Czech-Slovak treaty on legal 
assistance, national conflict rule applies.  
District Court 
Prague 10 
46 C 203/2014 November 30, 
2017 
Art. 1 (1), Art. 2 
(1), Art. 4 (1) 
unjust enrichment 
(claimant domiciled in Italy) 
The claimant transferred money to the defendant 
for the purpose of founding a Czech limited 
company, the defendant failed to finalize the 
necessary steps and the company was not 
founded. The District Court applied Art. 4 (1) of 
the Rome II, ignoring the special rule in Art. 10 
for unjust enrichment.  
Regional Court in 
Ostrava 
56 Co 113/2018 September 11, 
2018 
Art. 1 (1), recital 9  compensation for the non-
material loss suffered due to 
unlawful custody on the 
territory of the Czech 
Republic 
(claimant – Slovak national, 
defendant – Czech 
Republic) 
The Regional Court stated that the District Court 
did not draw any conclusions with respect to 
applicable law from the fact that the claimant 
was a Slovak national. The Regional Court 
stated further that as claims arising out of acta 
iure imperii are excluded from the scope of Rome 
II, and no applicable conflict rule is included in 
the bilateral Czech-Slovak treaty on legal 




Regional Court of 
Ostrava 
56 Co 67/2019 September 23, 
2019 
Art. 4 (1), (3) the Court of Appeal’s 
decision on the decision of 
the District Court in Přerov 
Ref. No 14 C 168/2017 
The Appeal Court confirmed the decision of the 
Court of the First Instance, stating that with 
respect to applicable law the court refers to the 
correct conclusions of the lower court. The 
application of Slovak substantive law is, 
according to the Appeal Court, based on Art. 4 








• The awareness of the Rome II Regulation in Estonia is higher amongst the judiciary and lower amongst other 
practitioners (practicing attorneys, in-house lawyers). There are a couple of scientific articles and master 
theses (in Estonian) which have addressed the provisions of the regulation, but these have not amounted to 
any scientific discussion on the regulation in Estonian legal literature.  
• The scope of application of the Rome II Regulation has not been addressed in Estonian case law and is the 
subject of passing reference in Estonian legal literature.  
• There are no cases in Estonian case law which would have given rise to the interpretation of the provisions 
on torts/delicts, unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio or culpa in contrahendo.  
• The freedom to choose the applicable law (Art 14) has been dealt with in criminal cases where the Estonian 
courts had to solve civil claims of the victims filed against the perpetrators of crimes. In these cases, Art 14 of 
the regulation was probably wrongly applied by the courts.  
• There are no Estonian cases where Arts 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 have been applied by Estonian 
courts. The content of the foreign law applied under the regulation must be presented to the courts by the 
parties, but courts have a general obligation to determine the content of foreign law and can, thus, also 
check what the parties have presented.  
• There have been no cases in Estonian case law on the implementation of Arts 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29. 
• There are no issues that have arisen in Estonia in the areas of specific interest to the Commission.  
1. Introduction 
The awareness of the Rome II Regulation is good among the Estonian judges since there have been several trainings 
on the EU private international law regulation organised by the Estonian Supreme Court.  
Estonian notaries have also been trained on the EU rules on the applicable law, so it is to be expected that they are 
familiar with the regulation, though the notaries probably do not need to apply the regulation in their practice that 
much (if at all).  
The awareness amongst the other practitioners, businesses and citizens is probably not that high, considering the very 
small number of cases in which the regulation has been applied in Estonia and considering that the awareness on the 
EU regulations amongst the practitioners is generally not that high.  
There are no statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in Estonia. All the cases where the regulation 
has been applied to or referred to are, however, easily found in the Official Gazette of Estonia, which includes the 
Estonian case law database (www.riigiteataja.ee). Between the entry into force of the regulation and 30.08.2020, 
there have been only 17 cases where the regulation has been applied or referred to.  
There is no doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in Estonia. There are a handful of scientific articles and master 
theses (in Estonian) where the Rome II regulation has been referred to, but these do not amount to discussion on the 
regulation in Estonian legal literature.  
There are no issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political level. 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 




There is only one case in Estonian case law where the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation was 
(very briefly) touched upon. In this case the court refused to apply the Rome II Regulation, because the matter at hand 
(defamation) fell out of scope of the regulation. In another case, the regulation was used in an unjust enrichment case. 
However, in neither of these cases did the courts go into an in-depth analysis of the regulation’s scope. 
There are no cases on the Rome II Regulation where the courts had difficulties in applying the category of “civil and 
commercial “ cases. There are also no cases involving torts, delicts and quasi-delicts where the courts had problems 
with defining the term “civil and commercial” matters within the meaning of the Brussels I Recast Regulation.  
There are no cases on the determination of the temporal scope of the Rome II Regulation (Arts 31-32). However, this 
issue has found a very brief explanation in Estonian legal literature.467 
There are no cases on the characterisation of the concept of “non-contractual obligations” and its relationship to the 
concept of “contractual” obligations in the context of the Rome II Regulation or the Brussels I Recast Regulation. The 
issue of distinguishing between contractual and non-contractual obligations within the context of Estonian private 
international law instruments has, however, been dealt with briefly in the Estonian legal literature.468 
There are no cases on the universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3). 
There are no cases on the approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to 
other EU private international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) 
(Recital (7)). However, since these regulations are generally used as a package during the judge trainings in Estonia, 
it is to be assumed that should such an opportunity arise, Estonian courts would interpret the two regulations in a similar 
manner.   
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
There are no cases in Estonian case law where any difficulties have arisen on the application of Art 4 of the regulation. 
Art 4 has been relied upon by the courts several times, but these cases have dealt with traffic accidents and therefore 
have not caused much discussion on whether Art 4 should be applied or not.  
There are no cases in Estonia where Arts 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 13 of the regulation was interpreted by the courts. 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
In one Estonian case, Art 10 of the Rome II Regulation was applied, but not interpreted (the case involved a simple 
unjust enrichment - a claimant wanted to get back money wrongly paid to a foreign defendant). 
There are no cases in Estonian case law where Arts 11 or 12 of the regulation would have been interpreted by the 
courts.  
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
The freedom to choose the applicable law within the context of the Rome II regulation has created some confusion in 
Estonia in criminal cases involving civil claims. Namely, in two Estonian cases the courts used Art 14 of the regulation 
to apply Estonian law to civil claims. The courts concluded that the choice of the victims of the crime to litigate their civil 
claim before Estonian courts and the acceptance by the defendant of the civil claim should indicate an agreement 
 
 
467 M. Torga. Kohalduva õiguse ja selle sisu kindlakstegemine rahvusvahelistes eraõiguslikes vaidlustes. – Juridica 
V/2014, p 411. 
468 See, for example: M. Torga. The conflict of conflict rules – the relationship between European regulations on private 
International law and Estonian legal assistance treaties concluded with third states. University of Tartu 2019. Available: 




within the meaning of Art 14 of the regulation. Since it is clear that the agreement on jurisdiction should not 
automatically include an agreement on the applicable law and since the relevant cases are already from 2011 and 
are made by the judges who usually deal with criminal cases and hence are not that aware of the EU private 
international law rules, these cases should not be taken as a guideline for any future case-law. 
There is no discussion in Estonia on the possible rethinking of Art 14.  
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
There are no Estonian cases where Arts 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 would have been applied by Estonian 
courts.  
It is generally agreed in Estonia that the foreign law is to be applied ex officio by Estonian courts, but that in cases 
where the parties can choose applicable law, it is up to the parties to plead foreign law (otherwise it is presumed that 
they have chosen Estonian law as the applicable law). The parties have a general obligation to prove the content of 
foreign law to the courts. However, Estonian courts have the opportunity to collect information on the content of foreign 
law on their own. This is done by researching foreign law by the judge himself or herself (for example, reading legal 
literature, searching in internet), but judges can also request help from the Estonian Ministries of Justice and Foreign 
Affairs, appoint experts and oblige parties to present them with the contents of foreign law. The judges are not, 
however, bound by what the parties present and have a right to check whether the foreign law indeed is the way that 
parties are describing it to be. 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
There have been no cases in Estonian case law on the implementation of Arts 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29. 
The practical interaction between the regulation and other EU and international legal instruments in intellectual property 
rights has, however, found brief attention in Estonian legal literature.469  
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
Estonia has not joined the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents.  
The mosaic approach has not found any attention in Estonian case law. There are no other problems that have arisen 
on the interpretation of the regulation in Estonian case law.  
3. Comments on areas of interest 
There are no issues that have arisen in Estonia on the exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, 
including defamation, from the scope of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising from differences among 
Member States’ rules in cross-border situations.  
There are no issues that have arisen in Estonia on the interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of 
defamation and data protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation 
(SLAPPs). 
There are no issues that have arisen in Estonia on the extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate 
abuses against human rights and lays down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability. 
There are no issues that have arisen in Estonia on the impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome 
II Regulation, and in particular on the suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
 
 









4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to decision 
of the Court of Justice if 
applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
Tartu County Court Criminal case no 1-
11-8927 
14.10.2011 Art 14(1)a General tort 
Freedom of choice 
If a defendant in a criminal proceedings agrees 
with a civil claim submitted in criminal proceedings 
by the victims of the crime and if the victims of the 
crime agree to litigate their civil claim in Estonian 
court, the parties should be considered as having 
chosen Estonian law to be applied to the tort.  
Tartu County Court Civil case no 2-11-
25631 
23.11.2011 Art 4(1) General tort Art 4(1) applied but not interpreted in a traffic 
accident case in which the defendant admitted the 
claim. 
Tartu County Court  Criminal case no 1-
11-13823 
19.12.2011 Art 14(1) General tort 
Freedom of choice 
Same as criminal case no 1-11-8927. 
Harju County Court Civil case no 2-11-
27979 
26.09.2012 Art 10(1) Unjust enrichment Art 10(1) applied to a claim where the Estonian 
claimant wanted to get back a certain sum of 
money wrongly paid to a German defendant. 
Tartu County Court Civil case no 2-13-
26316 
18.04.2016 Art 4(1) General tort Art 4(1) applied but not interpreted in a traffic 







Civil case no 3-2-1-
45-16 
16.06.2016 Art 4(1) General tort Art 4(1) applied but not interpreted in a traffic 
accident case concerning the insurer’s redress 
claim against the policyholder. 
Tartu Circuit Court Civil case no 2-16-
2695 
02.09.2016 Art 11 Negotiorum gestio Art 11 referred to, but not interpreted.  
Harju County Court  Civil case no 2-15-
105851 
20.02.2017 Art 4(1) General tort Art 4(1) applied but not interpreted in a traffic 
accident case concerning the insurer’s redress 
claim against the policyholder. 
Tallinn Circuit Court Civil case no 2-15-
14492 
29.03.2018 Art 1(2) Scope of the Rome II Art 1(2)g relied upon to refer to national PIL rules 
in a defamation case. 
Tallinn Circuit Court  Civil case no 2-17-
15908 
17.10.2018 Art 4(1) General tort Art 4(1) applied but not interpreted in a traffic 
accident case concerning the redress claim 
between insurers. The court also applied Arts 
15(a,b), 18 and 19.  
Harju County Court Civil case no 2-17-
13456 
12.02.2019 Art 4(1) General tort Art 4(1) applied but not interpreted in a traffic 
accident case concerning the redress claim 
between insurers. The court also applied Arts 
15(a,b) and 19. 
Harju County Court Civil case no 2-17-
130791 
04.04.2019 Art 4(1) General tort Art 4(1) applied but not interpreted in a traffic 
accident case concerning the redress claim of the 
insurer against the policyholder. 
Harju County Court Civil case no 2-17-
4218 
29.04.2019 Art 4(1) General tort Art 4(1) applied but not interpreted in a case 
concerning unfair competition and protection of 
business secrets. 
Harju County Court Civil case no 2-18-
14272 
22.05.2019 Art 4(1) General tort Art 4(1) applied but not interpreted in a traffic 




against the insurer to establish the absence of 
claim. 
Tallinn Circuit Court Civil case no 2-17-
4218 
25.10.2019 Art 4(1) General tort Art 4(1) applied but not interpreted in a case 
concerning unfair competition and protection of 
business secrets. 
Tallinn Circuit Court Civil case no 2-16-
3321 
03.04.2020 Art 4(1) 
Art 4(2) 
General tort Art 4(1) and Art 4(2) applied but not interpreted in 
a case concerning compensation for damage 
based on CMR. 
Tallinn Circuit Court  Civil case no 2-18-
113192 
27.05.2020 Art 4(1) General tort Art 4(1) and Art 4(2) applied but not interpreted in 
a traffic accident case concerning the redress claim 
of the insurer against the policyholder. 
 






• No case law related to the Rome II Regulation is available in Finland.  
• Neither political discussion nor significant doctrinal discussion about the Rome II Regulation is taking place in 
Finland.  
1. Introduction 
• How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State? 
In Finland, the lack of case law and legal literature regarding the Rome II Regulation affects awareness of the instrument 
among practitioners, businesses and citizens. Nevertheless, law students will most likely acquaint themselves with the 
Rome II Regulation during their studies at least at surface level. At the University of Helsinki (Finland’s capital city), the 
Rome II Regulation is dealt with briefly during the lectures on private international law. Currently at the University of 
Helsinki, the general course of private international law contains 12 hours of lectures and 8 hours of group work, so 
the time resources do not allow the study of the Regulation in detail. The two books used as study material during the 
course at the University of Helsinki mainly cover the Rome I Regulation470 (U Liukkunen, Sopimussuhteita koskeva 
lainvalinta (Talentum 2012)) and international family law (M Helin, Suomen kansainvälinen perhe- ja perintöoikeus 
2nd edition (Alma Talent, verkkokirjahylly, 2020)). This selection of books has not been made because of the 
perceived importance of these subject matters but because there are no other up-to-date books on private international 
law suitable for a basic course literature in Finnish language. Both books nevertheless mention the Rome II Regulation, 
and the doctrinal opinions presented in the books that are relevant to the Rome II Regulation are discussed in the 
corresponding paragraphs of this report. 
Over the last decades, there has been a tendency to underrate the importance of private international law in Finland. 
For instance in the 1990s, the teaching of private international law was basically wound down.471 These occurrences 
might have had an impact on the awareness of EU private international law in general and the Rome II Regulation in 
particular by the previous generations of lawyers. Koulu notes that in Finland the extremely low amount of case law 
related to private international law has naturally reduced interest to do private international law research in the first 
place, due to the legal science’s natural tendency to focus on burning legal issues.472 
• Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
As of July 2020, a search in the case database of the Helsinki District Court showed no results for the Rome II 
Regulation, signifying that the court has not applied the Regulation. Not a single case was detected, even though the 
Helsinki District Court resolves approximately 2,000 larger civil cases yearly and around 50,000 civil cases initiated 
 
 
470 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, 6–16. 
471 M Helin, Suomen kansainvälinen perhe- ja perintöoikeus 2nd edition (Alma Talent, verkkokirjahylly, 2020) 2.  
472 R Koulu, ‘Lainvalinnan arkipäivää – yhtenäistyykö korvausstatuutti lähivuosina?’ in T Lohi (ed) Kaavoitus, 
rakentaminen, varallisuus : juhlajulkaisu Vesa Majamaa 1945–28/12–2005 (Edita 2005) 178. Koulu’s article 
discusses the Commission’s proposal for the Rome II Regulation (COM/2003/427 final) and the European 
Parliament’s Report on the proposal (Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”). 27.6.2005. Final A6-0211/2005) and 





as summary civil cases, and despite the fact that many of the biggest civil cases in Finland are resolved at the Helsinki 
District Court.473  
Only one Supreme Court case touches upon the Rome II Regulation and its Article 4.474 However, in this case, the 
Supreme Court of Finland does not actually apply the provisions of the Regulation per se, since the event at issue took 
place prior to the date of application of the Regulation. It merely reflects on the contents of the Regulation’s provisions 
in order to find out what choice of law principles they contain.475 
During brief discussions in July 2020 with a small group of district judges who deal with non-contractual obligations 
at the Helsinki District Court, it became apparent that they are aware of the Rome II Regulation, similarly as they are 
aware of the other EU private international law instruments such as the Rome I, the Brussels I476, and the Brussels II a 
Regulations477. Furthermore, the judges show readiness to use the Rome II Regulation when needed, but for some 
reason the Rome II Regulation is not applied in practice. Some cases that involve the Rome I Regulation and the Brussels 
I Regulation were found in the Court’s database, but not many. The Brussels II a Regulation appears to be the most 
frequently used EU regulation, perhaps due to the comparable high number of international family law cases in 
Helsinki. Nevertheless, the total number of cases that deal with the Brussels II a Regulation is not particularly high. 
No clear hostility or resistance to applying EU private international law was detected; the conclusion was merely that 
there have been no cases in the Helsinki District Court of issues of choice of law relating to non-contractual disputes. 
Perhaps the disputing parties have not wished to invoke choice of law questions for certain reasons in courts in Finland, 
or perhaps the number of cases in which the private international law questions generally might become relevant is 
small due to Finland’s small size, geographically isolated location, and comparatively limited cross-border contacts.478 
The fact that there were no general statutory choice of law rules related to non-contractual obligations in Finland prior 
to the Rome II Regulation’s entry into force,479 might explain this state of affairs a little further. Liukkunen notes that the 
unwritten rules for choice of law related to non-contractual obligations in Finland were unclear. 480 She points out that 
 
 
473 Annual report of Helsinki District Court 2019,  
https://oikeus.fi/karajaoikeudet/helsinginkarajaoikeus/material/attachments/oikeus_karajaoikeudet_helsinginkar
ajaoikeus/liitteet2019/9MYIEBX03/Helsingin_karajaoikeuden_vuosikertomus_2019.pdf (assessed 22.1.2021), 
20–21.  
474 Supreme Court case KKO 2010:51. Diary number S2009/496, issued on 5 July 2010, ECLI:FI:KKO:2010:51.  
475 See more closely, Chapter II, Paragraph 6 c.  
476 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351, 
20.12.2012, 1–32. 
477 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1347/2000, OJ L 338, 23.12.2003, 1–29. 
478 See supra n. 3. Kalliokoski notes that cross border antitrust damage cases often tend to be solved in certain 
specific countries such as England, Germany, and the Netherlands. He notes that competition law processes take a 
long time – it generally takes quite a while before a court starts to deal with the antitrust damages – and the Rome I 
Regulation is still rather young instrument. Counsel T Kalliokoski ‘RE: Tutkimusprojektiin liittyvä tiedustelu’ Message to 
Iina Tornberg. 22 January 2021. E-mail.  
479 U Liukkunen, ‘Recent Private International Law Codifications’ in Erkki J Hollo (ed) Studies on the Finnish Legal 
System – Finnish Reports to the 18th Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law (IACL) (EDILEX 
Edita Publishing Oy 2011) 4. See also Koulu, supra n. 3, at 179. 
480 Liukkunen, ibid, at 132. Finnish legal literature that covered non-contractual obligations back then included T 
Esko, Rikkomusperusteiseen korvausvastuuseen sovellettavasta laista. Erityisesti tuotevastuuta silmällä pitäen 




the Regulation has thus clarified the legal situation in Finland by providing means to predict the effects of possible future 
liability and to determine the applicable law to already incurred damages.481 Liukkunen states that the Regulation “has 
meant a fundamental change to the basis of choice of law” in Finland.482 
• Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
No relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in Finland are available.  
• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
The doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation is almost non-existent in Finland.483 
• Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political 
level? 
Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation has caused a little discussion at a doctrinal level. The relationship between the 
paragraphs of the article has been perceived as complex. It is considered unclear when the escape clause of Article 
4 (3) applies, especially in relation to Article 4(2).484 It has been even questioned whether the latter is needed since 
the application of the closest connection principle most probably points at the law of the country where both the parties 
(the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage) have their habitual residence.485 The mosaic 
approach adopted by Article 4(1) has raised some questions, since Article 4(2) directly provides an exception to this 
general rule of the Regulation.486  
 
 
sopimussuhteen ulkopuoliseen vahingonkorvausvastuuseen sovellettavasta laista : erityisesti Suomen kansainvälisen 
yksityisoikeuden kannalta, (Helsingin yliopisto, 1987). 
481 Liukkunen, supra n. 10, at 145. 
482 Ibid., at 132. 
483 Finnish contributions that acknowledge the Rome II Regulation include among others: L Sisula-Tulokas, En skada – 
vad är det? Oikeus 2008 (37); 4: 433, fn. 61; L. Sisula-Tulokas, ‘Europeisering av vår skadeståndsrätt ... que será, 
será’ in H Lindfors et al (eds) Kovia aikoja: riitoja ja maksukyvyttömyyttä – Juhlakirja Risto Koulu 60 vuotta (Comi 
2009) 584, fn. 75; L Sisula-Tulokas, Vem ansvarar för skador förorsakade av förarlösa fordon? JFT 5–6/2019, 
329, fn. 60. M Norrgård refers to the Commission’s proposal for the Rome II Regulation in his article that regards 
intellectual property rights. M. Norrgård, Immaterialrättens territorialitet, JFT 4 –5/2005, 572–584. In his article 
that addresses the Draft Common Frame of Reference, Beale on the other hand refers to the Rome II Regulation once 
and notes that “[a]lthough under the Rome II Regulation parties can now choose what law of tort should apply to 
their relationship, I am not sure that there will be much scope for this kind of agreement in the kind of transactions that 
the Optional Instruments I have suggested would seek to cover.” H Beale, From Draft Common Frame of Reference 
to Optional Instrument, JFT 3–4/2009, 209. Mäenpää also includes one reference to the Rome II Regulation in his 
article. He notes that “[a]ccording to the Rome II Regulation, culpa in contrahendo is neither tort nor delict but its own 
type of non-contractual liability. The law applicable is the law that would have been applicable to the contract had it 
been entered into.” K Mäenpää, Contract Negotiations and the Importance of Being Earnest, JFT 4/2010, 341. 
Wetterstein discusses the Rome II Regulation in his article regarding maritime choice of law questions. P Wetterstein, 
Rom II-förordningen och sjöfarten, JFT 1–2/2010 s. 111–138.  
484 Liukkunen notes that Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation contains a similar escape clause related to product 
liability. Liukkunen, supra n. 10, at 136.  
485 Koulu, supra n. 3, at 184 –185. 




2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2))  
Helin refers to Articles 1 (2)(a) and 1 (2)(b) of the Rome II Regulation and notes that obligations arising out of a family 
relationship, or a relationship having comparable effects to a family relationship, are excluded from the scope of the 
Rome II Regulation.487 He presents Article 1 (2)(e) of the Rome II Regulation as an exclusion similar to Article 1 (2)(j) 
of the EU Succession Regulation.488 
Liukkunen on the other hand notes that both the Rome I Regulation and the Rome II Regulation exclude revenue, customs 
and administrative matters from the scope of their application.489 Furthermore, she notes that the Rome I Regulation 
does not cover non-contractual obligation and for those, the Rome II Regulation applies.490 Liukkunen notes that Article 
1 (2)(j) of the Rome I Regulation that states that obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract 
is compatible with Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation – the latter instrument applies to dealings prior to the conclusion 
of a contract.491 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, Arts 31-32  
No information available  
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2)  
Helin refers to Recital 11 of the Rome II Regulation, which states that the concept of non-contractual obligation should 
be understood as an autonomous concept. He takes this Recital as an example of an express statement of the general 
rule that the concepts of EU law should be characterized autonomously. He notes that this principle of an autonomous 
qualification can be difficult to follow in practice since there is no pan-European legal order on which the qualification 
could be based.492  
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3)  
No information available 
 
 
487 Helin, supra n. 2, at 395. 
488 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments 
in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, 107–
134. Ibid 790, fn 1042.  
489 U Liukkunen, Sopimussuhteita koskeva lainvalinta (Talentum 2012) 66.  
490 Ibid., at 67. 
491 Ibid., at 74. 




5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital 
(7))  
Liukkunen introduces the Rome II Regulation as a part of the ensemble of EU private international law rules set out in 
the Rome I Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation493 in addition to the Rome II Regulation. She notes that the Rome 
II Regulation did not have a predecessor like the Rome I Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation did. Therefore, prior 
to the Rome II Regulation’s entry into force, the choice of law rules related to the non-contractual obligation were very 
divergent between each EU Member State.494 In addition, Liukkunen notes that the EU choice of law rules relating to 
contractual obligations, on the one hand, and to non-contractual obligations on the other, complete each other. 
Furthermore, she notes that the rules of the Brussels I Regulation need to be paid heed to when applying both the Rome 
I and the Rome II Regulation since the latter two instruments are based on the approach adopted in the Brussels I 
Regulation.495 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of : 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1)  
See below Paragraph c.  
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims  
no information available 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and  
The Finnish Supreme Court case KKO 2010:51 concerned the applicable law for a claim for damages following a 
killing (i.e., a manslaughter committed under mitigating circumstances). The offence concerned was committed in 
Estonia. Both the victim and the offender were Finnish nationals who had their habitual residence in Estonia. The victim’s 
Finnish parents and siblings living in Finland claimed damages for the anguish arising from the victim’s death under 
Chapter 5 Section 4a of the Finnish Tort Liability Act. Estonian law did not include a similar provision. Under Estonian 
law, in such circumstances persons who were close to a victim were only able to claim immaterial and/or moral 
damages provided that certain conditions were fulfilled. Thus, the Court needed to determine whether the Finnish law, 
more favourable from the viewpoint of the claimants, should apply to the case.496 
In its decision, the Court notes that at the time of the offence there was no written choice of law rule in Finnish law that 
would have answered the question of what law should be applied to non-contractual obligations arising out of a tort 
in a cross-border case. In addition, the Court points out that there has hardly been any case law related to this issue. 
Nevertheless, the Court notes that in legal literature is has been quite consistently held that the applicable law should 
be the law of the place where the damage occurred. According to the Court, this rule has been applied frequently in 
neighbouring countries such as in Sweden.497  
 
 
493 Íbid., at 50. In her book, Liukkunen refers to the Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 12, 16.1.2001, 
1–23 but notices the ongoing reform of the Brussels I Regulation. 
494 Liukkunen, supra n. 20, at 50. See also Koulu, supra n. 3, at 179. 
495 Liukkunen, ibid. 
496 KKO 2010:51, supra n. 5, at paras. 1–6. 




The Court notes that lex loci delicti rule can first refer to the law of the country in which the harmful act was committed 
or in which the damage-causing event took place, and second, to the law of the country in the territory of which the 
person sustaining damage has been faced with damage. The Court points out that, in Finland, the first option has been 
preferred over the second one.498  
Paragraphs 10 to 13 of the Court’s decision relate to the Rome II Regulation. In paragraph 10, the Court explains that 
the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have adopted a regulation that concerns the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligation and that this regulation called as the Rome II Regulation applies as of 11 
January 2009. The Court continues explaining the contents of the rules in Article 4 and adds that the Regulation cannot 
be applied to the case at hand because the event giving rise to damage occurred before the Regulation’s entry into 
force.  
In Paragraph 11, the Court notes that in Finland prior to the Regulation it was generally proposed that the law 
applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort should be the law of the place where the tort occurred. 
Related to the case at issue, the Court considers that the application of this general rule would lead to the application 
of Estonian law since Estonia was the place in which the offence giving rise to the damage took place. The Court notes 
that even though this choice of law rule, assigning significance to the place where the tort occurred, might also refer to 
the place where the damage occurred, the Court finds that the place where the anguish arising from the death of the 
victim, which is not an indirect consequence of the tort, takes place cannot be deemed as a decisive factor in the choice 
of law. The Court notes that this presumption appears understandable also since the place where the persons entitled 
to compensation are located might depend only on incidental factors.499  
In Paragraph 12, the Court states that the closest connection rule in Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation has been 
considered a generally applicable principle of private international law in Finland as well. Therefore, the Court 
deemed it necessary to examine the application of that principle to the case at issue.500  
The Court points out that both the offender, the victim and the victim’s near relatives claiming damages were of Finnish 
nationality. Furthermore, the Court notes that at the time the damage occurred the domiciles of the relatives were in 
Finland. On the other hand, the place in which the offence was committed and in which the direct consequence of that 
offence occurred were in Estonia. Additionally, both the offender and the victim had their places of residence and 
domiciles in Estonia. The Court weighted up these factors and considered that the case was most closely connected to 
Estonia. Namely, both the general rule of lex loci delicti and the places of residence and domiciles of the offender and 
the direct victim as connecting factors pointed at Estonia. The nationalities of the persons concerned, and the domiciles 
of the claimants do not reveal the closest connection in this case. The Supreme Court considered that Estonian law 
should apply to the claim. 501  
 
 
498 Ibid., at para. 9.  
499 Ibid., at para. 11.  
500 Ibid., at para. 12. 
501 This case has been dealt in Finnish legal literature among other in U Liukkunen, ‘KKO 2010:51 Lainvalinta ja 
sopimuksen ulkopuolinen vahingonkorvausvastuu’ in P Timonen (ed) KKO:n ratkaisut kommentein II 2010 (Talentum 
2011) 20–25. Liukkunen notes that this decision is in line with Finnish legal literature and for its part enhances the 
predictability in choice of law. She notes that prior to this case, it was unclear whether the closest connection 
principle applies also to choice of law in relation to non-contractual obligations in Finland. She notes nevertheless 
that the importance of this case is diminished by the Rome II Regulation. This Supreme Court case is namely relevant 
only to damages that have occurred after the Regulation’s entry into force. Liukkunen, 22. The case KKO 2010:51 is 
also referred in a footnote as an additional reading material regarding the question of applicable law in cases 
where the damage has occurred in a foreign state in P Ståhlberg and J Karhu, Suomen vahingonkorvausoikeus, 6th 
ed. 8 (Talentum Media 2013) 505 and its Swedish translation, P Ståhlberg, J Karhu and A Wollstén, Finsk 




d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
no information available 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability;  
no information available 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6)  
no information available 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7)  
no information available 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13)  
no information available 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9)  
no information available 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4.  
no information available 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11)  
no information available 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12)  
no information available 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14)  
no information available 
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22)  
no information available 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations.  




18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above)  
no information available 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
Helin points out that in cases where the choice of law rule is based on an international obligation, whether the 
overriding mandatory rules of the forum country can be applied depends on the provisions of the international treaty 
or instrument at issue. Followingly, he notes that the Rome II Regulation accepts the application of the overriding 
mandatory provisions of the forum country in choice of law.502  
Liukkunen points out that the Rome II Regulation extended the overriding mandatory rules doctrine to the choice of law 
relating to damages.503 She notes the difference between Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation and Article 9 of the 
Rome I Regulation: in addition to the overriding mandatory rules of the forum country, the Rome I Regulation also 
covers the overriding mandatory rules of “third” countries that are countries that are neither forum countries nor those 
of the governing law, if the conditions set by the Regulation are fulfilled. The Rome II Regulation on the other hand 
addresses only the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum.504 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
no information available 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
no information available 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
no information available 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
no information available 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25)  
Helin uses Article 25 of the Rome II Regulation as an example of a choice of law rule in cases where the State at issue 
comprises several territorial units that have their own rules of law. He notes that this article handles such territorial units 
similarly to countries for the purposes of identifying the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation.505  
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26)  
no information available 
 
 
502 Helin, supra n. 2, at 92.  
503 Liukkunen, supra n. 20, at 241. 
504 Ibid. See also Liukkunen, supra n. 10, at 141.  




26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29)  
Liukkunen lists the reduction of fragmentation and the strengthening of legal certainty as central objectives of the 
coordinated unification of private international law through the Rome I and the Rome II Regulation.506 She notes that 
the fragmentation of private international law and hence the fragmentation of choice of law rules persists nevertheless, 
and continues to complicate the choice of law. Liukkunen observes that sectoral instruments of secondary EU legislation 
often include specific choice of law rules, regrettably drafted in an uncoordinated and differentiated manner.507 In this 
context, it is not helpful that the conflict of law rules have even been used as tools to unify politically difficult subject 
matters within the EU.508 Liukkunen notes that these scattered conflict of law rules are difficult to interpret and apply 
since they do not necessarily follow the basic systematics of private international law but are instead created to enhance 
specific EU policies. Liukkunen thinks that incoherence has truly become a serious issue of European private 
international law due to this increasing fragmentation.509  
As for Article 28 (1) of the Rome II Regulation, it is worth noting that Finland is a Contracting Party to the Hague 
Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Law Applicable to Products Liability. The rules of the Regulation cannot thus 
prejudice the application of the Convention.510 In addition, Liukkunen notes that certain Scandinavian environmental 
conventions contain choice of law provisions.511 For instance, the Convention on the Protection of the Environment of 
19 February 1974 between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden is relevant with respect to Article 28 (1) of the 
Rome II Regulation.512  
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State)  
no information available 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
Koulu notes that the lex loci damni (the law of the place where the damage occurs) has been selected as the general 
rule of the Rome II Regulation. He considers that compared to the traditional lex loci delicti approach, the weakness 
 
 
506 Ibid.  
507 Liukkunen notes that these choice of law rules that are scattered in these sectoral instruments can be called even 
as “hidden” choice of law rules. These private international law rules namely constitute a part of EU instruments that 
aim to harmonize internal (substantive) market law. Ibid., at 132–133. 
508 She provides international company law and participation rights of workers as an example here. Ibid. 
509 Liukkunen ibid, at 133. See also S Hafren, Några reflexioner inför Rom I-förordningens ikraftträdande JFT 
1/2008, 88. 
510 Liukkunen, ibid., at 145. See also Wetterstein, supra n. 14, at 134. 
511 Liukkunen, ibid. 
512 For instance, Article 3(2) of the Convention provides a mandatory rule that has similarity to Article 6(2) and 8(1) 
of the Rome I Regulation. It states that the question of compensation shall not be judged by rules which are less 
favourable to the injured party than the rules of compensation of the State in which the activities are being carried 
out. Unofficial translation of the instrument is available on 




of this rule is evident in cases where damages occur in several countries at the same time.513 Taking the Kronhofer 
case as an example, Reich points out that the lex loci damni rule might easily lead to a situation where “jurisdiction 
and applicable law may fall apart”. He notes that this disintegration appears as “a somewhat strange consequence, 
especially in the case of multiple violations”.514  
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations  
no information available 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
no information available 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability;  
no information available 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability.  
no information available 
 
 
513 Koulu, supra n. 3, at 184. 





4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and reference number  
 





Issues / subject areas 
 
 





Diary number S2009/496  
ECLI:FI:KKO:2010:51 
https://finlex.fi/fi/oikeus/kko/kko/2010/20100051 
Issued on 5 
July 2010 
Article 4(1) and 
4(3) 
The case concerned 
the applicable law for 
a claim for damages 
following a killing. 
The Court applied the 
closest connection 
principle in choice of 
law. 
The Supreme Court does not 
actually apply the provisions of the 
Regulation per se, since the event 
at issue took place prior to the 
date of application of the 
Regulation. It merely reflects on the 
contents of the Regulation’s 
provisions in order to find out what 








• In France, the Rome II Regulation has in general been very well received by practitioners who consider that 
it reduces the pre-existing legal uncertainty (resulting in a reduction of the possibility of forum shopping) and 
ensures greater predictability of the applicable law. 
• The French doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation is a lively one. It is particularly significant on the 
localisation of financial damages due to their high complexity linked to the digitalisation of the economy, 
which raises many complex issues. 
• Whilst the scope of civil and commercial matters has been well-received, there has been criticism of the 
exclusions. 
1. Introduction 
• How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State? 
In France, the Rome II Regulation has in general been very well received by practitioners who consider that it reduces 
the pre-existing legal uncertainty (resulting in a reduction of the possibility of forum shopping) and ensures greater 
predictability of the applicable law. This text is however unknown to the ordinary French citizen, and it remains an 
instrument for specialists. The general media has not covered this specific legal issue. 
• Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
Rome II Regulation is a European norm well known in France ; insomuch as it had been adopted under the influence 
of France which had always recognized the general principle of the article 4 : the rule of the lex loci delici since 1948 
in the Lautour case. This solution has been confirmed by a consistent line of case law (Civ. 25 mai 1948, D. 1948. 
357, note P. L.-P. ; JCP 1948. II. 4542, note Vasseur ; Civ. 1re, 1er juin 1976, D. 1977. 257, note F. Monéger ; JDI 
1977. 91, note B. Audit. – Civ. 1re, 8 févr. 1983, Bull. civ. I, no 51 ; JDI 1984. 123, note G. Légier). 
• Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
To our knowledge, there are no statistics on its application by French courts. 
• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
The French doctrinal debate is a lively one. It is particularly significant on the localisation of financial damages due to 
their high complexity linked to the digitalisation of the economy, which raises many complex issues. 
• Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political 
level? 
In the past, a strong inter-governmental debate which had been concluded by the exclusion of violations of privacy 
and personality rights including defamation due to political disagreement. This political disagreement has been 
reflected in academic exchanges by scholars. 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to : 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 




The notion of « civil and commercial matters » employed by art. 1 of the Rome II Regulation is far from new. It was 
developed by CJEU in the Eurocontrol case in 1976 and confirmed by the Rüfer case four years later. Previously, this 
autonomous concept had been used, as a « pivotal notion », in Rome I and Brussels I. Hence, this notion is a common 
denominator for at least three major European texts.  
Whilst the scope of civil and commercial matters has been well-received, there has been criticism of the exclusions. At first 
glance, the reader will find that inclusions only fill three lines before making a way to a succession of exclusions. That’s 
why, the first impression of a positive determination is quickly overturned. The criticism of the French doctrine focusses, on 
the one hand, on the numerous exclusions starting with that relating to « violations of privacy and rights relating to 
personality including defamation ». This latter exclusion is seen as a political failure of Europe given that the number of 
cyberoffences by media has increased.515 It could be explained by conflicting interests (press freedom versus protection 
of the respect to the right to a privacy life etc), leaving each state members to fix its own conflict-of-law rules516.  
The exclusion of nuclear damages from Rome II has also been criticised. The main argument advanced in favour of the 
exclusion is that there are already international conventions (Paris Convention, 29 juillet 1960 under the supervision of 
OECD ; Brussels Convention on civil responsibility relative to maritime transport of nuclear material, 17 dec 1971 ; 
Vienna Convention on civil responsibility relative to nuclear damages). However, it should be noted that all these 
conventions are more than fifty years old and were concluded in the cold war context ; it might have been pertinent merely 
to remind the conflict of law rule fixed by these conventions in a European text with less parties517.  
To conclude, beyond textual exclusions, CJEU in the case Granoralo decided to exclude from the scope of Rome II the 
right of action for the abrupt bringing to an end of long-established business relationships, considering this situation as a 
contractual matter,518 the recital 7 exposes the preoccupation of coherence about material scopes between Rome I, Rome 
II and Brussels I.  
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts 31-32) 
After many debates at a European level about the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, the Court of 
Justice of European Union, in the case C-412/10,Homawoo, settled the problem ruling that Rome II will apply to 
determine the governing law of non-contractual obligations only where the events giving rise to damage occurred after 
11 January 2009. Thus, the court marks a distinction between the date of entry into force (according to art. 297 of the 
TFUE : 20 days after its publication; that is to say the 20 august 2007) and the date for application – the 11 January 
2009 - fixed by art. 32. 
Now, the question of its reception by French courts has to be distinguished by two different trends. The first – but minority 
- had been initiated by the Paris Court of appeal (CA, Paris, 26 mars 2013, n°12-02707) which undertook a hazardous 
and questionable interpretation of Rome II from a temporal perspective. Indeed, it applies Rome II to operative events 
dated as of October and November 2018, that is to say largely before the date of application determined by the 
 
 
515 PERREAU-SAUSSINE (L.), « Les mal-aimés du règlement Rome II : les délits commis par voie de média », Recueil 
Dalloz, 2009, p.1647. 
516 BRIERE (C.), Fasc. 3206 :  règlement (CE) n°864/2007 du 11 juillet 2007 sur la la loi applicable aux obligations 
non contractuelles (« Rome II »), 27°. As instance, in case of defamation, in Germany, the conflit-of-law rule is 
ubiguity rule whereas in France, certain decisions have retained the law of the place of diffusion. Nonetheless, in 
France, there are still doctrinal divergence which are vectors of juridical instability. For the author, this exclusion of 
Rome II is temporay insofar the european commission ordered a study on this point and European parliament 
suggested to add a specific conflict of law rule in Rome II. On this subject, discussions stay intense : a part of the 
French doctrine is favourable to the law of the place of the disclosure (in this way MESTRE (J.), “Les conflits de lois 
relatifs à la vie privée”, Etudes offertes à P.Kayser, Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 1979, p.243, n°24), the 
other part pledge for the law of the victim’s residence (in this trend Bourel (P.), « Du rattachement de quelques délits 
spéciaux en droit international privé », RCADI 1989, t. 2, p. 261 s., spéc. p. 293 s. 
517 Four states members (Malta, Austria, Luxemburg, Cyprus) of EU have not ratified these international conventions; 
Rome II was an occasion to renegociate the question in a context radically different than cold war, in a small circle in 
which border states are more partners than ennemies. 




Homawoo case. The second – which has the final authority in the French legal order – is represented by the French Cour 
de cassation. In brief, its position is an orthodox approach; its reminder to French inferior courts repeats the distinction 
between the date of entry into force and the date for application. Its case law on this point is consistent (cf. Cass, 1er civ, 
5 sept 2018, n°16-24.109; Cass, 1er civ, 10 oct 2018, n° 17-14.401 and n°15-26.093) : Rome II is strictly 
applicable to operative events as of 11 January 2009. Before this date, this text is not “operational”. 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2)  
In European law, the concept of « non-contractual obligations » is an autonomous European concept519. Its perimeter is 
more extensive than its French equivalent. Article 2 defines it as « damage shall cover any consequence arising out of 
tort/delict, unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio or culpa in contrahendo. ». It incorporates at the same time tortious 
liability, the case of no-fault liability but also quasi contract or culpa in contrahendo. More specifically, the CJEU has 
defined residually the notion as all request activating the respondent’s responsibility and which is not based on a 
commitment towards the other party520.  
Concerning the reception of this by the French courts, the trend is complex. There has been a good deal of discussion in 
the French commentary on the right of action for the abrupt bringing to an end of long-established business relationships. 
Before the Granarolo case, in 2016, the French supreme courts had regularly held that this right of action was a delictual 
matter521. After the decision of the CJEU, there has been a phenomenon of resistance by French courts to the decision of 
the CJEU. This takes two forms :  
- Explicit rejections at the level of the Court of Appeal with disagreements between chambers :  
o For domestic affairs (without an international element)  it stays a delictual matter which, therefore, 
is included in the material scope of Rome II522 
o For international affairs  same answer, refusal from the Court of appeal523 
In a nutshell, the Chambers 10 and 11 of the division 5 of the Paris Court of appeal are on the same line (delictual 
matter) whereas the Chamber 4 has an opposite jurisprudence524 and affirms it is a contractual matter. In other terms, 
it is highly complicated to summarise here. 
- Implicit rejections at the level of the French supreme court - « Cour de cassation » - with several such 
instances :  
o Cass. com., 11 janv. 2017, nº 15-13.780  underlining that the former article L. 442-6, I, 5º of 
the commerce code initiates a tortious liability  
o Cass. com., 7 mai 2019, nº 17-15.340  in this case, the jurisdiction decided to squeeze out the 
question of the nature (contractual or non-contractual) of the brutal break of relationship hiding 
behind the following solution « regardless the legal basis, contractual or delictual, …. ». 
 
 
519 On the autonomous notion, see CJUE, 21 janv. 2016, aff. jtes C-359/14 et C-475/14, Ergo Insurance SE 
520 On this point, CJCE, 27 sept. 1988, aff. 189/87, Kalfelis : Rev. crit. DIP 1989, p. 117 ; JDI 1989, p. 457, obs. 
A. Huet. – CJCE, 17 juin 1992, aff. C-26/91, Jakob Handte : Rev. crit. DIP 1992, p. 726, note H. Gaudemet-
Tallon ; JDI 1993, p. 461, note J.-M. Bischoff. – CJCE, 27 oct. 1998, aff. C-51/91, La Réunion européenne SA : 
Rev. crit. DIP 1999, p. 322, note H. Gaudemet-Tallon ; JDI 1999, p. 625, note F. Leclerc 
521 In this way : Cass. com., 21 oct. 2008, nº 07-12.336 ; Cass. com., 15 sept. 2009, nº 07-10.493 ; Cass. com., 
18 janv. 2011, nº 10-11.885, bull. civ. IV, nº 9 ; Cass. com., 25 mars 2014, nº 12-29.534, bull. civ. IV, nº 58, sur 
cet arrêt, v. not. notre article in RLDA 2014/96, nº 5255 ; Cass. com., 20 mai 2014, nº 12-26.705, bull. civ. IV, nº 
90. 
522Cass. com., 11 janv. 2017, nº 15-13.780 ; CA Paris, 9 nov. 2018, nº 17/13048 ; CA Paris, 19 janv. 2018, nº 
15/21628 ; CA Paris, 28 juin 2018, nº 18/28490 ; CA Paris, 13 sept. 2018, nº 16/14413 
523 CA Paris, 5 déc. 2016, nº 15/16766. 




4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
There has not been any criticism in France : this characteristic has been welcomed by the French courts and doctrine 
as a simple established fact already present in other European norms such as Rome I (in its Article 2) and in a constant 
practice well before Rome II. As to the possibility of applying a foreign law, a great example of this is the issue of post 
Brexit international litigation.  
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation)(Recital 
(7) 
The Recital 7 of Rome II highlights the issue of the consistency between European instruments of private international 
law. The question of the unity (or divergence) is a « hot potato » for French jurists.  
From a perspective of coherence, Rome II Regulation has been articulated with other EU international private law, in 
particular with Rome I and Brussels I bis. There is a commonality of notions such as the European distinction between 
contractual and non-contractual matters, their scope (positively and negatively defined). In concrete terms, the CJEU 
has fixed the legislative competence on the jurisdictional competence : in many cases the court determines the non-
contractual qualification following the international competence525. Nonetheless, it adds that the abusive nature of the 
provision in the contract has to be scrutinized in view of the law designed by Rome I. The Court’s goal is to realize a 
consistent interpretation of Rome I, II and Brussels I bis. 
However, the acceptance of this by the French doctrinal writers is relatively heterogeneous. Many of these notions 
developed by the Brussels system (Brux 1, 1 bis) also involved in Rome I and Rome II (distinction between civil and 
commercial matter, contractual and non-contractual matter). The tryptic Rome I, II and Brussels I bis had been built as 
a whole with common notions to gain in synergy and heighten comprehension. But, it is seductive to replicate these 
autonomous definitions for a certain type of conflict, to another , all the more so, the recital 7 pleads in this way526. The 
French doctrine is divided between two trends :  
- Supporters of a unified position  H. GAUDEMET-TALLON, op. cit., no 178, p. 209. – T. AZZI, Bruxelles I, 
Rome I, Rome II : regard sur la qualification en droit international privé communautaire, D. 2009. ; 
J. LÜTTRINGHAUS, Rome I Regulation, F. FERRARI [dir.], 2014, Sellier, no 5, p. 26), 
- Supporters of a pluralist position  J.-S. QUÉGUINER, obs. sous l'arrêt Kainz, ADUE 2014. 465 s. – 
B. HAFTEL, Entre  «Rome I » et « Bruxelles I » : l'interprétation communautaire uniforme du règlement «Rome 
I», JDI 2010. 761 s., spéc. p. 766 s. – Adde pour une synthèse des différentes thèses en présence, J.-Cl. Dr. 
Int., Vo Qualification en droit international privé, fasc. 531, spéc. nos 145 s. – S. LEMAIRE, article préc., spéc. 
p. 43 
But we have to temper this irregularity at the French level by the simple fact that the CJEU jurisprudence is volatile 
insofar as the unified approach is not at all systematic and, thus, does not give to national jurisdictions stable notional 
point of references.527  
From a practical point of view, let’s take the example of the articulation between the Hague Convention relative to the 
law for traffic accidents and Rome II. There are two systems which promote indirectly the forum shopping and the law 
 
 
525 As instance, CJUE, 1er oct. 2002, aff. C-167/00, Henkel : JDI 2004, p. 903, note F. Leclerc ; Europe 2002, 
comm. 433, obs. L. Idot ; Rev. crit. DIP 2003, p. 682, note P. Rémy-Corlay. 
526 V. not., V. PARISOT, Vers une cohérence des textes européens en droit du travail ? Réflexion autour des arrêts 
Heiko Koelzsch et Jan Voogsgeerd de la Cour de justice, JDI 2012-2, doctr. – M. FALLON, Rapport 
introductif, in M. FALLON, P. LAGARDE et S. POILLOT-PERUZZETTO [dir.], Quelle architecture pour un code 
européen de droit international privé ?, p. 17 s 
527 CJUE 10 déc. 2015, Florin Lazar aff. C-350/14 for a non-unitary approach of the notion of “country of the 
damage”; the court does not appreciate it following its jurisprudence ; CJUE 21 janv. 2016, aff. jointes C-359/14 
et C-475/14, ERGO Insurance et Gjensidige Baltic for a unitary and autonomous approach, the court uses the 
european notion of contractual and non-contractual matter finded in the conflict of jurisdictions areas to transpose it 




shopping. Indeed, with Brussels I bis, the victim may request either the judge of the state of the respondent’s residence, 
or the judge of the place of the operative event. Let’s take another example : in case of a traffic accident on the 
Portuguese territory with a Spanish driver while the injured passenger is French. The French judge will choose the 
Portuguese law as the lex loci delici. The Spanish judge would have chosen the Hague convention which derogates to 
the lex loci delici, in favor of the law of the matriculation of the car (that is to say the Spanish law). As a conclusion, in 
this case, the implementation of Rome II and the Hague convention would result in the application of the same law – 
the law of the place of the traffic accident – if only the victim has her permanent residence in Portugal. Thus, many 
difficulties emerge from the conservation of the Hague Convention with the Rome II Regulation.  
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of : 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
The European jurisprudence lays down the principle that the direct damage is only appropriate to determine the 
applicable law ; the applicable law to indirect damages will follow the law of the principal damage. This interpretation 
had been confirmed by CJEU in 2015.528 
The French supreme court accepts without difficulties this point ; in a 2003 decision, it decided that « about the indirect 
victim’s moral prejudice, which is linked to the operative event, the applicable law to this injury is the law of the place 
of the principal damage, not the law of the place of the moral prejudice »529 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
In the continuation with the previous question, the same French supreme court decision is categorical: the law of the 
principal damage is the « juridical centre of gravity» so that secondary damage will be analyse through the prism of 
this applicable law to avoid a dispersion of the litigation. It was even the solution raised implicitly by the French 
jurisprudence in the Lautour case in 1948. 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3),  
About the application of the escape clause, there is only one interesting case of the Paris Court of appeal which overturn 
the French lower courts. It argues in its decision to choose the French law to the case applying the article 4(3) to the 
facts. Again, it was always a French judicial reflex before the adoption of Rome II. This article does not appear to pose 
any problem. 
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
The compensation of financial offences is included in the application of the instrument but there is not any special 
conflict of law rule while it is a very complex contentious matter. Thus, articles 4 et 14 are the sole articles to cover this 
field. There is no decision from the French supreme court on this theme which is why there is much doctrinal debate530. 
 
 
528 CJUE, 10 déc. 2015, aff. C-350/14, Lazar : Europe 2016, comm. 82, obs. L. Idot ; Rev. crit. DIP 2016, p. 678, 
note D. Bureau ; LPA 2016, n° 194, chronique de DIP du CUREJ, p. 7, note V. Parisot 
529 Cass. 1re civ., 28 oct. 2003 : Rev. crit. DIP 2004, p. 85, note D. Bureau ; D. 2004, p. 233, note 
Ph. Delebecque ; LPA 23 déc. 2003, p. 11, note P. Ancel ; LPA 8 juin 2004, p. 15, note H. Chanteloup ; JCP G 








The CJEU jurisprudence gives us some clues as to how to systematize legal reasoning about the localisation of the 
place for a financial damage. In the case Kronhofer : the victim had transferred money on a foreign bank account 
which had been used to realize financial operations ; the place of the damage would be identified in the country in 
which the bank account is located. A short while ago, the Paris Court of appeal answered a powerful decision in this 
area, arguing that « the place of the damage according to article 4.1 of Rome II has to be interpreted following the 
jurisprudence relative to the choice of competence in non-contractual matter in Brussels I bis Regulation »531. This is a 
clue, but not a fixed answer. The question is even more sensitive about falsified information which causes financial 
damage. Where is the appropriate localisation of the damage ?  
- the place of the diffusion of the information ?  
- the place of the bank account from which money had been invested ?  
- the place of the commercialisation of these financial products ?  
- the place of the victim’s residence ?  
In the LVMH c/ Morgan Stanley case, the Paris Court of appeal chose the French law as the law of the place of the 
diffusion of the wrong information532 but the question is still uncertain with several gaps between national jurisprudence 
of EU members 533 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability 
Before Rome II entered into force, the French supreme court considered that the Hague Convention on the law 
applicable to Products Liability must be raised automatically534 ; this obligation was not justified by its international law 
origin. 
Since the entry into force of Rome II, article 18 places the primacy of pre-existing international conventions. The French 
doctrine underlines also the absence of a definition of a product while there are many types (e.g. the definition given 
by Hague convention includes movable and immovable properties). Nonetheless, Rome II will be necessary in two 
particular cases. The first, in a transactional perspective, what is the applicable law for a non-signatory state to this 
Hague Convention535. The second is the question of the reparation of the damage caused to the product itself.  
As to the articulation of Rome II, art 5 and the 1973 Hague Convention, there is no recent French jurisprudence  but a 
French article is highly interesting to understand the French outlook about the articulation between these two 
instruments536. The 1973 Hague Convention is not relevant to frame the applicable law when the claimant and the 
defendant conclude an agreement (before or after the operative event) : the applicable law to this agreement will be 
designated by article 14 to determine conditions of its conclusion. According to the preparatory work of this 






531 CA Paris 12 novembre 2019 n° RG 19/03149, Société LLOYDS BANK PLC c/ SARL [X] et Société Générale 
532 CA Paris, 30 juin 2006  : RTD com. 2006, p. 875, obs. N. Rontchevsky ; Banque et Droit n° 108, juill.-août 
2006, p. 34, note H. de Vauplane. 
533 For more details, see Corneloup (S.), « La place du Règlement Rome II dans la régulation globale des marchés 
financiers », Cahiers de droit de l’entreprise n°6, Nov 2012, dossier 30. 
534 Cass. 1re civ., 6 févr. 2008, no 07-12.672 
535 BOSKOVIC (O.), Répertoire de droit international, « Règlement Rome II : obligations non contractuelles », Sept 






Lastly, it does not frame the applicable law to the recourse action or in case of subrogation. However, if the claimant 
did not acquire directly the product from the respondent, the Hague convention will be applicable (except if the 
claimant bases his action on a subrogation). 
Finally, taking into account the primacy of pre-existing international conventions on Rome II, the material scope of 
Rome II in this field is negatively defined – art 5 seems “only” applicable to situations declined by the 1973 Hague 
Convention. This conclusion emerges from the doctrine; the national jurisprudence should be updated. 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
The French doctrine has fully accepted notions of “unfair competition and acts restricting free competition” as 
autonomous concept for the interpretation of Rome II 537 . There is however a small reservation about the 
characterisation of this notion: indeed, many acts are located so close to the contract that the doubt is legitimate; it is 
the case of abusive prices fixed by a party toward his co-contracting party based upon a framework contract.  
The first question is: Does Article 2-1 of the Paris Union Convention on the industrial property, ratified by certain states, 
constitute a hidden conflict of law rule which prevails over Rome II, article 6 ?538 In the past, the French supreme court 
has never applied this convention539.  
The second question is : to what extent is Article 6 applied by French courts ? Very little used by French lower courts; 
in the Expedia case, the Paris Court of appeal “forgot” to enforce this article540. But, recently, the French supreme 
court541 has overturned a Paris Court of appeal decision542 on the basis of article 6-1 and 6-2 of Rome II. In 2017, 
the French supreme court has even overturned another Paris court of appeal decision founded on one of its rejection 
on the article 6 of Rome II.  
As a conclusion, we may affirm that article 6 has been taken into account at the highest level of judicial authority in 
France, which sounds like a positive indication of the inclusion of art 6 of Rome II in the French legal order. 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage543 (Art. 7) 
Article 7 of Rome II offers to the victim an option between the law of the place of the damage or the law of the place 
of the operative event (ubiquity rule). This rule had been unanimously welcomed by French experts and has been seen 
as constituting a powerful means to encourage industry to respect environment (but one disappointment: the exclusion 
of nuclear damages from the scope – see above). In addition, Rome II includes a large definition of environmental 
damage (recital 24). 
The French commentary however underlines three difficulties with this.544  
• The first is the moment of the choice of the law of the place of the operative event. No specific provisions of the 
Rome II give us an explicit answer but Recital 25 lays down that the law should be chosen by the lex fori. Two 
other issues have been raised: the definition of damage and the operative event for environmental damage. In 
another field, the French supreme court affirmed, about press offenses, that the act of broadcasting is the operative 
 
 
537 RLC 2010/22, no 1523, M. Behar-Touchais ; Suppl. RLDA 2013/83 no 4660, S. Clavel ; RLC 2018/72, 
no 3393, J-P. Arroyo 
538 T. Azzi et E. Treppoz, « Contrefaçon et conflits de lois : quelques remarques sur la liste des conventions 
internationales censées primer le règlement Rome II, D. 2011, p. 1293 
539 In this way Cass. com., 8 nov. 2017, no 16-10850, D. 2018. 966, obs. S. Clavel, ibid. 1939, obs. L. d'Avout, 
RCDIP 2019 p.547 note V. Pironon.  
540 CA Paris, 21 juin 2017 no 15/18784 
541 Cass, com, 15 janvier 2020, n°17-22.295 
542 CA Paris,10 mai 2017 
543 On this question, see Grisel (F.), « Analyse critique de l’article 7 du règlement du 11 juillet 2007 sur la loi 
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event.545 The identification of the operative event is a difficult stage when the place of the damage differs with the 
place of the decision making which caused the environmental damage. 
• Second, about the option: does Article 7 allow one to choose between the law of the place of the environmental 
damage or the law of personal damages? In other terms: do personal damages, suffered in the continuation of 
environmental damage have to be taken into account to identify the applicable law or not (autonomous damage 
unrelated to the environmental damage) ? The question raised is the risk of a multiplication of applicable laws. In 
the negative answer, the place of personal damage will be ignored in the identification of the applicable law 
process. Some writers have advocated in favour of the positive answer for “political reasons” (in order to offer to 
the victim an option between the law of the environmental damage or the law of her personal damages)  
• Third, about the introduction of the autonomy of parties (article 14) while the conflict of law rule generally 
promotes the general interest. It is a little difficult to understand why the autonomy of parties has been excluded in 
respect of private law matters (such as intellectual property) but has been maintained for environmental damages.  
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
There is no French supreme court decision on this topic but the commentary has raised the issue of infringement of 
intellectual property rights by a cyber means (again, raising the question of the localisation of the damage). The 
concept of lex protectionis is seen as an ambiguous notion; the wording of article 8 is comparable to article 4 because 
it requires to choose the law of the damage; article 8 is a transposition of article 4 to the intellectual property field. 
The first concern raised by doctrinal writers is the difference in approach between the conflict of law and the conflict 
of jurisdiction ; many experts support the idea of a convergence between the lex protectionis and the lex damni. All 
the more so, the position of the French supreme court546 before the adoption of Rome II was not in favour of this. In the 
Lamore case, the Court decided that the lex protectionis was not the country in which the damage occurred but the 
law of the place of the operative event. 
A part of the French doctrine considers that article 8 could be marginalized by other international rules,547 what is 
more the lack of French decisions prevents to determine a clear legal position. To conclude, the position of the French 
jurisprudence on this point of law is still highly uncertain, unstable. 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
There are no supreme court decisions on this topic even though, in France, actions involving industrial action are 
frequent in the maritime domain. By the way, the juridical press does not broach the question. We consider however 
that the risk of complications in case law is somewhat limited because strikes are generally geographically specific.  
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
This chapter is seen by French scholars as a concentration of heterogeneous notions but their common point is the 
identification of the applicable law. The common reasoning consists in researching the nearest point of contact (the 
most relevant) before choosing the second nearest point of contact and so on. Overall, the common reasoning is, firstly, 
to search a potential pre-existing contractual relationship. In case of failure, the applicable law will be the law of the 
country of residence of the parties. If this point of contact does not exist, then one must refer to the place of the operative 
event (that is to say the general rule of the article 4). 
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12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
The sole significant French case on this theme is a Paris Court of Appeal decision which upheld a French lower court 
decision on the choice of applicable law. It applies literally article 10(1) of Rome II attesting that there was a pre-
existing business relationship between the parties. Hence, the applicable law to the case of unjust enrichment has to 
be the law which frames the business relationship. Notwithstanding the lack of case law, article 10 of Rome II seems 
to be well received in the French legal order. The absence of debate on this point could be interpreted as a positive 
sign. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11)  
Again, there is a silence from French courts on this article of Rome II even though the notion of negotiorum gestio is 
well known in the French civil code. The doctrine points to a weakness of the Rome II Regulation: the case of a 
dissociation of constitutive elements (linked to the dematerialization and the “globalization" of social relationships) of 
the negotiorum gestio. The CJEU has to clarify this aspect. 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
The expression refers to all negotiations before the conclusion of contract and the break of contractual negotiations. 
The recital 30 affirms that culpa in contrahendo is an autonomous concept which should not be interpreted according 
to national law: this is a contractual matter in German law but a non-contractual matter in French law.548 According to 
the Rome II Regulation, it is a non-contractual matter. The content of article 12 has never caused controversy in the 
French commentary. 
By the way, the first two points of contact – lex of contractus and law of the residence of the parties – testify to the 
achievement of the principle of proximity in the identification of the applicable law. This preoccupation had been 
globally appreciated in France. 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
Commentators have noted that the choice of the parties being indicated expressly «or expressed or demonstrated with 
reasonable certainty by the circumstances of the case » may give rise to some uncertainty and might result in inconsistent 
case law. (See Carine Brière, « Fasc.  3206 : RÈGLEMENT (CE) N° 864/2007 DU 11 JUILLET 2007 SUR LA LOI 
APPLICABLE AUX OBLIGATIONS NON CONTRACTUELLES» JurisClasseur Europe Traité, para 84). 
In the commentary, there has been criticism about the criteria of “pursuing a commercial activity” in respect of the 
validity of a contractual agreement prior to the event giving rise to the damage occurred. In one text, it was stated that 
“La limitation de l'élection ex ante aux seuls commerçants est critiquable. Sans doute aurait-il été préférable d'étendre 
cette liberté de choix « aux rapports entre professionnels même non commerçants » … dans la mesure où la notion « 
d'activité commerciale » reçoit des acceptions différentes selon les pays. » (See Carine Brière, « Fasc.  3206 : 
RÈGLEMENT (CE) N° 864/2007 DU 11 JUILLET 2007 SUR LA LOI APPLICABLE AUX OBLIGATIONS NON 
CONTRACTUELLES» JurisClasseur Europe Traité, para 85). 
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
 
 




16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
There does not appear to be any case law / or particular problems relating to this issue.  
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
See previous answer. 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
There has been a degree of discussion concerning Article 15(c), which entails that the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations shall govern “the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy claimed.” 
The focus has been on the impact on road accident / PI cases. Some authors have suggested a different approach 
(see e.g. O. Boskovic, La réparation du préjudice en droit international privé, préface P. Lagarde (Paris, LGDJ, 
Bibliothèque de droit privé, t. 407) ; O. Boskovic, « Les dommages-intérêts en droit international privé. » JCP G 
2006.I.163). 
It has also been pointed out that this approach might result in the availability of punitive damages, which is traditionally 
frowned upon under French law, being governed by the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (O. Boskovic, 
« Règlement Rome II : obligations non contractuelles » in Répertoire de droit international para 134) 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
There does not appear to be any case law relating to this issue. This issue has been raised in respect of Business & 
Human rights cases (see below).  Some commentators have indicated that the impact of this rule is not likely to be great 
in French law : “D'une manière générale, on voit peu de dispositions relatives à la responsabilité extracontractuelle 
qui mériteraient la qualification de loi de police. » ( O. Boskovic, « Règlement Rome II : obligations non contractuelles » 
in Répertoire de droit international para 120). 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
This rule has been approved of by doctrinal writers (see O. Boskovic, « Règlement Rome II : obligations non 
contractuelles » in Répertoire de droit international para 124). 
It has been underlined in the French case law that this specific rule applies solely to non-contractual obligations and 
not in relation to contractual obligations. Cass. 1re civ., 24 janv. 2018, n° 17-10.959 : JurisData n° 2018-000857) 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19) 
There does not appear to be any case law / or particular problems relating to this issue – see below on relationship 
with 1971 Hague Convention.  
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
There does not appear to be any case law / or particular problems relating to this issue.  
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
One issue has been raised in the literature which how 23(2) will apply in case of loss caused to secondary victims (the 
so-called “préjudice par ricochet”.) One commentator has thus noted : « En effet, lorsque le règlement donne 
compétence à la loi de la résidence habituelle commune de la personne lésée et de la personne dont la responsabilité 
est invoquée, comment interpréter les termes « personne lésée » ? Faut-il entendre par là, la victime par ricochet ou 
bien faut-il s'en tenir à la victime directe ? Dans la mesure où ces deux personnes peuvent avoir des résidences 




texte ne permet de répondre à cette question et l'hésitation est donc permise. »  (see O. Boskovic, « Règlement Rome 
II : obligations non contractuelles » in Répertoire de droit international para 37). 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
No particular problems reported. 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
French commentary considers that the public policy rule will be applied only in exceptional circumstances, as the 
French courts have often been cautious in applying this doctrine in cases of delict (para 122). 
One specific issue raised is that of punitive damages. It is noted that Recital 32 deals specifically with this issue, which 
indicates that it should be dealt with on a case by case basis, and will only be contrary to public policy (ordre public) 
where the award of punitive damages is “of an excessive nature.”  
“Il est présent dans toutes les conventions internationales de conflits de lois. Il est vraisemblable que la CJUE en 
imposera une application exceptionnelle. La Cour de cassation française, quant à elle, a toujours fait preuve d'une 
grande modération dans l'usage de l'exception d'ordre public en matière délictuelle, en estimant que les dispositions 
étrangères ne sont pas contraires à l'ordre public international français « par cela seul qu'elles diffèrent des dispositions 
impératives du droit français, mais uniquement en ce qu'elles heurtent des principes de justice universelle considérés 
dans l'opinion française comme doués de valeur internationale absolue” (Cass. 25 mai 1948, GADIP, no 19). 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
As mentioned above, a part of the French doctrine considers that Article 8 of the Reg concerning IP could be 
marginalized by other international rules (such as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the 
Berne Convention) but the lack of French decisions on this means that the position is still unclear (For further discussion, 
see BERGE (J.-S), « Territorialité du droit de propriété intellectuelle et conflit de lois : prospective », Revue Lamy droit 
de l’immatériel, n°53, 1er oct 2009). 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
Pursuant to Article 28 of Rome II, the 1971 Hague Convention (to which France is a party) remains applicable. The 
rules contained therein sometimes differ from those in Rome II. This is the case as regards the direct action against the 
insurer of the person liable (covered in Art. 18 of Rome II, as we have seen above), which enables a tort victim to bring 
a claim directly against the tortfeasor’s insurer if either the law applicable to the tort / or the law applicable to the 
insurance contract so provides. The rule in the 1971 Hague Convention is different (see article 9 of the Convention), 
and is more favourable to victim as it allows a traffic victim a direct action against a liability insurer if such a claim is 
recognised either by the law applicable to the victim’s claim against the insured, or by the internal law of the country 
of accident; or by the law which governs the insurance contract (on this see P.Stone, EU Private International Law (3rd 
ed, Edward Elgar, 2014) page 128). 
Moreover, given that the 1971 Hague Convention does not deal with the issue of subrogation, then the rule laid down 
in Art. 19 of Rome II above is applicable (see on the relationship b/w Rome I and Rome II on this point, C-359/14 & 
C-475/14CJCE 21 Jan 2016,  Ergo Insurance SE).   
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  




3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope of the 
Rome II Regulation has been criticised by French academic : L. Perreau-Saussine L., Les mal aimés du règlement Rome 
II : les délits commis par voie de média , D. 2009, p. 1467.  
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
We are not aware of any French commentary on SLAPPs. 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
We are not aware of case law as yet. There is some doctrinal commentary about the impact of the French law 2017-
399 du 27 mars 2017 relating to a “devoir de vigilance » imposed on parent companies, and in particular as to 
whether the law in question may override the principle set out in 4(1) by virtue of the application of Article 16 
(mandatory provisions) or Article 17 (Rules of safety and conduct). See discussion in O. Boskovic, Brèves remarques 
sur le devoir de vigilance et le droit international privé, D. 2016. 385 ; A. Danis-Fatome & G. Viney, « La responsabilité 
civile dans la loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d'ordre » D 
2017.1610.  
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 







4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to decision 
of the Court of Justice 
if applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
Court of cassation N°16-24.109 10 october 2018 Art 31, 32 Temporal scope Rome II is strictly applicable to operative event 
unfolded from 11 January 2009 
Court of cassation  Nº 07-12.336 21 october 2008 Art 1(1), (2) Material scope Previous French conception of abrupt break of 
business relationships long-established before 
the adoption of Rome II. It is a non-contractual 
matter. 
Court of cassation  
nº 17-15.340 
 
7 mai 2019 
 
Art 1(1), (2) 
 
Material scope 
French conception of abrupt break of business 
relationships long-established after the adoption 
of Rome II and the Granarolo case which affirms 
that this field is a contractual matter. Implicit 
resistance of the French supreme court to accept 
the solution of the CJEU. 




28 october 2003 Art 4(1) The place of the direct 
damage 
The indirect victim’s moral harm is not take into 
account to identify the applicable law. The law 
applicable for the indemnisation of this indirect 
damage follows the law of the principal 
damage. 




15 january 2020 
 
Art 6 Unfair competition 
 






Paris Court of appeal 
 
30 juin 2006 
 
Prospectus liability 
Before Rome II, this French court has considered 
that the applicable law is the place of the 
diffusion of wrong information. 
 
 
Paris Court of appeal 
Société LLOYDS 
BANK PLC c/ SARL 
[X] et Société 
Générale 






Financial market torts 
An attempt of a French inferior court to localize 
the place of a financial damage. The place of the 
financial damage, according to art 4.1 of Rome 
II, must be located following the jurisprudence 









• The Rome II Regulation is well-known in German legal research and broadly applied in German court 
practice. Although individual questions regarding its application remain controversial, it has proved to be a 
reliable and appropriate instrument for determining the law applicable to non-contractual situations, which 
fits well into German private international law. 
• However, the exceptions provided for in Art. 1(2) Rome II Regulation seem to be too broad. In particular, 
the extensive discussion in the German literature on law applicable to privacy and personality rights illustrates 
the need for a conflict-of-laws rule for violations of rights of personality and privacy (see Q 1). 
• In some cases, the rules of the Rome II Regulation have been found to be inappropriate. In particular, more 
specific conflict-of-laws rules are needed with regard to financial market torts (see Q 6 d.). 
• The German literature has identified a gap in Art. 5 Rome II Regulation: those cases which are not covered 
by neither Art. 5(1) lit. (a), (b) nor (c) of the Regulation (see Q 7). 
• A clarification of the effects of foreign authorisations on the liability of a tortfeasor seems advisable, in 
particular with regard to environmental liability (Art. 7 Rome II Regulation) (see Q 9). 
• Any reform of the Regulation should also include clarifying amendments to the conflict-of-laws rule for 
negotiorum gestio (Art. 11 Rome II Regulation), especially with regard to the scope of application and the 
precise connecting factor (see Q 13). 
• From a German perspective, few issues are as controversial as that of the application of overriding 
mandatory rules under the Rome II Regulation. There is a strong need for clarification as to whether and 
which third country’s overriding mandatory rules can be applied or given effect, and if so, under what 
conditions (see Q 19). 
• It is frequently discussed in the German literature whether conflicts rules of the Regulation are appropriate in 
case of human rights violations in supply chains (see Q 31). 
1. Introduction 
The Rome II Regulation is quite well-known among practitioners who are dealing with cross-border issues. Most 
general practitioners know of its existence, though they are often not familiar with its precise content. The business 
community and citizens are generally ignorant about the text. This is not a specific feature of the Rome II Regulation, 
but applies to a wide range of legislation that is not relevant to the everyday life of individuals. 
In German courts, the Rome II Regulation is known and scrupulously followed. Every year, a collection of all German 
judgments in the area of private international law is published, which also includes cases dealing with the Rome II 
Regulation.549 The number of cases is at a constantly moderate level. Given the numerous cases in the area of non-
contractual obligations and the great importance of cross-border interaction, it must be assumed that the applicability 
of the Rome II Regulation is frequently overlooked. This assumption is confirmed by the comparatively few preliminary 
rulings by the CJEU that have been initiated by German courts.550 Moreover, some decisions testify to a lack of 
sufficient knowledge with regard to the application of the Rome II Regulation. This is not a dilemma specific to the 
Rome II Regulation but rather concerns the area of private international law in general. 
 
 
549 Kulms, Die deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebiete des Internationalen Privatrechts im Jahre (Mohr Siebeck 
1995-2017). 
550 See CJEU 27.9.2017, Nintendo, Joined Cases C-24/16 and C-25/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:724, as one of the 




Unfortunately, there are no statistics with regard to the application of the Rome II Regulation. A database search 
revealed that the Regulation was mentioned in 212 court decisions.551 Based on the extensive debate in the academia 
as well as the existing case law, it can be inferred, however, that the importance of the Rome II Regulation is not unduly 
underestimated in Germany. 
The doctrinal discussions within German academia relating to the Rome II Regulation are numerous and also of 
importance. Most of the commentaries on general civil law include a chapter on the Rome II Regulation. This applies 
also to the commentaries used predominantly by practitioners. In addition, there are a large number of papers and 
contributions on the Rome II Regulation. Often the focus is on the chapter on tort law. 
A lot of doctrinal debates arose in the literature with regard to minor issues of specific articles which will be addressed 
later on. A general problem of private international law which has been especially discussed in the context of the 
Rome II Regulation is whether and to which extent parallelism between jurisdiction and the applicable law is desirable. 
A very much discussed problem more specific to the Rome II Regulation is the question of how to determine the place 
in which the damage occurs in situations where financial loss is the only damage sustained. This problem is particularly 
relevant in the context of new technologies, where damage is hard to locate. Some of the Regulation’s aspects have 
caused considerable discussions within the legal community, e.g. the law applicable to human rights violations in 
production chains involving developing countries. Beyond the specialised circles, there is however no debate about 
the Regulation. 
Some reform proposals have also been made at the political level. Noteworthy is the proposal made by the Special 
Committee on Financial Market Law of the German Council for Private International Law in 2012, which recommended 
that a new conflict-of-laws rule relating to financial market torts be incorporated within the Rome II Regulation.552 
According to the proposal, this rule should determine the applicable law according to the place of the market on which 
the affected financial instrument is traded. 
In addition, a central legal policy aim is interpretation and modification of the Rome II Regulation in such a way that it 
can – better and more sustainably – be used as an instrument of transnational prosecution of human rights violations 
and human rights litigation.553 Such proposals have been discussed in the German parliament, but have not been 
successful yet.554 
Another reform proposal aims at avoiding the parallel existence of Rome II Regulation and the 1971 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents. As some Member States are signatories to the Hague 
Convention and others have not ratified it – including Germany – the private international law is not really harmonised 
in this area, as, according to Art 28 Rome II, the Hague Convention takes precedence over the Rome II Regulation as 
between those Member States who have ratified it.555 
 
 
551 The research has been carried out on the database juris.de on 14 September 2020. 
552 Resolution of the German Council for Private International Law, Special Committee on Financial Market Law, 
(2012) 32 IPRax 471-472. See Lehmann, ‘Vorschlag für eine Reform der Rom II-Verordnung im Bereich der 
Finanzmarktdelikte’ (2012) 32 IPRax 399. 
553 Knöfel, in Hüßtege/Mansel (eds), BGB: Rom-Verordnungen (Vol 6, 3rd edn, Nomos 2019) Vorb. Art. 1 Rom II-
VO paras 8-9 with further references. See Weller/Kaller/Schulz, ‘Haftung deutscher Unternehmen für 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Ausland’ (2016) 216 AcP 387; Wagner, ‘Haftung für 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen’ (2016) 80 RabelsZ 717. 
554 See Knöfel, in Hüßtege/Mansel (eds), BGB: Rom-Verordnungen (Vol 6, 3rd edn, Nomos 2019) Vorb. Art. 1 
Rom II-VO para 10. 
555 Thiede/Kellner, ‘"Forum shopping" zwischen dem Haager Übereinkommen über das auf Verkehrsunfälle 
anzuwendende Recht und der Rom-II-Verordnung: Eine Fallstudie’ (2007) 34 VersR 1624; Nordmeier, ‘Divergenz 
von Delikts- und Unterhaltsstatut bei tödlich verlaufenden Straßenverkehrsunfällen’ (2011) 31 IPRax 292, 295; 
Czaplinski, Das internationale Straßenverkehrsunfallrecht nach Inkrafttreten der Rom II-VO (Jenaer Wissenschaftliche 




Finally, there have been some discussions concerning the question of cross-border protection of privacy rights.556 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
In Germany, the existence of a civil or commercial matter is assessed in accordance with the caselaw of the CJEU on 
the basis of whether public powers are exercised.557 However, there is a lack of consensus as to the extent to which 
claims for refunds based on an act of specific public power are to be classified as civil and commercial matters. This is 
particularly problematic in cases where the state takes responsibility for remedying environmental damage but imposes 
the cost of doing so on a private party. It is sometimes assumed that such claims are covered by the Rome II 
Regulation558, while others disagree559. 
With regard to the exceptions listed in Art. 1(2) Rome II, German scholars recognise that these must be interpreted 
narrowly in order to maximise the effectiveness of the Union's conflict of laws regime. 560 There is also a broad 
agreement on how to interpret the individual exceptions listed in Art. 1(2) Rome II. However, the interpretation of 
Art. 1(2) lit. (d) remains subject to debate: It is disputed whether liability for incorrect prospectuses is covered by 
Art. 1(2) lit. (d) and thus not covered by the Rome II Regulation.561 
Furthermore, the scope of “the personal liability of officers and members as such” listed in Art. 1(2) lit. (d) is 
controversial. While there is agreement in the German literature that this provision includes the question of the limitation 
of “the personal liability of officers and members as such for the obligations of the company” on account of the chosen 
form of the company, it is unclear whether Art. 1(2) lit. (d) also excludes any liability of officers and shareholders in 
other situations, e.g. in case of an abuse of the corporate form leading to a piercing of the corporate veil.562 This 
question is seen in part in close connection with the problem whether such liability is to be characterised as being part 
of tort or corporate law. If one assumes a characterisation as tortious, the consequence is that this kind of liability does 
not fall under the exclusion criterion of Art. 1(2) lit. (d).563 
 
 
556 Knöfel, in Hüßtege/Mansel (eds), BGB: Rom-Verordnungen (Vol 6, 3rd edn, Nomos 2019) Art. 30 Rom II-VO 
paras 8ff. 
557 Schmidt, in Gsell/Krüger/Lorenz/Reymann (eds), beck-online.GROSSKOMMENTAR zum Zivilrecht (C.H. Beck 
2019) Art. 1 Rom II-VO para 16. 
558 Graziano, ‘Das auf außervertragliche Schuldverhältnisse anzuwendende Recht nach Inkrafttreten der Rom II-
Verordnung‘ (2009) 73 RabelsZ 53ff. 
559 Unberath/Cziupka, in Rauscher (ed), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR / EuIPR (Vol 3, 4th 
edn, Otto Schmidt 2016) Art. 1 Rom II-VO para 14. 
560 Knöfel, in Hüßtege/Mansel (eds), BGB: Rom-Verordnungen (Vol 6, 3rd edn, Nomos 2019) Art. 1 Rom II-VO 
para 34. 
561 Einsele, ‘Internationales Prospekthaftungsrecht – Kollisionsrechtlicher Anlegerschutz nach der Rom II-Verordnung‘ 
(2012) 20 ZEuP 23, 27; Schmidt, in Gsell/Krüger/Lorenz/Reymann (eds), beck-online.GROSSKOMMENTAR 
zum Zivilrecht (C.H. Beck 2019) Art. 1 Rom II-VO para 56. 
562 Knöfel, in Hüßtege/Mansel (eds), BGB: Rom-Verordnungen (Vol 6, 3rd edn, Nomos 2019) Art. 1 Rom II-VO 
para 47; Junker, in Säcker/Rixecker/Limperg (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (Vol 12, 7th edn, C.H. Beck 
2018) Art. 1 Rom II-VO paras 38f. 
563 Unberath/Cziupka, in Rauscher (ed), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR / EuIPR (Vol 3, 4th 




With regard to the exception in Art. 1(2) lit. (g) Rome II, it is debated whether the exemption also covers injuries to the 
body or health stemming from the violation of personal rights, such as an incorrect medical consultation leading to an 
operation without consent.564 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts 31-32) 
With regard to the different points in time mentioned in Arts. 31, 32 of the Regulation, there were doubts in the German 
literature as to the exact time from which the provisions of Rome II Regulation shall apply. However, since the decision 
by the CJEU in the Homawoo case, it has been universally accepted that the provisions of the Rome II Regulation only 
apply to cases which occurred after 11 January 2009. It remains nevertheless disputed how this result is to be justified 
doctrinally.565 
Concerning the interpretation of Art. 31 Rome II, it is still unclear amongst German scholars what exactly is meant by 
the event giving rise to damages. In this respect, it is disputed in particular whether the decisive factor should be the 
infringement of legal rights or the action leading to it. 566  The answer to this question also affects the precise 
determination of the event giving rise to damages in cases of actions of a certain duration, such as in cases of omission 
and in cases of strict liability. 
For acts of a certain duration, this means that it is disputed whether the temporal scope of application of the Rome II 
Regulation is uniformly assessed567 and whether the beginning of the act or the occurrence of the damage is relevant 
for determining the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation.568 
As regards injunctive relief claims, the question arises whether the mere possibility that damage might occur, an 
increase of the probability, or the time at which the court takes its decision, is relevant.569 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
In German jurisprudence, based on the criteria defined by the CJEU, the existence of a non-contractual obligation is 
in principle established by determining whether the legal relationship underlying the claim is based on a voluntary 
obligation.570 
However, there is disagreement about the relationship between Rome I and Rome II. While some assume that the 
Rome I and II Regulations, taken together, determine the applicable law of each obligation571, others argue that not 
every obligation can be attributed to one of the two Regulations. According to the latter view, there are thus obligations 
 
 
564 Knöfel, in Hüßtege/Mansel (eds), BGB: Rom-Verordnungen (Vol 6, 3rd edn, Nomos 2019) Art. 1 Rom II-VO 
para 55. 
565 Knöfel, in Hüßtege/Mansel (eds), BGB: Rom-Verordnungen (Vol 6, 3rd edn, Nomos 2019) Art. 31, 32 Rom II-
VO paras 4f. 
566 Schulze/Fervers, in Gsell/Krüger/Lorenz/Reymann (eds), beck-online.GROSSKOMMENTAR zum Zivilrecht 
(C.H. Beck 2019) Art. 31 Rom II-VO paras 7f. 
567 Junker, in Säcker/Rixecker/Limperg (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (Vol 12, 7th edn, C.H. Beck 2018) 
Art. 32 Rom II-VO para 10. 
568 Knöfel, in Hüßtege/Mansel (eds), BGB: Rom-Verordnungen (Vol 6, 3rd edn, Nomos 2019) Art. 31, 32 Rom II-
VO para 10. 
569 Picht in Rauscher (ed), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR / EuIPR (Vol 6, 4th edn, Otto 
Schmidt 2016) Art. 31, 32 Rom II-VO para 4a. 
570 See e.g. Staudinger/Magnus, in Staudinger BGB: Einleitung zur Rom I-VO (De Gruyter/Sellier 2016) Art. 1 Rom 
I-VO para 29; Knöfel, in Hüßtege/Mansel (eds), BGB: Rom-Verordnungen (Vol 6, 3rd edn, Nomos 2019) Art. 1 
Rom II-VO para 3; Unberath/Cziupka, in Rauscher (ed), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR / 
EuIPR (Vol 6, 4th edn, Otto Schmidt 2016) Art. 1 Rom II-VO para 25. 
571 Staudinger/Magnus, in Staudinger BGB: Einleitung zur Rom I-VO (De Gruyter/Sellier 2016) Art. 1 Rom I-VO 
para 31; Lehmann, ‘Eine Lücke im europäischen Kollisionsrecht der Schuldverhältnisse? Die Haftung wegen 




which cannot be classified under neither Rome I nor Rome II and which must therefore be determined by national 
conflict-of-law rules.572 An example of a legal relationship which is covered neither by Rome I nor Rome II, some 
scholar refer to the creditor's challenge in the case of insolvency, or to liability in cases of a takeover of a company. 
In addition, for some legal relationships, it is controversial whether they can be classified as contractual or non-
contractual obligations. Particularly difficult is the classification of the legal concept of a contract with protective effect 
in favour of third parties, which is a staple of German law. This legal institution gives a third party a contractual claim 
against the debtor of a contract, although the third party is not a party to the contract.  
The classification of liability as a falsus procurator is equally controversial. 573 Opinion is also divided as to the 
classification of an obligation resulting from the offering or announcement of a  promotional prize, as is often done in 
the retail sector.574 Furthermore, it is unclear whether the liability of an expert for his expert opinion to persons who 
have not themselves concluded a contract with the expert is to be classified as a contractual or non-contractual 
obligation.575 Finally, there is debate in German jurisprudence as to whether claims under property law establish a 
‘non-contractual relationship’ within the meaning of Art. 1(1) Rome II Regulation.576 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
There are no relevant unanswered questions in German practice or academia with regard to Art. 3 of the Regulation. 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital 
(7)) 
The German literature analyses the Rome II Regulation based on the general principles of interpretation established in 
German jurisprudence. Here, it is generally accepted that terms must be interpreted autonomously so that they have a 
uniform meaning throughout the EU.577 In this context, the literature emphasises the final competence of the CJEU to 
interpret these terms.578 
When interpreting the Rome II Regulation, the need for a harmonious interpretation with other legal acts of European 
private international law is highlighted with reference to Recital 7 of the Rome II Regulation.579 At the same time, any 
interpretation is supposed to take into account the differences which exist with regard to the determination of the 
competent court and the determination of the applicable law. For example, the mosaic approach for the determination 
of the law applicable to pure financial loss in the form of dispersed damage has been accepted, particularly with 
reference to Recital 7 of Rome II and the handling of this type of damage, when determining the competent court.580 
 
 
572 Knöfel, in Hüßtege/Mansel (eds), BGB: Rom-Verordnungen (Vol 6, 3rd edn, Nomos 2019) Art. 1 Rom II-VO 
para 5. 
573 See for a comprehensive overview Schmidt, in Gsell/Krüger/Lorenz/Reymann (eds), beck-
online.GROSSKOMMENTAR zum Zivilrecht (C.H. Beck 2019) Art. 1 Rom II-VO para 22. 
574 Junker, in Säcker/Rixecker/Limperg (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (Vol 12, 7th edn, C.H. Beck 2018) 
Art. 1 Rom II-VO paras 21f. 
575 Unberath/Cziupka, in Rauscher (ed), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR / EuIPR (Vol 6, 4th 
edn, Otto Schmidt 2016) Art. 1 Rom II-VO para 34. 
576 Knöfel, in Hüßtege/Mansel (eds), BGB: Rom-Verordnungen (Vol 6, 3rd edn, Nomos 2019) Art. 1 Rom II-VO 
paras 6f. 
577 Schmidt, in Gsell/Krüger/Lorenz/Reymann (eds), beck-online.GROSSKOMMENTAR zum Zivilrecht (C.H. Beck 
2019) Art. 1 Rom II-VO para 8. 
578 Junker, in Säcker/Rixecker/Limperg (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (Vol 12, 7th edn, C.H.Beck 2018) 
Vor Art. 1 Rom II-VO para 29. 
579 Unberath/Cziupka, in Rauscher (ed), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR / EuIPR (Vol 3, 4th 
edn, Otto Schmidt 2016) Art. 1 Rom II-VO para 5. 
580 Rühl, in Gsell/Krüger/Lorenz/Reymann (eds), beck-online.GROSSKOMMENTAR zum Zivilrecht (C.H. Beck 




2.2 Chapter II – Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art. 4(1) 
Only very few cases have so far dealt with the general rule of Art. 4 of the Regulation. It seems that this provision has 
not caused many problems in practice so far.  
Some initial cases concerned the law applicable to claims for injunctions against unfair terms.581 This issue has now 
been clarified by the CJEU by reference to Art. 6(1) Rome II.582 Other cases have dealt with Art. 4(2) and (3) of the 
Regulation (see below under b. and c.). 
The scarcity of case law stands in contrast to the abundant discussions Art. 4 Rome II has caused in the literature. Of 
special relevance is the application of this provision to financial market torts (see in more detail below under d.). 
Another topic of concern is the law applicable to tort claims against German retailers for human rights violations 
abroad (see in more detail below Q 31). 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art. 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
The application of Art. 4(2) Rome II does not seem to have created major problems in practice. There is however a 
discussion in the literature whether this provision could be extended to tort cases occurring outside of the EU involving 
two or more EU citizens residing in different Member States.583 A hypothetical example would be a car accident 
between a French and a German resident in Florida, USA. An application of Art. 4(2) Rome II to this set of facts would 
reflect that two EU citizens have a closer connection to the EU than to Florida. However, it is unclear which law should 
govern their relationship, given that there is currently no European law of torts. A possible solution could be to apply 
legal principles that are common to both French and German law, or to the private laws of the EU. Furthermore, an 
extension or an application by analogy does not seem to be possible due the restrictive wording of the provision. Such 
a change could only be introduced by reform of the Regulation. 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art. 4(3), and  
A number of cases deal with the so-called escape clause of Art. 4(3) Rome II, which they interpret strictly.584 In general, 
the application of this clause was rejected and did not play any further role in the judgments. 
A remarkable exception is the case of the Germanwings plane crashed down by a suicidal pilot in 2015. The court of 
first instance of Essen ruled that German law would govern the claims of the victims’ heirs against the US subsidiary of 
the German airline, which had provided training for the pilot.585 Though the crash happened in France, the court found 
that this was purely circumstantial and that there were no other connections to the French legal system. At the same 
time, it pointed to several connections to Germany which it deemed “essential”: the airline and the plaintiffs were 
German, the pilot was a German national, and the plane was heading for Germany. Based on these circumstances, 
the court found that the tort was manifestly more closely connected to Germany in the sense of Art. 4(3) Rome II. 
 
 
581 Federal Court of Justice (BGH) 9.7.2009, Xa ZR 19/08; Federal Court of Justice (BGH) 29.4.2010, Xa ZR 
5/09. 
582 CJEU 28.7.2016, Verein für Konsumentensachen, C-191/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:612. 
583 See von Hein, in Calliess (ed), Rome Regulations (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2014) Art. 4 Rome I 
para 41; von Hein, ‘Internationales Europäisches Deliktsrecht nach der Rom II-Verorodnung’ (2009) 17 ZEuP 6; 
Lehmann, in Hüßtege/Mansel (eds), BGB: Rom-Verordnungen (Vol 6, 3rd edn, Nomos 2019) Art. 4 Rom II-VO 
para 134. 
584 Court of Appeal Hamburg (Hanseatisches OLG) 2.5.2019, 3 U 182/17; Court of Appeal Nuremberg (OLG 
Nürnberg) 13.5.2015, 4 U 1839/14. 




In the literature, Art. 4(3) Rome II is often suggested as a device to avoid results under the Regulation that seem 
inadequate. This is particularly true in the case of financial market torts (see below d.) and human rights violations (see 
below Q 31). 
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts 
The German literature discusses how financial market torts shall be dealt with under the Regulation.586 There is broad 
agreement that it would be wholly inappropriate to apply the law of the state in which the damage occurred under 
Art. 4(1) Rome II for several reasons: first, the localisation of financial loss of investors is notoriously difficult. Second, 
any localisation involving investor-specific criteria, such as the place of the investor’s habitual residence or the place 
of establishment of the bank managing his account,587 would lead to a fragmentation of the applicable law to the 
liability for a single financial market tort, e.g. misrepresentation in a prospectus. This would confer an unjustified 
advantage on investors from a state with a high protective standard, who would be allowed to raid the coffers of the 
issuer at the expense of other investors. Moreover, the applicable law would become unforeseeable for the issuer 
given that the habitual residence of the investor or the establishment of his bank is mostly unknown to the issuer. At the 
same time, the fragmentation of the applicable law would also render collective actions of investors more difficult. 
There is thus agreement that the application of the law provided for in Art. 4(1) Rome II must be avoided. The question 
is how. Very few voices have favoured applying the law of the issuer.588 In contrast, the vast majority of German 
authors considers that the proper law for financial market torts is the law of the market where the financial instrument 
in question is traded.589 The German Council for Private International Law, a group of academics advising the German 
government adopted a resolution in 2012 to this effect. 590 It suggests introducing a new article into the Rome II 
Regulation containing a special conflict rule for financial torts. The general rule selects the law of the country where the 
affected financial instrument is traded. There is also an escape clause and a clause for instruments traded on more than 
one trading venue, in addition to a proposed change to the recitals. The reform has yet to be implemented. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability 
Germany is not a party to the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability 1973, so no interaction 
problems with Rome II exist in this regard. 
There are no reported cases on the application of Art. 5 Rome II. A problem identified by the literature concerns 
Art. 5(1) sentence 1 Rome II. This provision contains a hierarchy of combined connecting factors. The question 
discussed in the literature is which law applies if neither the combined conditions of Art. 5(1) sentence 1 lit. (a), (b) or 
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(c) Rome II are met. The Regulation does not provide an answer, so a gap exists. Proposals for filling this gap include: 
(1) the law that of the state that is closest to the one mentioned in Art. 5(1) sentence 1 lit. (a), (b) or (c) Rome II, provided 
that the product is also marketed there;591 (2) the application of the general rule of Art. 4592; and (3) the analogous 
application of Art. 5(1) sentence 2. 593 A clear solution of this issue can only be achieved through reforms to the 
Regulation. 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
Art. 6 Rome II comprises two sets of rules, one on unfair competition (Art. 6(1) and (2) Rome II), the other on antitrust 
law (Art. 6(3) and (4) Rome II). 
The general rule for determining the law governing unfair competition claims does not pose any major problems in 
practice so far. 
Doubts have emerged, however, regarding the role of Art. 6(2). In particular, it is unclear whether the reference to 
Art. 4 only concerns Art. 4(1) or also Art. 4(2) and (3). Some voices simply assume that the reference is made to the 
whole of Art. 4, as indicated by the text of Art. 6(2).594 Other authors contend, in contrast, that the application of 
Art. 4(2) and (3) in the context of unfair competition would risk further distorting competition, and should therefore be 
excluded.595 Their concern can be illustrated by a hypothetical example in which a company established in the same 
state as a consumer would be allowed to follow different rules than a competitor from another state. One may however 
object that even if Art. 4(2) were applied to this case, the rules of marketing should be the same for all competitors 
following Art. 17 Rome II. A clarification of the already abundantly clear text of Art. 4 Rome II does not seem in order. 
Moreover, German courts tend to interpret Art. 6(2) Rome II in a restrictive manner. A good illustration is a decision 
by the German Federal Court.596 In the underlying case, so-called “buddy-bots” had automatically performed player 
functions in the computer game “World of Warcraft”, allowing some players to gain points without doing anything. 
The Federal Court held that the claim by the developer of “World of Warcraft” against the company that had 
programmed the buddy-bots did not exclusively affect the interests of a specific competitor but also those of the other 
users of the game. It thus ruled out the application of Art. 6(2) Rome II and applied Art. 6(1) Rome II instead. A similarly 
restrictive interpretation has been adopted in the case of a press release by the airline Ryanair denouncing a ticket 
platform as being overpriced and illegal.597 
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No particular problems have been caused by Art. 6(3) Rome II. The Grand Chamber of the Federal Courts has applied 
the provision to a Dutch online pharmacy selling its products to German customers over the internet.598 The Grand 
Chamber ruled that German law applies in this case without having any major difficulties. 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
No cases have been reported concerning Art. 7 Rome II. 
The most relevant question discussed in the literature concerns the interaction of Art. 7 with Art. 17 of the Regulation: 
the effect of foreign authorisations on the liability of the polluter. Two contradicting theories have been submitted: on 
the one hand, it is suggested that such authorisations should be considered as “rules of safety and conduct” in the sense 
of Art. 17 where they have been issued by the competent authorities of another Member State and minimum 
procedural requirements have been respected.599 On the other hand, some authors are of the view that the recognition 
of foreign authorisations would undermine the goal of Art. 7 to incentivise the highest standards of behaviour for the 
protection of the environment.600 Some words in the recitals would be helpful to clarify this issue. 
Another problem discussed in the literature concerns the right of the victim to choose the applicable law.601 Recital 25 
submits this right to the provisions of national law; and the German legislator has adopted specific provisions in Art. 46a 
of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code (EGBGB). Nevertheless, a question that should be regulated by EU law is 
whether a choice in a particular proceeding is limited or whether it also has effects for subsequent proceedings between 
the same parties. Ideally, this question should be treated identically within the Union in order to exclude conflicts 
between different jurisdictions and possibilities of forum shopping. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
Art. 8 Rome II has led to some decisions by German courts. The German Federal Court had to judge whether the use 
of a picture of a German cruise liner for advertising purposes on the internet would violate the shipping company’s 
copyright.602 Although the picture had been taken in an Egyptian port, the Court ruled that German law applies in 
accordance with Art. 8(1) Rome II because the photo was used on a website directed at German customers inviting 
them to shore leaves. The Court furthermore ruled as obiter dicta that in case of EU intellectual property rights such as 
a brand, the country where the infringement was committed in the sense of Art. 8(2) Rome II is the one where a 
particular advertisement is uploaded on the internet.603 
In the literature, there is some debate about the country whose law provides copyright protection in the sense of 
Art. 8(1) Rome II.604 One camp of authors tends towards the principle of universality, according to which the law of 
the first publication or nationality of the author governs the protection of the work world-wide. The majority opinion 
favours the principle of territoriality, under which copyright protection depends on the country in which protection is 
sought. The debate seems quite fundamental and concerns core issues of intellectual property law. It seems unlikely 
that it could be solved by a reform of Rome II. 
A more practical issue concerns violations of intellectual property rights on the internet. These cases by definition have 
connections to multiple states, leading to a plurality of applicable laws under Art. 8(1) Rome II. The question that arises 
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is how their number can be limited in order to avoid the application of virtually all laws of the world. Methods suggested 
in the literature have been the introduction of an “effects” principle or a de minimis threshold.605 A clarification of this 
problem in the Regulation would be very welcome. 
A further issue is how the ownership of intellectual property rights is to be determined. Some authors think that this is a 
preliminary question, which has to be decided according to international conventions or national conflict-of-laws 
rules.606 Another strand in the literature wants to submit this problem to the Rome II Regulation.607 The debate could be 
easily solved through an additional rule in Art. 15 Rome II or a clarifying remark in a recital. 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
No case has been reported on this provision. In the literature, it has been questioned whether Art. 9 also covers the 
law governing the liability of officials of trade unions, former employees and atypical union members, such as 
students.608 Furthermore, it has been asked whether the provision also covers the law applicable to the liability of third 
persons that are not directly connected to the strike, e.g. the participants of a “flash mob”.609 These questions could be 
easily clarified through an additional recital. 
2.3 Chapter III – Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
There have been very few cases arising under Art. 10 Rome II in Germany so far. Nevertheless, there are some 
controversial points in the literature which would need clarification. 
With regard to Art. 10(1) of the Regulation it is unclear whether the provision also applies if the relationship between 
the parties, such as under a contract or a tort, arises in the same moment the unjust enrichment occurs.610 To give an 
example, if a theft constitutes both a tort and an unjust enrichment, the question arises whether Art. 10(1) Rome II is 
applicable. If Art. 10(1) is applied, the law applicable to the unjust enrichment is the law which governs the tort/delict. 
Yet Art. 10(1) can only be applied if one interprets the phrase “existing” in a wide sense. Contrary to that, one could 
argue that the relationship (the tort/delict) did not exist before the unjust enrichment. In that scenario the law applicable 
must be determined according to Art. 10(2) and (3) Rome II. 
A further problem concerns the relationship between Art. 10 and the general rule for tort/delict in Art. 4 Rome II. 
English law differentiates between “unjust enrichment by subtraction” und “unjust enrichment by wrongdoing”, with the 
latter being identified by many British scholars as a case of Art. 4 Rome II.611 There is however a broad consensus in 
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the German literature that such cases are to be classified under Art. 10 Rome II.612 What is discussed amongst German 
scholars, rather, is the relationship between unjust enrichment and rights in rem. 613  It would be helpful for the 
Regulation’s uniform application to clarify both questions. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
There is also very little case law with regard to the negotiorum gestio in Germany. It is not totally clear what is meant 
by this notion in the first place. The concept of negotiorum gestio must be interpreted autonomously. However, neither 
the regulation nor the recitals entail any hints about the meaning of it.614 Thus, legal uncertainty with regard to the 
applicability of the rule exists. To give an example, it is debated whether the situations addressed in sec. 687(1) and 
(2) of the German Civil Code are to be regarded as cases of negotiorum gestio in the sense of Art. 11 Rome II.615 It 
would be useful to at least define the content of negotiorum gestio in order to ensure greater legal certainty. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether “the country in which the act is performed” in the sense of Art. 11(3) of the Regulation 
is the country where the action leading to the obligation was undertaken616 or where a loss occurred that was caused 
by an action617. Also, if the negotiorum gestio consists of multiple actions taking place in different countries, it is difficult 
to identify the place which is decisive for Art. 11(3).618 Some refer to the place where the first action was taken,619 
while others consider the place where the centre of the actions is located to be relevant.620 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
There are quite a number of controversies surrounding the applicability of Art. 12 of the Regulation. It is rather unclear 
how Art. 4 Rome II and Art. 12 Rome II are to be delineated. Different approaches have been suggested in the 
literature.621 Some apply Art. 12 where a duty specific to a transaction was breached and Art. 4 where the general 
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duties owed to everybody have been violated, such as the duty to respect another’s physical integrity.622 Others focus 
on the damage caused and not the duty which has been breached, by applying Art. 12 where the compensation 
sought relates to a disappointment in performance expectations, and Art. 4 where it relates to the violation of integrity 
interests.623 
A special case with regard to the delineation of Arts. 4 and 12 Rome II concerns the question of third-party liability. 
Some stress that third persons are not party to the contract and thus apply Art. 4.624 However, one could also look at 
the specific duty which was breached and then determine whether it is more contractual or more tortious.625 In cases 
where the duty is more of a contractual nature, one could argue in favour of the application of Art. 12. If one follows 
this opinion, it is subsequently debated whether paragraph 1 or 2 of Art. 12 shall apply.626 
Finally, there are some uncertainties with regard to the delineation of Art. 12 Rome II and the Rome I Regulation. First, 
it is unclear whether the violation of precontractual disclosure obligations is governed by Rome I or Rome II.627 A similar 
problem arises with damage suffered by the conclusion of a contract that does not meet the expectations of one party 
as it was based on wrong information. Such damage could be subject to Rome I or Art. 12 Rome II.628 Moreover, it is 
unclear whether the liability of an agent without authority is governed by Rome II, as advocated by the minority view 
among German scholars, or by Rome I, as the majority thinks.629 
Apart from the scope of application, there are also some other uncertainties surrounding Art. 12 Rome II. One problem 
relates to the relationship of the different alternatives in paragraph 2.630 Some argue that they are of equal rank as the 
wording suggests. The prevailing view in German literature is, however, that the alternatives are not equal, and that 
the legislator wanted to establish a graduated system similar to the ones followed by Arts. 4, 10 and 11 of the 
Regulation. 
There is also a debate about Art. 12(2) lit. (c). Some scholars suggest that the wording is mistaken and that the provision 
would also apply to Art. 12(1). 631 If that is indeed the case, a clarification in this sense would be in order. 
A rather special issue relates to the situation where damages are claimed for the breakdown of contractual 
negotiations. Some scholars argue a party must be shielded from claims not foreseeable for that party given that the 
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law of his country of habitual residence does not provide for this type of liability.632 This is backed up by an analogy 
to Art. 10(2) Rome I Regulation, according to which a party “may rely upon the law of the country in which he has his 
habitual residence if it appears from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of his 
conduct in accordance with the law specified in paragraph 1.” 
2.4 Chapter IV – Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
The rule on freedom of choice has been generally welcomed in Germany, especially, the possibility of an ex-post 
choice of law.633 The different wording compared to the Rome I Regulation concerning the provision on implicit choice 
of law has created some uncertainty though. 634 Art. 3(1) Rome I requires a “clearly demonstrated” (in German: 
“hinreichender Sicherheit”) choice whereas Art. 14(1) Rome II demands a choice “demonstrated with reasonable 
certainty” (in German: “eindeutig”). It would thus be better to harmonise the wordings. 
The implicit choice-of law clause has been the subject of some judgments. Very recently, the OLG Frankfurt decided 
that when ascribing an implicit choice of law to the parties, the latter must at least be aware of the possibility of making 
such a choice.635 If they only present their arguments before the court based on the lex fori, the court may not infer 
from this that they also implicitly wish to choose the law of the lex fori. Other courts as well demand at a minimum some 
kind of awareness with regard to the possibility of a choice of law.636 Thus it has been ruled that where two German 
lawyers negotiate limitation periods before a German court, it cannot be inferred that they wanted to choose German 
law if the question of applicable law was not part of the negotiation.637 
Another problem concerns the meaning of “freely negotiated” in Art. 14(1) lit. (b) Rome II. In particular, it is debated 
whether standard clauses or general terms and conditions can be classified as freely negotiated, and if so, under what 
circumstances.638 
As the Rome II Regulation does not contain any provisions regarding the validity and form of the choice of law, the 
standards for such assessments are not clear.639 Some argue in favour of applying Art. 3(5), (10), (11) and (13) 
Rome I by analogy in the context of Art. 14 Rome II. 
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2.5 Chapter V – Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art. 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
Art. 1(3) Rome II Regulation is interpreted broadly in Germany. The concept of procedure also includes legally 
controlled mechanisms which do not take place before courts and which do not aim at settling disputes by way of a 
decision.640 The term “evidence” is understood as any activity of the court or of the parties in civil proceedings, the 
object or aim of which is a fact submitted to the judge and which is intended to serve to achieve its conviction in the 
sense of confirming an assertion of facts.641 In general, Art. 1(3) Rome II is considered to be of largely declaratory 
nature since it only establishes the well-known principle of applying the civil procedural law of the lex fori.642 
The relationship between Art. 1(3) Rome II and Art. 21 Rome II is clear in German literature and not connected to any 
problems. 
The systematic position of Art. 1(3) Rome II is criticised. Due to the close connection with the scope of the reference, a 
positioning in the context of Art. 15 Rome II is considered more appropriate.643 
With regard to Art. 22 of the Regulation, two issues in particular are controversial in Germany. First, it is unclear under 
which law the required standard of proof is determined, i.e. what degree of certainty must be achieved in order to 
consider a fact to be proven. It is discussed whether this is governed by the lex causae or the lex fori.644 Furthermore, 
it is disputed how the German legal institution of prima facie evidence should be classified. Prima facie evidence is a 
concept of German law under which the judge, applying general principles of experience, may draw from established 
facts on the basis of a typical course of events which constitute sufficient proof of a fact to be established. The 
classification of prima facie evidence is very contested in substantive law, where it is partly classified under substantive 
law and partly under procedural law. Mirroring this discussion in private international law, it is debated whether the 
law applicable to prima facie evidence is to be determined according to the lex fori or the lex causae.645 
It is controversial whether the subjective burden of proof is to be classified as substantive or procedural law, and thus 
determined according to the lex fori or the lex causae.646 To this extent, the German Federal Court recently decided 
that the issue is procedural and that the determination of the applicable law is governed by the lex fori.647 
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17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
The substantive rules applicable under the Rome II Regulation are pleaded and proven as any other provisions of 
foreign law. Under sec. 293 of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO):  
“The laws applicable in another state, customary laws, and statutes must be proven only insofar 
as the court is not aware of them. In making inquiries as regards these rules of law, the court is 
not restricted to the proof produced by the parties in the form of supporting documents; it has the 
authority to use other sources of reference as well, and to issue the required orders for such use.” 
No specific problems have been raised by the application of this provision in the context of the law applicable under 
the Rome II Regulation. 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15 lit. (a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its 
relationship to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
Art. 15 Rome II has not created many problems in theory or practice.  
 
Some difficulties persist though regarding claims involving multiple parties. It is discussed whether the governing law 
has to be determined individually for each relation between two parties or whether it could also comprise relations to 
third parties. The Court of Appeal of Düsseldorf initiated a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice regarding the law 
applicable to preparatory acts by third parties for an infringement of intellectual property rights.648 The question was 
however dismissed by the CJEU because of a lack of reasons given by the referring court for the reference on this 
point.649 It is therefore an open issue whether a third party participating in a tort committed by another person will be 
submitted to the same law as the latter or not. This question could be addressed by a change of Art. 15 or by an 
additional recital. 
German literature is inconsistent in its assessment of the extent to which party-agreed exclusions or limitations of liability 
are covered by Art. 15 lit. (b) Rome II Regulation. According to one view, the law applicable under the Rome II 
Regulation determines whether and to what extent the non-contractual obligation can be modified by way of a party 
agreement. Apart from that, the law applicable under the Rome I Regulation would govern the exclusion and limitation 
of liability.650 Others determine the law applicable to contractual exclusions or limitations of liability uniformly by 
reference to the Rome II Regulation.651 Some authors also consider corresponding exclusions and limitations of liability 
not to be covered by Art. 15 lit. (b) Rome II Regulation at all.652 
With regard to Art. 15 lit. (c) Rome II, it is disputed whether this provision also includes the right of a court to estimate 
damages or whether this is to be determined according to the lex fori as part of procedural law.653 
In connection with Art. 15 lit. (f) Rome II, it is disputed whether the law applicable to claims of an indirectly injured 
party is determined according to the law applicable to the relationship between the tortfeasor and the directly injured 
party or whether the applicable law to this relationship is to be determined independently.654 The CJEU judgment in 
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Lazar 655  has not fully settled this debate. In particular, some authors continue to argue for the independent 
determination of the applicable law where third parties suffered their own damage, such as witnesses to a car 
accident.656 
Finally, with regard to Art. 15 lit. (h) Rome II Regulation, some argue that all questions regarding a settlement are 
covered by this provision. Others follow a different approach and determine the question whether an obligation arising 
from a non-contractual obligation is amenable to settlement on the basis of the Rome II Regulation, whereas the 
settlement contract as such is subject to the Rome I Regulation as a contractual obligation.657 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16) 
No decision of importance deals with this provision. However, there is a hot debate in the literature whether Art. 16 
Rome II disallows the application of overriding mandatory provisions of third countries.658 This debate has been caused 
by the absence of a rule on this subject, which stands in stark contrast to Art. 9(3) Rome I. It is strongly advised that a 
review of Rome II includes a specific rule on this question. It is clear that this rule could not be copied from the Rome I 
Regulation given that concepts such as the “unlawfulness of the contract” and the “place of performance” do not play 
any role in the context of non-contractual obligations. In the view of the author of the present report, a more general 
conception should be chosen, which could be inspired e.g. by Art. 19 of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International 
Law. 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18) 
Two questions are mainly discussed in German literature in connection with Art. 18 Rome II: First, the consequences of 
choosing a tort law under Art. 14 Rome II that does not recognise a direct claim and the extent to which such a choice 
of law requires the consent of the insurer are controversial.659 Second, the delimitation of the governing tort law and 
the law governing the insurance contract under Art. 18 Rome II is disputed. In this respect, it is being discussed in 
particular whether the possibility of the victim to choose between two laws also comprises the limitation period for 
direct claims and the maximum insurance limits.660 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19) 
There is debate as to whether Art. 19 Rome II is directly applicable or only by analogy if the third party's obligation to 
satisfy the creditor is not imposed directly against the creditor but only in the relationship between the third party and 
the debtor.661 
In addition, it is discussed whether Art. 19 is applicable in cases where a third party who has paid the entire debt due 
to an obligation towards the creditor may seek recourse against other debtors who are also liable. For example, this 
is the case in insurance where there are several tortfeasors. In these cases, it is agreed that the applicable law to the 
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transfer of claims based on the plurality of debtors is determined by Art. 20 Rome II and the applicable law to the 
transfer of claims based on the obligation towards the creditor is determined by Art. 19 Rome II. The applicable law 
must hence be assessed separately for each claim.662 
As regards recourse between insurance companies of the same injuring party, it is disputed whether Art. 19 Rome II or 
Art. 20 Rome II is applicable.663 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art. 20) 
In German literature the interpretation of the term "same claim" in Art. 20 Rome II is discussed. Some interpret this term 
in a very broad sense: it is neither a prerequisite that the claims are subject to the same law nor that the claims are 
based on the same legal ground. The only decisive factor is that, if one of the debtors pays his debt, all other debtors 
are released from their obligation to pay the creditor and that the obligations are of equal rank.664 Others apply Art. 20 
Rome II only if the same law applies to all of the claims against the debtors; otherwise, the question if and to what 
extent the debtor is allowed to take recourse shall be determined by Art. 20 Rome II Regulation while the law 
applicable to objections by other debtors to the claim, the consequences of performance to the former creditor and 
other aspects of the debt relationship is determined by the law applicable to the relationship between this debtor and 
the former creditor.665 
In the German literature, there is, however a discussion in respect of Art. 20 Rome II as to whether Art. 16 sentence 2 
Rome I should be applied by analogy in cases of Art. 20 Rome II.666 
It is also disputed how the applicable law is determined for liability exemptions of various debtors who have agreed 
amongst themselves to contribute if the creditor has not yet been satisfied.667 If one of the debtors had a special 
settlement with the creditor, this could potentially result in a partial release of the other debtors. The question is under 
which law governs such release. 
2.6 Chapter VI – Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art. 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business 
The concept of habitual residence has not raised many questions in German case law and literature. One minor point 
that is still unclear is the precise meaning and scope of the expression “companies and other bodies”.668  
With regard to natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business, there is far-reaching consensus 
concerning the meaning of habitual residence, even though the Rome II Regulation does not put the meaning in 
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concrete terms.669 The habitual residence is understood in German literature as the centre of one’s life, relations or 
being or as the factual residence (“Schwerpunkt der Lebensverhältnisse”, “Lebens- oder Daseinsmittelpunkt” or 
“faktischer Wohnsitz”). This place can be identified by looking at the focus of all social, cultural and economic relations 
of the person in question.670 Although, most scholars agree on this, some minor questions are still discussed, such as 
whether one person can actually have more than one habitual residence.671 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art. 24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art. 25) 
The implementation of the exclusion of the renvoi in Art. 24 and of Art. 25 are clear in Germany and there have been 
no relevant cases so far. One interesting question, which is debated amongst German scholars, is whether parties can 
deviate from the exclusion of the renvoi by way of a choice of law that extends to rules of private international law of 
the chosen state.672 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
The concept of public policy of the forum is clear and no major difficulties have been encountered so far. One minor 
issue, which is debated in German literature, is whether directives are part of public policy in cases where they have 
not been transposed correctly by the Member State whose law has to be applied, but the relevant provisions also 
cannot be applied directly according to the case law of the CJEU.673 
Another discussion concerns the legal consequences of a violation of the public policy of the forum by the lex 
causae.674 It is debated whether the ensuing gap must in this case be filled using the provisions of the lex fori or whether 
the gap must be filled based on the lex causae. 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
The interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments is very much debated 
in Germany. The legal situation is unclear for multiple reasons. 
First, it is discussed whether Art. 27 applies at all in the context of harmonised substantive law of the EU. Some argue 
that private international law does not apply to cases governed by harmonised substantive law, such as the CISG, 
while other scholars disagree and want to apply private international law first.675 
Second, it is unclear whether Art. 27 only applies to other Union law containing conflict-of-law rules or whether it 
applies to all other substantive Union law. In this context it is also disputed under what circumstances a provision can 
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be identified as a conflict-of-laws rule. Some scholars argue that provisions defining the territorial scope, such as Art. 3 
GDPR, are also conflict-of-law rules.676 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
The 1971 Hague Convention has not been ratified by Germany and is therefore not applicable. 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach 
In German literature, the mosaic approach has largely prevailed.677 The reason for this is, on the one hand, the case 
law of the CJEU regarding international jurisdiction and, on the other hand, the declaration of the Commission who 
suggested to use the mosaic approach developed for international jurisdiction as well for the Rome II Regulation.678 In 
favour of this approach it is argued that this leads to a parallelism of jurisdiction and applicable law. At the same time, 
however, the problems of such a mosaic approach for conflict-of-law rules and the Rome II Regulation are also 
emphasised, in particular, the danger of different assessments of an act due to the application of different legal systems 
and the additional effort for persons operating in several states who have to base their actions on several legal 
systems.679 The coordination and adaptation problems associated with the split-up into different national laws are also 
emphasised.680 
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
The exclusion of violations of privacy and personal rights, including defamation, is seen critically in German literature 
from a legal policy perspective.681 However, no specific problems arose in connection with this exclusion under the 
Rome II Regulation. Due to the questionable legal policy underlying this exclusion, it is argued that Art. 1(2) lit. (g) 
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Rome II Regulation is to be interpreted very narrowly excluding, in particular, certain claims for damages for pain and 
suffering from its scope.682 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
The relationship of the Rome II Regulation to data protection issues has so far received little attention in German 
literature. The discussion regularly revolves around three questions: First, it is unclear whether the GDPR itself contains 
provisions that can be considered as conflict-of-laws rules. Secondly, it is questionable how the GDPR relates to the 
Rome Regulations, in particular whether its applicability can be determined without the law applicable under private 
international law. If it is assumed that the application of the GDPR must be preceded by an analysis under private 
international law, the question then arises as to the relationship between the Rome Regulations and the GDPR. In 
particular, it is doubtful whether Art. 3 GDPR is a special conflict-of-laws rule in the sense of Art. 23 Rome I Regulation 
and Art. 27 Rome II Regulation.683 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
The law applicable to corporate liability for human rights violations has recently received much attention in the German 
literature. 684  The interest was sparked by German retailers who exploit the lenient standards of labour law in 
developing countries to deliver cheap goods for the German market through supply chains. In case the victims of these 
practices bring an action before German courts because of the damage suffered, the lenient standards of their home 
country apply under Art. 4(1) and 17 Rome II. The problem was strikingly illustrated by a claim brought in German 
courts against the German retailer Kik by the heirs of the employees of a Pakistani supplier which had died when a 
plant burnt down in Pakistan.685 Under Pakistani law, the claims for wrongful death prescribed within a period of one 
or two years after the incident. The German court found no way to escape the application of this rule and dismiss the 
claims.  
The case has led to a broader discussion about the relationship between European private international law and human 
rights violations. Several authors have analysed whether German public policy or German overriding mandatory 
provisions could act as a barrier to the application of the standards of the lex loci delicti.686 However, the results were 
negative because of the supposed distance of the facts to the German legal system. This has triggered a proposal by 
one group of academics to apply German law via the escape clause of Art. 4(3) Rome II Regulation, save for the case 
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in which the victim prefers the application of the lex loci delicti under Art. 4(1) Rome II Regulation.687 This proposal 
effectively amounts to the introduction of an option right of the victim similar to that provided in Art. 7 Rome II 
Regulation. In the opinion of the author of this report, such an option could only be introduced by the European 
legislator via a reform of the Regulation. 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
As artificial intelligence is an area which is still very young and evolving, no case law exists with regard to the Rome II. 
Also, the interplay of artificial intelligence and Rome II have barely been discussed in the literature so far. Nonetheless, 
this area will be of greater importance with the rise of artificial intelligence in the upcoming years and decades. 
Potential problems may include inter alia the identification of the tortfeasor, the applicability of Art. 5 Rome II to artificial 
intelligence and questions relating to a choice of law involving artificial intelligence.
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4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to decision 
of the Court of Justice 
if applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
BGH Xa ZR 19/08 9.7.2009 Art. 1 Applicable law for 
injunctions and validity of 
GTC  
 
BGH VI ZR 217/10 19.7.2011 Art. 1 Applicability of state liability  
LG Dortmund 8 O 46/13 14.5.2014 Art. 1 Applicability of Rome II for 
dispute about handball 
players’ release to play for 
the national team 
 
AG Nürnberg 21 C 7497/18 31.1.2019 Art. 1 Classification of 
compensation claims based 





AG Charlottenburg 203 C 47/16 29.112016 Art. 2 Applicability of tort statute to 





LG Saarbrücken 13 S 5/15 25.6.2015 Art. 3 Validity of referral to Swiss 
law following Art. 4 of 
Rome II 
 
BGH Xa ZR 19/08 9.7.2009 Art. 4 Applicable law for 
injunctions and validity of 
GTC 
 
BGH Xa ZR 5/09 29.4.2010 Art. 4 Determining the place where 
harm occurred in connection 
with injunctions against GTC 
The decisive factor for determining the place 
where the damage occurs under Art. 4(1) 
Rome II Regulation in the case of actions for 
injunctions against the use of general terms and 
conditions is the place where the general terms 
and conditions are likely to be used. 
BGH I ZR 178/08 11.2.2010 Art. 4 Reference of GTC on a 
webpage is classified as 
“usage of GTC” 
 
OLG Köln 13 U 41/11 25.1.2012 Art. 4 Applicability of Art. 4 
regarding takeover bids 
 
KG 5 U 63/12 16.4.2013 Art. 4 Determining the place where 
harm occurred in connection 
with a website’s top level 
domain  
 
OLG Nürnberg 4 U 1839/14 13.5.2015 Art. 4 Determining which country 
has manifestly closer 
connections to a car accident  
 
OLG Nürnberg 7 UF 617/18 31.10.2018 Art. 4 Applicable law for a 





the abusive use of power of 
attorney to access a bank 
account 
LG Essen 16 O 11/18 1.7.2020 Art. 4 Determining which country 
has manifestly closer 
connections to a plane crash 
in France 
 
BGH I ZR 253/14 12.1.2017 Art. 6 Applicability of Art. 6(2) for 
a computer game where 
automated bots negatively 
impact both the consumers 
and the company operating 
the game 
 
OLG Hamm I-4 U 196/10 1.2.2011 Art. 6 Country of origin principle 
may apply to online 
advertisement 
 
KG 5 U 167/13 12.6.2015 Art. 6 Country of origin principle 
does not supersede the 
domestic-market principle 
 
OLG Köln 6 U 172/13 14.3.2014 Art. 6 A website in German is 
targeted at German 
customers  
 
LG Karlsruhe 14 O 27/11 KfH III 16.12.2011 Art. 6 Applicability of German law 
for a website (Application of 
precedents set in CJEU cases 





GmS-OGB GmS-OGB 1/10 22.8.2012 Art. 6 Determination of the 
marketplace for a mail-order 
drug business selling to 
consumers  
 
KG 5 U 63/12 16.4.2013 Art. 6 Applicability of Art. 6(2) for 
incriminating statements 
about a German hotel that 
were published on a website 
operated in Switzerland 
 
OLG Hamm 4 U 100/13 17.12.2013 Art. 6 German Telemedia Act is not 
exempt from competition law 
 
OLG Hamburg 3 U 86/13 6.11.2014 Art. 6 Confirming the above 
mentioned ruling  
 
BGH I ZR 131/12 12.12.2013 Art. 6 Statements about an airline 
in a press release affect the 
public interest for undistorted 
competition 
 
OLG Düsseldorf VI-U (Kart) 13/14 15.7.2015 Art. 6 Applicable law for damages 
occurring in different 
countries.  
 
OLG Köln 6 U 152/16 28.4.2017 Art. 6 The affected market of the 
violation of a (German) 
disclosure obligation lies in 
Germany 
 
KG 5 W 221/17 11.10.2017 Art. 6 Applicability of German law 





(language of blog is 
German) 
OLG München 29 U 1091/18 10.1.2019 Art. 6 Applicable law for 
injunctions against GTC and 
the reimbursement of 
warning costs 
 
LG Hamburg 315 O 540/12 10.1.2013 Art. 8 The law of the country in 
which protection is claimed 
also determines what 
constitutes an act of 
exploitation 
 
BGH I ZR 76/11 5.11.2015 Art. 8 Extent of the tort statute for 
rights resulting from and 
related to intellectual 
property  
 
LG Hamburg 308 O 480/16 22.3.2017 Art. 8 Application of Art. 8 to 
disclosure obligations 
 
BGH I ZR 247/15 27.4.2017 Art. 8 Application of Art. 8 for 
recordings of works 
protected by copyright.  
 
BGH I ZR 164/16 9.11.2017 Art. 8 If a Community trademark is 
violated, the place where the 
damage occurred is where 






OLG Hamm 24 U 110/15 6.4.2017 Art. 10 Applicable law for recovery 
claim in connection with a 
car accident 
 
LG München I 10 O 6084/12 18.4.2013 Art. 11 The law applicable for a 
contract may not be used as 
a connecting factor for 
Art. 11 
 
LG Hamburg 329 O 343/14 4.12.2015 Art. 12 Choice of law in a contract 
that was ultimately not signed 





OLG München 34 SchH 18/13 7.7.2014 Art. 14 Laws from a state that is not 
the place of arbitration are 
irrelevant for determining the 
arbitrability of a claim, even 
if said norms are binding 
 
OLG Frankfurt  6 W 9/20 30.1.2020 Art. 14 Choice of law by implication  
OLG Hamm I-9 U 44/19 21.5.2019 Art. 14 Choice of law by implication 
when both parties acted 
under wrong assumptions 
about the applicable law 
 
LG Saarbrücken 13 S 21/15 11.5.2015 Art. 15 Scope of the applicable law 





OLG Düsseldorf I-20 U 225/13 7.1.2016 Arts. 8 and 15 Scope of applicable law for 
multiple involved persons 
In this case, the OLG initiated a preliminary 
ruling to the CJEU. The question concerned the 
interpretation of Art. 8(2) Rome II. More 
specifically, it asked how the place “in which the 
act of infringement was committed” is to be 
determined in cases in which the infringer offers 
goods that infringe a Community design on a 
website and that website is also directed at 
Member States other than the one in which the 
person damaged by the infringement is 
domiciled, and/or has goods that infringe a 
Community design shipped to a Member State 
other than the one in which it is domiciled? 
The CJEU found that the country in which the act 
of infringement was committed is the country 
where the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred. Where the same defendant is accused 
of various acts of infringement committed in 
various Member States, the correct approach for 
identifying the event giving rise to the damage is 
not to refer to each alleged act of infringement, 
but to make an overall assessment of that 
defendant’s conduct in order to determine the 
place where the initial act of infringement at the 
origin of that conduct was committed or 
threatened by it. 
LG Neuruppin 1 O 120/14 8.3.2017 Art. 16 Classification of damage 







OLG München 10 U 2408/16 4.11.2016 Art. 17 Classification of the highway 
code as a rule of conduct 
 
LG Hamburg 327 O 59/16 10.11.2016 Art. 17 Applicability on contractual 
relations in case of 
occupational regulations 
 
AG Köln 268 C 89/1 29.4.2014 Art. 19 Choice of law for the 
preferential quota of 
damages 
 
OLG Celle 14 U 163/19 5.2.2020 Art. 19 Choice of laws in the case of 
multiple insurers for one 
vehicle 
 
BGH IV ZR 62/19 18.3.2020 Art. 19 Choice of laws for recoveries 
of the insurer from the 
injuring party 
Recourse claims of an insurer against a co-
insured third party are contractually qualified, as 
they originate from the insurance contract. The 
law applicable to the legal relationship between 
the insurer and the third party is hence 
determined by the Rome I Regulation. 
BGH III ZR 7/15 8.9.2016 Art. 22 Classification of the nature of 
general rules regarding the 
burden of proof 
 
OLG Saarbrücken 4 U 33/18 6.2.2020 Art. 22 Classification of the nature of 
prima facie proof 
 
AG Geldern 4 C 356/10 27.10.2010 Art. 26 Public policy conflicts of rules 






LG Neuruppin 1 O 120/14 8.3.2017 Art. 26 Public policy conflicts of 








• Prior to the adoption of the Rome II Regulation the conflict of law rule that determined the law applicable to 
the most cases of extracontractual liability was article 26 of the Greek civil code (hereafter GCC). Article 26 
GCC disposed: “Obligations arising from tort. Obligations arising from tort shall be governed by the law of 
the State where the tortious act was committed”.  
• Rome II regulation is an instrument which has been applied regularly by Greek courts. Judges and 
practitioners both seem aware of the implications of the instrument. Apart from some cases where judges had 
a difficulty to determine correctly the scope of application of the Regulation rationae temporis, the Regulation 
has been applied without significant problems. Its entry into force has not exercised a particular influence 
into the resolution of problems of applicable law to non-contractual obligations. In other words, the 
Regulation did not revolutionize judicial practice. 
• The introduction of the Regulation has not exercised a significant influence on the private international law 
issues of non-contractual obligations that have been contentious in Greek law. In the big majority of the cases 
judges applied article 4 par. 1 of the Regulation. To a lesser extent we see that article 10 par. 1 of the 
Regulation is also applied.  The use of article 10 is most of time subsidiary since claims based on unjustified 
enrichment are considered in Greek civil law as subsidiary to the claims based on a contract or on tort. 
Therefore, when a claim is considered as well-founded on the basis of a contract the Court does not proceed 
to the examination the unjustified enrichment argument. Another finding from this study is the frequent 
recourse to the escape clause of article 4 par. 3. The application of the exception leads in all the cases to 
the application of the law of the forum. The application of the law of the forum in these circumstances is in 
most of the cases justified. However, courts don’t always provide sufficient arguments in support of their 
conclusion. Finally, the rest of the conflict of laws rules of the Regulation have hardly been applied.  
• No particular comments can be made in the areas of interest and this is because of the nature of cases with 
internationality elements with which Greek courts mostly deal. These deal only rarely with issues such as the 
violations of privacy, rights relating to personality, including defamation, corporate abuses against human 
rights and Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). 
1. Introduction 
• How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State? 
The answer to this question depends to a certain extent on the field of practice. Practitioners who are engaged in 
international litigation are better versed into the Regulation and its provisions. One such example concerns practitioners 
and courts who are specialized in maritime law. In the Greek legal order the legislator has created a chamber 
specialized in maritime disputes (article 51 of Law no. 2172/1993) whose seat is in the Civil courts of Piraeus (Piraeus 
is the biggest port of Greece). Judges in this chamber are very frequently confronted with cases affected with 
internationality elements. It can generally be noted that judges of this chamber fair better dealing with issues of 
applicable law and international jurisdiction. There are however also judges that do not seem to be aware of the inner 
logic of the Regulation. The same can be said for certain practitioners. Nonetheless, it has to be pointed out that in the 
majority of cases dealing with torts with an internationality element judges identified correctly that Rome II Regulation 
had to be examined and eventually applied. Finally, there are not reliable data in relation to citizens so as to determine 
to which degree they are aware of the Regulation.  
• Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
The Regulation is generally known and applied by the courts although there have been some problems in the 
understanding of its conditions of application, and more precisely of the scope of application rationae temporis. 
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• Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
There are no relevant statistics as to the application of the Rome II Regulation. 
• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
The doctrinal discussion in Greece on Rome II Regulation is not so developed. Nonetheless, a thorough and 
comprehensive commentary has been written on the Rome II Regulation. Besides that, several articles have been 
published on different issues of non-contractual liability in private international law. As a general conclusion, it can be 
said that the doctrinal discussion in this field has not been intense.  
An issue that has attracted the attention of the doctrine concerns preliminary questions in the field of non-contractual 
liability (see.V. Koumpli, “Article 4-Addendum II, Tortious liability due to road traffic accidents”, in A. Bolos/P.-
D.Tzakas, op.cit., pp. 183-207) for traffic accidents. A significant number of such cases with an internationality element 
have been brought before Greek courts mainly for two reasons. The first reason is that Greece has in comparison with 
other EU countries one of the worst statistics in traffic accidents resulting in the death of the persons involved. The second 
is that the attribution of Greek citizenship is a hard, bureaucratic, time and money consuming procedure. As a 
consequence, thousands of foreigner citizens who have lived for several years in Greece and thus have been 
integrated to a great extent in the country have not acquired the Greek citizenship. The real link of these people with 
the country of their origin has progressively weakened and even remote. As a consequence, a lot of cases brought 
before Greek courts appear as private international law cases but in reality, are most closely linked with the Greek 
legal order. In our opinion the foreign citizenship in these circumstances is not de lege ferenda an internationality 
element sufficient to trigger a reasoning in terms of private international law. In most of the aforementioned cases, 
Greek law has been designated as applicable since both the accident and the damage occurred in Greece. Therefore, 
Greek law is designated as applicable both by virtue of article 26 Greek civil code (hereafter GCC) and by virtue of 
Rome II Regulation. As already said an interesting issue of preliminary question (incidental question) arises in these 
cases. The fact that the law designated to the main problem is the law of the forum means that in reality judges are not 
confronted with a genuine incidental question problem as it is perceived traditionally in private international law. This 
is because there is no necessity to choose between the conflict-of-law rules of the forum and the conflict of law rules of 
lex causae. The major issue in these cases brought before Greek courts has been to determine the persons entitled to 
seek moral damages, when a death happens as a result of a traffic accident. The answer to that question was thought 
to fall within the scope of article 26 GCC (The Greek conflict-of-law rule on non-contractual liability). This led 
systematically to the application of Greek law as the accidents occurred always in Greece. Therefore, Greek 
substantive law was applied. Among the different provisions of Greek law article 932 GCC provides that: “In the event 
of a tort, regardless of the compensation for the property damage, the court may award reasonable monetary 
satisfaction due to non-pecuniary damage. This applies in particular to anyone who has suffered an injury to his health, 
honor or purity or has been deprived of his liberty. In the event of a person’s death, the monetary compensation can 
be awarded to the victim's family for pain and suffering”. This application of this provision necessitates the 
determination of family members. Greek courts held that the determination of the members of the family has to be 
conducted according to the Greek law and pursuant to the meaning of the provision of article 932 GCC as to what a 
family comprises (Areios Pagos 1414/2019 ; Court of first instance of Athens 1815/2019 ; Court of first instance of 
Athens 16782/2017. All Greek case law can be retrieved by the data base in Greek of the Athens Bar Association 
http://www.dsanet.gr/1024x768Auth.htm ). According to this position the conflict of law rules on parentage and 
kinship of the Civil code have to be taken into consideration only if one of the litigants challenges the existence of the 
parentage or kinship which entitles a person to seek pretium doloris (compensation for pain and suffering). That said, 
Rome II Regulation exercised no influence as to the answer to these preliminary questions of family law.   
• Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political 
level? 
Doctrinal discussion in relation to issues of applicable law to non-contractual obligations has been developed. 
However, this discussion is not linked directly with the adoption of the Regulation since the problems examined in this 
context had already arisen at an earlier moment. After the adoption of the Rome II Regulation judges did not actively 
seek whether and how this new piece of legislation shed light to the questions asked in the past. One of these 
aforementioned problems was whether the liability of a person acquiring an undertaking for the debts contracted by 
the latter before its sale and transfer can be qualified as a non-contractual issue covered by the relevant conflict of law 
rules of the Greek civil code (In that sense see Metallinos, in A. Bolos/P.-D.Tzakas, op.cit., p. 149-150, no 28; contra 
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Korotzis, « The Regulation 864/2007 of the European Union on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 
(Rome II) and its influence on Greek maritime law », Nomiko Vima 2009, 283 and 291; G. Panopoulos, « The liability 
of the person who acquires a patrimony or undertaking in private international law », (see infra 2.1.1)).  
At a political level there has not been any discussion concerning Rome II regulation. 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to : 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded matters 
(Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
There have not been significant problems so far in relation to the material scope of application of the Regulation. There 
have nonetheless been some issues concerning the material scope as well one problem in relation to the territorial 
scope of the Regulation. The problems in relation to the material scope have arisen prior to the adoption of the 
Regulation and concerned article 26 GCC which designates the applicable law to torts. The question was whether the 
responsibility of a person acquiring an undertaking for the debts contracted by the latter before its sale and transfer 
can be qualified as a non-contractual issue and thus submitted to the relevant conflict of laws (In that sense see 
Metallinos, in A. Bolos/P.-D.Tzakas, op.cit., p. 149-150, no 28; contra Korotzis, « The Regulation 864/2007 of the 
European Union on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) and its influence on Greek maritime 
law», Nomiko Vima 2009, 283 and 291; G. Panopoulos, « The liability of the person who acquires an estate or 
undertaking in private international law (on the occasion of the decision of the Court of Appeal of Pireaus 94/2009) 
[in Greek] », 2011, published in https://www.hiifl.gr/wp-content/uploads/Panopoulos-Final.pdf  (2011 ; H. 
Meïdanis, « Sale and purchase of vessels before Greek courts – How safe is the choice of foreign law made by the 
parties ? The controversial discussion on Article 479 of the Greek Civil Code», RHDI 61 (2008), p. 455; P. 
Dimitriadis/K. Rokas, «The applicable law in 479 of the Greek civil code-The effect of Res Judicata on Third Parties, 
Synigoros (66), 2008, p. 38). This question is linked with the doctrinal discussion conducted as regards the problem 
of the qualification of Actio pauliana as a tort. It has been argued that both actio pauliana and the liability of the 
purchaser of an undertaking can be qualified as non-contractual and thus covered by the conflict of laws of the Rome 
II Regulation (see in that sense Metallinos, in A. Bolos/P.-D.Tzakas, op.cit., p. 149-150). Judges prior to the Regulation 
applied article 25 al. 2 GCC (Article 25 of the Greek civil code is the conflict of law rule that determines the applicable 
law to contracts) which determined as applicable to that problem “the law which is appropriate to the contract having 
regard to all the special circumstances” (Application by analogy of article 25 b GCC and of article 4 par. 4 of Rome 
I regulation Multi-member court of Piraeus 3658/2019; Court of first instance of Piraeus 2601/2019). This doctrinal 
discussion has been developed mainly because of the existence of a significant number of shipping companies which 
have a close link with the Greek legal order. Greek courts do not explicitly qualify this issue as non-contractual. They 
maintain their solution as to the applicable law to this specific issue, i.e. that the law applicable is determined by the 
exception clause of article 4 par. 3 of Rome I regulation. In addition, they continue to invoke article 25 GCC which 
determines the applicable law to contracts although Rome I Regulation has replaced article 25 GCC for all the issues 
that fall within the material scope of the Regulation. Therefore, the reference to article 25 GCC is either mistaken or 
could mean that judges have a doubt as to whether the aforementioned question falls within the scope of Rome I 
Regulation. One could argue more precisely that the issue under examination does not fall within the material scope 
of Rome I Regulation and thus article 25 GCC continues to be applicable to it. Such position is not explained 
sufficiently. Furthermore, Greek judges do not explain in detail the reasons of the application of article 25 GCC to the 
aforementioned issue. An alternative reading of judges’ approach could interpret their reference to article 25 GCC 
just as a reminder of the case law generated prior to the adoption of the Regulation.  Moreover, we observe that there 
is a fluctuation as to the way courts qualify the issue of the extent of the responsibility of the buyer of an undertaking 
for its debts. In some cases, judges have qualified it as non- contractual and apply Rome II Regulation (Court of first 
instance of Piraeus 3410/2018). However, even in cases where the qualification remains vague the Courts have 
recourse to the escape clause for the needs of determination of the applicable law. When they conclude that Rome II 
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Regulation is applicable to that issue, article 4 par. 3 of Rome II regulation is invoked in support of their solution (Court 
of first instance of Piraeus 839/2019; Court of first instance of Piraeus 3410/2018).  
Another situation which is indicative of difficulties in the determination of the material scope of the conflict of law rules 
of the Regulation is the following.  It concerns situations where the courts have to decide on the applicable law to the 
liability of the shipowner for the debts (debts that are generated as a result of the exploitation of a ship) created by the 
charterer (This liability of the shipowner is limited to the value of the ship and is regulated in Greek law by article 109 
of the Code of private maritime law [Κώδικας Ιδιωτικού Ναυτικού Δικαίου-ΚΙΝΔ]. Such liability is considered as 
deriving by the law (ex lege) (Supreme Court 1529/2017; see also supra the issue of the joint liability of the purchaser 
of an undertaking and of the seller of this undertaking). Although, courts characterize the ship-owner’s liability as non-
contractual, they do not seek the answer as regards the applicable law in the Rome II Regulation. Instead they rely on 
an application by analogy of articles 4 par. 1 a of the Rome Convention and article 25 b of the Greek civil code688. 
Article 25 b GCC leads to the application of the law which is deemed to be the most suitable as it results from the 
specific circumstances. This solution is confirmed by a number of decisions where judges apply by analogy the conflict 
of law rule of article 4 par. 3 of the Regulation 593/2008 trying to identify the country to which the situation is more 
closely connected (Court of first instance of Piraeus 2658/2018 ; Court of first instance of Piraeus 4133/2017). In 
Greek case law (Court of first instance of Piraeus 3075/2012 not published; cited by A. Metallinos, in A. Bolos/D.-
P. Tzakas (eds), The private international law of non-contractual obligations, Commentary of Regulation 864/2007 
[Rome II]) it has been decided that a non-contractual liability that does not coincide with one of the specific types of 
non-contractual liability envisaged by the Rome II Regulation does not fall within the material scope of the Regulation. 
Therefore, article 26 GCC is applicable in order to determine the applicable law.  
Greek courts seem also to accept that actio pauliana has to be considered as a non-contractual obligation to which 
the applicable law has to be determined by the provisions of the Rome II Regulation (Court of first instance of Piraeus 
3410/2018; Court of Appeals of Piraeus 28/2017; in favor of this opinion see Metallinos, in A. Bolos/P.-D. Tzakas, 
op.cit., p. 149, nos 26-27). In the cases dealing with a fraudulent conveyance judges applied Rome II Regulation 
having directly recourse to the escape clause of article 4 par. 3 (Court of Appeals of Piraeus 28/2017; Court of first 
instance of Piraeus 3410/2018).  
Finally, as noted above, there has also been a problem relative to the territorial scope or the scope rationae personae 
of the Regulation. This emerged in one case brought before the courts of Thessalloniki. The judges (Court of first instance, 
Thessaloniki 822/2017 and Supreme Court 1747/2017) excluded the application of the Regulation and applied 
the national conflict of law rule of article 26 GCC. They did not apply the Regulation because the victim did not have 
the citizenship of an EU member state (It had the Syrian nationality). It is as if the judges discovered an additional 
condition rationae persona  for the application of the Regulation rendering it dependent on the EU citizenship of the 
persons involved in the non-contractual liability issue. This interpretation has unfortunately been validated by the 
Supreme Court (in chamber-Areios Pagos is the name of Greek Supreme Court). Our view is that the judges reached 
to that conclusion from a result-oriented approach that dictated according to them the application of Greek law. The 
solution is unfortunate, not only because it is simply wrong but also because a correct application of Rome II Regulation 
would also lead to the application of Greek law. Judges thought that they had to apply Syrian law because it was the 
country where the moral damage of the relatives of the deceased had been suffered. This interpretation was mistaken 
since according to the prevailing view in doctrine the law of the country where the initial damage occurred is also 
applicable in relation to the claims of third parties suffering by the indirect consequences of the tort.  
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts 31-32) 
There have been several cases revealing problems in the determination of the conditions of temporal scope of the 
Regulation. Judges have not always been particularly careful on the interpretation and application of the conditions of 
the temporal scope. In some cases, they did not pay attention to article 31 of the Regulation and have reached to the 
wrong conclusions as to its application. This problem is linked with the difficulty of the Courts to focus on the moment 
that the events which gave rise occurred so as to determine whether they fall within the temporal scope of the Regulation 
 
 
688 “Article 25-Contractual obligations. Contractual obligations shall be governed by the law to which the parties 
have submitted themselves. Failing this shall be applicable the law which is appropriate to the contact having regard 
to the whole of the special circumstances”). 
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or not (See in that sense Multi-member court of first instance of Athens 5304/2015 and Areios Pagos 249/2018 
which corrected the motivation of the judges of first instance; Court of first instance of Thessaloniki, 2760/2013 and 
Areios Pagos 755/2019; Court of first instance of Thessaloniki. 17933/2012 and ΑΠ 756/2019; Court of first 
instance Thess. 2760/2013 and Areios Pagos 755/2019; Areios Pagos 468/2019 and C-136/16 and Areios 
Pagos 1166/2019; Multi-member Court of Thessaloniki 10369/2009). However, in most of the cases the mistaken 
interpretation as to the temporal scope of the Regulation did not lead to significant problems since in the majority of 
these cases both the Regulation and art. 26 of the Greek civil code led to the same applicable law (Multi-member 
Court of Thessaloniki 10369/2009). Finally, in most of the cases brought before Greek courts judges determined 
correctly the temporal scope of the regulation (Court of Appeal of Piraeus 81/2017; Court of first instance of Larissa 
61/2017).  
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of “contractual 
obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
See 2.1.1. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
In one decision of the Greek Supreme court, judges made a serious mistake as to the universal application of the 
Regulation. The Supreme Court in its decision 1747/2007 did not apply the Regulation because the victim did not 
have the citizenship of an EU member (see above under 2.1.2). Although this issue is linked with the lack of 
comprehension of the territorial scope of the Regulation, it is connected in our opinion as well with an insufficient 
understanding of the meaning of the universal application of the Regulation. As said above (under 2.1.2) an 
understanding of this decision could be found in a result-oriented approach of the court in this case.  
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital (7)) 
No indication of problems so far in that respect are to be reported. 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of : 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with respect 
to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
A general observation as to the application of conflict-of-law rules of the Regulation is that Greek judges in a significant 
number of cases invoke article 4 of the Regulation in combination with article 26 GCC which regulates the applicable 
law in torts (“Article 26-Obligations arising from tort. Obligations arising from tort shall be governed by the law of the 
state where the tortuous act was committed”). This is problematic for two reasons. First of all, the Rome II Regulation 
replaces article 26 GCC for all the differences and problems that fall within the material scope of the Regulation. 
Secondly, the combined reference could induce judges in mistakes since article 4 par. 1 of the Regulation uses the lex 
loci damni whereas article 26 GCC adopts the lex loci delicti commissii criterion. However, problems did not appear 
in any of the cases where judges formulated their reasoning in that way (Court of Appeal of Piraeus 581/2018; Court 
of Appeal of Piraeus 749/2018; Multi-member court of first instance of Piraeus 1410/2019; Court of first instance 
of Piraeus 2658/2018).  
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
There have not been any major difficulties in the determination of the place of direct damage (applied in a case of a 
collision between ships occurred in Nigeria:  Court of Appeals of Piraeus 29/2019). As regards the determination of 
damage of financial nature it appears that at least in one case it has been accepted that the place where the damage 
has occurred is the place where the bank account from which money have been extracted is held (Court of first instance 
of Piraeus 2166/2011).   
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b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
There have been only a limited number of cases where the first rule of displacement has been applied (eg. See Court 
of appeal of Piraeus 44/2017; Court of first instance of Piraeus 2019/2019). No major difficulties are to be reported 
in that respect. 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and  
We can observe a recourse to the escape clause of article 4 (3) in numerous cases (Multi-member court of first instance 
of Athens 3393/2018; Court of first instance of Piraeus 1719/2018). This is often the case in differences of maritime 
nature (Multi-member court of first instance of Piraeus 3420/2018; Court of first instance of Piraeus 2535/2018; 
Court of first instance of Piraeus 4996/2017: place of the real seat of the defendants, place of conclusion of the 
contract linked with the tort). This frequent recourse to the escape clause can partly be explained given that a significant 
number of maritime business is conducted by the means of offshore companies, constituted in countries like Monrovia, 
Marshall islands, The Bahamas etc which are linked with the financial interests of Greek citizens. The links with the 
Greek legal order are apparent from the fact that a significant number of these undertakings have their offices in 
Greece, their management is conducted by Greece and are linked to the financial interests of Greek shipowners and 
charterers. Besides that, the application of article 4 par. 1 in those cases does not make real sense. It would necessitate 
to determine the place of a damage which is frequently of financial nature and which is most often fortuitous or has 
little connection to the tort. This would have as a consequence to have to deal with all the difficulties linked with the 
determination of the place where the financial damage occurs. It has to be added that no decision having applied the 
escape clause under any circumstances has been challenged so far by any of the litigants.  
Judges have also applied the escape clause to a number of cases of different nature such as ones engaging the 
responsibility of financial institutions for investment products (Multi-member court of first instance of Athens 
1470/2017 and 1471/2017; Multi-member court of first instance of Athens, 1902/2017). The basic argument in 
those cases was that the applicable law to the contract governing the relationship between the parties (the bank and 
the client) was Greek law. The application of Greek law to the contract was based also on the fact that the claimants 
had invoked Greek law during the litigation and defendants did not challenge that. Eventually, the judges could have 
reached to the same result by applying article 4 par. 1 of the Regulation since the bank accounts through which the 
acts giving rise to the tort took place, were open and held in Greece.   
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
There has been no significant litigation on prospectus liability or other financial market torts. One case which concerned 
the acquisition of a company and was linked with charges of market manipulation was brought before Greek courts 
(Multi-member Court of first instance of Athens 6006/2010). The applicable law to that case was determined 
according to article 26 GCC because it did not fall within the temporal scope of the Regulation.  
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
There has not been a specific case on product liability. 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
The provision has been hardly invoked and applied albeit correctly (Multi-member Court of first instance of Athens 
3955/2015; Multi-member Court of first instance of Athens 3008/2018). In the cases where unfair competition 
issues arose, the tortious acts were linked also to violations of intellectual property. No major difficulties have been 
observed in that respect apart from one case where judges had mistakenly directly recourse to article 4 par. 1 of the 
Regulation instead of focusing to article 6 par. 1 (Multi-member Ct of 1st Inst. Thess. 4622/2015).  
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
There have been no cases dealing with environmental damage. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
In two cases of infringement of intellectual property rights where judges did not apply article 8 par. 1 as they should 
but based their answer on art. 4 par. 1 (Multi-member Ct of 1st Inst. Thess. 4622/2015: this case dealt as well with 
unfair practices; Court of first instance of Athens 4568/2012). The result nonetheless would be in any case the same. 
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Article 8 has also been applied in other cases without serious difficulties (Multi-member Court of first instance of Athens 
3008/2018; Multi-member Court of first instance of Athens 3141/2015; Multi-member Court of first instance of 
Athens 3955/2015). In one case, the action of the claimants had as a legal basis both an infringement of intellectual 
property rights as well as the unfair practices of the respondent (Multi-member Court of first instance of Athens 
3008/2018).   
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
There have not been any cases with internationality elements dealing with industrial action. 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict in Art. 
4. 
Article 10 has been invoked and applied in a number of cases dealing with unjust enrichment. In most of them the law 
applicable to the contract concluded between the parties turns to be the determining factor for the determination of 
applicable law to the unjust enrichment (Court of first instance of Athens 3993/2017;  Multi-member court of first 
instance of Piraeus 3496/2019; Court of first instance of Piraeus 32/2019 ; Court of first instance of Piraeus 
336/2019; Court of first instance of Piraeus 1278/2019; Court of first instance of Piraeus 1279/2019; Court of 
first instance of Piraeus 2303/2018; Multi-member court of first instance of Piraeus 236/2017 ; Multi-member court 
of first instance of Piraeus 3114/2017 ; Court of first instance of Piraeus 1416/2017; Court of first instance of Piraeus 
5409/2017 ). 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
There have not been any cases with internationality elements dealing with negotiorum gestio. 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
There has been one case dealing with culpa in contrahendo in which judges applied correctly the conflict of law rule 
of article 12 par. 1 of the Regulation. No difficulty has emerged in relation to the application of this rule (Court of 
Appeal of Larissa 348/2015). 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
There have not been any cases where the conflict of law rule on freedom of choice has been applied. In a number of 
cases article 14 of the Regulation has been invoked by the judges in their reasoning but the circumstances of the choice 
of applicable law to the non-contractual liability do not appear clearly from the text of the decision (Court of first 
instance of Piraeus 1420/2015; in the same sense Multi-member Court of first instance of Athens 3961/2015 and 
3962/2015). The Courts justified occasionally the application of the law of the forum as the result of a tacit choice of 
law made by the parties during the litigation (Court of first instance of Patras 420/2018; Multi-member court of first 
instance of Athens 1470/2017 and 1471/2017; Multi-member court of first instance of Athens 1902/2017 and 
1906/2017; Court of first instance of Piraeus 4133/2017; Multi-member court of first instance of Patras, 
244/2015). This finding is based on the fact that one of the litigants invokes Greek law before the Court and the other 
does not contest its application.  
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2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that exclusion 
or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
There have been no difficulties in that respect. 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of the 
substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual obligations. 
There have not been any particular difficulties in that respect. The Courts in cases where the application of foreign law 
is necessary order most frequently the parties to produce a legal opinion from the Hellenic Institute of International and 
Foreign Law (hereafter Hiifl  https://hiifl.gr/en ; see for instance in Supreme Court 1529/2017 where it is mentioned 
that the Hellenic institute has provided the required information as to the content of English law; the court ordered the 
litigants to produce a legal opinion from the Hiifl as to the content of Dutch and Belgian Law in Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 3008/2018) which is based in Athens. The Hiifl provides after a written request a legal opinion on the 
content of the foreign applicable law. However, in some cases judges acquire knowledge by their own means 
(personal research) as they are allowed to do (article 337 Greek code of civil procedure). In Greek private 
international law foreign law is treated as an issue of law and not as an issue of fact required to be proven (as it is the 
case in common law countries).  
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship to 
the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
An interesting issue concerns the determination of the persons entitled to compensation. The Regulation provides that 
the applicable law to the damage also determines the circle of the persons entitled to compensation for damages 
sustained personally. Greek law considers that the same law determines the persons entitled to compensation for 
indirect damages (Supr Ct. 1863/2017).  
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
There have been two cases where overriding mandatory provisions have been invoked (Court of appeal of Piraeus 
29/2019; Court of appeal of Piraeus 714/2012). In one of those (Court of appeal of Piraeus 714/2012) judges 
have qualified as overriding mandatory provisions the rules of the collective agreements on the minimum salaries of 
seamen. This finding does not constitute a novelty since these rules had already been qualified as overriding mandatory 
rules prior to the adoption of the Rome II Regulation. In the same decision judges qualified as an overriding mandatory 
rule the provision of article 1 par. 1 of Law 762/1978, "on civil liability of a representative concluding an employment 
contract in Greece with a seafarer". This provision stipulates that, "if the seafarer's employer, shipowner or the person 
who exploits the ship, does not have a permanent residence in Greece or if it is a foreign shipping company, the person 
who represents him in the conclusion in Greece of a contract of employment on board of its ship, is fully and jointly 
responsible with him for all the obligations of the shipowner arising from the maritime employment contract or in 
connection with this contract towards the seafarer (par. 1).)”  
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
There has not been any difficulty in relation to this provision. 
21. The application of the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
There has been one case where the judges have applied the specific rule on subrogation although such application 
was erroneous in that context (Court of first instance of Piraeus 2023/2019). 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
There have not been any cases where the specific rule on multiple liability has been applied. 
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2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to persons 
covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
There have not been any difficulties observed in that respect. 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with more 
than one legal system (Art.25) 
There are no difficulties in that respect because Renvoi is in principle excluded in Greek private international law (article 
32 GCC). Besides that, Greece is a one legal system country. 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
No particular difficulties are to be reported because the application of foreign law has been rare. In the cases, where 
foreign law has been applied there have not been any difficulty in relation to the rule of public policy. The public policy 
has hardly been invoked in decisions of non-contractual liability.  
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in specific 
areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 29) 
In one case Greek courts had to take into consideration the EU legal framework on intellectual property (Regulation 
EU 2015/2424 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark and Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 implementing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark, and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 
2869/95 on the fees payable to the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) and 
Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark) and the national provisions 
applicable according to article 8 par. 2 of the Rome II regulation so as to determine the rules applicable to an 
infringement of an EU trade mark (Multi-member court of first instance 3008/2018). Thus, it specified that issues such 
as the monetary compensation for moral damages for the infringement do not fall within the scope of article 101 par. 
2 or the Regulation 2015/2424 and have to be solved by the national law which will be designated applicable by 
article 8 par. 2 of the Rome II Regulation. In other words, judges explain the way the issues of infringement are 
delimitated between the relevant EU instrument and national law. The act of infringement of the EU trademark had 
taken place in Greece and therefore Greek law was applicable. In the same case the claimants argued that the 
infringement constituted an act of unfair competition as well. Judges qualified the acts of the defendant as constituting 
unfair competition in accordance with the definitions of the directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and 
amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) and Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising. Thus, judges had also to appreciate the 
applicable law according to article 6 par. 1 of the Rome II Regulation. This led them to the conclusion that Belgian and 
Dutch law had to be applied since the competitive relations and the collective interests of consumers were affected in 
these two countries. Having determined the applicable law judges postponed the issuance of the decision in order to 
obtain information about the content of Belgian and Dutch law. They ordered the litigants to produce a legal opinion 
from the Hiifl on the content of these two laws. Other than the aforementioned, there have not been any other cases 
revealing such interaction most probably because of the limited number of cases dealing with environmental damages, 
intellectual property rights or data protection. 
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2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on legal 
certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
The 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents has not been signed by Greece. Thus, the 
Convention is not relevant for Greece.  
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, including 
but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
There has not been any case where the mosaic approach had to be applied so far. In one case the application of 
article 6 par. 1 would lead to the application of the mosaic approach  (Multi-member court of first instance 
3008/2018) but the court suspended its ruling after having ordered the parties to produce a legal opinion on the 
content of Dutch and Belgian law by the Hellenic Institute of International and Foreign. It is reasonable to note that at 
least in some occasions the application of the mosaic approach will lead to delays of the judicial procedure because 
of the need to produce information as to the content of the laws applicable to the dispute.  
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope of 
the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in cross-
border situations 
Judges applied in these cases the conflict of law rule of the Greek civil code (art.26 GCC). There has been one decision 
in which judges applied the Regulation’ provisions despite the fact that one of the claims formulated was based on a 
violation or personality rights (Multi-member Court of first instance of Athens 6006/2010). It has to be noted that in 
the latter case the Regulation should in any event not have been applied also because the events giving rise to damage 
had taken place before the 11th January of 2009. However, the application of the conflict of law rule of article 26 
GCC would lead to the same applicable law. Other than that, no particular difficulties are to be mentioned. 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
No comment. 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays down 
an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
There have not been any cases so far dealing with corporate abuses against human rights.  
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the suitability 
of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
There has been no case as regards artificial intelligence. We would like however to express our skepticism  in relation 
to the existing conflict of law rules and their ability to correspond to the needs of non-contractual liability arising out of 
the use of artificial intelligence. The fact that deep-learning allows to machines and robots to evolve in an unpredicted 
way deserves some thought. Although, deep-learning and evolution of machines, robots and other applications are 
considered as one of the strengths of AI it could pose serious difficulties. There are a number of questions that need to 
be thought more thoroughly. Who will be liable for a damage inflicted to a person due to a skill developed after the 
sale of a machine and thanks to the inherent ability of machines to evolve via deep-learning? The problem is first of all 
a problem of substantive law in relation to the rules that will determine the conditions of liability. If there are efforts to 
adopt uniform substantive rules on the status of this type of liability, Rome II Regulation could be no longer relevant. If 
on the contrary, countries develop their own set of substantive rules depending on their investment in this type of 
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technologies, then the potential divergence of national legislations will be a source of legal uncertainty and a hurdle 
to the development and use of AI technology. Then, the conflict-of-laws rules of Rome II Regulation might enter into the 
picture. Will in that case article 4 par. 1 designating the law where the damage occurred appropriate? Can the conflict-
of-law rule on product liability be appropriate to provide an answer to this problem? Can a product using AI be 
covered by article 5 of Rome II Regulation? In some cases, a positive answer will be easy to provide. In relation to 
other questions we could hesitate to accept this conflict of law rule. The country where the product was marketed as a 
criterion required for the determination of the applicable law does not seem to be appropriate in the circumstances of 
a global market. This rule if applicable will lead to the applicable law of the country where the damage occurred. The 
solution does not seem will-suited. This will be especially so if the country which has developed the technology has its 
seat in a different country. A final question one could ask in that respect is whether the developer of AI technology will 
have any sort of liability in case he does not notify to the persons having purchased its products or technology 





4. List of national case law 
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Case name and 
reference number  
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of the Court of Justice if 
applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
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Findings (only for key cases) 
Supreme Court 1529/2017 7.09.2017 
The Regulation has not 
been applied 
although the Courts 
have identified that the 
liability of the 
shipowner for the acts 




Art. 4 par 1 of the 
Rome Convention on 
the law applicable to 
contractual 
obligations 
Extra contractual liability of 
the shipowner for the acts of 
the charterer of the ship. 
The case concerned the determination of the 
liability of a shipowner for the acts of a charterer. 
Judges have qualified this type of liability as extra-
contractual (ex lege) but have not applied the rules 
of Rome II Regulation to the determination of the 
applicable law although the facts fell within its 
temporal scope. Instead, they applied by analogy 
article 25 b of the Greek civil code [hereafter 
GCC] (“Article 25-Contractual obligations. 
Contractual obligations shall be governed by the 
law to which the parties have submitted themselves. 
Failing this shall be applicable the law which is 
appropriate to the contact having regard to the 
whole of the special circumstances”) in 
combination with article 4 par 1 a of the Rome 
Convention (“Article 4 Applicable law in the 
absence of choice 1. To the extent that the law 
applicable to the contract has not been chosen in 
accordance with Article 3, the contract shall be 
governed by the law of the country with which it is 
most closely connected”. A crucial point taken into 
consideration for the determination of the 
applicable law to the liability of the shipowner was 
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the law applicable to the contract concluded 
between the shipowner and the charterer. Parties 
had submitted their contract to English law and 
judges at first instance and on appeal have 
concluded that English law governed also the 
liability of the shipowner. The determination of the 
applicable law to the extra-contractual liability of 
the shipowner has not been challenged. The 
appeal before the Supreme court was successful. 
The judgment of  the Court of Appeal was set aside 
for having erroneously interpreted and applied 
article 21 (4) of the Senior Courts Act of English 
law. 
Supreme Court 1747/2017 22.09.2017 1, 3, 4, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule The case involved a traffic accident in which the 
victims were of Syrian nationality. The members of 
their family who claimed moral damages had their 
habitual residence in Syria. The judges erroneously 
determined the territorial scope of the Regulation 
whose application was excluded. They applied 
instead art. 26 GCC because the victim did not 
have the citizenship of an EU member state. Greek 
law was applicable according to art. 26GCC. A 
correct interpretation of the Regulation would lead 
as well to the application of Greek law. Art. 4 par. 
2 of the Regulation was also invoked although its 
conditions were not met.  
Supreme Court  1863/2017 20.10.2017 4(1), 4(2), 31, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 1st 
rule of displacement 
The case concerned the attribution of moral 
damages after a death provoked by a traffic 
accident. The determination of the applicable law 
has not been challenged. The Court of appeal’s 
judgment was challenged for the way it determined 
the compensation. The appeal was rejected.  
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Supreme Court  249/2018 30.01.2018 1(1), 2, 4, 4(3), 14, 
15, 31, 32  
Tort/delict – General rule: 
escape clause, Application in 
time 
An action has been brought for malpractice against 
attorneys for the way they exercised their duties. 
The facts did not fall within the temporal scope of 
the Rome II Regulation which had been applied by 
the courts of first and second instance and led to 
the application of Greek Law. The Supreme court 
judges found that the Court of Appeal’s motivation 
was wrong but the operative part of the judgment 
was right. The appeal has been rejected. This 
decision manifests the difficulty of judges to apply 
correctly the provisions relative to the temporal 
scope of the regulation. 
Supreme Court 270/2018 15.12.2018 4(1), 4(2) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 1st 
rule of displacement 
The case dealt with a traffic accident. The decision 
of the Court of Appeal of Larissa has been 
challenged among other reasons for not having 
invoked explicitly the provisions of the Rome II 
Regulation. The applicants claimed that the 
provisions of the Regulation should lead to the 
application of the law of Albania. These 
allegations have been rejected by the Supreme 
court which considered that the omission of the 
rules of the Regulation was insufficient to consider 
that the action lacked of a legal basis. Judges went 
on to observe that according to art.s 4.1 and 4.2 
of the Regulation Greek law was applicable not 
only because the place of the direct damage was 
in Greece but also because both the responsible 
for the accident and the victim had their habitual 
residence in Greece.  
Supreme Court 755/2019 10.05.2019 4, 31, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 
Application in time 
This case dealt with a traffic accident and the claims 
brought by the social security organization -
substituted in the victim’s place- against the person 
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responsible and the insurance companies. The 
social security organization was substituted in the 
victim’s place after having paid an invalidity 
pension. As a result of that it tried to claim the rights 
transferred to it due to this substitution. The Court 
clarified that there were two distinct issues to which 
the applicable law had to be determined. The first 
one was that of the subrogation of a person who 
has a duty to satisfy a creditor to the rights of the 
latter. The second was the law applicable to the 
tort. The claim transferred to the person who has 
satisfied the creditor remains a claim arising from 
the tort. The subrogation and the rights of the 
organization arising therefrom were governed by 
Greek law. The subrogation derived in that case 
from the law. Therefore, the law applicable to the 
subrogation had to be determined according to the 
rules governing the relation between the social 
security organization and the creditor. The Court 
reached this conclusion applying by analogy 
article 25 GCC. As regards the claim transferred to 
this organization this was governed by the law 
applicable to the tort which in this case was 
determined by art. 26 GCC. The case did not fall 
within the temporal scope of the Rome II Regulation 
but the Court of appeal applied it. Thus the 
Supreme court reached the same conclusion as to 
the applicable law to the tort as the first and second 
instance courts did but on the basis of article 26 
GCC. Once again, the Supreme court judges 
found that the motivation of courts adjudicating on 
the merits was wrong but the operative part of the 
judgment was right. 
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Supreme Court 756/2019 10.05.2019 4, 31, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 
Application in time 
It is the same case as the previous one  (Supreme 
Court 755/2019). Different decisions have been 
issued because the Social Security Organization 
filed separate actions which were challenged 
separately. 
Supreme Court 848/2019 26.06.2019 31, 32 Application in time This case deals with a defamation action. The 
courts have correctly excluded the application of 
the Rome II Regulation and have applied instead 
article 26 GCC to determine the applicable law to 
the tort. The application of the Regulation has been 
excluded based on the conditions of the temporal 
scope of the Regulation. The acts constituting the 
tort had taken place on the 20.12.2007. The 
Supreme Court confirmed the findings of the courts 
adjudicating on the merits as to the determination 
of the applicable law. It is noteworthy that the 
judges have identified as the place where the 
tortious act was committed the country where the 
center of the interests of the victim was located 
(country of the domicile of the victim).  
Supreme Court  1166/2019 28.05.2019 4(1), 4(2), 31, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 1st 
rule of displacement, 
Application in time 
This case is relative to the chartering of a ship. The 
charterer has not paid in time the agreed freights. 
The private international law issue examined by the 
Supreme court judges was the one of the 
determination of the applicable law to the tort. The 
applicants before the Supreme court claimed that 
at least for the acts that had taken place after the 
01.01.2009 the Court should have applied the 
Regulation and not article 26 GCC. The Supreme 
court accepted that the Regulation had to be 
applied but reached to the same conclusion as the 
Court of appeals, ie that the Greek law was 
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applicable on the basis of both art. 4.1 and art. 
4.2. The motivation of the Court of second instance 
was found to be partially mistaken but its 
conclusion as to the applicable law correct. The 
Supreme court judges rejected the allegation 
according to which the escape clause (4.3) was 
applicable. Their decision in that respect is 
explained by the absence of “a pre-existing 
relationship between the parties” such as a 
contract. The arguments excluding the escape 
clause are not sufficient although the conclusion is 
most probably correct.   
Supreme Court 1295/2019 11.06.2019 1(1), 2, 4, 14, 15, 
31, 32 
Application in time The case concerned the sale of a ship and the 
issuance of false certificates as to its condition and 
its seaworthiness. The Courts applied correctly the 
temporal scope conditions of the Regulation and 
concluded that the Regulation was not applicable.  
Supreme Court 1414/2019 08.11.2019 4(1), 4(2), 31, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 1st 
rule of displacement 
This case dealt with a traffic accident. Greek law 
was designated applicable as a result of the 
application of art. 4 (1). One of the issues that 
arose was the one of the determination of the 
person entitled to be paid moral damages for the 
death that has been provoked as a result of the 
accident. The Supreme Court’s decision confirmed 
the position of previous decisions according to 
which the quality of a family member is to be 
understood in the sense of Greek substantive law. 
The Greek conflict of law rules as to the quality of 
a family member have to be applied only in case 
one of the litigants challenges the quality of the 
family member who seeks moral damages.  
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Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Thess. 
10369/2009 03.03.2009 4(1), 5(1), 31, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 
Product Liability, Application 
in time 
 
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
6006/2010 23.09.2010 4(1), 31, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 
Application in time 
The decision is one of the few dealing with the tort 
of market manipulation. The problem of the 
applicable law is resolved according to art. 26 
GCC because the facts did not enter within the 
temporal scope of the Regulation. The decision is 
not final because the court ordered an expert 
opinion as regards different issues that had to be 
evaluated.   
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 2166/2011 --.--.2011 4(1), 31, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 
Application in time 
The case concerned a tort related to the extraction 
of money from a bank account. This decision is one 
of those having accepted that the place where the 
financial damage occurs is in the country where the 
bank account is held from which money have been 
extracted.  
Court of App. Pir.  12/2011 --.--.2011 1(1), 3, 4, 31, 32 Application in time  
Court of 1st Inst. Ath. 4568/2012 16.05.2012 4(1) Intellectual Property Rights  
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
1738/2012 --.--.2012 31,32 Application in time  
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
2528/2012 05.04.2012 31,32 Application in time  
Court of App. Pir. 714/2012 15.11.2012 1(1), 3, 4(3), 14, 16, 
32 
Tort/delict – General rule: 
escape clause, Application in 
The interesting point in this decision is that judges 
have qualified as overriding mandatory provisions 
the rules of the collective agreements on the 
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time, Overriding mandatory 
rules 
minimum salaries of seamen. Judges also qualified 
as an overriding mandatory rule the provision of 
article 1 par. 1 of Law 762/1978, "on civil liability 
of a representative concluding an employment 
contract in Greece with a seafarer". This provision 
stipulates that, "if the seafarer's employer, 
shipowner or the person who exploits the ship, 
does not have a permanent residence in Greece or 
if it is a foreign shipping company, the person who 
represents him in the conclusion in Greece of a 
contract of employment on board of its ship, is fully 
and jointly responsible with him for all the 
obligations of the shipowner arising from the 
maritime employment contract or in connection 
with this contract towards the seafarer (par. 1).)” 
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Vol. 
199/2013 --.--.2013 1, 2(1), 4, 12(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Thess. 20455/2014 08.12.2014 1, 2(1), 4(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir.  1817/2014 --.--.2014 4(3) Tort/delict – General rule: 
escape clause 
 




4(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage 
 
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Thess. 
11792/2014 --.--.2014 31, 32 Application in time  




31, 32 Application in time  
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1(1), 2(1), 3(1), 31, 
32 
Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage 
 




4(1), 10(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, Unjust 
Enrichment, Application in 
time 
 
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Pir. 
3839/2014 31.07.2014 31, 32 Application in time  
Court of App. Pir.  238/2014 27.03.2014 1(1), 2(1), 3, 4(1), 
10(1), 31, 32 
Tort/Delict – General rule, 
Unjust Enrichment, Application 
in time 
Case relative to the lift of the corporate veil which 
can have as a result to treat the rights or duties of a 
corporation as the rights or liabilities of its 
shareholders. 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 1420/2015 09.09.2015 14 Freedom of choice  
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
3141/2015 --.--.2015 1(1), 8(1), 15 Intellectual Property Rights The case concerned an infringement of an 
intellectual property right of an architect which was 
the result of an unauthorized use of photos of the 
exterior of a building. The Court applied art. 8 par. 
1 of the Regulation which led to Greek law. 
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
3955/2015 18.11.2015 6, 8(1) Unfair Competition, 
Intellectual Property Rights 
The case concerned an infringement of the 
European patent of a medication. The infringement 
constituted at the same time an act of unfair 
competition. Judges concluded that according to 
art.s 6 par. 1 and 8 par 1 of the Regulation Greek 
law had to be applied to both legal bases.  
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
3961/2015 08.10.2015 2, 4, 14(1a), 15 Freedom of choice  
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Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
3962/2015 08.10.2015 2, 4, 14(1a), 15 Freedom of choice  




4 Unfair Competition, 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Despite the fact that the case concerned acts that 
constituted both a violation of a European Union 
trademark as well as an unfair practice, judges 
applied art. 4 par. 1 of the Regulation in the 
determination of applicable law.  




2, 4, 14(1a), 15 Freedom of choice  




4(1), 4(3), 10(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 
Escape clause, Unjust 
Enrichment 
 
Court of App. West 
Mac. 
44/2015 --.--.2015 31, 32 Application in time  
Court of App. Lar. 348/2015 --.--.2015 1, 4(1), 12, 21, 31, 
32 
Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, Culpa 
In Contrahendo 
This is the only case where Courts had to apply the 
conflict of law rule of article 12 par. 1 in addition 
to the conflict of law rule of article 4 par. 1.  
Court of App. Pir. 149/2015 30.03.2015 4(3) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Escape clause 
The case is relative to the lift of the corporate veil of 
a legal entity. The Court concluded that the 
applicable law to the lift of the corporate veil is the 
Greek law on the basis of art. 4 par. 4 of Rome I 
Regulation. The claims of the applicant are two-
fold. The first is based on the theory of piercing the 
corporate veil while the second is based on a tort. 
Courts concluded that the applicable law to the tort 
is Greek law on the basis of art. 4 par. 3 of Rome 
II Regulation.  
 
284 
Court of 1st Inst. Thess. 126/2016 07.01.2016 1(1), 4, 4(2), 4(3) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Escape clause 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 2811/2016 --.12.2016 1(1), 10(1), 32 Unjust Enrichment  
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
875/2016 02.03.2016 6(1), 8(1), 8(2) Unfair Competition, 
Intellectual Property Rights 
The case is relative to the infringement of an EU 
trademark by means of a domain name created 
well after the registration of the aforementioned 
trademark. The company having created this 
domain name had an activity very similar with the 
one of the claimant. The Court concluded that the 
acts of the respondent constituted both a violation 
of an intellectual property right as well as unfair 
competition. Judges reached the conclusion that 
Greek law had to be applied both on the basis of 
art.s 8 par. 1 and 2 and 6 of the Regulation.  
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
1934/2016 21.09.2016 6(1), 8(1), 8(2) Unfair Competition, 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Similar decision to the decision of the Multi-
member court of first instance of Athens 
875/2016. 
Court of App. Pir. 541/2016 20.12.2016 1(1), 2(1), 10(1), 
14(1a), 31, 32 
Unjust Enrichment, Freedom of 
choice 
 
District Civil Ct Ath. 5286/2017 27.09.2017 4(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 
Product Liability 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Ath. 3993/2017 15.05.2017 10 Unjust Enrichment  
Court of 1st Inst. Thess.  16782/2017 30.10.2017 4(3) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Escape clause 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Lar. 61/2017 --.--.2017 31, 32 Application in time  
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Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 821/2017 --.02.2017 1(1), 2(1), 4(3), 31, 
32 
Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Escape clause 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir.  1416/2017 --.--.2017 10(1), 14(2) Unjust Enrichment, Freedom of 
choice 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir.  4133/2017 --.09.2017 1(1), 14(1a), 31, 32 Freedom of choice This case concerned the liability of a shipowner 
resulting from a collision between two ships. Judges 
concluded that Greek law is applicable on the 
basis of an agreement as to its application entered 
after the events giving rise to the damage occurred. 
The agreement is thought to have taken place 
tacitly before the Court. Judges also determined the 
applicable law to the liability of the shipowner. 
Although they qualified this type of liability as 
deriving from the law, they identified the 
applicable law by an application by analogy of 
article 4 par. 3 of Rome I Regulation.  
Court of 1st Inst. Pir.  4996/2017 --.--.2017 1(1), 2(1), 4(1), 4(3) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 
Escape clause, Applicable 
law to the lift of the corporate 
veil  
The case concerned a contract of sale of fuel to a 
shipping company. The legal bases of the 
application were the contract, the theory of the lift 
of the corporate veil and the tort. The issue of the lift 
of the corporate veil is governed by article 10 
GCC which leads to the application of the law of 
the real seat of the company. The judges applied to 
the tort the escape clause of 4 par. 3 of the 
Regulation which led to the application of Greek 
law. The subsidiary company of the claimant was a 
Greek company and the respondents had their 
residence and their main establishment in Greece. 
An additional element in support of the application 
of the escape clause was the fact that the contract 
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concluded between the litigants was also governed 
by the Greek law.  
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 5409/2017 --.12.2017 1(1), 2(1), 3, 10(1), 
32 
Unjust Enrichment  
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
1470/2017 11.01.2017 2, 4, 14(1a), 15 Tort/Delict – General rule, 
Freedom of choice 
 
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath.  
1471/2017 11.01.2017 2, 4, 14(1a), 15 Tort/Delict – General rule, 
Freedom of choice 
 
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
1887/2017 05.04.2017 4(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage 
 
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath.  
1902/2017 26.04.2017 2, 4, 14(1a), 15 Tort/Delict – General rule, 
Freedom of choice 
 
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath.  
1906/2017 26.04.2017 2, 4, 14(1a), 15 Tort/Delict – General rule, 
Freedom of choice 
 
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Pir.  
236/2017 04.01.2017 1(1), 2(1), 3, 10(1), 
32 
Unjust Enrichment  
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Pir.  
3114/2017 30.05.2017,     --
.06.2017 
1(1), 2(1), 3, 10(1), 
32 
Unjust Enrichment  
Court of App. Pir. 28/2017 08.12.2016, 
19.01.2017 
4(3) 
Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Escape clause 
 
Court of App. Pir.  44/2017 12.01.2017, 
26.01.2017 
4(1), 4(2) Tort/Delict – General rule: 




Court of App. Pir.  81/2017 12.01.2017, 
15.02.2017 
31, 32 Application in time  
Court of 1st Inst. Patr. 420/2018 29.06.2018 2, 10, 14(1), 15 Unjust Enrichment, Freedom of 
choice 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 1719/2018 --.--.2018 10(1) Unjust Enrichment  
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 2303/2018 --.--.2018 10(1) Unjust Enrichment  
Court of 1st Inst. Pir.  2431/2018 --.--.2018 4(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir.  2535/2018 --.06.2018 1(1), 2(1), 4(3), 31, 
32 
Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Escape clause 
The case is related to the exploitation of a ship. The 
ship was under the flag of Liberia and the damage 
has occurred in The Bahamas. However, judges 
concluded on the basis of the clause of exception 
that Greek law was applicable. The tort committed 
was relevant to a contract concluded between the 
litigants which was also governed by Greek law. It 
is the clause of exception which also led to the 
application of Greek law to the contract.  
Court of 1st Inst. Pir.  2658/2018 --.--.2018 4(3), 10(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Escape clause, Unjust 
Enrichment 
The judgment resolved different issues among 
which the problem of the applicable law to the 
liability of a shipowner for the claims that are born 
as a result of the exploitation of a ship by a 
charterer. Judges qualified this liability, which 
derives by the law, as extra-contractual. 
Nonetheless, they held that the applicable law to 
this type of liability is determined by an application 
by analogy of art. 25 b GCC and art. 4 par. 4 of 
the Rome I Regulation. Judges considered as well 
the law applicable to the issue of lifting of the 
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corporate veil. This problem is governed by article 
10 GCC which led to the application of the law of 
the real seat of the company. Finally, judges 
resolved the law applicable to the liability of the 
persons having the management of the ships which 
were at the origin of this litigation. They proceeded 
in that respect to a combined application of art.s 
26 GCC and 4 par. 3 of the Regulation. The 
application of the clause of exception led to the 
designation of Greek law. The solution seems 
justified given that there was a pre-existing contract 
between the parties governed by Greek law. In 
addition the companies and the persons involved 
in this case had a close connection with the Greek 
legal order.  
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 3410/2018 --.07.2018 1(1), 1(2), 2(2), 4(3), 
15, 23, 24, 31, 32 
Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Escape clause; applicable law 
to the actio pauliana; 
applicable law to the liability 
of a person who acquires an 
undertaking   
The Court had to resolve a maritime dispute that 
concerned the sale of fuel to a ship. The applicant 
sought with his action the payment of the cost of the 
fuel and compensation for moral damages. The 
fuel was sold to a ship which was later sold to a 
third company. The judges clarified a number of 
issues. They qualified the liability of the person 
acquiring an undertaking as extra-contractual and 
determined the applicable law to it according to 
art. 4 par 3 of the Regulation. The second issue is 
that of the liability of the shipowner for the acts of 
the charterer. This liability is also qualified 
extracontractual but the law applicable to it is 
determined by a combined application of art.s 25 
b GCC and 4 par 4 of the Rome I Regulation. 
Finally, the Court considered that the actio 
pauliana also falls within the material scope of the 
Rome II Regulation and reached the conclusion that 
Greek law was applicable on the basis of the 
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escape clause. The conclusion of the Court was that 
Greek law was applicable in all the 
aforementioned issues.   
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
3008/2018 --.--.2018 1, 2, 3, 6(1), 8(2), 15 Intellectual Property Rights, 
Unfair Competition 
The case concerned an infringement of an EU trade 
mark and the unfair practices of a company who 
took an unfair advantage of the distinctive signs of 
the trade mark of another company selling olive oil. 
Judges invoked directives 2005/29/EC of 11 
May 2005 and 2006/114/EC of 12th December 
2006 in order to qualify the unfair practices. They 
also invoked (EU) 2017/1001 Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 
2017 on the EU trade mark in order to determine 
correctly the questions governed by EU law 
provisions and the ones governed by the 
substantive rules of national law. The national law 
applicable had to be  determined according to the 
rules of Rome II Regulation. They concluded that 
the issues not covered by the 2017/1001 
Regulation and sanctions other than those 
described by the 2017/1001 Regulation are 
governed by the law designated in accordance 
with art. 8 par. 2 of the Rome II Regulation. In this 
case the illegal use of a trademark took place in 
Greece. Therefore, Greek law was deemed to be 
applicable. The action filed was also based on the 
fact that the respondent took an unfair advantage 
of the distinctive signs of the product of the 
claimant. The court applied in that respect art 6 par. 
1 concluding that Dutch law and Belgian law had 
to be applied. They reached this conclusion 
because the product of the respondent was 
exported and sold to the markets of The 
Netherlands and of Belgium. Judges suspended the 
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trial and ordered the litigants to produce a legal 
information as to the content of Dutch and Belgian 
law by the Hellenic Institute of International and 
Foreign Law.  
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Ath. 
3393/2018 06.08.2018 2, 4, 14(1a), 15 Escape clause, Freedom of 
choice 
The case concerned the liability of a bank for the 
sale of perpetual bonds to its clients. The action is 
based both on a contractual basis and on a tort 
committed by the bank. Judges held that Greek law 
is applicable to the tort because, the tortious 
behaviour was connected with the contracts 
concluded between the clients and the bank, which 
were also governed by Greek law. Judges 
reinforced their reasoning as to the application of 
Greek law to the tort by invoking art. 14 par. 1 of 
the Regulation. Such choice of Greek law to the tort 
is in connection with the fact that the claimants 
invoked Greek law and the respondents did not 
challenge that.  
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Pir.  
3420/2018 --.--.2018 4, 4(3) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Escape clause 
The litigation is linked with the exploitation of a 
shipping company. The Court had in this case to 
solve two issues of applicable law. The first was to 
determine the applicable law to the lift of the 
corporate veil of a company. This is governed by 
art. 10 GCC which leads to the application of the 
law of the real seat of the company. The second 
issue was that of the determination of the 
applicable law to the tort. Greek judges had 
recourse to the escape clause of the Regulation (4 
par. 3) which led to the application of Greek law. 
The closest connection with the Greek legal order 
could be justified by the fact that the litigants had 
their main activities in Greece.  
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Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Pir. 
5409/2018 11.12.2018 3, 4, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule  
Court of App. Pir.  581/2018 07.06.2018 4(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage 
The case concerned a contract of sale of fuel to a 
shipping company. The claim was based both on a 
violation of a contract as well as on a tort. The 
Court based its solution both on art.s 4 par. 1 of the 
Regulation and 26 GCC which shows some 
confusion in the reasoning followed. This way of 
reasoning can lead to a confusion between the lex 
loci delicti commissi (art. 26 GCC) and the lex loci 
damni (art. 4 par 1 of the Reg.) It is crucial however 
that both litigants have pleaded their case on the 
basis of Greek law. That’s why the court invoked 
also in support of its conclusion as to the applicable 
law a choice of law made after the moment the tort 
was committed.  
Court of App. Pir.  749/2018 13.12.2018 1(1), 2(1), 4(1), 4(3), 
31, 32 
Tort/Delict – General rule The tort in this case was connected with the sale of 
a ship. Judges proceeded to a combined 
application of art.s 26 GCC and 4 par. 1 & 3 of 
the Regulation. Greek law was determined 
applicable on the basis of the escape clause. 
Although the holding companies involved in this 
litigation had their seat abroad there was a 
multitude of elements showing that the tort was 
more closely connected with the Greek legal order. 
The claimant was domiciled abroad but all the 
involved parties were Greek; the company that 
exercised the management had its real seat in 
Greece (the statutory seat was abroad).  
Court of 1st Inst. Ath. 1130/2019 07.05.2019 4(1), 4(3) Tort/Delict – General rule  
 
292 
Court of 1st Inst. Ath. 1815/2019 29.07.2019 4, 15, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule  
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 32/2019 --.--.2019 1(1), 2(1), 3, 10(1), 
32 
Unjust Enrichment The applicant in this instance sought the payment of 
the consideration for the sale of fuel to a shipowner. 
The claim is based both on a contractual basis and 
subsidiarily on the legal basis of the unjustified 
enrichment. The Court concluded that the law 
applicable to the unjustified enrichment was the 
Greek law (10.1) due to the law applicable to the 
contract of sale of the fuel which was also Greek 
law.  
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 336/2019 --.--.2019 3, 4(3), 10(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Escape clause, Unjust 
Enrichment 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 585/2019 --.--.2019 4(1), 31, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 839/2019 30.05.2019 2(2), 4(3) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Escape clause 
The case is linked with a contract of sale of 
cardboard boxes. The main finding of this judgment 
is the determination of the applicable law to the 
joint liability of a person who acquires an 
undertaking for the debts contracted prior to the 
sale of this undertaking. Judges considered this 
liability as deriving by the law (ex lege) and found 
that it falls within the material scope of the 
Regulation. They found that the applicable law had 
to be determined by the escape clause of art. 4 par. 
3 of the Regulation. They concluded that Greek law 
was applicable.  
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 1278/2019 08.04.2019 1(1), 2(1), 3, 10(1), 
32 
Unjust Enrichment  
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Court of 1st Inst. Pir.  1279/2019 08.04.2019 1(1), 2(1), 3, 10(1), 
32 
Unjust Enrichment  
Court of 1st Inst. Pir.  2019/2019 --.--.2019 4(2), 23 Tort/Delict – General rule: 1st 
rule of displacement 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 2023/2019 28.05.2019, 
11.06.2019 
19 Subrogation Judges have mistakenly applied the specific rule on 
subrogation in that context. 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 2138/2019 --.--.2019 4, 32 Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir.  2601/2019 23.07.2019 1(1), 2, 10(1), 31, 
32 
Liability that derives by the law 
(art. 479 GCC), Unjust 
Enrichment 
The differences brought before the court concerned 
a contract of sale of equipment and of supplies to 
a shipping company whose sole asset was a ship. 
The company having bought the equipment was 
later sold to a third company. The main private 
international law issue solved by the Court was the 
one of the applicable law to the joint liability of the 
person who acquires an undertaking for the debts 
created prior to its sale. Article 479 GCC which 
governs this issue creates a responsibility that 
derives from the law (ex lege). The law applicable 
to this issue was determined by a combined 
application of art. 25 b GCC and art. 4 par. 4 of 
the Rome I Regulation. Judges concluded that the 
law applicable to this issue was the Greek law. The 
claims were based both on a contractual basis and 
on the subsidiary legal basis of the unjustified 
enrichment to which the court applied art. 10 par. 
1 of the Regulation.   




2, 3, 4(1), 15 Tort/Delict – General rule: 








4 Tort/Delict – General rule Judges proceeded to a combined application of 
art.s 26 GCC and 4 of the Regulation. Although the 
claimants are foreign companies, judges 
concluded that the place where the damage 
occurred was Greece because the real seat of 
these companies was in Greece.  
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
Inst. Pir.  
3496/2019 21.10.2019 1(1), 2(1), 10(1) Unjust Enrichment  
Multi-member Ct of 1st 
inst. Pir. 
3658/2019 07.11.2019 4 Tort/Delict – General rule The case arose in the context of a collision of two 
yachts. The main private international law issue 
solved by the Court was the one of the applicable 
law to the joint liability of the person who acquires 
an undertaking for the debts created prior to its 
sale. Article 479 GCC which governs this issue 
creates a responsibility that derives from the law 
(ex lege). According to the judges the law 
applicable to this issue had to be determined by a 
combined application of art. 25 b GCC and art. 4 
par. 4 of the Rome I Regulation. Judges concluded 
that Greek law was applicable to this issue.  
Court of App. Ath. 7120/2019 12.12.2019, 
27.12.2019 
4(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage 
 
Court of App. Pir. 29/2019 06.12.2018, 
16.01.2019 
1(1), 2, 3, 4(1), 15, 
16, 31, 32 
Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, 
Overriding mandatory 
provisions 
The case dealt with a collision of two ships that took 
place in Nigeria. The Court applied art. 4 par. 1 of 
the Regulation and reached to the conclusion that 
Nigerian law was applicable. It dismissed the 
arguments of the appellant that Greek law should 
have been applied either on the basis of art. 4 par. 
2 or 4 par. 3 of the Regulation. According to the 
judges the shipowner company had no link with 
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Greece. The fact that the manager of the damaged 
ship had its main establishment in Greece and that 
the shipowner who provoked the damage also had 
its main establishment in Piraeus were not 
considered as significant enough to trigger the 
application of the escape clause.  
Court of 1st Inst. Pir. 90/2020 --.--.2020 1(2), 4(1), 10(1) Tort/Delict – General rule: 
Place of direct damage, Unjust 
Enrichment 
 
Court of 1st Inst. Pir.  334/2020 --.--.2020 1(1), 2(1), 4(1), 31, 
32 
Tort/Delict – General rule: 










• There is plenty of literature dealing with Rome II in Hungary, but these are often very descriptive and not sufficiently 
analytical to provide answers for the questions below. This is the reason why some questions stayed unanswered. 
• It is important to note that in Hungary most international private law relationships are discussed in the context of 
Act XXVIII of 2017 on international private law689 that applies as a set of default rules for issues not regulated, 
among others, by the Rome II Regulation. 
• Rome II is often discussed from a distinctly European perspective with less or no reference to Hungarian-specific 
context. 
1. Introduction 
• How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State?  
There is no publicly available information on how aware businesses and citizens are. When it comes to practitioners the 
picture is mixed, as explained below.  
• Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State?  
It is hard to generalize as there is no official statistics on the frequency of cases with foreign elements in front of Hungarian 
courts. Academic views are inconsistent on how frequently Rome II or any conflict of laws rules would be applied by the 
courts. According to Bóka, disputes with foreign elements are likely to be rare and hence courts do not have a routine in 
handling these cases. It happens that the court simply disregards the foreign element and bases its decision solely on 
Hungarian law. 690 According to Szabados, however, from the date of accession, even in the absence of an explicit 
provision, the principle of the primacy of EU law applied automatically. Following the adoption of the Rome I and Rome II 
Regulations, the Hungarian legislature repealed the previous autonomous conflict-of-laws rules and referred explicitly to 
the primacy of the Rome I Regulation and the Rome II Regulation. The Rome II Regulation also gained application in 
Hungarian court practice. Courts were correct in not applying the Rome II Regulation to claims related to the violation of 
personality rights.691 




689 Act XXVIII of 2017 on International Private Law (2017. évi XXVIII. Törvény a nemzetközi magánjogról). This act repeals the 
previousDecree Act XIII of 1979 on International Private Law  
690 János Bóka „Jogharmonizációs dilemmák a külföldi jog tartalmának megállapításával kapcsolatban” (2014)  
X(2) Iustum Aequum Salutare   23, 27 http://ias.jak.ppke.hu/hir/ias/20142sz/04.pdf 
691 Tamás Szabados, “EU Private International Law in Hungary, An Overview on the Occasion of the 15th Anniversary of 
Hungary’s Accession to the EU” (2018) 2 Elte Law Journal 41 available at https://eltelawjournal.hu/eu-private-
international-law-in-hungary-an-overview-on-the-occasion-of-the-15th-anniversary-of-hungarys-accession-to-the-eu/   
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• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State?  
The general impression given by the reviewed literature is that academics feel the need for discussing the important aspects 
of Rome II by providing theoretical analysis supplemented with case-law analysis to guide practitioners. However, 
unfortunately there is no evidence to what extent academic discussions are taken into account in practice.  
• Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political 
level?  
At the Insurance Law Subsection of the Hungarian Lawyers Association on the 28th of October 2008, the problem of forum 
shopping has been highlighted on a practical level in the context of road traffic accidents. As it appears, Hungary has a 
large percentage of road traffic accidents with foreign elements, and this gives rise to forum shopping. Practicing lawyers 
pointed out the risk for forum shopping in international torts because there are enormous differences in awarding non-
material damages between countries. For instance, awarding non-material damages to relatives is not possible under 
German law, whereas in other countries clients can get large amounts of compensation on this basis.692 It is obviously in the 
interest of the victim to obtain the highest possible compensation and thus to use the law of the country that would enable 
the achievement of this aim. 
On a doctrinal level it has been highlighted that the applicable law may lead to such a low level of compensation that it 
would even harm human dignity (under Art. 15 para. b) and c) of Rome II Regulation).693 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded matters 
(Art. 1(1)-(2))  
Generally, Hungarian scholars emphasized the need to interpret the key concepts in Rome II according to the rules of this 
Regulation together with the clarification of the rules by the CJEU. They urge the need to depart from interpreting key 
concepts of Rome II according to the understanding of the key concepts developed and established over years by national 
law. This arguably also applies to the category of ‘civil and commercial matters’.694 For instance, the Budapest Court of 
Appeal (in a case referred for preliminary reference C- 102/15) interpreting the provisions of the Regulation according to 
 
 
692 Tibor Pataky, Beszámoló a Magyar Jogászegylet szekcióüléséről, (2008) available at 
https://www.biztositas.hu/hirek-informaciok/biztositasi-szemle/2009-januar/biztositasi-jogi-szakosztaly-ulese.html 
693 Tamás Szabados, „Emberi méltóság és nemzetközi magánjog”, in Katalin Raffai and Sarolta Szabó (eds) Honeste 
beneficare pro scientiaÜnnepi kötet Burián László 65. születésnapja alkalmából (Pázmány Press, 2019) available at 
https://jak.ppke.hu/uploads/collection/207/file/BurianLaszlo65_unnepikotet_2019.pdf 
694 For instance,  László Burián,  „Kodifikálható-e az Európai Unió nemzetközi magánjogának „Általános Része”?” 
(2014) X(2) Iustum Aequum Salutare 7 available at http://ias.jak.ppke.hu/hir/ias/20142sz/02.pdf,  Ildikó Nagyné 





Hungarian law wrongly classified an administrative case as civil695. Some authors even see the unified concepts/definitions 
as tools for creating unified international private law.696  
In terms of defining excluded matters, there is an opinion that Rome II should be applicable for any damages caused during 
negotiation on shares transfer/acquisition under Art. 1(d) on non- contractual obligations arising out of the law of 
companies. Czigler argues for the applicability of Rome I on the transfer of shares, and it follows that Rome II via Art. 12 is 
then applicable for any damages caused during the negotiation (culpa in contrahendo) of the transfer/acquisition.697 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts 31-32)  
The unclear result of the relationship between the entry into force and the various rules on the start of application of Rome II 
caused debates in Hungary. Art. 31 of Rome II provides its applicability on events following its entry into force, that is, 
according to Art. 32 after 11 January 2009. The leading academic interpretation that follows Art. 254(1) TFEU is that 
Rome II Regulation is applicable to events causing non-contractual obligations following 20 August 2007. It follows that 
the Regulation is applicable from 11 January 2009 for events following 20 August 2007.698 Courts do not always follow 
this interpretation. For instance, a judgment P. 24.487/2012/47 in 2017 for a road traffic accident in 2005 wrongly 
applied Rome II (see The list of national case law below).699  
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of “contractual 
obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2)  
Mádl and Vékás emphasize that the contours of non-contractual obligations are not as clear as those of contractual 
obligations. Determining the characterization of culpa in contrahendo can be confusing for Hungarian courts, because 
there is a major difference between the approach of Rome II and the Hungarian Civil Code. The Hungarian Civil Code 
makes the categorization of infringing the obligation to cooperate and inform during negotiations dependent to the 
conclusion of the contract. If following negotiations, the contract is concluded, it will be treated as a contractual matter and, 
if the contract is not concluded, as a non-contractual matter. On the contrary, Rome II treats any infringement that occur in 
the course of contract conclusion as a non-contractual obligation.700 Mádl and Vékás highlighted that in the above situation 
the problem must be considered as a matter of EU law - the application of Rome II must get primacy over Hungarian national 
rules. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3)  
The rule on universal application does not create any special problems in Hungary. The general problems with the 
application of foreign law continue to be relevant: accessibility, interpretation and application of foreign law.  
Accessibility: the unclear nature of accessibility of foreign law under Rome II creates practical problems and academic 
debates in Hungary. How is foreign law going to be accessible? Do courts have ex officio powers, or should the onus be 
 
 
695 See below C-102/15 in the List of national case law. 
696 Katalin Gombos, “A határon átnyúló elemeket tartalmazó jogviták bírói gyakorlata” (2014) 
X(2) Iustum Aequum Salutare15 available at  http://ias.jak.ppke.hu/hir/ias/20142sz/03.pdf  
697 Dezső Tamás Czigler, Az európai nemzetközi (kolliziós) magánjog és családi jog főbb kérdései, Phd thesis 
(Szécshényi István Egyetem, Győr, 2011) 241 – 244 available at 
http://www.sze.hu/~smuk/DoktoriIskola/Fokozatszerzes/CzieglerDT/Disszert%E1ci%F3%20-
%20V%E9gleges%20verzi%F3.pdf 
698 Ferenc Mádl and Lajos Vékás, Nemzetközi magánjog és nemzetközi gazdasági kapcsolatok joga (Elte Eötvös Kiadó, 
2014) available at 
https://regi.tankonyvtar.hu/hu/tartalom/tamop425/2011_0001_527_nemzetkozi_maganjog/ch25s02.html 
699 A similar approach was taken by the Budapest-Capital Regional Court Pf. 641.647/2013/4. See below in the List of 
national case law. 
700 Mádl and Vékás, Supra note 10; László Burián Európai kollíziós jog: Korszak-ésparadigmaváltás a nemzetközi 




on the parties to provide the foreign law to the proceeding court? 701 According to Vékás, although Rome II is mandatory 
for Member State courts, this does automatically entail an ex officio obligation. The mandatory nature of the Regulation 
only means that at the request of the applicant, the court can only apply the Regulation in question. This also means that 
courts will need to refuse the parties request to disregard the applicable law to which the rules of Rome II have led and the 
parties could only ask the court to disregard the applicable foreign law where the parties have forum selection autonomy.702 
Ildikó Nagyné Sándor is of the opinion that Hungarian courts should have ex officio obligation to observe the presence of 
a foreign element in the dispute and to apply EU conflict of law rules. She also recommends that the parties should not have 
the option to choose lex fori instead of the law applicable based on conflict of law rules.703 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and its relationship to other EU private international law 
instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital (7)).  
Hungarian commentators note that the Hungarian Commentary to Brussels I 704 edited by the National Office for the 
Judiciary (Országos Bírósági Hivatal) with Hungarian experts on EU law is useful in explaining many key notions in Rome 
II.705 It has been emphasized that Rome I and Rome II as well as Brussels I are complementary to each other and this could 
be useful in their interpretation. This however leads to another problem, the issue of regulatory overlap between Rome I, 
Rome II and Rome III, and the content of the rules does not always correspond. This led some authors to argue for the need 
of Rome 0.706 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with respect 
to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1):  
Gárdos highlights a discrepancy in Hungarian law and Rome II in identifying the place of direct damage. For instance, 
which law will apply for awarding non-material damages for relatives of a person that passed away following a road traffic 
accident? Under Hungarian law this non-material damage is the direct damage (damage to personality rights) of the 
relatives whereas under Rome II, following the CJEU in C-350/14 this would be classified as indirect damage.707 Thus the 
place of death is taken as the connecting factor for determining the applicable law. Gárdos highlighted the need for unified 
interpretation of the rules of Rome II and recommends following the CJEU’s approach textual interpretation in C-350/14 
Florin Lazar v Allianz SpA, especially considering Art. 2 and recitals 16 and 17 in interpreting Art. 4(1). 708 
 
 
701 Nagyné Sándor, Supra Note 6.  
702 Mádl and Vékás, Supra Note 10. 
703 Nagyné Sándor, Supra Note 6. 
704 Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (recast) 
705 Joghatóság az átdolgozott Brüsszel I Rendeletben, Kommentár (Országos Bírósági Hivatal, 2016) available at  
http://publicatio.bibl.u-
szeged.hu/11525/1/Joghatosag_az_atdolgozott_Brusszel_I._rendeletben___Kommentar_u.pdf  
706 Burián, Supra Note 6.  
707 In Hungarian law, non-material damages are regulated in Section 2:52 of Act V of 2013 on Hungarian Civil Code. 
The regulation is very narrow. Although the Civil Code does not characterise non-material damages as direct, as these 
damages are directly linked to the injured person’s personality rights, they can arguably be called ‘direct’.  
708 Gárdos, Mosonyi, Tomori Law Firm, A kártlritési követelésekre alkalmazandó jog A Róma II rendeeólet szabákyait 




b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims   
There is no available information on this question. 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3)  
There is no available information on this question.  
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
There is no available information on this question. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability:  
Fuglinszky discusses matters of product warranty and Rome II without bringing in the 1973 Hague Convention into a 
theoretical perspective. He notes that Art. 5 of Rome II should be applicable in competition with other rules when goods are 
purchased from non-Hungarian manufacturers. Although product warranty rules result in repair or replacement claims 
directly settled with the manufacturer as opposed to compensation claims for damages caused by faulty products, 
Fuglinszky finds that in the absence of direct EU regulation, Art. 5 of Rome II is the best placed to fill the regulatory gap. This 
is because the relationship between consumers and manufacturers is non-contractual and because some of the aims of Art. 
5 in the recitals could equally be applicable to product warranty.  Naturally, there is always a possibility that Hungarian 
law would be applicable by virtue of Art. 5(2) to the transaction or that Rome I would also apply as the consumer would 
try to enforce its rights with the seller (Rome I) and the manufacturer (Rome II) at the same time. Finally, he notes that the 
content of warranty rights would need to be determined by reference to the applicable substantive law.709 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6)  
In Hungary there is no tradition of awarding damages for competition infringements. This process is too long and 
complicated. Court proceedings would usually involve several instances, many years with associated challenges of 
corporate insolvency and evidentiary problems for proving decade long harms. Perhaps the most significant challenge of 
court disputes is for the claimant to be able to prove the amount of damages sustained and the causal connection between 
the competition infringement and the damages.710 However, Mester notes that this may all change following the recent 
CJEU case C-451/18 Tibor Trans. In this case the CJEU took the law of the affected market as the applicable law and the 
case was thus decided under Hungarian law. Gárdos notes that the applicability of Hungarian law may incentivize 
companies to seek remedies from courts in future in competition disputes.711 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7)  
There does not seem to be any Hungary specific problems with environmental damages claims. Kecskés et al. point to a 
more Europe-wide positive effect of the rules. They note that Art. 7 enables the victim of cross-border pollution to benefit 
from the law that is more favourable to them. From a methodological point of view, the preferential treatment of plaintiffs is 
not compatible with traditional European choice-of-law rules. The authors note that distinctive values such as legal 
predictability, fairness and neutrality, which are being promoted by traditional European choice of law rules “should be 
sacrificed, at least to some degree in the limited area of environmental tort.” The advantage should be given to the 
distinguished principle of substantive justice that would in this case ensure that the polluter pays and that a high level of 
 
 
709 Ádám Fuglinszky „ A termékszavatosség kollíziós jogi minősítése” (2016) 4 Polgári Jog available at 
https://uj.jogtar.hu/login#doc/db/193/id/A1600401.POJ/.%20(2016) 
710 Éva Mária Verebesné dr. Verzár, „A versenyjogi jogsértés folytán fennálló kártérítési követelések sorsa a finn 
aszfaltkartellügy kapcsán hozott ítélet tükrében” (2019) VX (2) Versentükör 90 available at 
https://www.gvh.hu/pfile/file?path=/gvh/kiadvanyok/versenytukor/lapszamok/versenytukor_2019_02&inline=true  
711 Ágnes Mester “A „káresemény bekövetkezésének helye” értelmezése az Európai Unió Bíróságának Tibor-Trans-




environmental protection is set and is preserved. All the above confirm that the provisions of the Rome II Regulation truly 
accomplished the polluter pays principle.712 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13):  
Although Rome II identifies the applicable law arising from the infringement of intellectual property rights in Art. 8(1), Nagy 
highlights that it does not deal with the law applicable to identify the author (who can be considered the original author of 
the intellectual property). Nagy argues in favour of the application of the state of origin (lex originis) instead of the more 
accepted lex loci protectionis.713 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
Again, there do not seem to be any pressing Hungary specific problems. Kovács notes that Art. 9 reflects the principle of 
territoriality that fits within the broader international practice for international or cross-border international actions more 
generally, where normally (although she notes the absence of consensus on this issue) the law of the country would apply 
where the affected company/employer is located. Companies involved in industrial actions are most likely to be 
multinational companies with branches in more than one country or cross-border strike to express solidarity. Kovács 
emphasizes the usual international practice that reflects the principle of territoriality; and take the country of where the 
company affected by the action is located.714 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict in Art. 
4.  
There is no available information on this question.  
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11):  
There is no available information on this question.  
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12):  
The above-mentioned problem (under 2.1) of classifying matters as contractual or non-contractual. 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
 
 
712 László Kecskés et al. “The polluter pays (?) - Compensation for cross-border environmental damages” in: Drinóczi, T; 
Župan, M; Mario, Vinkovic (eds) Law - Regions - Development, Pécs (Faculty of Law, University of Pécs, Faculty of Law, J. 
J. Strossmayer University of Osijek, 2013) available at 
https://www.academia.edu/10530949/Book_chapter_T%C3%ADmea_Drin%C3%B3czi_Mirela_Zupan_eds._Law_R
egions_Development_p_79_-_100_Title_Representation_and_possibilities_of_regions_in_the_European_Union  
713 Csongor István Nagy „A szerzőság kérdése a kollaíziós jogban”  in Katalin Raffai and Sarolta Szabó (eds) Honeste 
beneficare pro scientiaÜnnepi kötet Burián László 65. születésnapja alkalmából (Pázmány Press, 2019) available at 
https://jak.ppke.hu/uploads/collection/207/file/BurianLaszlo65_unnepikotet_2019.pdf 
714 Erika Kovács „Az európai munkajogi kollíziós szabályok elemzése, különös tekintettel a Róma I. Rendeletre”, 6(2) 




15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14):  
The freedom of choice rules is considered good in Hungary and even the Hungarian Act on International Private Law was 
modified to reflect this solution.715  
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that exclusion 
or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22):  
There is no available information on this question. 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of the 
substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual obligations.  
Ildikó Nagyné Sándor sees a problem of national laws having different rules for allowing appeals based on a wrong 
application and interpretation of foreign applicable (substantive) law. She notes that one country may consider this as a 
valid ground for appeal while the other might not, ultimately leading to unfair results and potentially denying parties of their 
important procedural right to appeal.  
Other than this specific issue, Nagyné Sándor talks about several technical and practical issues that should be resolved to 
aid court processes with foreign elements. There needs to be a much better system of communication between Member 
State courts and adequate legal framework and technical requirements to aid the understanding and the provision of the 
content of foreign law. In Hungary, she highlights, the Ministry of Justice should have a separate division dedicated to 
provide support for courts with their pending cases with foreign law and that would also maintain communication with the 
Member State whose laws are applicable in particular cases. According to Nagyné Sándor, these two interventions would 
enable swift acquisition of foreign law and would significantly speed up court proceedings.716 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship to 
the issues addressed at points 16 17 above):  
Hungarian scholars raised an interesting question about the amount of compensation awardable under Art. 15 b) and c) 
of Rome II. It is a theoretically puzzling question whether the public policy clause would result in setting aside the applicable 
law based on Rome II if the amount of compensation awardable under the given national law would harm the human dignity 
of the injured person.717 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16):  
Scholars have noted that although Rome II deals with overriding mandatory provisions in Art. 16, it does not provide their 
definitions and thus, scholars point to the applicability of Rome I as a gap filler but note that it should be interpreted taking 
into account the relevant circumstances.718 It has also been pointed out that Rome II makes compulsory to take into account 
some rules that are not mandatory, effectively then making them mandatory for Member States. For instance, based on Art. 
17, courts need to consider rules of safety and conduct e.g. road traffic rules of a third country, i.e. the place where the tort 
was committed (lex loci delicti commissi). Although these rules do not quality as mandatory provisions within Art. 16, the 
 
 
715 Lajos Vékás „Európai uniós és tagállami nemzetközi magánjog” 61(10) Magyar Jog 589, 595 available  at 
https://www.mokk.hu/regioldal/pdf/linkgyujto/Magyar_Jog/2017-10_Magyar_Jog.pdf, see also Nagyné Sándor, 
Supra Note 6. 
716 Nagyné Sándor, Supra Note 6.  
717 Szabados, Supra Note 5. 
718 Katalin Raffai  „Az imperatív normák jelentőségéről az európai uniós nemzetközi magánjogban” Pázmány Law 
Working Papers 2014/24 available at http://plwp.eu/docs/wp/2014/2014-24_Raffai.pdf  
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regulation makes it mandatory to take them into account. The reason for mandating the consideration of third country rules 
is that courts would be unable to make fair and just decisions on liability without taking them into account. Without mandating 
courts to take into account these rules they would not be taken into account based on the rules of international private law 
that would provide the applicability of the place where the damage occurred (lex loci damni) or the law chosen by the 
parties. In case of collision however between the rules of a third country and the rules of the applicable law the rules of the 
applicable law should prevail.719  
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18):  
This rule is applied frequently in practice given the number of road traffic accidents involving Hungarian citizens but more 
often than applying this rule, the parties reach an out of court agreement (settlement) with the insurer.720 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19):  
There is no available information on this question. 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20):  
There is no available information on this question. 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to persons 
covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business:  
Burián notes the applicability of habitual residence instead of nationality/citizenship in spite of not having a unified 
definition of habitual residence. According to him, although Art. 23 of Rome II defines the notion of habitual residence for 
corporations, these definitions are inapplicable for natural persons. He also notes that it would be impossible to give a 
unified, international private law definition of habitual residence. Instead, the concept needs to be flexible to be able to be 
interpreted in the specific context in which it occurs.721  
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with more 
than one legal system (Art.25):  
Vékás notes the less significant practical role of renvoi nowadays. According to him, there is no need for renvoi in the EU. 
The unified rules of the EU minimized the application of renvoi to third non-EU countries by unified laws of the EU (just as in 
case of unified rules with international convention).722 There is no information on Art. 25.  
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26):  
Regarding the application of the public policy clause, authors point to CJEU case-law on the interpretation of Art. 34 of 
Brussels I Regulation, and to the explanations from recital 32 on the provision.723 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in specific 
areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 29):  
Hungarian scholars did not deal with the specific issue, however, it could be noted here that there are numerous international 
agreements that regulate the above areas in addition to Hungarian domestic and other EU rules, and thus this raises the 
 
 
719 Vékás, Supra Note 27, 596. 
720 Pataky, Supra Note 4. 
721 László Burián „Európai kollíziós jog: Korszak-és paradigmaváltás a nemzetközi magánjogban?” 9, Draft available at 
https://jak.ppke.hu/uploads/articles/12417/file/kollizios_jogegysegesites.pdf 
722 Vékás, Supra Note 27.  
723 Burián, Supra Note 33. 
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practical question of what rules to apply on a case at hand: the Hungarian rules, the international agreements that Hungary 
is a signatory of or EU rules.724  
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on legal 
certainty (where relevant for your Member State):  
Hungary is not a member of the Hague Convention and thus Rome II is the applicable instrument for road traffic accidents.725 
According to Nagy, the fact that some Member States are part of the Convention and some are not is not the most fortunate 
solution as it gives rise to forum shopping.726 This author urges the Commission to reconsider this approach and to use the 
opportunity of a periodic review on the operation of Rome II to revise the current position. He highlights that no empirical 
data is necessary for establishing that the split of the conflict regimes is an unwelcome plight, even if they usually result in 
the application of the same law and that Art. 28 should be amended in such a way that the Regulation has precedence 
over the Convention.727  
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, including 
but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach:  
There was no experience with applying the mosaic approach in practice in Hungary. However, Czigler theoretically notes 
that in case of a multi-state tort, these should be solved separately by applying the relevant substantive rules of a country 
where the damage occurred (so called, issue by issue analysis). If Rome II is read in conjunction with Brussels I, this enables 
the injured to choose between three avenues for obtaining compensation: 1) sue the person who caused injury at its own 
place of habitual residence and apply the substantive rules of the countries where the damages occurred; 2) start damages 
action in the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and apply the substantive rules of the countries 
where the damage occurred; 3) start the damages action in the country where the damage occurred, however, in this case, 
the proceeding court can only award compensation in respect of damages that occurred under its own jurisdiction. Czigler 
concludes that none of the options are ideal. In addition, he notes that even more confusingly Rome II and Brussels I attribute 
divergent meaning to the notion of the ‘event giving rise to the damage’.728 
 
 
724 Interview by Emese Szilágyi with Dr Zoltán Nemessányi, Deputy State Secretary for International Judicial Cooperation 
at the Ministry of Justice, Budapest, 29 March 2017 avaiable at  https://www.jogiforum.hu/interju/157, see also The 
list of EU and internaitonal legal sources between Hungary and other countries that are applicable for judicial 
cooperation in civil cases, Pulsihed by the Ministry of Justice, last update in 2015 avaiable at 
https://igazsagugyiinformaciok.kormany.hu/download/e/1d/e0000/%C3%A1llamok%20%C3%A9s%20egyezm%
C3%A9nyek%20t%C3%A1j%C3%A9koztat%C3%B3%202015%20%20%C3%A1prilis.pdf 
725 Pataky, Supra Note 4. 
726 Ibidem. 
727 Csongor István Nagy “The Rome II Regulation and Traffic Accidents: Uniform Conflict Rules with Some Room for 
Forum Shopping – How so?” (2010)  6(1) Journal of Private International Law 93 available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1737713; Lajos Vékás “About the Rome II regulation, the European Unification of the 
Conflict rules of Torts, in Resolving International Conflicts” in Peter Hay et al. Liber Amicorum Tibor Várady (CEU Press, 
2009).  
728 Czigler, Supra Note 9, 250 – 251. 
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Vékás highlights a legal gap of Rome II that would need to be addressed. Namely, Rome II left out the matter of contributory 
negligence.729  
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that emerged 
in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope of 
the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in cross-border 
situations.  
Vékás and Mádl emphasize that the academia unanimously considers the exclusion of personality rights (private life, 
honour, reputation) from the scope of Rome II as the ‘most unfortunate handicap’ of the Rome II, the approach that needs 
revision.730 The absence of regulation provides opportunities for forum shopping. The authors note for instance that England 
is known for ‘libel tourism’ because, according to the authors, English law presumes the existence of damages when 
personality rights are infringed.  
In the absence of EU rules, in Hungary the rules for violations of privacy rights and rights relating to personality fall under 
Art. 23 of the new Act on International Private Law,731 and these had been inserted here in the absence of EU rules in Rome 
II. The Hungarian solution provides the applicable law as the law of the habitual residence (szokásos tartózkodási helye) 
/registered place of business (székhely) of the injured. However, it also gives a choice of law opportunity to the injured and 
this choice will override the default rule. The injured may choose Hungarian law as the applicable law, the law of the 
habitual residence of the person causing the injury or the law of the place where the injured party has its major business 
interests. It can also be important to know that under Art. 23(3) the above choice of law rules also apply for preventive 
actions to eliminate the danger of infringing personality rights. These solutions are presented here as possible model rules 
for the EU law maker given that, in drafting these rules, the Hungarian drafting team scrutinized the CJEU case law on 
violation of personality rights, especially those committed on the internet.732 
In addition, Vincze notes the new challenges raised by online platforms that operate world-wide and their violations of 
privacy and personality rights. The operation of these platforms raises an important and interesting question as to the legal 
effect of a judgment from a Member State. Could a Member State court oblige the platform to remove harmful content 
posted by users residing in other Member States? This question was recently raised in front of the CJEU in C- 18/18 
Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited.733 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs):  
 
 
729 Vékás, Supra Note 27, 592. 
730 Mádl and Vékás, Supra Note 10, 449. See also Vékás, Supra Note 27, 589 – 602. Vékás, Supra Note 39. 
731 Interview with Dr. Nemessányi, Supra Note 36. See also Csongor István Nagy (2012) “The Word is a Dangerous 
Weapon: Jurisdiction, Applicable Law And Personality Rights in EU Law – Missed and New Opportunities” (2012) 8(2) 
Journal of Private International Law 251. 
732 Ibidem. 
733 Gabriella Anita Vincze, “Joghatósági kihívások a digitális korban. Az interneten elkövetett személyiségi jogi 
jogsértések legújabb fejleményei az EUB előtt” in Katalin Raffai and Sarolta Szabó (eds) Honeste beneficare pro scientia 





There is no Hungary-specific information available on SLAPPs, but one Hungarian organization, the Clean Air Action Group 
joined 118 organizatons in asking the EU for anti-SLAPP measures. They have published the policy paper: Ending gag 
lawsuits in Europe to protect democracy and fundamental rights. The policy paper also refers to Rome II noting that by 
allowing the claimant to select the most favourable substantive law for defamation, Rome II effectively leads to a ‘race to a 
bottom’ leaving victims with the lowest standard of freedom of expression.734 
In regard to SLAPP lawsuits more generally, a recent report prepared for the Academic Network of European Citizenship 
Rights that talks about SLAPP-like lawsuits against Hungarain academics and vexation of civil activities.735 Although the 
report considers the relationship between SLAPP lawsuits and Rome II it does so without specific reference to Hungary. 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays down 
an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability:  
There is no available information on this question. No reference was found in business and human rights academic papers 
to Rome II. 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the suitability 
of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability:  
Hungary has no special civil liability regime, including non-contractual liability for damage caused by artificial intelligence 
or even a legal definition of artificial intelligence. Hence, if the the confict of law rules point on Hungarian law as the 
applicable law, the general rules on non-contradtual liability will apply. In a recent report prepared for the European 
Commission Evans provides the following summary: 
For AI the most important provision is Section 6:535-6:539 of the Hungarian Civil Code that provides the a general strict 
(objective) liability regime (liability for hazardous activities), which covers liability for 'things', such as machinery and 
equipment (without explicitly covering AI or software). According to BDT 2012.2661, an activity is hazardous where a 
relatively minor disorder occurring during the performane of an activity could create a situation threatening to cause serious 
injury (such as a life-threatening injury, injury causing a permanent disability, a permanent deterioration of health or 
substantial damage to property), or where even a minor negligence of the person carrying out the activity could create a 
situation that poses a risk to serious injury. However, a person will not be exempt from liability for reason of an irregularity 
that is due to an unidentifiable reason where such an irregularity occurred within the hazardous activity itself. Such a reason 
could be the faulty, irregular operation of the software of the AI where it causes extra-contractual damage.736 
Whilst there is academic interest in exploring the legal implications of AI, Rome II is very seldome at the center of attention. 
The reason may be, as Udvary notes, that new issues raised by the emergence of AI should be primary solved by relevant 
substantive rules rather than rules on conflict of laws.737 
 
 
734 Ending Gag Lawsuits in Europe Protecting Democracy and Fundamental Rights https://europeanjournalists.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/Ending-SLAPPs-NGO-Policy-Paper-119-FINAL.pdf 
735 Petra Bárd et al. SLAPP in the EU Context, Report for the Academic Network of European Citzenship Rights, May 
2020) avaiable at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ad-hoc-literature-review-analysis-key-elements-
slapp_en.pdf 
736 Tatjana Evans, Civil liability regime for artificial intelligence (Report for the European Parliament, September 2020) 
20,  avaiable  at 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/654178/EPRS_STU(2020)654178_EN.pdf. See 
for a more detailed presentartion of non-contractual liability and AI in Hungarian context Andrea Bocskai-Láng 
„Hungary: non-contractual liability and artificial intelligence” in Annex I of the same Repor: Comparative study on 
national rules concerning non-contractual liability, including with regard to AI. 
737 Sándor Udvary “A non-humán ágensek (intelligens rendszerek) jogi szabályozása – robotok, dedikált rendszerek 
(önvezető autók)” in Árpád Olivér Homicskó A digitalizáció hatása az egyes jogterületeken (Károli Gáspár Univesity of 
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Academics seem particularly interested in liability caused by authonomous vehicles. Horváthy738 warns that the use of 
autonomus vehicles will change the nature of road traffic accidents and that this should be reflected in legislation. Namely, 
while today the negligence or intentional act of the persons concerned (e.g. going above the speed limits, etc.) is dominant 
in judicial decision making, with the arrival of autonomous vehicles using ‘robot drivers’ objective factors such as technical 
reasons, technical problems, etc. are expected to play a much more important role than today. As a result, Horváthy warns, 
product liability claims migh supersede non-contractual liability claims. According to the author, compared to the concept 
of non-contractual damages, the rules of jurisdiction and conflict of laws regarding product liability are already closer to 
the model that focuses on the injured party, however, the specificities of possible product liability claims related to 
autonomous vehicles and artificial  intelligence should also be investigated. He suggests the review of the relationship of 








the Hugarian Reformed Church, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, 2020) available at 
https://ajk.kre.hu/images/doc6/PR/A_digitalizacio_hatasa_az_egyes_jogteruleteken.pdf 
738 Balázs Horváthy “Autonomous vehicles – Challenges for EU private international law” in Judit Glavanits et al. (eds) EU 
Business Law and Digital Revolution: Selected Studies from New Fields of Technology (Széchenyi István University, Deák 
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Findings (only for key cases) 
CJEU 
 
Tibor-Trans Fuvarozó és 
Kereskedelmi Kft. 
V DAF Trucks NV 
Reference for Preliminary 
Ruling C-451/18 
Hungarian transport company 
purchased several trucks 
manufactured by DAF Trucks via 
Hungarian intermediaries (no 
contractual relationship) – DAF 
was part of a cartel and sold 
trucks at inflated price. Collusive 
agreements took place in 
Germany. 
Győr Regional Court of Appeal, 










based on previously 
established infringement 
of competition law 
 
The first instance court refused jurisdiction based on 
Art. 7(2) of Brussels I because the colluding 
agreements took place in Germany.  
In interpreting Art. 7(2) of Brussels I and the place 
where the harmful event occurred, the CJEU also 
looked at the solution of Art. 6(3)(a) of Rome II for the 
law applicable to actions for damages based on an 
act restricting competition, under which the applicable 
law is the law of the country where the market is, or is 
likely to be, affected. The CJEU concluded that in an 
action for compensation for damage caused by 
collusive arrangements on pricing and gross price 
increases for trucks, ‘the place where the harmful 
event occurred’ covers the place where the market 
which is affected by that infringement is located, that 
is to say, the place where the market prices were 
distorted and in which the victim claims to have 
suffered that damage, even where the action is 
directed against a participant in the cartel at issue 
with whom that victim had not established contractual 
relations. Consequently, Hungarian law was 




Hungarian plaintiff company’s 
vehicle suffered damage in 
Germany. Plaintiff asked 








4 (1)  
15 
Damages compensation, 
law applicable for 
calculating interest on the 
sum owed 
Applying Art. 4(1) of Rome II the Hungarian Supreme 
Court decided that in the present case the applicable 
law for determining the entitlement and the amount of 
damages compensation is German law as the place 





Based on Art. 18, German law will determine 
whether direct action against the insurer is available.  
Applying Arts. 2 and 15, the Court concluded that the 
fact that the plaintiff asked for compensation to be 
awarded in Hungarian forints does not justify the 
applicability of Hungarian law. The claim should be 
fully decided based on relevant provisions on 
Germany law applicable for debts owed in foreign 
currency (amount and calculation of interest) (no 





al Court   
No name  
(Hungarian poultry breeding 
company brought damages 
action against an Austrian 
foundation and slaughterhouses s 
for forcing the company to stop 
feather collection from his breed 
due to economic duress)  
First instance judgment: 
G.40.057/2012/118 
Debrecen Court of Appeal 
(Debreceni Ítélőtábla) 
Gf.II.30.106/2015/7.  
Supreme Court (Kúria) 
Gfv.VII.30.183/2015/10 
Constitutional Court:  
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caused road traffic accident with 

















No name (Hungarian tourist 
suffered road traffic accident in 
Greece- run over by motorbike 





4(1) Material and non-material 
damages compensation  
The Hungarian court applied Greek law as the place 
where the damage occurred- where the non-material 
damage was suffered and where the material 









No name (plaintiff and defendant 
Hungarian nationals involved in 
road traffic accident in Hungary 
while the plaintiff was driving a 






4(1) Damages compensation, 
direct again against 
insurer   
The Court applied Hungarian law (Act LXII of 2009 
on compulsory vehicle insurance), in spite of the fact 
that the car was registered and insured in country x. 
Following Art. 4(1) the court reasoned that the 
applicable law is the law where the damage 
occurred, regardless of the location of the infringing 
event and where the indirect consequences of this 
event occurred (no paragraph available).  
CJEU Gazdasági Versenyhivatal v 
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 
Österreich (Plaintiff fined 
defendant for breaching 
competition rules- action for 
recovery of sum not due on the 
ground of unjust enrichment) 
C-102/15  





10 (1) Recovery of sum not due 




This case is interesting because of the mistake that the 
referring Budapest Court of Appeal made in 
interpreting the provisions of Rome II according to 
Hungarian law instead of autonomous interpretation 
of the Regulation. This resulted in the wrong 
classification of the administrative case as civil. 
The CJEU did not question this classification and 
proceeded on the merits of the case.  
AG Whal, giving his opinion in the case noted in para 
4 that ‘For reasons which are not obvious, the 
referring court has not put a question as to whether 
the action before it comes within the scope of the 
regulation. One possible explanation for this, as 
demonstrated at the hearing, might in fact be that, 
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under Hungarian law, such types of action are clearly 
civil matters.’ 
In fact, commentators note, this was an incorrect 
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4(1) Damages compensation, 
direct action against 
Hungarian insurer  
The court wrongly applied Rome II for a road traffic 






• Overall, Italian courts and practitioners appear to be familiar with the Rome II Regulation. Reported cases, 
however, deal for the most part with road accidents and torts otherwise falling within the scope of the general 
rule in Art. 4. In fact, several provisions in the Regulation have never, or very rarely, been specifically 
discussed, let alone applied, in court proceedings.  
• Few scholarly contributions have been published in Italy regarding the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations over the last few years, compared with those published in the years immediately following the 
adoption of the Regulation. This explains, to some extent, why relatively new topics such as the role of 
conflict-of-laws rules in data protection, the relevance of the Regulation to transnational human rights 
litigation involving corporations and the impact of the Rome II Regulation on liability arising out of artificial 
intelligence applications remain insufficiently explored in the country. 
• Italian courts have not experienced any special difficulties in applying the general rule on torts in Art. 4. Hard 
cases, however, such as those relating to double- or multi-locality torts, have not been specifically the object, 
so far, of any ruling.  
• The rules on special torts in Articles 5 to 9 have rarely been discussed by courts in Italy. No reported decisions 
could be retrieved regarding some of the above rules, such as the rule on liability arising from industrial 
action. 
• Similarly, few rulings are known which relate to unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio and pre-contractual 
liability. The single reported case concerning culpa in contrahendo suggests that courts may find it difficult to 
yield rational and predictable results when localising damage resulting from the violation of good faith in 
pre-contractual dealings. 
• Italian courts have very rarely been seised of cases involving the application of Art. 14 on freedom of choice. 
No evidence is available on the frequency with which choice-of-law agreements are actually stipulated with 
respect to non-contractual obligations. 
• Only some of the ‘common rules’ in Chapter V of the Regulation have specifically been the object of 
discussion in judgments given by Italian courts. The issues surrounding the assessment of damage, notably in 
cases involving victims whose habitual residence is in a State other than the forum, have been among the 
most frequently discussed. As regards damages for non-monetary prejudice, Italian courts consider that, 
while the rules governing the said assessment must be taken from lex causae, the standards used by Italian 
courts to quantify such damages on an equitable basis apply, in the country, to domestic and cross-border 
cases alike, regardless of the social and economic conditions of the victim, that is regardless of whether the 
habitual residence of the victim is in a State whose cost of living and social conditions are similar to Italy’s, 
or not.  
• Italian courts follow, in general, a genuinely restrictive approach to public policy. That said, situations arise 
in practice where the normally applicable foreign law must be disregarded out of respect for the fundamental 
principles of the Italian legal system. According to the Italian Supreme Court, this occurs, in particular, where, 
under the foreign law in question, the relatives of the victim of an accident, or some of them, are denied 
compensation as a matter of principle for the suffering resulting from the loss of a loved one, i.e. regardless 
of any assessment of whether the concerned relatives’ ties with the victim would be such as to deserve 
protection through the award of damages.  
1. Introduction 
Italian practitioners are, overall, familiar with the Rome II Regulation. This is true in particular of litigation lawyers and 
in-house counsels in the insurance sector.  
Lacking reliable evidence, the author of this report was unable to assess the extent to which Italian businesses and the 




Italian courts, too, seem to have a fair knowledge of the Rome II Regulation and of the relevant judgments of the Court 
of Justice. Most of the cases decided by Italian courts, however, relate to road accidents, or torts otherwise falling 
within the scope of Art. 4. The provisions on ‘special torts’ (Articles 5 to 9) and those regarding unjust enrichment, 
negotiorum gestio and pre-contractual liability have so far been the object of very few rulings. The same holds true for 
Art. 14 of the Regulation, on freedom of choice. Similarly, little or no evidence exists regarding the application of most 
of the ‘common rules’ in Chapter V, including the rule on multiple liability, direct action against the insurer and burden 
of proof. It is hard to determine in these circumstances the extent to which practitioners in Italy are familiar with the 
Regulation as a whole, rather than some of its key provisions.  
No statistics could be found relating to the application of the Rome II Regulation in Italy.  
The Regulation formed the object of various scholarly works in the years immediately following its adoption. Published 
contributions have been significantly less numerous in the subsequent years. Recent literature mostly consists of case 
notes and short essays focusing on particular topics. No reference work providing an in-depth analysis of the 
Regulation (such as an article-by-article commentary) has been published recently. 
The following issues relating to the law applicable to non-contractual obligations have been among the most debated 
among Italian scholars and in courts: 
• whether, in the event of an accident, the prejudice related to the death of the victim sustained by the relatives 
should be treated as a ‘damage’ for the purposes of determining the applicable law, or rather as an ‘indirect 
consequence’ of the accident: the issue was referred to the Court of Justice by an Italian court, the Tribunal 
of Trieste, and finally settled in Florin Lazar;739  
• whether the foreign law applicable to the liability resulting from such an accident ought to be disregarded on 
grounds of public policy where it is established that, according to the law in question, the close relatives of 
the victim are not entitled, as such, to any compensation: the Italian Supreme Court answered the question in 
the affirmative in a ruling of 2018, analysed below in this report;740  
• whether, for the purposes of assessing the quantum of compensation due for the said prejudice, regard ought 
to be had to the cost of living and other social and economic indicators of the State of habitual residence of 
those entitled to compensation: the Italian Supreme Court replied in the negative in a ruling of 2016, 
illustrated below.741 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
So far, Italian courts have only rarely been seised of cases involving an assessment of the applicability ratione materiae 
of the Rome II Regulation.  
One such case was decided in 2017 by the Tribunal of Trento.742 An Italian company sought compensation from the 
sole director of an English company for monies that the latter proved unable to pay. The plaintiff claimed that the 
company’s insolvency was in fact due to the director’s malfeasance. The Tribunal ruled that the matter fell outside the 
 
 
739  See § 2.2 below. 
740  See § 2.6 below. 
741  See § 2.5 below. 




scope of the Regulation pursuant to Art. 1(2)(d) and relied, instead, on the conflict-of-laws rules on torts in the Italian 
Statute on Private International Law. 
Another ruling, given by the Italian Supreme Court in 2019, is of some interest in this respect.743 The Court apparently 
did not have any doubts as to the applicability of the Rome II Regulation in this case, although, it is contended, the 
issue would have probably required a more careful analysis. A dispute arose between an Italian company and a 
company based in the UK regarding the prejudice caused by the latter in its capacity as enforcement officer for the 
High Court of England and Wales. The claimant was the secured creditor of an Italian company which owed monies 
to two English businesses. In the framework of enforcement proceedings in the UK against the Italian company, the 
defendant organised the sale of an aircraft owned by the latter. This, the claimant argued, resulted in the breach of its 
rights over the aircraft based on a mortgage. The Supreme Court held that the Italian courts lacked jurisdiction. It relied 
for this on Art. 7 point 2 of the Brussels I bis Regulation. It did not deem it necessary to assess whether the liability of a 
private company for acts performed in the exercise of State authority (acta iure imperii) should be deemed to fall within 
the scope of the Regulation. The Court implicitly assumed it did. Since the Court referred to Art. 4 of the Rome II 
Regulation for the purposes of interpreting Art. 7 point 2 of the Brussels I bis Regulation, one may suppose that, had 
the jurisdiction of Italian courts been asserted in the case examined, the Court would have resorted to the Rome II 
Regulation to determine the law applicable to the merits of the dispute. Given that the Regulation only applies ‘in civil 
and commercial matters’, the pertinence of its rules in the case at issue cannot, it is submitted, be taken for granted. 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts. 31-32) 
Italian courts were asked to assess the applicability ratione temporis of the Regulation in a number of instances. This 
mainly occurred, unsurprisingly, in the first years after the Regulation became applicable. With few exceptions,744 
Italian courts showed to be aware of the interpretation of Articles 31 and 32 of the Regulation provided by the Court 
of Justice in Homawoo.745 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
Rare are the cases where Italian courts discussed the notion of ‘non-contractual obligations’ for the purposes of 
determining the applicability of the Rome II Regulation. In some instances, the matter would have deserved a more 
accurate consideration. In 2020, for example, the Tribunal of Siracusa ruled on a claim for compensation brought by 
a person living in Italy who had suffered personal injuries falling down the stairs in a hotel in Paris.746 The woman sued 
the hotel company for negligence, claiming that the carpet covering the stairs had not been properly fixed. The Tribunal 
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction according to Art. 5 point 3 of the Brussels I Regulation but noted in an obiter 
that the substance of the case was governed by French law, pursuant to Art. 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation. The Tribunal 
did not find it appropriate to inquire into whether the alleged liability of the hotel company should rather be 
characterised (for the purposes of jurisdiction, and – where relevant – the applicable law) as contractual in nature, 
i.e. as a liability arising from a breach of the contractual duty of care and protection owed by the hotel to its clients.  
A ruling of the Italian Supreme Court of 2020 provides an additional illustration of the doubts that practitioners 
sometimes raise concerning the distinction between contractual and non-contractual obligations. 747  The case 
concerned the alleged liability of a German doctor and a German medical laboratory for failing to detect a fatal 
cancer. The patient suffering from the cancer used to live in Italy when she was visited by the German doctor, in 
Germany. Her cancer became apparent after she returned to Italy, when it was too late to treat it. The woman’s heirs 
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framed their action in tort and contract, alternatively. The Court, for its part, considered the matter to be contractual in 
nature, noting that the claimants were in fact complaining of the defendants’ negligence in performing the medical 
investigation they had undertaken to carry out in their relationship with the patient. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
Although none of the rulings considered for this report involved the application of the law of a State other than a 
Members State of the EU, Italian courts appear to be aware of the universal character of the Rome II Regulation, just 
like they are – as it is attested by numerous judgments – of the universal character of similar legal instruments, such as 
the Rome I and the Rome III Regulations. 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital 
(7)) 
It is not frequent for Italian courts to refer to the Brussels I bis Regulation, or any of its predecessors, for the purposes of 
interpreting the Rome II Regulation.  
In a ruling of 2018, the Italian Supreme Court relied on the Rome II Regulation as a means to interpret Art. 5 point 3 
of the Brussels I Regulation, on jurisdiction over torts or delicts.748 At issue was whether Italian courts had jurisdiction to 
entertain a case of unfair competition brought by a radio broadcaster based in Trieste against a broadcaster based in 
Slovenia, accused of using its radio signals to disrupt the former’s communications. The Court referred to the special 
conflict-of-law rules on unfair competition in Art. 6 of the Rome II Regulation to state that the damage had occurred in 
Italy, since the acts complained of by the claimant had allegedly affected the competitive relations between the parties 
in Italy, where the audience of the two broadcasters was located.  
No references to the Rome I Regulation were found in the case law of Italian courts relating to the Rome II Regulation. 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art. 4(1) 
As mentioned above, the vast majority of the cases decided by Italian courts under the Rome II Regulation concern the 
general rule on torts in Art. 4. Road accidents cases are, by far, the most numerous. Most of those cases involve a 
rather straightforward application of Art. 4(1). For example, the Tribunal of Florence had no difficulties in ruling, in 
2017, that a claim for damages following a traffic accident in Greece should be decided in accordance with Greek 
law.749 The Court of Appeal of Milan likewise held in 2019 that Hungarian law applied to the liability arising out of 
an accident in Hungary.750  
The interpretation of the term ‘damage’ proved problematic in some early cases. The question arose whether the 
prejudice related to the death of the victim, sustained by relatives living in a country other than the country where the 
accident occurred, ought to be treated as a ‘damage’ for the purposes of Art. 4(1), or rather as an indirect 
consequence of the accident. The judgment of the Court of Justice in Florin Lazar, where the Court endorsed the latter 
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option, put an end to the debate. Italian courts were quick to take note of the Court’s answer and have since consistently 
followed that approach,751 including in tort cases governed by domestic conflict-of-laws rules.752  
On a different note, doubts have been raised in legal literature as regards the localisation of maritime torts, other than 
those falling within the scope of Art. 7. One author, referring to the findings of the Court of Justice in DFDS Torline,753 
suggested that the ship’s flag should assist in the identification of the place of the damage, pursuant to Art. 4(1), in the 
case of intra-vessel torts, i.e., torts that merely affect life on board the vessel concerned, without prejudice for the 
application of the rules in Art. 4(2) and (3).754 As to ‘external’ maritime torts, difficulties arise where the damage 
occurred in areas outside the jurisdiction of any States. The same author opined that regard should be had to the 
implicit rule according to which, where the applicable law cannot be determined otherwise, the law of the country with 
which the tort is most closely connected applies.755  
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art. 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
Italian courts relied on Art. 4(2) of the Regulation in various instances. The interpretation of Art. 4(2) raised no difficulties 
in practice, as illustrated by a ruling of 2019 given by the Tribunal of Reggio Emilia.756 A car accident occurred near 
Barcelona, in Spain, caused by the negligence of the driver, with no other vehicles being involved. The passenger 
suffered serious personal injuries as a result of the accident. As the driver and the passenger had their habitual 
residence in Italy at the time of the accident, the Tribunal ruled that Italian law was applicable. The Tribunal 
acknowledged that neither the company which owned the car nor the car’s insurer were based in Italy, but considered 
that the latter circumstances do not affect the operation of Art. 4(2) of the Regulation. 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art. 4(3), and 
Italian courts have, so far, never applied the escape clause provided for in Art. 4(3). In fact, the latter provision has 
seldom been invoked in court proceedings in the country. Arguably, litigation lawyers are aware that the provision is 
meant to apply exceptionally, and that strong arguments must be put forward to displace the rules in Art. 4(1) and (2). 
In a case decided in 2014, regarding a road accident which occurred in Romania, the Tribunal of Bologna ruled that 
the fact that the car involved was registered in Italy, and insured by an Italian insurer, was not enough a reason to 
exclude, on the basis of Art. 4(3), the application of Romanian law.757  
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts 
The localisation of torts unrelated to car, or similar, accidents has been discussed in cases where jurisdiction, rather 
than the applicable law, was the main concern, or as the subject of scholarly reflection. Two scenarios attracted 
particular attention in this respect, namely prospectus liability and the liability of rating agencies towards issuers and 
investors.  
The Italian Supreme Court decided in 2011 a cases involving an assessment of whether Italian courts had jurisdiction 
to rule on a matter of prospectus liability.758 The case originated in a claim for compensation brought by an Italian 
asset management company against a number of defendants based in Ireland and Switzerland The claimant had 
purchased the shares of an undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities established in Ireland. It did 
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so on reliance of a prospectus that later proved false, when the claimant discovered it was one the victims of the 
infamous fraud orchestrated by Bernie Madoff. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had played an active role in 
drafting and circulating the prospectus and had thus contributed to causing the damage. The Supreme Court asserted 
the jurisdiction of Italian courts on the basis of Art. 5 point 3 of the Brussels I Regulation. It noted that the event giving 
rise to the damage occurred in Italy, for the purchase had been offered to the buyer in Italy, and the prospectus itself 
had been presented to the latter there. The Court added that the damage, too, occurred in Italy, arguing that the 
purchased shares should be deemed to be localised in Italy in accordance with the Place of the Relevant Intermediary 
Approach (PRIMA), as expressed in in Art. 9 of Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements.  
The ruling prompted mixed reactions among commentators. One author argued that the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of Article 5 point 3 of the Brussels I Regulation was mainly driven by a concern for the protection of the Italian market 
and investors based in Italy.759 The same author welcomed the use of PRIMA, stressing that other connecting factors 
would fail to reflect the peculiar features of dematerialised shares, but criticised the Court for localising the shares at 
the place where the deposit and custodial accounts were kept. The Financial Collateral Directive, the said author noted, 
clearly identifies the relevant intermediary, but does not determine its location.760  
The law applicable to the liability of rating agencies was the object of debate among scholars. One author expressed 
the view that the liability of rating agencies would be most conveniently governed by the law of the country where the 
market in which the rated title is being traded761. To achieve that result, this author argued, one should be ready to 
resort to Art. 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation.  
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
No reported cases could be found in Italian databases applying, or considering, Art. 5 of the Rome II Regulation, on 
product liability. In the absence of documented practice, the impact of the provision on the professionals and consumers 
concerned remains difficult to assess. The relevance of the alleged shortcomings of Art. 5 is equally hard to evaluate. 
Those shortcomings result, among other things, from the alleged lack of clear guidance regarding the notion of 
marketing for the purposes of Art. 5762, and from the uncertainties that surround the treatment of product liability cases 
where the defective product was not marketed in any of the States specified in Art. 5(1)(a) to (c).763  
Incidentally, no reported ruling could be retrieved in Italian databases regarding the application of Art. 63 of the 
Italian Statute on Private International Law, the domestic conflict-of-laws rule on product liability which existed prior to 
the adoption of the Rome II Regulation.  
Italy is not a party to the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability. 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
The practice of Italian courts concerning the rule in Art. 6 on unfair competition and acts restricting free competition is 
very limited. No judicial decision applying Art. 6 of the Regulation could be found in databases. As observed above, 
the Italian Supreme Court did refer to Art. 6 in a judgment of 2018, but only for the purposes of interpreting the special 
rule on jurisdiction in matters relating to torts or delicts in the Brussels I Regulation. 
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Art. 6, it is submitted, may call for application outside court proceedings, in particular where an undertaking is believed 
to carry out unfair commercial practices, and associations of consumers call for the intervention of the competent 
competition or consumer protection authorities.  
The Italian Competition Authority has been occasionally seised of matters with a cross-border element. The Authority 
never explicitly referred to Art. 6 of the Rome II Regulation in relation to such matters. In some instances, however, it 
would seem that the Authority implicitly relied on that provision. In a decision given in 2016, for example, the Authority 
found that a low-cost airline company based in Norway was providing to consumers, via the Italian version of its 
website, misleading information on credit card charges.764 It held that this was in breach of the Italian rules on unfair 
commercial practices and imposed a fine on the airline company. Plausibly, the Authority assumed that Italian law 
applied in the circumstance given that the practice affected the collective interests of consumers in Italy, and considered 
that that was enough to bring the matter with the purview of its regulatory powers. 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
No ruling discussing the application of the special conflict-of-law rule for environmental damage in Art. 7 of the 
Regulation could be retrieved in case law databases. It is difficult, in these circumstances, to assess the practical 
relevance of the questions raised by scholars with respect to this provision One such question is about the causal link 
between an environmental damage and a ‘damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage’: it 
is unclear how closely should a personal damage, or a damage to property, be linked to an environmental damage 
in order to trigger the application of Art. 7 both to the environmental damage itself and to the connected personal or 
property damage. 765 The same author observed that the relevance to Art. 7 of authorisations issued by public 
authorities in the country in which the event giving rise to the alleged damage occurred remains unclear, that is, 
whether, outside the case where the governing law is the law of the country where the polluting event took place, the 
authorisations in question should be characterised as overriding mandatory provisions under Art. 16, as rules of 
conduct within the meaning of Art. 17, or otherwise.766 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
The case law of Italian courts regarding Art. 8 of the Rome II Regulation, on the law applicable to the infringement of 
intellectual property rights, consists of few cases.  
The Tribunal of Bologna issued in 2018 a ruling involving a rather straightforward application of Art. 8.767 An Italian 
company seised the Tribunal seeking a declaration that the use of a certain word to describe the goods advertised in 
its website did not amount to the infringement of German trademarks owned by a German company (the latter had 
complained precisely of such use). The Tribunal resorted to Art. 8 and applied German law to rule on the substance of 
the case.  
A few months earlier, the Tribunal of Turin decided a slightly more complex case.768 An Italian company, the holder of 
the television rights for Italy of several TV series, seised the Tribunal of Turin complaining that excerpts of those series 
had been unlawfully uploaded on an online platform, operated by a French company, by individual users of the 
platform itself, and had thus become available to other users without its authorisation. The Tribunal held that the alleged 
liability of the platform operator was to be assessed on the basis of Italian law. It relied for this both on Art. 8 of the 
Rome II Regulation and on Art. 4, noting that, in the circumstances, Italy was both the country where the protection of 
the rights at issue was claimed and the country in which the damage occurred. The ruling is illustrative of the doubts 
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surrounding the characterisation of rights over digital and other immaterial content for the purposes of Art. 8 of the 
Regulation. 
The issue was raised by an author of the characterisation, for the purposes of the Rome II Regulation, of non-contractual 
obligations arising out of the infringement of undisclosed know-how and trade secrets within the meaning of Directive 
2016/943. 769  While Italian law protects trade secrets through the rules on intellectual property law, the law 
applicable to the liability resulting from the infringement of such secrets does not necessarily come with the purview of 
Art. 8 of the Regulation, the said author submitted, and may rather need to be addressed in light of Art. 6, on unfair 
competition.770  
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
No rulings are reported in caselaw databases regarding the liability for damages caused by industrial action, pursuant 
to Art. 9 of the Rome II Regulation.  
 
2.3  Chapter III - Unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio and culpa in contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
The author of this report is not aware of any case decided by Italian courts involving the application of Art. 10 of the 
Rome II Regulation, on unjust enrichment. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
In 2018, the Tribunal of Bergamo ruled on a case of negotiorum gestio under Art. 11 of the Regulation.771 An Austrian 
company seised the Tribunal of Bergamo seeking the reimbursement of the costs it had borne to provide assistance to 
a racing cyclist who had been the victim of an accident during a cycling race in Austria. The cyclist, who lived in Italy, 
was transported by the Austrian company’s helicopter to a nearby hospital. The Tribunal noted that the decision to 
transport the cyclist was taken at a time when the cyclist was unable to express his will. The Court argued that the 
relationship between the parties could not be characterised as contractual in nature and should rather be labelled as 
negotiorum gestio within the meaning of Art. 11 of the Rome II Regulation. Specifically, the Tribunal considered that 
the case fell under Art. 11(3), since the assistance provided did not concern a relationship existing between the parties 
and the parties did not have their habitual residence in the same country when the event occurred. The Tribunal ruled, 
accordingly, that the defendant’s liability be assessed against the ‘law of the country in which the act was performed’, 
i.e. Austrian law.  
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
The Tribunal of Udine decided in 2018 a case of pre-contractual liability involving the application of Art. 12 of the 
Rome II Regulation.772 A Slovenian company wished to submit a tender for the realisation of a storing facility at a port 
in Slovenia. It contacted an Italian company, proposing that, had the contract been awarded, the two would have 
joined forces to perform the resulting obligations. The contract was in fact awarded to the Slovenian company, but the 
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two companies eventually failed to enter into a cooperation agreement. In fact, the Italian company complained that, 
under to the Slovenian company’s tender, the remuneration for the work due to be carried out by the Italian company 
itself was significantly lower than originally discussed. The Slovenian company ultimately entered into a cooperation 
agreement with another undertaking. The Italian company sued the Slovenian company before the Tribunal of Udine, 
claiming that the defendant had breached its duties of good faith in pre-contractual dealings. The Tribunal ruled that 
Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation was not applicable in the circumstances, since the law that would have been 
applicable to the cooperation contract, had it been entered into, could not be determined. It turned then to Article 
12(2)(a), according to which culpa in contrahendo is governed by the law of the country in which the damage 
occurred. The Tribunal concluded that Italian law applied, noting that the plaintiff alleged to have sustained the 
prejudice in Italy, where it was based. 
The ruling, it is submitted, provides an illustration of the difficulties inherent in localising damage in pre-contractual 
liability cases. The Tribunal apparently found itself unable to carry out such localisation otherwise than relying on the 
plaintiff’s own allegations. Without stating this explicitly, the Tribunal plausibly considered that – in the absence of 
stronger geographical indicia – the prejudice resulting from the alleged breach of good faith could not be localised 
elsewhere than in the country where the affected party was established, i.e. Italy in the circumstances. This seems to 
confirm the fear expressed by some authors, according to which the known difficulties raised by the localisation of pure 
economic loss, as addressed by the Court of Justice in Marinari and Kronhofer, among others, are set to resurface in 
the context of pre-contractual liability under a rule such as Art. 12(2)(a) of the Rome II Regulation.773 
2.4  Chapter IV - Freedom of choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
Few reported cases could be found where Italian courts applied, or considered, Art. 14 of the Rome II Regulation, on 
choice of law.  
In a ruling of 2012, regarding the liability resulting from a road accident in Spain, the Tribunal of Varese began by 
observing that Spanish law would normally be applicable pursuant to Art. 4(1) of the Regulation.774 It considered, 
however, that the parties to the dispute had agreed on the application of Italian law in accordance with Art. 14. The 
parties themselves did not explicitly stated their intention to have Italian law applied, but their attorneys – the Tribunal 
noted – consistently referred throughout the proceedings to Italian rules, as well as to concepts used in the Italian legal 
system and to the case law of Italian courts. In the Tribunal’s view, this was enough to concluded that a choice of Italian 
law pursuant to Article 14 had occurred in the circumstances. 
The ruling is illustrative of the uncertainties underlying the treatment of accords procéduraux, i.e. the agreements 
whereby the parties to a dispute stipulate – often tacitly – that a given law, notably the law of the forum, be applied 
to the merits of the dispute in a particular set of proceedings. The view has been expressed in literature that, failing a 
specific provision (such as the one found in Art. 7 of the Hague Protocol of 2007 on the law applicable to maintenance 
obligations), the agreements in question can only be enforced insofar as they comply with the relevant provisions on 
freedom of choice (Art. 14 of the Rome II Regulation, in the circumstances).775 The statements made by the parties’ 
attorneys in the course of the proceedings should not be lightly presumed to convey the will of the parties on an issue 
such as the identification of the law applicable to the legal relationship at issue. In fact, one thing is to pleas the law 
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and present the facts (that is what attorneys are meant to do), and another is to agree that the substance of a legal 
relationship should be governed by a law other than the law that would normally apply to the case. This means that, 
in order to assess whether such an agreement was validly concluded by the parties’ representatives, one should 
determine whether the latter were granted the power to shape the substance of the parties’ relationship, rather than 
simply assisting them in the framework of court proceedings.   
Other courts took a more cautious posture towards choice of law. In a ruling of 2014, concerning a road accident in 
Romania, the Tribunal of Bologna dismissed an argument whereby the parties had tacitly chosen Italian law pursuant 
to Art. 14 of the Rome II Regulation.776 An argument to that affect had been advanced on the ground that the victim of 
the accident had agreed to undergo a medical examination at the premises of the insurance company in Italy, and 
that an out-of-court settlement had been negotiated in Italy between the parties. The above circumstances, the Tribunal 
observed, did not provide evidence of the existence of a choice-of-law agreement between the parties.  
Due to the limited number of reported cases relating to Art. 14, it is hard to appraise the practical relevance of the 
uncertainties which, according to scholars, surround this provision. Those uncertainties concern, in particular: the notion 
of ‘commercial activity’ for the purposes of Art. 14(1)(b), i.e., whether it includes activities other than those carried out 
in the field of industry or trade, such as the activities of artistic performers or athletes, or those of a company manager; 
the admissibility of dépeçage, as under Art. 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation, e.g., where the contemplated damage is 
likely to occur in two or more States, and the parties wish to have the various portions of the damage governed by the 
law of the country in which the portion concerned occurred; and the law applicable to the choice-of-law agreement 
itself, i.e. whether the approach in Art. 3(5) of the Rome I Regulation should be followed also in the framework of Art. 
14 of the Rome II Regulation.777 
2.5  Chapter V - Common rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art. 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
Italian courts have very rarely discussed the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ from the scope of the Rome II 
Regulation, pursuant to Art. 1(3).  
A ruling of 2017 by the Tribunal of Florence noted that it is not for the law specified in accordance with the Regulation 
to decide whether the victim of a road accident should jointly sue the person whose liability is at stake and the insurer.778 
Procedural issues, the Tribunal observed, lie outside the scope of the Regulation and are governed by the lex fori. 
No specific reference could be found in reported cases to issues of formal validity and burden of proof as dealt with 
under Articles 21 and 22 of the Regulation. 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
The approach of Italian courts to the pleading, proof and application of foreign law may be summarised as follows.  
Based on Article 14 of the Italian Statute on Private International Law, the seised court is required to apply the pertinent 
conflict-of-laws provisions by its own motion, as soon as it is clear that the conditions for the application of such 
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provisions are met in the circumstances. If the issue of the applicable law is indeed raised ex officio, the parties are to 
be given an opportunity to express their views on the matter.  
If the case appears to be governed by a foreign law, it is the task of the seised court to ascertain the content of the 
relevant provisions: the parties are of course permitted to provide the court with the information they consider to be 
useful (translations, affidavits, etc.), but they will not suffer any adverse procedural consequences if they fail to do so.  
For the purposes of determining the content of the relevant foreign rules, the seised court may, basically, ask for the 
assistance of the Ministry of Justice, appoint an expert, or seek the cooperation of the consular or diplomatic 
representations in Italy of the State whose law is applicable.  
According to Article 15 of the Statute on Private International Law, the court must ensure that the foreign rules in 
question are interpreted and applied consistently with the manner in which they are interpreted and applied in the 
State where they belong. The incorrect interpretation or application of the applicable foreign law justifies an appeal 
on point of law. 
The practical operation of the described approach is not entirely satisfactory, in particular as regards the ascertainment 
of foreign law. Information collected through the Ministry of Justice and diplomatic or consular representations often 
consist in the mere reproduction of legal texts, without any background information and without an illustration of the 
way in which the texts in question are normally understood and applied in practice. Expert opinions, for their part, do 
provide such extra elements, but the drafting of such opinions obviously requires time, and the costs are borne by the 
parties (in practice, the parties are expected to remunerate both the court appointed expert and their own experts, if 
they wish to appoint any). Tariffs are set by the Ministry of Justice for opinions drafted by court-appointed experts, 
which the appointing court is not permitted to derogate from. As the remuneration owed to court-appointed experts 
pursuant to those tariffs is significantly lower than the fair market value of similar opinions by practicing lawyers or other 
experts, potential experts are often unwilling to make themselves available for court appointments. 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
Apparently, no special difficulties were experienced by Italian courts in relation with Art. 15 of the Rome II Regulation. 
In most of the cases where the scope of the lex causae was the object of discussion, the above provision did not prove 
problematic. An illustration may be found in a ruling given in 2016 by the Tribunal of Bolzano regarding the liability 
arising from a ski accident which occurred in Italy, caused by a child whose habitual residence was in Germany.779 
Having found that Italian law was applicable in accordance with Art. 4(1) of the Regulation, the Tribunal resorted to 
Italian law for the purposes of determining – pursuant to Art. 15(a) and (b), respectively – whether the parents should 
be held liable for the acts performed by the child, and whether they should be deemed to be exempt from liability on 
some grounds, as they claimed in the proceedings.  
Rather, doubts were expressed as to the relevance of the lex causae to the assessment of damage, as provided for in 
Art. 15(c).  
As regards damages for non-monetary prejudice suffered as a result of an accident, Italian courts appear to be aware 
that the rules governing the assessment of those damages must be taken from lex causae. Conversely, doubts have 
been raised, for some time, as to whether the standards normally used to quantify such damages on an equitable basis 
apply also to cross-border cases, notably where the habitual residence of the victim is in a State whose cost of living 
and social conditions significantly differ from Italy’s. In fact, the view was put forward (and occasionally endorsed by 
courts),780 that in determining the quantum of damages regard ought to be had, inter alia, to the social and economic 
conditions of the victim’s State of residence. In practice, according to this view, the amount resulting from the 
application of the standards normally used in Italy should be reduced in cases involving victims living in poorer 
countries. The Italian Supreme Court rejected the latter view in a ruling of 2016, regarding a case to which, 
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incidentally, the Regulation was not applicable.781 Elaborating on a judgment of 2012,782 the Supreme Court held 
that a person’s right to compensation should be enforced irrespective of their economic conditions. To do otherwise, 
the Court observed, would result in unlawful discrimination.  
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16) 
Overriding mandatory provisions have only seldom been referred to by Italian courts in cases regarding non-
contractual obligations. Two rulings, both decided under the Italian Statute on Private International Law, rather than 
the Rome II Regulation, are relevant in this respect. In 2012, the Italian Supreme Court held that the Italian provisions 
mandating a particular public body (Ufficio Centrale Italiano) to compensate damages resulting from accidents 
involving a car registered abroad should be characterised as overriding mandatory provisions and should accordingly 
apply to any matters within their scope, whatever the law specified under the pertinent conflict-of-laws rules.783 Lower 
courts have since reiterated this finding in cases with the purview of the Rome II Regulation.784  
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18) 
No rulings could be found which specifically discuss the rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable in 
Art. 18 of the Rome II Regulation.  
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19) 
No explicit references to the rule on subrogation in Art. 19 of the Rome II Regulation could be retrieved in caselaw 
databases.  
That said, a ruling rendered by the Court of Appeal of Milan in 2018 appears to raise precisely an issue of 
subrogation.785 In 2010, an accident occurred at the Lugano Airport caused by the negligence of an employee of the 
Italian company in charge, as a sub-contractor, of aircraft-refuelling services. The accident resulted in the spill-over of 
fuel in a river nearby, for which the contractor’s insurer paid the Municipality of Lugano the amount needed for clean-
up and remediation. Years later, the insurer sued the Italian sub-contractor in Italy, seeking the repayment of that 
amount. The Italian company argued that Swiss law applied to the liability arising from the accident, and that 
repayment was foreclosed according to the relevant Swiss rules. At first instance, the Tribunal of Monza, too, ruled 
that Swiss law applied, but did so on the ground that Swiss law governed the insurance contract under which the 
insurer had satisfied the Municipality. The Court of Appeal affirmed the Tribunal’s findings on the latter point. None of 
the rulings mentioned Article 19 of the Rome II Regulation. 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art. 20) 
The rule on multiple liability in Art. 20 of the Regulation has not been the specific object of any known ruling given by 
Italian courts.      
2.6  Chapter VI - Other provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art. 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business 
No ruling could be found in caselaw databases discussing the notion of habitual residence in detail.  
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As regards natural persons, Italian courts generally rely on formal attestations of residence issued by the competent 
Municipalities, or similar authorities, rather than carrying out an inquiry aimed at determining the place where the 
individual concerned established, with the intention that it should be of a lasting character, the permanent or habitual 
centre of his or her interests.  
In none of the cases examined for this report the seised court was asked to determine the habitual residence of a legal 
person or other body. 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art. 24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art. 25) 
No difficulties have been detected in connection with Art. 24 of the Rome II Regulation, on the exclusion of renvoi.  
None of the rulings considered for this report involved the application of Art. 25, on States with more than one legal 
system. The familiarity of Italian courts with the identical rule in Art. 22 of the Rome I Regulation and, prior to that, Art. 
19 of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, suggests that the application of 
the above provision should not give rise to particular difficulties. 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
Italian courts are aware that foreign law (or a foreign judgment) may not be given effect in Italy where to do so would 
contravene the fundamental principles of the Italian legal system. The Italian Supreme Court often stressed that the 
public policy defence may not be raised unless it is established that, in the circumstances, the application of the foreign 
law in question would be irretrievably at odds with the core values of the Italian legal order, notably as they result from 
the Italian Constitution and the relevant international conventions in force for Italy (in particular, in the field of human 
rights). This approach equally applies to tort cases and cases touching other areas of law, and is generally followed 
by Italian courts regardless of whether the normally applicable foreign law was determined, in the circumstances, 
pursuant to domestic rather than uniform conflict-of-laws rules. 
Various tort cases are known where Italian courts were asked to disregard foreign law, because of its alleged 
inconsistency with public policy. Those moves were dismissed in several of those cases. In a judgment of 2017, for 
example, the Tribunal of Trento dismissed the claimant’s submission that the application of Lithuanian law – which the 
Tribunal had found to govern the liability resulting from a road accident occurred in Lithuania – would violate the 
public policy of Italy.786 The claimant complained that the amount of damages he was entitled to in accordance with 
Lithuanian law rules was significantly lower than the amount he would obtain under Italian law. The Tribunal ruled that 
a difference as to the quantum of damages between the lex causae and the lex fori is not in itself a sufficient reason to 
trigger the public policy exception. The latter finding was upheld, and further reinforced, by the Court of Appeal of 
Trento in a ruling of 2020.787 
Over the last few years, the Italian Supreme Court issued various rulings clarifying the scope of Italian public policy in 
the field of torts. Two of them are particularly significant for the purposes of this report. 
The Court held in 2017 that Italian public policy no longer precludes as a matter of principle the recognition of foreign 
judgments under which the victim of a tort is awarded punitive damages.788 Rather, a case-by-case analysis is needed 
of the grounds on which damages were awarded, and the interests pursued. Specifically, foreign judgments awarding 
non-compensatory damages may be recognised in Italy provided they rest on a particular provision of law, or a 
recognisable rule of the relevant legal order, and aim to ensure the effective realisation of an important policy. The 
finding, it is submitted, applies with the necessary adaptations to the application, via the relevant conflict-of-laws rules, 
of such foreign law as provides for the award of punitive  damages. 
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In 2018, the Italian Supreme Court ruled that the public policy of Italy opposes the application of a foreign law under 
which the close relatives of the victim of a fatal accident are denied as a matter of principle any compensation for the 
suffering sustained as a result of the death of a loved one.789 In the circumstances, Serbian law, which applied to the 
case, provided that the spouse of the victim and his children were entitled to damages, but made compensation to 
other relatives, namely the victim’s brothers and sisters, contingent on cohabitation at the time of the accident, and 
simply excluded the right of other relatives still, such as grandchildren, to obtain damages. The Court stressed that the 
right to reparation for the suffering entailed by the death of a next of kin is an aspect of the legal protection of family 
relations. It held that to deny such reparation would amount to disregarding the personal and emotional bonds between 
the relatives concerned and the deceased. This, the Court noted, would be inconsistent with the value recognised by 
the Italian legal system to family ties, as attested by the Italian Constitution. The Supreme Court conceded that the 
fundamental principle of family protection, including by the award of damages in case of harm, does not imply that all 
relatives be entitled to compensation, whatever the circumstances, for the suffering resulting from the loss of a loved 
one. Indeed, the existence (and the extent) of each relative’s right to reparation depends on a range of factors, such 
as, notably, the nature and strength of their ties with the deceased. Indeed, cohabitation is among the relevant indicia, 
but it should not be treated as decisive in itself. A rigid rule in this respect would in fact jeopardise the protection of 
such non-cohabitating brothers and sisters who entertained meaningful ties with the deceased. A general exclusion of 
grandchildren from those entitled to reparation would involve, the Court argued, a similar danger and should 
accordingly be disapplied on grounds of public policy. 
Whatever the grounds, where the public policy defence is raised, the application of the normally applicable foreign 
law is excluded, and the issue arises of which rules should govern the matter subsidiarily, i.e. instead of the law specified 
under the relevant conflict-of-laws provisions. 
As the latter issue is not dealt with in the Rome II Regulation, the generally accepted view in Italy is that regard ought 
to be had to the domestic provisions on public policy.790 According to Art. 16(2) of the Italian Statute on Private 
International Law, the seised court must turn to the law designated under a different connecting factor, if available, 
applicable to the case, which may in fact be a foreign law. The lex fori will only apply as such where the described 
process fails, notably because no other connecting factors are provided under the pertinent conflict-of-laws rule, or 
because such alternative connecting factor results in the designation of the same law as was ousted under the public 
policy defence, or in the designation of another law whose application would equally offend the core values of the 
forum. 
While the practice of Italian courts does not provide evidence of any special difficulty in this connection, the lack of a 
uniform rule in the Rome II Regulation dealing with the identification of the subsidiarily applicable law may in some 
circumstances give rise to doubts and concerns. It is submitted that the Italian solution, though inherently complex, has 
the advantage of preserving the effet utile of the Regulation: for instance, if the law chosen by the parties pursuant to 
Art. 14 is disregarded on public policy grounds, then, instead of directly resorting to the lex fori, the seised court would 
turn to Art. 4 (or the special conflict-of-laws rule applicable in the circumstances) and apply the law specified 
thereunder. 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
Very few indications could be retrieved in the case law of Italian courts regarding the interaction between the Rome II 
Regulation and other EU or international legal instruments.  
A ruling given in 2009 by the Tribunal of Turin provides an illustration of the kind of difficulties that may arise from the 
coexistence of conflict-of-laws rules and conventions laying down uniform rules of substantive law. 791 An Italian 
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company seised the Tribunal of Turin complaining about the acts of unfair competition allegedly committed in Japan 
by an English company, which involved an infringement of the former’s intellectual property rights. The Tribunal did not 
refer to any conflict-of-laws rules and resorted instead to the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property 
of 1883, without considering whether, in the circumstances, the domestic law specified under the pertinent conflict-of-
law rules could play a role (a residual one, as the case may be). 
2.7  Comments on other practical problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
has been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
Italy is not a party to the Hague Convention of 1971 on the law applicable to traffic accidents. 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach 
Some of the problems that scholars predicted, or warned about, in their analyses of the Rome II Regulation have not 
(yet) manifested themselves in the documented practice of Italian courts.  
This applies, in particular, to the treatment, under Art. 4, of double- or multi-locality torts. The mosaic approach 
advocated in the report accompanying the Commission’s proposal for what would become the Rome II Regulation 
was criticised by several authors, in that it fails to consider that the law of torts is not only concerned with the 
consequences of a tort (which might in fact express themselves in several countries, and thus be reasonably submitted 
to the laws of such countries, distributively), but also to the bases of tort: the latter call as such for a unitary assessment, 
which the mosaic approach might well frustrate.792 Absent reliable information on the way in which the problem is 
being addressed by practitioners (in Italy), it is difficult to assess whether the alternative solutions proposed (notably, 
the application of the law of the country where the main damage occurred, or the application of the law of the country 
with which the non-contractual obligation in question is most closely connected) would better serve the goals of the 
Regulation in the various situations where the above problem might arise. 
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
For at least fifteen years, now, no cases have been decided by Italian courts which involved a determination of the law 
applicable to a violation of privacy or a violation of rights relating to personality. Accordingly, the difficulties arising 
from the exclusion of those matters from the scope of the Rome II Regulation remain difficult to assess. 
Scholarly contributions on the above topics are not numerous, either. Various works were devoted to the issues 
regarding jurisdiction over defamation or the infringement of privacy and data protection rights, but none of them deals 
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extensively with conflicts of laws.793 One article, published in 2009, concerned precisely the law applicable to the 
non-contractual obligations resulting from the said violations. 794  A more recent contribution to the same topic 
advocated the introduction of a special rule for the cases in question in the Italian Statute of Private International Law.795 
Under the proposed rule, if all the persons involved have their habitual residence in the same State, the law of that 
State shall apply. If the latter condition is not met, compensation for damages suffered in one State shall be governed 
by the law of that State. However, if the victim brings proceedings for the entire prejudice suffered based on such 
grounds of jurisdiction as his or her habitual residence, or the domicile of the person held to be liable, then the law of 
the forum shall apply to all of the damages.  
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
Consistent with the preceding remark, the interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and 
data protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), represent 
largely unexplored topics in Italian literature. 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
No ruling could be found in Italian case law databases where the Rome II Regulation was considered in connection 
with, let alone applied to, cases relating to corporate violations of human rights. The author of this report is aware that 
cases of this kind were in fact commenced before Italian courts, but no information could be retrieved to determine the 
current status of those proceedings. One such case, brought by the Ikebiri community against ENI, the Italian oil 
company, before the Tribunal of Milan in 2018 for alleged pollution in the Niger delta,796 was eventually the object 
of an out-of-court settlement in 2020. The suitability of the Regulation to deal with this class of cases cannot accordingly 
be tested, at this stage, against the practice of Italian courts. 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
Lacking relevant developments, Italian practice similarly fails to provide indications as to the impact of artificial 
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choice) 
 
Corte di Cassazione No 7932 18 May 2012  Public policy  
Tribunale di Trieste  11 July 2013 Art. 4(1) 
 
Law applicable to torts – 
General rule (place of 
damage) 
 
Corte di Cassazione No 19405 22 August 2013  Assessment of damage; Public 
policy  
The application of the normally applicable 
foreign law ought to be excluded if it fails, as a 
matter of principle, to provide reparation for the 
non-pecuniary prejudice consisting in the loss of 
a loved one. 
Tribunale di Bologna - 17 March 2014 Art. 4(1) and (3) / 
Art. 14 
Law applicable to torts – 
General rule (place of 
damage) (escape clause); 






Tribunale di Trento No 1277 11 December 
2014 
Art. 4(1) Law applicable to torts – 
General rule (place of 
damage); Public policy 
 






12 May 2015 Articles 31 and 32 Temporal scope  
Tribunale di Modena - 4 December 
2015 
Art. 4(1) / Recital 
33 
Law applicable to torts – 
General rule (place of 
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Tribunale di Monza No 1036 6 April 2017 Art. 4(2) Law applicable to torts – 
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Tribunale di Trento No 683 22 June 2017 Art. 4(1) / Art. 26 
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damage); Public policy 
The mere fact that the applicable foreign law 
provides for the award of damages that are 
lower than those awarded under the lex fori is 
not enough a reason to trigger the public policy 
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Tribunale di Ivrea No 596 4 July 2017 Art. 16 Overriding mandatory 
provisions 
 
Corte di Cassazione No 16601 5 July 2017 Recital 32 Punitive damages Foreign judgments awarding punitive damages 
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policy. 
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would run against the public policy of Italy. 
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Tribunale di Viterbo No 572 2 May 2019 Art. 4(1) Law applicable to torts – 
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2019 
Art. 4(1) / Art. 26 Law applicable to torts – 
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No 774 19 March 2020 Art. 4(2) Law applicable to torts – 
General rule (parties having 
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same country) 
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• Practitioners have a limited knowledge of the Rome II Regulation. The national law does not make any 
reference to the Regulation therefore either national conflict-of-laws rules that are very poorly drafted in the 
Introduction part of Civil Law adopted in 1937, or domestic substantive law, are applied (see: part 1 and 
2.5(17) of the Report).  
• There are not many cases applying the Rome II Regulation. Even if the representatives of the parties refer to 
the Regulation in their submissions, in most cases, the courts do not apply it. If the courts apply the Rome II 
Regulation, they tend to copy the reasoning from other judgments without comparing fact patterns or the 
validity of the arguments, thus building incorrect case law (see: 2.5 (21) of the Report). The commentaries 
are not used to substantiate the judgments as there are no academic literature on the Rome II Regulation in 
Latvian, and lack of foreign language knowledge limits judges to use international commentaries (see: part 1 
of the Report). 
• There is some knowledge about the methodology of applying European private international law, including 
the Rome II Regulation, even though the group of Latvian lawyers have developed the schema of application 
of the Rome II Regulation in Latvian, for example, guiding the potential users on how to check the temporal, 
geographical and material scopes of application (see: part 2.1. of the Report). 
• Most of the Latvian courts’ case law where the Rome II Regulation is applied is related to insurance claims 
thus the references are made mostly to Art. 4 and 19 (see: 2.5 (21) of the Report). There is no case law, 
discussions or commentaries related to the rules applicable to non-contractual obligations other than general 
rules thus there is no material as regards areas that are of particular interest for the Commission.  
• The case law shows that it is difficult to determine the interrelation between the Rome II Regulation and the 
1971 Hague Convention. In one case the 1971 Hague Convention played an important role as – 
uncharacteristically – the court applied the foreign law (see: 2.5 (28) of the Report). 
• Even if the parties and the judge acknowledge that the Rome II Regulation should be applied, they may avoid 
doing so if it leads to the application of foreign law and the determination of its substance. In the latter case, 
the national law does not give real guidance or help. Moreover, in practice it is difficult, time-consuming and 
expensive to determine the content of foreign law. The London Convention, unfortunately, is not helpful in this 
respect (see: 2.5 (17) of the Report). 
1. Introduction 
• How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State? 
Even if practitioners are aware of the Rome II Regulation, they try not to apply the Regulation as it might lead to the 
application of foreign law. Moreover, in the opinion of practitioners, the content and the scope of foreign law is hard 
to determine because of inefficient national procedural law and international legal assistance. 
Most likely, businesses and citizens are not aware of the Rome II Regulation.  
• Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
There are only a few cases where courts have applied the Rome II Regulation. In some of them judges just mention the 
Regulation but do not refer to a particular article. There are also cases where parties request the judge to apply the 
Regulation but the judge ignores such request. Most likely again, it is connected with the fact that judges are reluctant 




• Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
No. It is even difficult to find case law where the Rome II Regulation is mentioned or applied.  
• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
There is no serious doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in Latvia.  
• Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political 
level? 
No.  
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
In most of the cases the representatives and judges do not check the scope of application of the Regulation thus there 
has not been discussion around the concept of “civil and commercial matters”.  
To ensure a correct and systemic application of the Rome II (as well as Rome I and Brussels Ibis), the group of Latvian 
lawyers have proposed a schema of application of the Regulations798 providing step by step guidance. Still, even if it 
is used in academic/university circles, it is rarely applied in practice.   
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, Arts 31-32) 
Practitioners do not pay attention to the temporal scope of the Regulations. The Rome II Regulation has been in force 
for some time thus in practice, even if the practitioners do not check the temporal scope, they might not mistakenly 
assume that the Regulation applies. However, for example, there is still no understanding regarding the temporal scope 
of the Brussels I bis Regulation (Art. 66). 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
In practice, there is no in-depth analyses of this concept.  
In one case the court dealt with a traffic accident in Estonia and an insurance claim. The owner of the bus (the plaintiff, 
Latvian company) submitted a claim against the Lithuanian and Latvian insurer companies for compensation of 
damages, arguing that damages were caused by the insurer delaying payment of the compensation. By submitting the 
compensation request the plaintiff suggested that they had joined the insurance agreement concluded by the insurers 
and the insured person that caused an accident. The court concluded that there was no contractual relationship 
between the plaintiff and defendants. Moreover, if there had been, the claim was not within the temporal scope of the 
Rome I Regulation (an agreement was concluded 2 August 2009). The court decided that the traffic accident was a 
clear delict and the Rome II Regulation shall be applied.799  
It shall be added that in this case at hand the court referred to some of the Estonian law articles which translation was 
submitted by the plaintiff but the main legal analysis was based on Latvian substantial law. The Court did not refer to 
the 1971 Hague Convention.  
 
 
798 Dr. Kačevska I., Dr. Rudevska B., Dr Buka A., Dambergs M., Fillers A. Recommendation and Guidelines “Effective 
Adoption, Transposition, Implementation and Application of European Union Legislation in the Area of Civil Justice 
(Latvia, Hungary, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom), European Commission, Ministry of Justice of Latvia, 
2015, p. 100. Available: http://kacevska.lv/f/Vadlinijas_anglu.pdf 




4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
After discussions with Latvian lawyers and judges, one can conclude that there is no understanding as to how any other 
state’s law can be applied if the case is adjudicated in Latvia, even more if it is the law of a Non-Member State. 
Therefore the legal community either does not know that they have to apply foreign law or they seek to apply the 
escape clause to establish that the case is more closely connected with the law of the forum.  
Moreover, in the national Civil Procedure Law there are two very brief articles on applying foreign law [Article 654 
(‘The Text of Foreign Law’) and Article 655 (‘Ascertaining Foreign Law’)]. Both articles have been drafted in 2004 
and have not been changed since. The articles do not clearly state whether the parties shall prove the content of foreign 
law and how or whether the judge shall apply it ex officio.  
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital 
(7)) 
The Brussels I bis Regulation is rather better known to the judiciary and other legal practitioners; however, in general 
there is no understanding of how these instruments interact. Also in practice, there is a lack of knowledge regarding 
autonomous qualification of EU concepts.  
There are brief commentaries in Latvian regarding interpretation methods in EU private international law;800 however, 
there are no references made to this publication in the case law.  
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
There are only a few cases where parties have referred to or a court has applied Art. 4 of the Rome II Regulation.  
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
Reference to the Rome II Regulation are mostly made in cases involving traffic accidents caused in other countries and 
subsequent claims for insurance compensations, thus there had been no particular problems to determine the place of 
direct damages.801 
In this regard, one hypothetical outcome can be elaborated. A plaintiff with a Latvian domicile got in a skiing accident 
with a defendant with a domicile in Italy. The defendant was proven guilty for the accident. A plaintiff submitted a 
European small claim before a Latvian court pursuant the Brussels I bis Regulation, Art. 7.2 as in the place where the 
damages continued to occur (the plaintiff had to undergo different surgeries, medical treatments etc.).802 The parties 
reached a settlement but had it not been so, the outcome of the case would have been of interest. I.e., in accordance 
with the European Small Claims Regulation, Art. 12.1, the court shall not require the parties to make any legal 
assessment of the claim thus the court would have to determine applicable law by itself in accordance with the Rome 
II Regulation and Italian law would have applied. Firstly, the court was already not comfortable applying the Brussels 
I bis Regulation and the European Small Claims Regulations and doubtfully, whether it would realize that it shall 
determine applicable law in the case. Secondly, under national procedural law, most likely, the plaintiff would have 
to prove the content of the Italian law what would be in conflict with European Small Claims Regulation. Thirdly, one 
could doubt why jurisdiction but not the applicable law could be tied to Latvia.  
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
 
 
800 Dr. Kačevska I., Dr. Rudevska B., Dr Buka A., Dambergs M., Fillers A. Recommendation and Guidelines “Effective 
Adoption, Transposition, Implementation and Application of European Union Legislation in the Area of Civil Justice 
(Latvia, Hungary, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom), European Commission, Ministry of Justice of Latvia, 
2015, p. 16-62. Available: http://kacevska.lv/f/Vadlinijas_anglu.pdf 
801 See: Riga City Latgales Suburb Court’s judgment in the case No. C29849910, 01.06.2016; Riga City Ziemelu 
Suburb Court’s judgment in the case No. C32288214, 14.11.2016. 




Publicly, there are no case or commentaries available where this Art. is applied.  
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and  
Publicly, there are no case or commentaries available where this Art. is applied. However, there is one case concerning 
the Rome I Regulation where the court found that since the habitual residence of the carrier and the place of receipt of 
goods agreed by the parties were in Estonia, Estonian law applied. However, after reaching this solution, it continued 
its analysis by referring to the escape clause of Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation. The court underlined that the 
habitual residence of the consignor (the forwarding agent) was in Latvia and it was the consignor who determined the 
place of receipt. Moreover, both parties had referred to Latvian law in their submissions, indicating their will to be 
subjected to Latvian law. The sum of these circumstances showed that the contract was manifestly more closely 
connected to Latvia than Estonia, hence Latvian law applied.  
The only connecting factor to Latvia was the habitual residence of the consignor thus it is clearly shown that the court 
used the escape clause to ensure that its law applies and it did not even elaborate on the parties’ implicit agreement 
on applicable law.803 
In many cases the courts copy the reasoning of other judgments without comparing the factual background, applicable 
instrument or validity of arguments, very similar outcome could be also in applying Art.4(3) of the Rome II Regulation. 
Even if Art. 4(3) is not applied directly, the courts still try to avoid the application of foreign law, i.e., just formally 
mentions it but then give a legal arguments based on the national substantive law. See example in part 2.1(3).  
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
Publicly, there are no case available where this Art. is applied.  
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
Publicly, there are any case or commentaries available where this Art. is applied. Latvia is not a party to the 1973 
Hague Convention.  
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
There is no direct reference to this Art., but it was applied in one case. In one case the court had to decide whether a 
claim based on the infringement of a trade secret felt within the scope of an arbitration agreement, and it applied both 
national law and the Rome II Regulation, Art. 8, thus concluding that torts were not within the scope of the arbitration 
agreement.804 The court had to apply the Regulation directly without any reference to the national substantive law. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether Art. 8 applies in the case at hand as trade secrets do not fall within scope of Art. 8. 
Art. 6 would probably apply.  
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
Publicly, there are no case available where this Art. is applied.  
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
See above para. 8 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
Publicly, there are no case available where this Art. is applied.  
 
 
803 City of Riga Northern District Court’s judgment in the case No. C33687116, 03.08.2017. 




2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio and Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
Publicly, there are no case or commentaries available where this Art. is applied.  
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
There is no discussion within the legal/business environment to rethink Art. 14 of the Regulation. However, there is one 
case of particular interest.  This case between two Latvian companies concerned an insurance compensation claim 
arising from a traffic accident in Lithuania. The Appellate court agreed with the submissions of the plaintiff and decided 
that the defendant had tacitly agreed to apply Latvian law because the defendant had not referred to it and did not 
submit the Lithuanian law during proceedings. In the Supreme Court the defendant objected to the existence of an 
implied agreement pursuant Art. 14 of the Rome II Regulation.  
In its decision the Supreme Court indicated, first, that a choice of forum did not automatically entail a choice of the 
applicable law. Then the Supreme Court briefly discussed the concept of ‘an agreement freely negotiated’ being a 
mandatory precondition for the consensus on the applicable law. The court annulled the judgment of the appeal court 
and sent the case back for re-consideration, noting that the lower court had to determine the relevant applicable law 
and also evaluate the interrelation between the Rome II Regulation and the Hague Convention of 4 May 1971 on the 
Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents.805 
See also the case cited in part 22 (6) c of this report.  
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
Publicly, there are no case or commentaries available where this Art. is applied.  
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
As indicated above, the national legal framework is not suitable for the application of foreign law therefore there is 
some professional discussion as to whether the burden of proof of the applicability of foreign law is on the party and 
whether the court shall examine conflict-of-laws rules only when one of the parties refers to conflict of law or foreign 
law. 
In court practice, foreign law is treated as a ‘fact’ and the case law shows that the parties shall prove the content of 
the law.  
One case seamlessly illustrates how it works in practice. In an insurance claim between two Latvian companies 
regarding a traffic accident in Germany, the court decided that German law should be applied pursuant to Article 4 
 
 




of the Rome II Regulation. The plaintiff only submitted the judgment of the German Supreme Court in which relevant 
German law had been referred to and interpreted. The court was of the opinion that the judgment was not a legal act 
on which the claim could be based and the plaintiff had to submit a translation of the text of the foreign law in the 
official language as required by the Civil Procedure Law. The plaintiff did not do so and the claim was dismissed.806 
The court of second instance disagreed with such a formal approach and decided that submission of the German law 
was not significant in the case at hand; firstly, because the judgment of the German Supreme Court was sufficient to 
determine the substance of the law; and secondly, because the defendant did not object on the application of this 
foreign court’s judgment.807  
It shall be indicated that Latvia is a party to the European Convention of 7 June 1968 on Information on Foreign Law; 
however, this instrument is not often used. Firstly, because judges may not know it; secondly, it is no so effective and 
delays the proceedings. There are no reported cases where this Convention is used but most likely, if the court does 
not receive the information on foreign law from other country, it would lead to the application of domestic substantial 
law.  
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
Publicly, there are no case or commentaries available where this Art. is applied.  
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
Publicly, there are no case or commentaries available where this Art. is applied. Moreover, as there is almost no case 
law involving the application of foreign law, this issue has not been treated or discussed. And in practice it would be 
rather difficult to recognize the overriding mandatory rules as they are usually not identified.  
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
Most of the case law in Latvian where Rome II is referred to relates to claims against insurers but this particular Art. is 
not applied in those cases.  
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
There a few cases with very similar factual background808 where the judges have borrowed legal argumentation from 
each other.  
A car was stolen from a person domiciled in another Member State. The foreign insurer paid compensation and 
received property rights. Then the insurer identified a person in Latvia who had bought the stolen car (in good faith) 
and then this foreign insurer brought a claim before a Latvian court against a person domiciled in Latvia. The plaintiffs 
framed their claims as property claims for the return of possession of the vehicle. 
The courts had very similar judgments and in all cases, Art. 19 of the Rome II Regulation was referred to in order to 
verify whether the insurer was the owner of the vehicle without further elaboration. Namely, the courts did not use the 
Rome II Regulation to determine the law applicable to the claim, but only used Article 19 to justify the right of the insurer 
to bring a claim against the third party.  
From a theoretical point of view, it is interesting to know whether the Rome II Regulation applies to rei vindicatio, i.e. a 
claim for return of the property at all, as there are different international opinions.  
One could suggest that this could be defined as claim deriving from unjust enrichment.  
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
Publicly, there are no case available where this Art. is applied.  
 
 
806 Riga City Ziemelu Suburb Court’s judgment in the case No. C32288214, 14.11.2016. 
807 Riga District Court’s judgment in the case No. C32288214, 15.03.2017. 
808 Supreme Court of Latvia’s judgment in the case No. SKC-79/2015, 17.12.2015; Riga Regional Court’s 





2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
There is no discussion regarding this issue neither in case law or academic papers; however, in practice there might 
be problems to define a natural person’s habitual residence and to distinguish it from the concept “domicile”.  
Moreover, after some comparative research regarding MS national law, it might be concluded that the concept of a 
natural person’s “domicile” is defined very similarly thus it is questioned why the EU legislator cannot make it an 
autonomous concept? 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
There has been no academic discussion on those issues. In theory, since the Member States have adopted the Rome II 
Regulation, theyhave agreed to avoid the application of their own conflict-of-laws rules. Hence, when the said 
Regulation indicates the law of a Member State, renvoi is technically impossible.  
But renvoi could be more relevant where the applicable law is that of a third state having their own conflict-of-laws 
system.   
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
Publicly, there are no case available where this Art. is applied.  
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
Publicly, there are no case available where this Art. is applied.  
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
Interaction between the Regulation and the Convention is a very topical question in court practice. 
The 1971 Hague Convention entered into force in Latvia on 15 October 2000.809 There are no official statistics 
regarding the application of this Convention in Latvia but there are cases. One of the cases is unique, as the appellate 
court applied foreign law, which is very rare in Latvian case law. The court applied Lithuanian law, which was submitted 
by the claimant because the traffic accident occurred in Lithuania (Article 3 of the 1971 Hague Convention).810 It did 
so because the Supreme Court returned this case for reconsideration to the second instance and instructed the court of 
appeal to consider the interrelation between the Rome II Regulation and the 1971 Hague Convention. Specifically, 
the Supreme Court noted that the 1971 Hague Convention did not allow the parties to implicitly choose the applicable 
law.811 
In the case at hand, the 1971 Hague Convention played an important role as – uncharacteristically – the court applied 
foreign law. However, since the practice is so limited, it is hard to elaborate on other aspects of the application of the 
Regulation and Convention.  
 
 
809 Par 1971. gada 4. maija Hāgas konvenciju par ceļu satiksmes negadījumiem piemērojamo likumu (Law on 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents) [2000] Latvijas Vēstnesis No. 244/246, 30.06.2000.  
810 Riga Regional Court’s judgment in the case No. C30631610, 28.09.2015. 




28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
Publicly, there are no case available where this Art. is applied. 
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
Publicly, there are no case or commentary available where this Art. is applied.  
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
Publicly, there are no case or commentary available where this Art. is applied.  
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
Publicly, there are no case or commentary available where this Art. is applied.  
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 




4. List of national case law 
 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and reference 
number  
 
Reference to decision of 
the Court of Justice if 
applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
Riga District Court C29298118812 
 
4.12.2019 Art. 4.1 
Art. 15 
Insurance, traffic accident  
Riga City Vidzeme 
Suburb Court 
C30482117813 11.10.2018 Art. 19 Insurance  
Riga District Court C32288214814 
C-359/14 and C-
475/14 Ergo Insurance  
15.03.2017 Art. 4.1 
 
Insurance, traffic accident  
Riga City Latgale 
Suburb court  
C29849910815 01.06.2016 Art. 4.1 
Art. 28 
Insurance, traffic accident  
Supreme Court SKC-79/2015 
(C39067707)816 
17.12.2015 Art. 19 Insurance, theft, 
Subrogation 
§ 7.3. “Taking into consideration that legal 
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A foreign insurer brought a 
claim before a Latvian court 
against a person domiciled 
in Latvia.  A car was stolen 
from a person domiciled in 
another Member State. The 
insurer paid compensation 
and received property 
rights. Then the insurer 
identified a person in Latvia 
who has bought the stolen 
car.  
The plaintiff requested 
property claims for the 
return of possession of the 
vehicle. 
insurer SAS “ERGO Lietuva” emerges from the 
insurance contract concluded in Lithuania, the 
question about insurers obligation to satisfy 
claims of insured as well as the transfer of 
ownership or subrogation are governed by the 
Lithuanian law, which within the meaning of 
the Regulation is imperative for resolving the 
dispute of non-contractual obligations.” 
§ 7.5. “In the conclusions of the appealed 
judgment the Appeal court regarding the 
transfer of property rights of movable assets 
from /pers. F/ (insured) to SAS “Ergo Lietuva” 
(insurer) has not considered whether the 
foreign law shall be applied; instead the court 
has applied the Civil Law of the Republic of 
Latvia to determine the property rights of the 
claimant to the reclaimed assets. These 
grounds are reason to revoke the appealed 
judgment in part.”  





v Jack Odenbreit 
01.07.2015 Art. 14 
Art. 28 
Art. 31  
Plaintiff SIA “Ugo auto” 
submitted claim against 
insurer “ERGO Latvija” for 
insurance compensation.  
The court applied Lithuanian 
law, which was submitted 
by the plaintiff because the 
traffic accident occurred in 
§ 11 [..] [Regarding Art. 14.1 of Regulation] 
“Freedom of choice is mandatory precondition 
for agreement on applicable law but in the 
case at hand the parties have not agreed on 
applicable law in writing or orally (evidenced 
in writing). There is no such agreement in this 
case as the defendant has objected to the 
plaintiff’s suggestion to apply the Latvian law 







Lithuania (Article 3 of the 
1971 Hague Convention).  
§ 14 [..] “1971 Hague Convention does not 
directly allow parties to agree on applicable 
law .  
Therefore the court, reviewing the dispute, 
initially shall consider the interaction between 
mentioned convention and regulation 
No. 864/2007 what was not done. [..]  
Only after determination of the applicable 
material law (Latvian and/or foreign) the court 
can decide whether SIA “Ugo auto” is the 
person suffering damages from the traffic 
accident and it is entitled to insurance 
compensation and whether the insurer has 
obligation to pay any sums of damages”.  
The judgment of appeal court was revoked 
and sent for reconsideration.  
Riga District Court  C28375210818 7.04.2014 Plaintiff mentions 
regulation without 
specific article, the 















Riga District Court 
(also Supreme 
Court) 
C04154813820 27.08.2013 Art. 8 Interim measures, trade 
secret 
 











After the analysis of the relevant regulations of the Republic of Lithuania and European Union international legal acts, 
national case law and doctrine cited herein, the following main conclusions related to the application of the Rome II 
Regulation and interpretation of the provisions thereof can be presented:  
• In the event of a conflict over the law applicable to non-contractual relations, it shall be decided in accordance 
with the private international law. Conflict-of-law rules of private international law are regulated in Chapter II 
"Private International Law" of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania and in other laws and bilateral or 
multilateral international treaties. Paragraph 1 of Article 1.10 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania states 
that foreign law shall apply to civil relations when international agreements, agreements between the parties or 
laws of the Republic of Lithuania so provide. It is noted that the Rome II Regulation is directly applicable in all EU 
Member States and therefore national rules of private international law do not apply when they overlap with the 
rules of the Rome II Regulation. 
• It must be acknowledged that areas of special interest to the European Commission - financial market torts, 
corporate abuses against human rights, artificial intelligence, and SLAPPs - have not been examined in the works 
of researchers of the Republic of Lithuania, and there is no case law in Lithuania related to these areas.  
• After analysing the case law of Lithuanian courts of all instances, it can be concluded that the Rome II Regulation 
is applied in Lithuania to a narrow scope of cases. Almost all disputes related to the provisions of the Rome II 
Regulation concerned the determination of the applicable law in cases regarding recourse claims in insurance 
legal relationships, such as between insurers of a towed and towing motor vehicles, or the insurer and the person 
responsible for the damage.   
• The main problems related to the application of the Rome II Regulation and / or interpretation of the provisions 
thereof are the following: 1) the "Rome II" Regulation is applied in a narrow scope of cases; 2) the courts avoid 
developing and interpreting the provisions of the "Rome II" Regulation and simply rely on the previous precedents 
of courts in similar cases; 3) the courts do not refer to a specific paragraph of the article when they apply a certain 
provision of the “Rome II” Regulation (usually Article 4 (1)).  
• The Supreme Court of Lithuania referred a question regarding the determination of the applicable law to the CJEU 
for a prejudicial ruling in 2014 in a case between two insurers concerning a recourse claim, etc.   
1. Introduction 
• How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State? 
Due to limited number of relevant cases in LT, practitioners, businesses and citizens in Lithuania lack practical experience 
in examining and applying the Rome II Regulation. .  
• Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
The principles of direct application and universal binding nature of the Rome II Regulation are recognised in Lithuanian 
courts of all instances. However, the Rome II Regulation is applied to a narrow scope of situations. In most cases, the 
application and interpretation of the provisions of the Rome II Regulation in national case law relate exclusively to a number 
of provisions, such as Article 1 (Scope), Article 4 (General rule), Article 20 (Multiple liability), Article 31 (Application in 
time), Article 32 (Date of application). In applying the provisions of the Rome II Regulation, Lithuanian courts avoid 
interpreting and developing the contents of the provisions of the Regulation and mainly rely on the precedents established 




• Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
There are no statistical data on the application of the Rome II Regulation in the Republic of Lithuania. 
• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
In Lithuania, at the doctrinal level, insufficient attention is paid to issues related to the application of the Rome II Regulation. 
For researchers and their research topics related to the Rome II Regulation, please see the previously provided List of the 
main doctrinal sources and List of key experts in Lithuania. 
• Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political level? 
The issues examined by the researchers in relation to the Rome II Regulation can be seen from the provided List of the main 
doctrinal sources. Specifically, V. Mizaras, in his article "Results of the unification of private international law in the 
European Union: the Rome I and Rome II Regulations", has analysed the provisions of these regulations in comparison with 
the national provisions of private international law821. J. Grigienė and E. Laurišaitė in their article "Abuse of the conflict of 
law rules" examined cases of the abuse of the conflict of law provisions, including law shopping and forum shopping822. 
Other specific issues have not been addressed yet.  
To date, no discussions have taken place at the political level in Lithuania regarding the Rome II Regulation.  
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded matters 
(Art. 1(1)-(2)).  
The court shall determine each time ex officio whether the Rome II Regulation is applicable in a particular case. Taking 
into account that, as mentioned, in the case law of Lithuanian courts the Rome II Regulation is applied in almost all 
cases regarding the right to recourse claims, the courts follow the previously established court precedents, therefore 
there are no special difficulties.  
As regards the legal term "civil and commercial matters" used in Article 1(1) of the Rome II Regulation, there are no 
difficulties in applying or delimiting this term. The concepts provided in this term are the subject of national regulation.  
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts 31-32). 
In the case law of Lithuanian courts, when interpreting the provisions of Articles 31-32 of the Rome II Regulation, the 
practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union is taken into account823. 
 
 
821 Vytautas Mizaras. "Results of the unification of private international law in the European Union: The Rome I and Rome 
II Regulations." Vilnius: Justitia, 2008, nr. 4 (70), p. 2 – 24; 2009, nr. 1 (71), p. 2-18. 
822 https://www.vdu.lt/cris/bitstream/20.500.12259/30767/1/ISSN2029-4239_2012_N_1_8.PG_5-24.pdf  
823 For instance, the ruling of 17 November 2011 in Deo Antoine Homawoo v Commission GMF Assurances SA (C-
412/10), clarified that: 1) the national court should apply the Rome II Regulation only for the events causing damages 
that took place since 11 January 2009; 2) the only moment to be taken into account is when the event which caused the 
damage occurred (Article 31); 3) Article 31 of the Rome II Regulation cannot be interpreted irrespective of the date of 





Only two cases have been identified in the national case law where the question of the temporal application of the 
Rome II Regulation was raised.   
For example, the Supreme Court of Lithuania in its ruling in the civil case no. 3K-3-292/2014 held that the Rome II 
Regulation was not applicable in the case because the accident which caused the damage occurred on 24 April 
2008, and in accordance with Article 32 of the Regulation, the Rome II Regulation only entered into force on 11 
January 2009 (with the exception of Article 29, which entered into force on 11 July 2008). Article 31 of the Regulation 
also provides that the Regulation is to apply only to events occurring after its entry into force. 
The Supreme Court in its case No. 3K-3-415/2014 (wherein the court referred for a prejudicial ruling) stated that “In 
the examined case, the insurance contracts of both vehicles were concluded later than 17 December 2009, and the 
traffic accident occurred in 21 January 2011, therefore, in terms of time, the provisions of the Rome I and Rome II 
Regulations, which replace national conflict-of-law rules in their scope of application (Articles 31 and 32 of the Rome 
II Regulation), should be applied." 
The analysis of the case law suggests that there are no problems with the application of Articles 31 and 32 of Rome II 
Regulation, as the court decides, depending on the date of the accident and the date of entry into force of this 
Regulation, whether the provisions of the Rome II Regulation can be invoked in a particular dispute.   
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of “contractual 
obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2). 
In its prejudicial ruling of 21 January 2016 in joined cases C-359/14 and C-475/14, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union stated that, as regards the respective scopes of application areas of the Rome I and Rome II 
Regulations, it should be noted that the terms "contractual obligations" and "non-contractual obligations" used therein 
must be interpreted independently, largely on the basis of the scheme and objectives of these regulations (see 
paragraph 44 of the prejudicial ruling for reference). 
A "non-contractual obligation" must also be understood as an obligation arising from one of the events listed in Article 
2 of this Regulation, i.e. in accordance to the Article 2 of the Rome II Regulation, it applies to obligations arising out 
of damages, i.e. any consequences arising from delict, unjust enrichment, negatorium gestio or culpa in contrahendo. 
This interpretation was provided in a preliminary ruling on which national courts of all instances rely.  
Recital 11 of Rome II Regulation states that "The concept of a non-contractual obligation varies from one Member 
State to another. For the purposes of this Regulation, a non-contractual obligation should therefore be understood as 
an independent concept." Thus, the concept of a “non-contractual obligation” is the subject of Lithuanian national 
regulation.  
In addition, the scope of the Rome II Regulation (Article 1) is directly linked to the list of non-contractual obligations 
(Article 2). Therefore, in accordance with the above-mentioned interpretation of the CJEU, Lithuania follows the list of 
non-contractual obligations established in Article 2 of the Rome II Regulation. 
As regards the relationship between "non-contractual obligations" and "contractual obligations", it is necessary to pay 
attention to the following. In the past, there was a lack of consensus regarding the separation of contractual and non-
contractual obligations. However, it is currently the established case law of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in its ruling 
of 7 december 2017 in civil case no. 3K-3-389-915/2017 mentioned, that, for example, in resolving disputes 
regarding a traffic accident in a foreign country, the civil legal relations based upon the vehicle driver's mandatory 
civil liability insurance agreement between an insurer and a third person who was inflicted with damage is a delict 
liability relation. Meanwhile, the civil legal relationship between the policyholder and the insurer or between both 
insurers is of a contractual nature.  
No other disputes concerning delimitation of “contractual obligations” and “non-contractual obligations” have arisen 
in Lithuania to date.  




The general application of the Rome II Regulation is recognised in Lithuania, therefore there are no difficulties with the 
interpretation or application of this provision in practice and doctrine.  
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation)(Recital (7))  
The relationship between the Rome II Regulation and other private international law instruments of the European Union 
inevitably give rise to new conflicts.  
As regards the relationship between the Rome II Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation, recital 7 of the Rome II 
Regulation provides that "the substantive scope of application and provisions of this Regulation should be aligned with 
the 22 December 2000 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters ("Brussels I") and on instruments relating to the law applicable to 
contractual obligations." 
In this context, the Vilnius City District Court and the Supreme Court of Lithuania in cases no. C-359/14 and C-
475/14 sought, in their references for a preliminary ruling, an interpretation of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations 
and Directive 2009/103 in order to determine the law applicable to the right of recourse of the insurer of the truck, 
which had compensated the person injured during the accident, towards the insurer of the trailer which was towed 
during the accident.  
2.2 Chapter II – Tort /Delict  
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with respect 
to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1)  
As can be seen from the Case Summary Form, in Lithuania the most common cases involve recourse claims, in which 
the court decides on the applicable law in accordance with Article 4 (1) of the Rome II Regulation. For instance, ruling 
of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 15 June 2016 in civil case no. 3K-3-203-969/2016; ruling of Vilnius Regional 
Court of 20 September 2016 in civil case no. 2A-19-585/2016; ruling of Kaunas Regional Court of 6 October 
2016 in civil case no. 2A-1228-657/2016, etc.  
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
The analysis of the national case law reveals only one case in which Article 4 (2) of the Rome II Regulation had been 
applied. 
The Panevėžys Regional Court, which heard an appeal in the civil case No. 2A-749-212/2018 has ruled that, in 
accordance with Article 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation, the law of the State of registration of the vehicles applies to 
the administration of damages. As both the wrongdoer's and the victim's vehicles were registered in the Republic of 
Lithuania, the Lithuanian law has been applied instead of the law of Germany. Thus, the court interpreted the habitual 
residence of the defendant and the injured party at the time of the infliction of damage as the law of the place of 
registration of the vehicles of both parties. 
c. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
Until this date, there have been no instances in Lithuanian case law on the issue. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
Paragraph 5 of Article 1.43 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania states that the obligations arising from 
damage caused by products of inadequate quality are governed by the law of the place of damage if the victim has 
a permanent residence in that country or the business of the person responsible for the damage is located in this country 




state the person, responsible for the damage, has his business in, or the injured party has bought the product in that 
country, the injured party's habitual residence state’s law is applied. If the law applicable cannot be determined on 
the basis of the criteria listed in this paragraph, the law of the State of the person liable shall apply, unless the claimant 
bases his claim on the law of the State where the damage was caused. 
Lithuanian courts’ practice is based on the provisions of the national civil law, without referring to the 1973 Hague 
Convention on Product Liability.  
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation refers to the national law of the states, therefore Lithuanian law is applied to 
competition disputes in accordance with the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania. 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
The analysis of the case law of the Lithuanian courts has not revealed any cases where Roma II applied, specified in 
Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation, relating to Environment damage, as all the cases examined so far have been of a 
national nature.  
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
To date, the case law of Lithuanian courts has not included the application of the choice of law provisions enshrined 
in Articles 8 and 13 of the Rome II Regulation relating to infringements of intellectual property rights. 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
In the case law of the Lithuanian courts, no cases in which Article 9 of the Rome II Regulation, establishing choice of 
law rules for Industrial actions, was applied were found.  
2.3 Chapter III – Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio and Culpa In Contrahendo 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict in Art. 
4. 
No instances of application of the Unjust enrichment provision established in Article 10 of the Rome II Regulation were 
found in Lithuanian case-law, including its relationship to the general tort rule in Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation.  
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
There have been no cases in Lithuanian case law in which the special rule of Negotorium gestio enshrined in Article 
11 of the Rome II Regulation had been applied.   
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
Up to date, there are no instances in Lithuanian case law of application of the Culpa in contrahendo provision, 
enshrined in Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. 
2.4 Chapter IV – Freedom of Choice 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
The analysis of case-law shows that the exercise of the freedom of choice enshrined in Article 14 of the Rome II 




in a contractual relationship. In Lithuania, there have been no discussions so far on the application of the provision 
enshrined in Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation and other related problematic issues. 
It should be  noted that the right of the parties to choose the applicable law is limited. The freedom of choice must be 
clearly expressed or clear from the circumstances of the case and shall not affect the rights of third parties. 
2.5 Chapter V – Common Rules 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that exclusion 
or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22). 
There are no difficulties in applying Article 1(3) of the Rome II Regulation concerning the non-application of the Rome 
II Regulation to evidence and procedure and the relationship with the provisions of Article 21-21 of the Rome II 
Regulation. Article 780 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania establishes that the provisions of Part VII of this 
Code regulating international civil proceedings are applied unless an international agreement to which the Republic 
of Lithuania is a party regulates the respective relations otherwise. 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of the 
substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual obligations. 
Due to a limited number of cases, to date, no specific approach could be identified regarding questions of pleading, 
proof and application to individual cases of the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation 
governing non-contractual obligation.  
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship to 
the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
There are several cases in the case law of the Lithuanian courts, for example ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania 
of 15 December 2017 in case no. 3K-3-390-701/2017; the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 6 May 2016 in case 
no. 3K-3-187-701/2016, in which Articles 15(a) and (b) of the Rome II Regulation have been invoked, but other 
Articles have not been applied. For example, the Supreme Court of Lithuania in its ruling of 6 May 2016 in civil case 
no. 3K-3-187-701/2016, based on a prejudicial ruling from the CJEU, stated that “it is for the national court first to 
determine how the injured persons should be compensated under national law determined in accordance with the 
Rome II Regulation (in this case German law), while the fault must be distributed among the driver and manager of the 
truck and to the manager of the trailer (paragraph 61 of the prejudicial ruling). Under Articles 15(a) and (b) of the 
Rome II Regulation, German law governs the basis, scope and substantiation for the division of liability.” 
There was no relationship with the issues addressed in paragraphs 16 and 17.  
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
Although this rule 824 is usually applied in foreign court decisions within the scope of the statute of limitations, in 
Lithuania, this provision has not been applied in courts’ practice. 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
The case law of Lithuanian courts has not included the application of the specific rule on direct action against the 
insurer of the person liable in Article 18 of the Rome II Regulation.  
 
 
824 For example, in the ruling of 31 January 2019 in Case C-149/18 Agostinho da Silva Martins, the CJEU ruled on 
whether Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that a national provision which provides for 
a limitation period of three years for bringing an action for damages in an accident may be regarded as overriding 
imperative provision within the meaning of this Article (see: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-




Persons who have suffered damage in Lithuania actively exercise the right to file a direct claim for compensation for 
damage (pecuniary and / or non-pecuniary) to the insurer of the responsible person.  
The obligation of the insurer to pay the insurance indemnity to the injured person amounts to the fulfilment of the 
contractual obligations arising from the compulsory civil liability insurance contract.   
The obligation of the Insurer to indemnify non-pecuniary damage arises on the basis of law, general grounds for 
indemnification of non-pecuniary damage, i.e. in accordance with Article 6.250, Article 6.283, Article 6.284 of the 
Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania.  
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
The Supreme Court of Lithuania indicated825 the position of the CJEU which provided in its prejudicial ruling that the 
question of whether the truck’s insurer acquires a right of recourse towards the insurer of the trailer after compensating 
the injured person, must be decided in accordance with Article 19 of the Rome II Regulation, which distinguishes 
between non-contractual and contractual matters. Under Article 19 of Rome II, the possible exercise of the right of 
recourse is governed by the law applicable to the obligation of the civil liability insurer to compensate the injured 
person. The insurer's obligation to cover the policyholder's civil liability rises from an agreement concluded with the 
policyholder, therefore conditions, under which the insurer can exercise the rights of the person injured during the 
event against the persons responsible for the event depends on the national legislation regulating the insurance 
agreement, which is determined according to Article 7 of Rome I Regulation (prejudicial ruling points 56-58). 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20) 
The Supreme Court of Lithuania in its ruling of 8 October 2014826 had referred questions to the CJEU for a prejudicial 
ruling. One of the questions was whether vehicle insurers should be regarded as debtors liable under the same 
requirement within the meaning of Article 20 of the Rome II Regulation and the law applicable to their relationships 
should be determined in accordance with that rule. 
The CJEU827 had explained that, in view of the joint civil liability of the managers of the truck and the trailer, the 
corresponding obligation to pay the insurance benefit to the injured party arose accordingly for the insurers of both 
vehicles. An insurer who has performed the joint obligation, acquires the right to claim from another insurer a part of 
the indemnity paid to the injured party. 
However, there has been no specific case in Lithuania where Article 20 of the Rome II Regulation was applied. 
2.6 Chapter VI – Other Provisions 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to persons 
covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
Until this date, there have been no instances in Lithuanian case law of application of Article 23 of the Rome II 
Regulation.  
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with more 
than one legal system (Art.25) 
Paragraph 1 of Article 1.14 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania states that if the applicable foreign law 
provides for a reference back to the law of the Republic of Lithuania, the law of the Republic of Lithuania shall apply 
only in the cases provided for in this Code or foreign law.  
 
 
825 Ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 6 May 2016 in civil case no. 3K-3-187-701/2016.  
826 Ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 8 October 2014 in civil case No. 3K-3-415/2014. 




Paragraph 2 of Article 1.14 states that where the applicable foreign law provides for a reference to the law of a third 
country, the law of the third country shall apply only in the cases provided for in this Code or in the law of the third 
country.  
Paragraph 3 of Article 1.14 provides that if the applicable foreign law in determining the civil legal status of a person 
refers back to the law of the Republic of Lithuania, the law of the Republic of Lithuania shall apply.  
Paragraph 4 of Article 1.14 indicates that paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article shall not apply if the applicable law 
is chosen by the parties, as well as in identifying law applicable to the form of the transaction and the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations. Paragraph 5 stats that if an international agreement (convention) is to be applied in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter, the issues of reversal and referral to the law of a third country shall be 
governed by the provisions of the applicable international agreement (convention).  
Article 607 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides that if the applicable law of a foreign 
state refers back to the law of the Republic of Lithuania, the law of the Republic of Lithuania shall apply. The question 
is dealt with in the same way as in the case of a reference to the law of a third country: if the applicable law refers to 
the law of a third country, the law of a third country must be applied. According to Article 1.10 of the Civil Code, the 
term "foreign law" refers only to the substantive law of a foreign State and not to its conflict-of-law rules.828 
Given that there is one common legal system throughout the territory of Lithuania, the application of the provisions 
enshrined in Articles 25(1) and (2) of the Rome II Regulation is not relevant.  
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26). 
The analysis revealed no cases in Lithuania in which national courts had applied the public policy/ordre public clause 
established in Article 26 of the Rome II Regulation 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in specific 
areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 29) 
Disputes arising in Lithuania regarding environmental damage, intellectual property rights or data protection are of a 
national character, therefore, to date, there are no practical questions regarding the interaction between the Rome II 
Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments in the above-mentioned areas.  
It is also clear from the provisions of Articles 27, 28, 29 of the Rome II Regulation, that the Rome II Regulation will take 
precedence, when the provisions of EU law or conventions concluded between Member States will be applicable. 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on legal 
certainty (where relevant for your Member State)  
Lithuania has ratified829 The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents (hereinafter - the Hague 
convention) and is therefore subject to the provisions of the Hague Convention. 
The obligation to ensure the principle of legal certainty in situations where the conflict of application between the Rome 
II Regulation and the Hague Convention arises in a specific case falls on the Lithuanian courts.   
 
 
828 The Summary review of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 21 December 2000 of case law in application of the rules 
of private international law No. A2-14. Case law. 2000, 14. 




There are only a few cases in the practice of Lithuanian courts regarding the relationship between the Rome II 
Regulation and the Hague Convention and the determination of the applicable law to claims for compensation for 
injury to health or life, which was suffered during a traffic accident.  
Article 1.44 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that the law applicable to claims for compensation 
for damage caused by an accident is to be determined in accordance with 4 May 1971 Hague Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents. 
the Supreme Court of Lithuania in its ruling of 6 May 2016 in civil case no. 3K-3-187-701/2016 
The Supreme Court of Lithuania in its ruling of 15 June 2016 in civil case no. 3K-3-203-969/2016 830  has 
emphasized that “Article 1.44 of Civil Code is a rule referring in all cases to the Hague Convention when deciding 
the question of the law applicable to claims for compensation for damage caused by an accident. In accordance 
with Article 1.44 of the Civil Code, the provisions of the Hague Convention shall apply whether or not the 
conditions laid down in Article 18(4) of that Convention are fulfilled in a particular case.” Consequently, the 
Hague Convention applies in all cases where a claim for damages is made in the event of an accident. The Hague 
Convention applies even if the State in which the traffic accident took place has not ratified or otherwise joined the 
Convention.  
For example, the Supreme Court, in its ruling of 3 June 2014 in criminal case No. 2K-280/2014831 has stated that 
“recital 36 and Article 28(1) of the Rome II Regulation provide that the Regulation does not affect the application 
of international conventions to which one or more Member States are parties at the time when this Regulation is 
adopted and which lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to non-contractual obligations. One such international 
convention is the 1971 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents.”  
Also in its ruling in civil case no. 3K-3-292/2014 the Supreme Court of Lithuania found that “the 4 May 1971 The 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Accidents of 4 May 1971 does not apply to recourse claims and 
subrogation as far as insurance companies are concerned (Article 2 (5) of the Hague Convention).” 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, including 
but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach.  
As mentioned above, the main practical problem with the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation in 
Lithuanian law is that the Rome II Regulation is applied in Lithuania only to a narrow scope of cases, i.e. almost only 
to cases related to disputes arising from the right of recourse. 
3. Comments on areas of interest 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope of 
the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in cross-
border situations 
Disputes related to privacy and personal rights violations in Lithuania, including defamation, are mostly of a national 
character832 or governed by European Union legal acts (i.e. the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
 
 
830Ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 15 June 2016 in civil case no. 3K-3-203-969/2016. 
831In addition, ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 13 May 2016 in civil case No. 3K-3-189-469/2016.  




of personal data833), so there are currently no major difficulties found due to differences in Member States' rules in 
cross-border situations.   
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
Defamation is recognised as a criminal offense in Lithuania, expressis verbis enshrined in Article 154 of the Criminal 
Code of the Republic of Lithuania, therefore the issue of the interaction of defamation with the Rome II Regulation, 
including SLAPP, does not arise. Meanwhile, to date, all disputes related to the protection of personal data in Lithuania 
are national. Although manifestations of SLAPP can be detected in Lithuania, as in other countries, they have not been 
reported to be related to the provisions of the “Rome II” Regulation.  
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
To date, there have been no cases in Lithuania where the Rome II Regulation had been applied to human rights abuses 
by companies. 
32.  The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
In the light of active discussions at the level of the European Union on the establishment of common regulation of 
artificial intelligence in European law and its incorporation into the national legal systems of the Member States, 
Lithuania also834 conducts intense discussions regarding the possibility of incorporating the regulation of artificial 
intelligence into the national legal system.  
 
 
833 For example, in Lithuania, disputes concerning the protection of the rights of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data are governed by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, which is a directly applicable legal act.  
834 Since 1992 Lithuanian scientists and researchers consistently conduct research in the field of law and artificial 
intelligence. The relationship between the information society, artificial intelligence and law has been researched on a 
national level (https://repository.mruni.eu/bitstream/handle/007/14284/3820-7942-1-
SM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), dirbtinio intelekto ir besiformuojančių technologijų etikos klausimas  
(https://www.vdu.lt/cris/bitstream/20.500.12259/35657/1/ISSN1392-6845_2017_N_4.PG_19-24%20.pdf), 
dirbtinio intelekto sistemų taikymo teismų veikloje problematika bei kylančios rizikos dėl žmogaus teisių apsaugos 
užtikrinimo problematika 
(file:///C:/Users/d.mamone/Downloads/64349755.pdf).(https://repository.mruni.eu/bitstream/handle/007/14
284/3820-7942-1-SM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), dirbtinio intelekto ir besiformuojančių technologijų etikos 
klausimas  (https://www.vdu.lt/cris/bitstream/20.500.12259/35657/1/ISSN1392-6845_2017_N_4.PG_19-
24%20.pdf), dirbtinio intelekto sistemų taikymo teismų veikloje problematika bei kylančios rizikos dėl žmogaus teisių 
apsaugos užtikrinimo problematika (file:///C:/Users/d.mamone/Downloads/64349755.pdf).( 
https://repository.mruni.eu/bitstream/handle/007/14284/3820-7942-1-SM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y ), 
artificial intelligence and the issue of ethics of emerging technologies ( 
https://www.vdu.lt/cris/bitstream/20.500.12259/35657/1/ISSN1392-6845_2017_N_4.PG_19-24%20.pdf ), 
the problem of application of artificial intelligence systems in court activities and emerging risks on the issue of ensuring 
the protection of human rights ( file: /// C: /Users/d.mamone/Downloads/64349755.pdf ). A scientific debate is 
currently taking place on the possibility of considering a smart robot as a subject of legal responsibility in general, 
recognizing that this innovative area is incompatible with current legal regulation (http://www.tf.vu.lt/wp-




In Lithuania, the issue of the impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation has not been 
analysed. At the level of the doctrinal discussion835, the question of whether an intelligent robot can be considered 
subject to legal liability in general is still addressed, and only thereafter the possibility of the application of non-
contractual liability to it can be analysed.   
 
 
Lithuanian universities have launched new study programs, such as the Master of Laws program in Technology and 
Business.  







4. List of national case law 
Court or 
tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to 
decision of the 
Court of Justice if 
applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 












Article 4 [aut. Part 
1836] 
 
The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse where the 
Motor Insurers’ Bureau of the Republic of 
Lithuania having compensated such damage to 
the National Insurers’ Bureau of Germany filed 
a recourse claim against a private limited 
liability company as the employer of the natural 












The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse where AB 
Lietuvos draudimas having paid the insurance 
claim to the person who had suffered damage 
The law applicable in the proceedings 
was determined on the basis of the 
provisions of the Law on Compulsory 
Insurance Against Civil Liability in 
Respect of the Use of Motor Vehicles, 
however, the court pointed out that 
the provisions of  the Law on 
 
 




during a traffic accident in France filed a 
recourse claim against a public establishment 
as the employer of the natural person liable for 
the damage caused.   
 
Compulsory Insurance Against Civil 
Liability in Respect of the Use of Motor 
Vehicles correlated with Article 4 of 
Rome II according to which the law 
applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation is the law of the country in 
which the damage occurred 






















The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse where the 
Motor Insurers’ Bureau of the Republic of 
Lithuania having  reimbursed the National 
Insurers’ Bureau of Germany claimed 
compensation of the said amount from a private 
limited liability company as the employer of the 
natural person liable for the damage caused.  
 
The court states that the provisions of 
the Law on Compulsory Insurance 
Against Civil Liability in Respect of the 
Use of Motor Vehicles are in accord 
with the provisions of Article 4 of 











Article 4 [aut. Part 
1 d.] 
 
The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse  where the 
Motor Insurers’ Bureau of the Republic of 
Lithuania having  reimbursed  the amount paid 
by the National Insurers’ Bureau of Germany, 
claimed compensation of the said amount from 
 Similar to Case No. 3 (Paragraph 




a private limited liability company as the 
employer of the natural person liable for the 








Article 4 [aut. Part 
1] 
 
The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse where the 
National Insurers’ Bureau of the Republic of 
Lithuania having  compensated the amount 
paid by the National Insurers’ Bureau of 
Germany, claimed compensation of the said 
amount from a private limited liability company 
as the employer of the natural person liable for 
the damage caused.   
 
 
Similar to Cases No. 3, No. 4 












The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse where the 
National Insurers’ Bureau of the Republic of 
Lithuania having compensated the amount paid 
by the National Insurers’ Bureau of Germany, 
claimed compensation of the said amount from 
a private limited liability company as the 
employer of the natural person liable for the 
damage caused.  
 
 
The court has ruled out that under 
Article 4(2) of Rome II the applicable 
law is the law of the Republic of 
Lithuania because the vehicles of both 
the perpetrator and the victim are 
registered in the Republic of Lithuania, 
and that the damage has been 
administered in accordance with the 
law of the state of registration of the 
vehicles, i.e. the law of the Republic of 







Article 4 [aut. Part 
1] 
The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse where the 





Lithuania having  reimbursed the damage 
suffered by the victim filed a recourse claim 
against the natural person directly liable for the 




























The dispute arose over the rules of law 
governing a recourse claim filed by the Motor 
Insurers’ Bureau of the Republic of Lithuania 
having paid the insurance claim to the National 
Insurers’ Bureau of another state against the 
person liable for the damage caused. 
 
Similar to Case No. 2, No. 4, No. 7, 









Article 4 [aut. Part 
1] 
The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse where the 
Motor Insurers’ Bureau of the Republic of 
Lithuania having paid the insurance claim to the 
National Insurers’ Bureau of another state filed 
a recourse claim against the person liable for 
the damage caused. 
 
 
Similar to Case No. 2, No. 4, No. 7 














the court of 
appellate 
instance 
(Order of the 
Kaunas 
Regional Court 












The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse where the 
National Insurers’ Bureau of the Republic of 
Lithuania having reimbursed the damage to the 
National Insurers’ Bureau of another state filed 
a recourse claim against the person liable for 
the damage caused.  
 
 
Similar to Case No. 2, No. 4, No. 7, 









Article 4 [aut. Part 
1] 
 
The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse where the 
Motor Insurers’ Bureau of the Republic of 
Lithuania having  reimbursed the damage 
suffered by the victim filed a recourse claim 
against a private limited liability company as 















Article 4  
The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse where the 
Motor Insurers’ Bureau of the Republic of 
Lithuania having  reimbursed the amount paid 
by the National Insurers’ Bureau of Germany 
filed a recourse claim against a private limited 
liability company as the employer of the natural 









Article 4 [aut. Part 
1] 
 
The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse where the 
Motor Insurers’ Bureau of the Republic of 
Lithuania having reimbursed the damage paid 
by the National Insurers’ Bureau of Great 
Britain filed a recourse claim against a private 
limited liability company as the employer of the 
natural person liable for the damage caused.   
 
 














Article 4, 31 and 
32.  
 
The dispute in the proceedings arose over the 
award of the paid portion (i.e. 50 per cent) of 
the insurance claim where Plaintiff AAS 
Gjensidige Baltic operating in Lithuania 
through AAS Gjensidige Baltic Lithuanian 
Branch  reimbursed the damage to Defendant 
AAS BTA Baltic Insurance Company operating 
in Lithuania through AAS BTA Baltic Insurance 
Company Lithuanian Branch.  
The court has noted that the issue of 
the applicable law governing liability 
of the persons responsible for the 
damage was not raised in the appeal, 
nor was the said issue examined by 
the court of first instance, however, in 
the light of the explanations presented 
in the CJEU preliminary ruling and  
considering the fact that the  insurers’ 
obligation to compensate the damage 








of Lithuania of 
8 October 
2014 and the 
Vilnius City 
District Court of 
15 July 2015. 
persons responsible for such damage 
it is primarily necessary to determine 
the law applicable to civil liability of 
the persons responsible for the 
damage in order to resolve the 
pending dispute correctly.  
The court has relied on the 





(on the basis of 














Article 4 [aut.Part 
1] 
The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute between the vehicle insurer and the 
trailer insurer concerning compensation of 









Article 1, 4, 20 
[aut. Part 1] 
The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning invalidation of a set-off 
and compensation of damage by the right of 
recourse. 
 
Issues – whether the statutory legal relationship 
existing between the two different insurers are 
of non-contractual or contractual nature.  
 
It has been noted by the court that 
Article 14(b) of the Directive 
2009/103/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 relating to 
insurance against civil liability in 
respect of the use of motor  vehicles, 
and the enforcement of the obligation 
to insure such liability lays down a 
conflict-of-law rule which must apply 




 victims of traffic accidents but also to 
the vehicle insurers liable for the 
damage caused during the traffic 
accident by determining the law 
applicable to their relationship, the 
said rule is special vis-à-vis the rules 
of applicable law laid down in Rome 
I and Rome II. 
 
 
Rome II should be applicable to the 
case and the legal relationship of the 
parties should be regarded as falling 
outside the concept of non-
contractual obligation and thus be 
viewed as derivative legal 
relationship arising out of a tort. As 
there was no contract concluded 
between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant, the provisions under 
Rome I applicable to contractual 
relations could not be applicable to 
such legal relationship as the latter 
should be deemed to fall within the 









The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute concerning compensation of 
damage by the right of recourse where ADB 
Gjensidige having  compensated the damage 
to the victim of a traffic accident in Germany 
filed a recourse claim against the person liable 
for the damage caused.  
 
 
The court has noted that in the light of 
Article 4 of Rome II regarding the 
applicable law and considering the 
content of the German law, it follows 
that in the event of a traffic accident in 
Germany where damage was caused 
by a vehicle and trailer combination, 




Issues – scope of liability of the vehicle insurer 
and of the trailer insurer in the traffic accident in 
Germany under Rome II and the German 
national law. 
have joint liability and the insurers 
having insured civil liability of the 
vehicle operator and of the trailer 
operator usually pay the insurance 






(the said Ruling 
was rendered 
by the Supreme 
Court of 
Lithuania on the 
basis of the 
CJEU 
preliminary 









Art 4, 15 (a), (b), 
19, 27, 28, 31, 
32.  
The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute between the insurers of operators of 
different vehicles, i.e. a tractor unit and a trailer, 
concerning the obligation to compensate the 





In the light of the arguments presented 
in the CJEU preliminary ruling, the 
Supreme Court of Lithuania has stated 
that in the event of a traffic accident in 
Germany where damage was caused 
by a vehicle and  trailer combination, 
operators of such vehicle and trailer 
have joint liability.  
Therefore, the tractor unit insurer has 
the right to claim from the trailer 
insurer compensation of 50 per cent 
of the amount paid to the victim 
(Paragraphs No. 23, 23(1), 38, 39, 











475/14 on 21 
January 2016  
8 October 
2014 




The Supreme Court of Lithuania issued 
an order requesting the CJEU to pass 






Supreme Court of 
Lithuania of 8 
October 2014 and 
the Vilnius City 










28(1) and 32, 
preamble recital 
36. 
A civil claim for compensation of the survivor’s 
damage was filed in the criminal proceedings 
when 2 citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
died during a traffic accident that was caused 
in the Republic of Lithuania through the fault of 
a citizen of the Republic of Latvia who was 
driving the tractor unit registered in the Republic 
of Latvia.  
Issues – relationship between Roma II and 
other international conventions governing the 
issues of applicable law in the non-contractual 
legal relationship dealing with compensation of 
damage.  
The court has commented on the 
provisions of Rome II to the extent that 
recital 36 of the Preamble and Article 
28(1) of Rome II lay down that the 
Regulation does not affect the 
application of international 
conventions to which one or more 
Member States are a party at the time 
of adoption of this Regulation and lay 
down conflict-of-law rules relating to 
non-contractual obligations. One of 
such international conventions is the 
1971 Hague Convention on the Law 








[aut. Article 1] The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute between the vehicle insurer and the 
trailer insurer regarding compensation of 
damages by the right of recourse in a traffic 
accident that occurred in a foreign state.   
Point at issue – whether the legal relationship 
between the two different insurers derives from 
non-contractual or contractual legal 
relationship which directly relates to the 
possibility of (non)application of Rome II.   
The court held that the issues of 
insurance against civil liability in 
respect of the use of motor vehicles 
should be decided on the basis of a 
contract of compulsory insurance 
against civil liability in respect of use 
of motor vehicles and that Rome II 
should not be applicable because the 
existence of the contract of 
compulsory insurance against civil 
liability in respect of use of motor 
vehicles does not give grounds for 













The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute regarding a claim filed by the 
insurer having  compensated the damage 
against the insurer having insured the person’s 
civil liability when a traffic accident occurs in 
the state other than the state of registration of 
the vehicle.  
Point at issue – to assess the nature of the 
existing legal relationship – whether such 
obligations are contractual or non-contractual 
which directly relates to the possibility of 
(non)application of Rome II.   
 
 
The Supreme Court of Lithuania 
decided not to apply the provisions of 
Rome II because it considered that the 
legal relationship between the insurer 
having compensated the damage and 
the insurer having insured the civil 
liability of the person who caused 











[aut. Article 1] The issue of applicable law was considered in 
the dispute regarding compensation of 
damage where 4 persons suffered damage 
during a traffic accident caused by criminal 
offences committed by a natural person that 
involved violation of the Road Traffic Rules. 
Issues – whether due to the  existence of a 
contract of compulsory insurance against civil 
liability in respect of use of motor vehicles 
between the insurer and the insured the 
insurer’s obligation to compensate the damage 
derives from non-contractual civil liability rules 
or from the insurance contract and the rules of 
law governing insurance relationship  
The court found that the appeal was 
groundlessly based on Rome II 
determining the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations because 
the insurer’s obligation to compensate 
the damage was deriving from 
contractual relationship. 
24. Court of 












Articles 1, 2, 4, 15 
(a) and (b) 
This preliminary ruling was issued in the context 
of disputes between insurance companies, 
namely those concerning the law applicable to 
recourse claims between the parties in the event 
of traffic accidents in Germany.  
It was clarified by the CJEU among 
other things that the liability of the two 
insurers was non-contractual. 
Apart from that: the existence of the 
right of the insurer having insured the 




proceedings on 8 
October 2014 by 
the Supreme Court 
of Lithuania and on 
15 July 2015by 
the Vilnius City 
District Court)  
In particular, the uncertainty as to the 
determination of the law applicable to the 
dispute between the two insurers was resolved. 
The law applicable to the recourse claim filed 
by the tractor unit’s insurer having paid the 
insurance claim to the person having suffered 
damage in the traffic accidence caused by the 
said tractor unit’s driver against the insurer of 
the trailer pulled during the said traffic accident.  
the accident, to file a claim against the 
trailer’s insurer  after payment of the 
insurance claim to the victim may not 
be deemed to arise from the insurance 
contract though it implies at the same 
time non-contractual liability of the 
said trailer operator vis-à-vis the said  
victim. Therefore, such duty of the 
trailer operator to compensate the 
damage must be regarded as a “non-
contractual obligation” within the 






• The Rome II Regulation is rarely applied in Luxembourg. 
• Awareness of the Rome II Regulation among practitioners is unclear. 
• The practical importance and awareness of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic 
accidents is possibly higher than that of the Rome II Regulation. 
• Two cases decided before the entry into force of the Regulation suggest that the suitability of the Regulation 
for regulating financial market torts might become an issue, including for the uncertainty surrounding its 
material scope. 
1. Introduction 
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is a small country where half of the working force commutes from neighbouring 
countries and most economic activity is international. Private international law is thus used on a daily basis by 
practitioners. This would suggest that the Rome II Regulation is probably well known. There is anecdotal evidence 
suggesting the contrary, however. Certain judgments of the highest courts in the country have addressed issues of 
choice of law in tort matters without even mentioning the Regulation, and, conversely, certain judgments have referred 
to the Regulation in divorce and traffic accident cases.   
The size of the country also results in a low number of cases and limited scholarly production. It is only in 2019 that 
Luxembourg authorities have made public a database including a large number of cases (though probably not all of 
them, which explains why this author cannot be certain to have identified all relevant cases), and there are no judicial 
statistics on the use of the Regulation. The doctrinal discussion on the Regulation is almost inexistent, with the exception 
of two books presenting the private international law of Luxembourg (J.-Cl. Wiwinius Le droit international privé au 
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Bauler, 3ème éd. 2011 ; G. Cuniberti, Droit international privé luxembourgeois, vol. 1, 
Legitech 2020) and a contribution to a recent book (E. Fronczak “Luxembourg”, in E. Guinchard (ed.), Rome I and 
Rome II in Practice, Intersentia 2020). This author is unaware of any discussion at a political level on the regulation. 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to : 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
Luxembourg courts have applied several times the Rome II Regulation to tort claims made in the context of divorce 
proceedings. Art 1(2)(a) was not raised. 
The scope of the exclusion of corporate matters is also an issue: see below Question 6. 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, Arts 31-32) 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 





To the knowledge of this author, none of these provisions has raised any issue in Luxembourg. 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of : 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and  
To the knowledge of this author, none of these provisions has raised any issue in Luxembourg. 
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
The suitability of the various paragraphs of Art 4 to govern financial market torts was not discussed as such. The 
Luxembourg Court of Appeal has decided two cases concerned with cross-border financial market torts (CA, 1st April 
2015, case no 38886; 21 December 2016, case no 41086), but the Rome II Regulation did not apply rationae 
temporis. In one of the cases, however, the court referred to the Regulation as a persuasive authority (CA, 1st April 
2015, case no 38886). 
In each of the two cases, the court found that Luxembourg law applied. In the first (CA, 1st April 2015, case no 38886), 
the reason was because the loss had occurred in Luxembourg, as the account on which the securities were held was 
situated. The court referred to the Rome II Regulation as a persuasive authority. In the second (CA, 21 December 
2016, case no 41086), the reason for applying Luxembourg law was that the securities (issued by a foreign company 
established in the British Virgin Islands) were marketed in Luxembourg in violation of certain provisions of Luxembourg 
law. The court did not refer to the Rome II Regulation, which would not have supported its decision, as Luxembourg 
was arguably the place of the event giving rise to the damage. This second case raises the issue of the legitimate interest 
of Member States to apply their law to regulate the marketing on their territory of securities issued by foreign 
companies. 
Finally, such cases raise the issue of the scope of the Rome II Regulation and whether actions against directors of 
companies are governed by the law of the tort or by the law of the company. The issue is unsettled and creates 
uncertainty. In the second case (CA, 21 December 2016, case no 41086), the issue was raised (at least implicitly), 
but the court did not address it.  
CA, 1st April 2015, case no 38886 
Facts: 
The defendants own a bank account from the claimant, a Luxembourgish bank, on which were made several purchases 
of securities. This bank transferred the securities to another account owned by a German company following a written 
instruction order from the defendants to do so by a person who usurped their identity. The defendants seek 
compensation for their damage. 
Held: 
Rome II regulation embodies Luxembourgish case-law by opting for the law of the place where the damage occurred.  
The place where the damage occurred is the place where the fact generating liability directly produced its effects on 
the direct victim, in this case Luxembourg, the damage being the defendants’ spoliation resulting from the fraudulent 
transfer and sale of their securities. Since the damage occurred in Luxembourg, the conditions, nature and scope of 
the liability are determined by Luxembourgish law. 





The claimants bought securities of a company established in the British Virgin Islands managed in Luxembourg by the 
defendants. The offer was made in Luxembourg, and the marketing materials contained false information about them, 
notably regarding its investment policy, wrongly qualified as cautious. The claimants lost all the money they invested 
and seek to trigger the defendants’ liability for fraudulent placement of their securities.  
Held: 
The liability of the defendants is tortious because it is not shown that the operating costs paid by the securities’ subscriber 
were also paid by his successors.  
Since the offer of securities by the company constituted in the British Virgin Islands was made in Luxembourg and the 
company is run and managed from Luxembourg, the defendants were subject to Luxembourg company law. Its 
provisions impose criminal sanctions on any person inducing subscriptions or payments through means of false 
information knowing that they are not accurate (art. 164 Luxembourg Company Act). The defendants could not have 
ignored that the information given to the claimants was false, and the loss of their investments is linked to the fund’s 
policy which is in no way cautious as described to the claimants. The defendants are thus liable and must compensate 
the claimants’ damage as they violated Luxembourgish law in marketing the securities. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
Luxembourg is a party to the 1973 Hague Convention. However, to the knowledge of this author, the Convention has 
never been applied. As recently as 2019, the Court of Appeal ignored both the Rome II Regulation and the 1973 
Hague Convention to determine the law governing a product liability claim (Luxembourg Court of Appeal, 19 June 
2019, case no 41449). 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
To the knowledge of this author, this provision was only applied by one Luxembourg court of first instance (District 
Court of Diekirch, 27 November 2018, case no 21057 and 21295). The court applied Art. 6(2), but it might be that 
the case fell rather in the scope of Art 6(1). 
Ms Fronczak presents the case as follows: 
“A Belgian transport and logistics company took issue with the fact that the Luxembourg company it had hired to 
perform transport services on its behalf for a client did not inform it about its – eventually successful – participation in 
the following procurement procedure launched by that client. Considering that the Luxembourg company committed 
an act of unfair competition, the Belgian company refused to pay the latest invoices for transport services. In this case, 
the Luxembourg company started legal action. In response, the Belgian company requested compensation for an 
alleged damage resulting from the act of unfair competition allegedly committed by the Luxembourg company. 
Given the facts of the case, the court applied Article 6(2) Rome II. It therefore had to establish the place where the 
alleged damage occurred in order to identify applicable law. This should have been the country where the specific 
competitor’ s interests, i.e. his competitive position vis- à -vis the acting competitor, had been affected. From the 
judgment we know only that the transport services concerned goods from a warehouse located in France to the client’s 
affiliates, authorised retailers and ateliers located in Belgium. Without any in-depth analysis the court stated that the 
alleged damage occurred in the place where the alleged victim was established, i.e. in Belgium. It therefore applied 
Belgian law. 
In the case at hand, it seems that the competitor’s interests in the Belgian market were affected and therefore the choice 
of law was correct, however the justification was not. Nevertheless, one case decided by a first instance court does 
not allow one to draw a general conclusion that the Luxembourg courts have difficulties with the application of the 
specific rules established by the Rome II Regulation." (extract from Fronczak, Rome I and Rome II in Practice, p. 406). 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
To the knowledge of this author, there has been no debate or interest in any of these two provisions in Luxembourg. It 
does not seem that they were ever applied by Luxembourg courts either. 




To the knowledge of this author, these provisions were never applied in Luxembourg and did not generate any debate. 
They raise, however, issues of coordination with existing international conventions. It is unclear, for instance, whether 
the Berne Convention includes rules (art 5(2)) which could be characterised as choice of law rules and would thus 
exclude the application of the Rome II Regulation (see G. Cuniberti, Droit international privé luxembourgeois, vol. 1, 
Legitech 2020, para. 281).  
It should be noted that the position of Luxembourg with respect to trademarks and designs is peculiar as Luxembourg 
belongs to the BENELUX area (BENELUX IP Convention of 25 February 2005) which has adopted common rules and 
established a single court, which suppresses most choice of law issues within this area.  
The BENELUX IP Convention establishes BENELUX trademarks and designs. These regional IP rights can be registered 
by filing either with the regional BENELUX Office for IP (seat: the Hague) or with one of the three national 
administrations (which shall then forward the application to the regional office). Arts 2.20 and 3.16 of the Convention 
define the extent of the protection of the holder of respectively trademarks and designs. Additionally, other provisions 
of the Convention define the remedies available in case of infringements of trademarks and designs. These provisions 
are authoritatively interpreted by a regional BENELUX court. In these fields, the law of the three countries is uniform. If 
the Rome II Regulation designates the law of either of them, the BENELUX uniform law is applicable. If the dispute is 
intra-BENELUX, choice of law issues do not arise. 
However, both arts 2.20 and 3.16 (respectively for trademarks and designs) of the Convention reserve the application 
of the common law of torts. As the law of torts was not harmonised among BENELUX countries, this necessarily refers 
to the national law of torts, which should be designated by the choice of law rule in the Rome II Regulation. From a 
practical standpoint, however, it is unclear why claimants might need to refer to national law to supplement the 
Convention. Luxembourg courts have referred to Luxembourg law to grant certain provisional measures, but arts 2.22 
and 3.18 (respectively for trademarks and designs) expressly provide that national law governs provisional measures.  
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
To the knowledge of this author, there has been no debate or interest in this provision in Luxembourg. It does not seem 
that they were ever applied by Luxembourg courts either. 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
This provision was applied in two cases. The first allowed the clarification of certain interesting issues. 
CA, 13 October 2010, case no 32035 
Facts: 
The claimant, a German municipality, transferred a sum of money on the account of a bank (whose successors, two 
Luxembourgish companies, are the defendants). This transfer was made in performance of a loan agreement between 
the claimant and a Luxembourg municipality, at the request of a broker who embezzled money by dealing with the 
parties without ever putting them in touch. The claimant demands reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. The 
recipients of the payment (ie the bank) argue that it was made in the context of a loan from the bank to the Luxembourg 
municipality.  
Held: 
The court addresses the issue of the law governing the claim for unjust enrichment made by the German municipality 
against the bank. The Rome II did not apply. 
The court finds that a loan contract existed between the Luxembourg municipality and the bank, and that it was 
governed by Luxembourg law. The parties disagree as to whether the law governing the claim for unjust enrichment 
should be the law of the underlying relationship (the loan contract governed by Luxembourg law) or the law of the 




Part of Luxembourgish case-law already applied to quasi-contracts the law governing the underlying legal relationship 
on which the quasi-contract is based before the entry into force of Rome II for three reasons: the link with the underlying 
legal relationship is presumed to be the closest; quasi-contracts are remedies to ordinary rules which justified the mere 
extension of the law applicable to the latter; and the parties expect this law to also govern the indirect consequences 
of their legal relationship. 
A first issue is whether the relevant underlying legal relationship can bind only one of the parties to the quasi-contract 
claim to a third party; the court relies on a Swiss case of Nov. 1st, 1952 and French scholarship to decide that the 
underlying relationship need not be between the two parties to the unjust enrichment claim. The court also rules that 
the underlying relationship must have existed. If a payment is made in execution of an existing legal relationship which 
is then declared void, the creditor’s enrichment, of which the “cause” rested on this relationship, has no more “cause” 
and the law applicable to the annulment of the relationship also applies to the unjust enrichment resulting from it.   
Mrs Fronczak cites another case that she presents as follows: 
In two more parallel cases (TA Luxembourg, 09.01.2015, no. 8/2015, no. 166.013 du rôle, and 09.01.2015, no. 
5/2015, 
no. 166.014 du rôle), a person residing in Luxembourg received invalidity and survivor ’s benefits granted to his 
mother for over four years after her death. In both cases, the law applicable to the action lodged by the social security 
institution and based on répétition de l ’indû was determined on the basis of Article 10 of the Rome II Regulation. In 
these cases, the applicability ratione temporis of the Rome II Regulation was not self-evident, since the pensions were 
received between 1 July 2006 and 31 October 2010, and the Regulation only applies to events occurring aft er 11 
January 2009. Consequently, the law applicable to the damage caused by the payments made before 11 January 
2009 should have been ascertained on the basis of national private international law rules. Unfortunately, the court 
did not explain its choice to apply the Rome II Regulation to all events giving rise to the alleged damage (extract from 
Fronczak, Rome I and Rome II in Practice, p. 408). 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
This provision was applied in one case but did not raise any particular issue. 
In this case (TA Luxembourg, 31.01.2014, no. 204/2014 and 19.12.2014, no. 2585/2014, no. 149.694 
du r ô le), an aeroplane engine was shipped from Canada, where it had undergone a technical check, to Germany, 
from where it was to be shipped onwards to Luxembourg. Th e engine was supposed to undergo customs clearance 
in Luxembourg but, since this did not happen, the engine was sent to a depository in Germany where it stayed for over 
20 days, which triggered its customs clearance in Germany. Th e VAT imposed on the company running the German 
depository was re-invoiced to the German company that was supposed to perform the customs clearance in 
Luxembourg. This company paid this sum and requested reimbursement from the Luxembourg company – i.e. the owner 
of the plane. Since that company refused to pay, the German company seised a Luxembourg court. Having found a 
document entitled ‘ Customs Clearance Instructions for Fiscal Representation ’ insufficient to prove a contractual 
relationship between the parties, the court analysed the possible existence of negotiorum gestio . Going through the 
plethora of rules indicated in Article 11 Rome II and in the absence of a contractual relationship or the habitual 
residence of the parties in the same Member State, the law of the place where the management of aff airs was 
performed was found to apply. Payment of the invoice was identifi ed as an action of management and therefore 
German law was applicable (extract from Fronczak, Rome I and Rome II in Practice, p. 407). 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
This provision was applied in one case but has not raised any particular issue. 
District Court of Luxembourg, 18 November 2008, case no 108103 
Facts: 
The claimant and the first defendant, an Italian company, entered into a cooperation agreement for counselling a 
subsidiary of the defendant located in Argentina. The claimant was the subsidiary’s manager and owned 1% of its 
share capital. The defendant sells off 99% of it to the second defendant, a Luxembourg company, which sent to the 
claimant a framework contract aiming at reorganising the subsidiary and partly transferring the share capital to the 




She then resigns and the subsidiary informs her of her dismissal from her manager position. The claimant brought 
proceedings in Argentina for unfair dismissal, in which the 2 defendant companies are held severally liable to pay 
termination indemnity. 
Held: 
As the dispute deals with the breakdown of talks regarding the framework contract and not with the cooperation 
agreement, the applicable law is that which is designated in the draft framework agreement. This solution is in 
conformity with Art. 12 of Rome II Regulation, although not in force yet, which designates the law of the contract which 
was not concluded in case of a fault committed during the precontractual stage and of a breach of a precontractual 
obligation.   
Luxembourg law applies, as the contemplated framework contract provided for the application of Luxembourg law, 
the contract was to be signed in Luxembourg and one of the parties was a company incorporated in Luxembourg.  
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
To the knowledge of this author, the application of this provision was never discussed by courts and did not raise any 
issue in Luxembourg. 
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
To the knowledge of this author, none of these issues was raised in Luxembourg. 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
While it does not seem that this provision was applied by Luxembourg courts, the issue of its wider influence and 
potential extension to the context of contractual obligation was discussed and rejected in the case below.  
District Court of Luxembourg, March 2014, case no 79 / 201412 
Facts: 
The claimant is a Luxembourgish company who asked the first defendant, also a Luxembourgish company, to file a 
request for hiring subsidies. It was rejected on the ground that the deadline to file it had passed. The claimant sues the 
first defendant and his insurer, the Belgian subsidiary of a Dutch company, to be compensated for the damage resulting 
from the refusal.  
Held: 
The claimant and the first defendant entered into a contract for the provision of services; the claim should thus be subject 




The direct action being contractual, the Rome II Regulation does not apply. 
Applying to the direct action the law of the place of the damage is not an appropriate solution as it is not suitable to 
contractual matters for two reasons: the accidental nature of the damage, and the fact that it requires the delimitation 
of the scope with regard to both the law governing the insurance contract and the law governing liability, which is the 
law of the contract concluded between the victim and the insured party. 
Thus the law governing the contract concluded between the victim and the insured party should be applied to the 
question of the admissibility of the direct action, Luxembourgish law here, although the insurance contract concluded 
between the two defendant is subject to Belgian law.  
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
While it does not seem that any of these provisions was applied by Luxembourg courts, an academic writer has raised 
the issue of the absence of provision regulating cases where rights are transferred in the absence of a duty to satisfy 
the creditor, and the resulting uncertainty (G. Cuniberti, Droit international privé luxembourgeois, vol. 1, Legitech 
2020, para. 242).   
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
To the knowledge of this author, none of these issues was raised in Luxembourg. 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
The rule in Art 26 raises a couple of issues (G. Cuniberti, Droit international privé luxembourgeois, vol. 1, Legitech 
2020, para. 71). The first is the extent to which Member States are free to apply various doctrines to limit its operation 
(effet atténué, ordre public de proximité, etc…). The second is that the meaning (and usefulness) of the limitation 
introduced by the term “manifestly” is unclear.  
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
A specific issue of coordination with international legal instruments arises in the filed of intellectual property rights, 
creating uncertainty as to whether the Rome II Regulation applies at all (supra, question 10). 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
The 1971 Hague Convention is frequently applied and of huge practical significance in a country where half of the 
work force (i.e. 200 000 workers) commutes every day from France, Belgium and Germany. 
Because the 1971 Convention is old and often applied, it is well known by courts and lawyers in Luxembourg, and 
this author is unaware of cases where it was wrongly applied (in contrast, cases where the Rome II Regulation was 
wrongly applied are numerous, including in traffic accident cases: see below). Importantly, it is also applicable in the 




rules apply in the third neighbouring country (Germany, 25% of commuters), and might thus create incentives for forum 
shopping, but they limited under the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
As an old instrument, the Hague Convention is silent on a number of important issues such as the admissibility of 
applying overriding mandatory provisions or choosing the applicable law. Contrary to French and Belgian courts, 
Luxembourg courts have not addressed these issues. 
Whether the Hague Convention often leads to results different from the Rome II Regulation is unclear. The statistics of 
the Luxembourg government on traffic accidents in Luxembourg show that in about 25% of accidents, the car hit a tree 
(typically in the middle of the countryside) or some other similar immobile object: the Hague Convention provides for 
the application of the law of the place of the accident. In about 47% of accidents, the accident involved several cars. 
As half of the workforce commutes from neighbouring countries, a rough estimate is that half of the accidents occurring 
during the week might involve cars matriculated in different states (although certain non residents/commuters have 
cars matriculated in Luxembourg, their matriculation would not be taken into account for the purpose of the Hague 
Convention) and thus lead to the application of the law of the place of the accident. Furthermore, 73% of lethal 
accidents occur between Friday night and Sunday, and are much less likely to involve foreign residents: the law of the 
place of accident and the law of the matriculation and residence of all parties would apply. In the vast majority of 
cases, therefore, it does not seem that the Hague Convention leads to results different from the Rome II Regulation. 
Ms Fronczak has identified some cases where the Rome II Regulation was wrongly applied instead of the Hague 
Convention, and argued that this resulted from the misleading understanding that the scope of the Hague Convention 
was limited. She noted, however, that the application of the right instrument in these cases would not have resulted in 
a different outcome. 
In three cases, the Luxembourg courts directly applied Rome II to find the applicable law, without considering the 
possibility of applying the 1971 Hague Convention. 
One of these cases concerned a traffic accident that occurred in Luxembourg involving a Belgian and a Dutch car. The 
court applied the law of the place of the accident on the basis of the Rome II Regulation, although it seems that the 
1971 Hague Convention should have been applied (TA Luxembourg, 15.11.2011, no. 156/2011, no. 138.290 
du r ô le.). It should be noted, however, that this case was decided before the French Cour de cassation confirmed 
that, under Article 28 of the Rome II Regulation, the 1971 Hague Convention, as a convention non-exclusively 
concluded between the EU Member States, shall take precedence over the Regulation. The Luxembourg literature at 
that point was of the opinion that aft er the entry into force of the Rome II Regulation, the 1971 Hague Convention was 
to apply only to relations between Luxembourg and third countries (J.-C. Wiwinius , L e droit international privé au 
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg , Paul Bauler , Luxembourg 2011 , p. 203).  
In another case, the accident occurred in Belgium but the parties were all (except one passenger) domiciled in 
Luxembourg. Although it is not specified in the judgment, it seems that the cars involved in the accident were also 
registered in Luxembourg. In this case, the accident took place in April 2013, the first instance decision was taken on 
9 July 2014 – shortly after the abovementioned  decision of the Cour de cassation. However, the appeal judgment 
was only delivered on 1 December 2015. In this case, an application of the 1971 Hague Convention would have 
allowed for a clear solution, as it provides for the application of the law of the state of the common registration of the 
vehicles involved in an accident. In fact, this Convention explicitly excludes in Article 4(a) the use of the habitual 
residence of a victim as a linking factor. On the contrary, for the Luxembourg court to designate, on the basis of the 
Rome II Regulation, lex fori as applicable law required ‘ignoring’ the fact that one of the defendants was domiciled in 
Belgium. This was achieved on the basis that his involvement in the accident, apart from being just another passenger, 
was not proven (TA Luxembourg, 01.12.2015, no. 251/2015, no. 164.190 du rôle.). The implications for the 
applicability of the 1971 Hague Convention stemming from the subrogation of one of the insurance companies 
involved was not discussed in the judgment. 
In addition, in a case where two motorbikes owned by persons domiciled in Belgium were involved in an accident in 
Luxembourg, Belgian law was identified as the applicable law on the basis of Article 4(2) Rome II (TP Luxembourg, 
05.06.2014, Rép. fisc. no. 2389/14.).  
In all these cases, the application of the Rome II Regulation did not lead to the application of a different law than the 




solutions were different only in theory, but not in practice. (extract from Fronczak, Rome I and Rome II in Practice, p. 
400). 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
No. 
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
This author is unaware of any discussion concerning any of these issues in Luxembourg in the context of the Rome II 
Regulation.  
For instance, while there has been increasing awareness of Luxembourg authorities on the issue of business and human 
rights (with the establishment of a working group on the topic in the ministry of foreign affairs), there is no reported 
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Findings (only for key cases) 
District Court of 
Diekirch 
21057 and 21295 27 November 
2018 
6(2) Unfair competition See summary above at 8. 
Court of appeal 118/18 12 July 2018 31 Temporal scope  
Court of appeal 38886 1 April 2015 4(1) Liability of bank for allowing fraudulent 
sale of securities 
Loss occurred in country where the account on 
which the securities were held was situated (see 
summary above at 6) 
Court of appeal 32035 13 Oct 2010 10 Law governing loan contract applies to 
a claim of unjust enrichment  
See summary above at 12. 
Court of appeal 32124 13 Oct 2010 10 Same The content of the judgment is identical to the 
previous one.  
District Court of 
Luxembourg city 
251/2015 (no. 
164.190 du role) 
1 Dec 2015 4(2) Traffic accident See summary above at 27. 
District Court of 
Luxembourg city 






Material scope of Regulation not 
discussed 
District Court of 
Luxembourg city 
8/2015 (no 
166.013 du rôle) 
 
5/2015 (no. 
166.014 du rôle) 
9 Jan 2015 10 Unjust enrichment See summary above at 12. 
District Court of 
Luxembourg city 







19 Dec 2014 
31 Jan 2014 
 
11 Negotiorum gestio See summary above at 13. 
Justice of the Peace of 
Luxembourg city 
Rép. fisc. no. 
2389/14. 
5 June 2014 4(2) Traffic accident See summary above at 27. 
District Court of 
Luxembourg city 
246/2014 22 May 2014 4(1) Nervous shock for divorce 
Material scope of Regulation not 
discussed 
 
District Court of 
Luxembourg city 
79 / 2014 12 March 
2014 
18 Direct action in contractual matters Law governing the insurance contract applies 
(see summary above at 20) 
District Court of 
Luxembourg city 




District Court of 
Luxembourg city 
369/12 6 Dec 2012 4(2) Nervous shock for divorce 
Material scope of Regulation not 
discussed 
 
District Court of 
Luxembourg city 
156/2011 (no. 
138.290 du r ô le). 
15 Nov 2011 4(1) Traffic accident See summary above at 27. 
District Court of 
Luxembourg city 






• In Malta, the understanding and use of the Rome II Regulation is limited amongst the majority of practitioners, 
businesses and citizens. However, practitioners who regularly work on cross-border issues are more likely 
to be aware of the regulation. There are no statistical data available on the Regulation. (1. Introduction) 
• Due to the limited case law, there are no data on general trends and difficulties in addressing the scope or 
interpretation under Chapter 1 of the Regulation. Nonetheless, the universal application of the Regulation 
(art.3) is dealt with in the case of Xerri Godwin Nomine vs Zejt Marine Services Limited. (2.1 Chapter I – 
Scope and Interpretation) 
• The case of Xerri Godwin Nomine vs Zejt Marine Services Limited involved a collision incident between two 
Maltese flagged vessels, where the plaintiff had leased the vessel from a Polish company. Although both 
companies were registered and flagged by Malta, the court held that because the place of direct damage 
took place in Tunisian waters, Tunisian law applies (art 4(1)). (2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict a)  
• The same case goes on to examine whether Tunisian law should not apply because the both parties have the 
same habitual residence. The court decided that with one of the plaintiffs being the Polish owners of the 
vessel, article 4(2) could not apply. (2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict b) Further, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
argument that due to the Maltese nationality, Malta as the flag state and the court’s jurisdiction, Maltese law 
should apply, as the collision and damages, clearly happened in another country. (2.2 Chapter II - 
Tort/Delict c) 
• In the context of the adversarial system, Maltese law applies, unless parties wishing to rely on foreign law 
plead its application and provide evidence to the court. In cases where there are conflict of laws, Maltese 
law has a privileged status, thus, application of foreign law would ‘not prevent the application of mandatory 
provisions of Maltese law’ (2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules).  
• The Court in Xerri v Zejt Marine Services in its implementation of the concept habitual residence noted that 
the registered state of a company is not necessarily the same as the company’s central administration (art 
23). The party invoking the article 4 exception, has the burden of proof. (2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions) 
• Maltese Private International Law fosters that in the application of a provision of the lex causae there should 
not be any breach of Maltese public policy, a ‘juridical or moral principle which is regarded as being 
fundamental for Maltese society’. (2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions) 
• Malta, not being a party to the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents, faces 
concerns on the quantification of damages in incidents involving cross-border motor accident, as this does 
not fall under the scope of Rome II Regulation. (2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions) 
• The treatment of defamation as regards SLAPP suits in Malta is subject to public debate at the moment. 
Following the murder of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, NGOs, political parties, and the public have 
been lobbying for anti-SLAPP legislation. As Rome II Regulation 1(2)(g) excludes from its scope defamation 
cases, claimants can still engage in forum shopping – which raises human rights implications – especially in 
a context of small media houses. (2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems) 
1. Introduction 
The Rome II Regulation seems to be little applied and understood by the majority of practitioners, business and citizens 
in Malta although those practitioners who regularly work on cross-border issues are more likely to be aware of the 
regulation.  
No statistics are available regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in Malta. Statistics can be gleaned from 
searches on the Judgments Website. Indeed a seach for Rome II Regulation Results in 2 judgments (same case, 2 




is not referenced (they arise because the reference number of the cases is 864/2007); another 6 records are doubles 
linked to the same set of parties and facts, whilst a final 2 decisions are left. These have been reviewed and whilst the 
Regulation is referenced at least once in these decisions, it is not addressed by the Court or explored in any depth by 
the Parties. One decision, Xerri Godwin Nomine vs Zejt Marine Services Limited is the most directly applicable decision 
and will be subject to analysis in this report.  
Doctrinal discussion in Malta has been evolving over the past decade and there has been a series of new books 
published about Maltese law. However, analysis of the Rome II in that literature is limited to a handful of pieces 
including a book chapter, a dissertation and a relevant policy brief. By contrast however, particular issues, including 
anti-SLAPP legislation, where the Rome II Regulation can have significant implications have been discussed extensively 
in the public domain. Here, aspects of EU law were raised as part of the discussion.   
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
The limited case law addressing the Rome II Regulation in Malta has addressed the question of scope or interpretation 
or matters arising under Chapter 1 of the Regulation. A number of decisions that mention the Regulation have in fact 
been dealt with primarily under other EU private international law instruments, notably the Recast Brussels Regulation.  
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to : 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, Arts 31-32) 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
Whilst the case law does not specifically address Article 3 of the Regulation, it is worth noting that the application of a 
foreign law was considered in obiter in Xerri Godwin Nomine vs Zejt Marine Services Limited where the court noted 
the possibility of the application of either Tunisian or Polish Law. Indeed the final decision in the case was that Tunisian 
law applied.  
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation)(Recital 
(7)) 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of : 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
Article 4 of Rome II Regulation was the subject of extensive determination by the Maltese Courts in Xerri Godwin 
Nomine vs Zejt Marine Services Limited. The court entered into a detailed analysis of the provisions, and the 
relationship between the different subsections of Article 4. Briefly, the case revolved around an incident involving a 
collision between 2 Maltese Flagged vessels having taken place in Tunisian waters (Sousse Port). The first vessel 
(plaintiff) was owned by a Polish company but leased under a bareboat charter to a Maltese company (p. 7). The 
second vessel was owned by a Maltese company. The court starts from the premise, uncontested by the parties, that 
the jurisdiction of the Maltese courts is established under Article 742(1)(b) of the Code of Organisation and Civil 




should be determined, not on the basis of general private intenational law rules, but rather on the basis of the Rome II 
Regulation, quoting the final statement of the regulation stating ‘this regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in the Member States in accordance with the Treatyestablishing the European Community’. On this point, 
the Court goes on to quote from Liz Hefferman about the geographical reach of the Regulation and in particular that it 
‘extends to any proceedings in tort that contain an international element whether European or not’. 837 
The contestation then arises from the challenge by the defendant regarding the proper law. The defendants excepted 
that: ‘in any case the incident occurred in Tunisia and therefore the responsibility for the incident and any damage 
should be determined according to Tunisian law’ (P.5). On the contrary, the plaintiffs argued that a distinction must be 
drawn between the lex loci damni and the lex loci delicti commissi. They note that whilst the incident did occur in 
Tunisia, both vessels flew the Maltese flag and as such should be considered as an extension of Maltese nationality 
and therefore Maltese law should be applied as the lex loci delicti. The court was not convinced by this interpretation 
and noted that this was not a case where the incident happened in one place but the damage occurred elsewhere. 
The case revolves around an incident (collision) that occurred in Tunisian waters and the damage was suffered in the 
same place. Therefore, the court noted, these facts call directly within the ambit of Article 4(1) of the regulation.838  
On this, the court goes on to explore the particular application to the maritime sphere. The Court does not consider the 
matter of where a vessel is flagged under the Civil law as a factor that would result in an exception to the general 
applicability of 4(1). Indeed, the court notes, the same article does not distinguish between physical persons, moral 
persons or a vessel. In support of this, the court quotes Cheshire, North and Fawcett Private International Law 14th 
Edition, in part saying ‘the deletion of the special provision indicates that when interpreting the regulation, a country 
should not be identified by looking at the law of the flag’.839  
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
On this basis, the court argues that in principle Article 4(1) is applicable and therefore prima facie Tunisian law should 
be applied to the case at hand. However, the court continues, the Regulation allows exceptions to this general rule, in 
the form of Article 4(2), which provides that ‘where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage 
both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs, the law of that country 
shall apply’. Given that the parties are all legal persons, the Court makes reference to Article 23(1) of the Regulation 
which clarifies the meaning of habitual residence for legal persons. The plaintiffs note that Article 4(2) is applicable 
given that one of the plaintiffs and the defendant are both Maltese companies. The court considers this to be fallacious 
noting the distinction between registration and central administration (we return to this discussion elsewhere in this 
report). In brief the court notes that ‘the place where a company is registered is not necessarily where it has its central 
administration’. More broadly the court notes that any exception to the rule must be narrowly interpreted and that what 
renders 4(2) inapplicable is that not all the parties involved in the case are habitually resident in Malta. Indeed one of 
the plaintiffs, the owner of the vessel that was allegedly damaged in the collision is a Polish company. The other plantiff, 
that is the one registered in Malta, seems to lease the vessel (bareboat charter) and therefore it is not clear who exactly 
suffered the damage between the plaintiffs.Since one of the parties with a direct and certain interest, that is the owner 
of the vesselis certainly not habitually resident in Malta, the exception (4(2)) is not applicable.840  
Moreover, the plaintiffs noted that the non-Maltese resident plaintiff had submitted to the application of Maltese law 
by virtue of having filed the case in Malta. The court rejected this argument, noting that this is not strictly correct as the 
jurisdiction is established by the fact that the defendant is registered in Malta Moreover, the exception of Article 4(2) 
is not intended to be used at the discretion of the party to sue where the plaintiff considers it most fit as to the applicable 
law, but rather, it is based on the objective criterion that, as the article notes, does not leave doubt that all parties 
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involved must have their habitual residence in the same country. It is not a question of choice or indeed of a qualified 
or absolute majority, but all of the parties.  
Therefore the determination of the Court is that in cases involving multiple parties, all must be habitually resident for 
Article 4(2) to apply,  rather than a majority of the parties. The fact that non-resident parties agree to the application 
of Maltese law is irrelevant.  
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and  
The plaintiffs further argued that even if 4(2) was not applicable, the court should find Article 4(3) to be applicable. 
They note that the nationality of the concerned parties, the flag state of the vessels, the injury suffered which is limited 
to the two vessels and the jurisdiction of the Maltese courts all favour the application of Maltese law to the case. The 
Court considered that 4(3) provides scope for discretion for a claim to be decided on the basis of the law that best fits 
the circumstances. It quotes from Cheshire, North and Fawcett regarding the exceptional nature of 4(3); the fact that 
the connection must be with a country rather than the law of a country and that 4(3) is likely to operate more commonly 
as an exception to Article 4(1) rather than Article 4(2) and that situations that merit its application ‘are likely to be 
relatively rare’.841  
In the particular case, the Court noted that this situation of an exceptional nature does not exist. It addressed specifically 
the question of the flag states and drew a distinction between events occurring between two ships and those that may 
have happened aboard a ship. The court further noted that the nationality of one of the parties in Polish and not Maltese 
which is relevant especially as they are the ones who suffered the most direct damage. The court concludes that no 
evidence had been brought suggesting that, beyond the registration of the vessels, there is some instrinsic connection 
to Maltese law arising from the collision and damages, which clearly happened in another country (Tunisia). 
The Court further noted that ‘the fact that Maltese courts have jurisdiction, does not create any presumed right that the 
claim be decided on the basis of Maltese law’.  
In the view of the court, the connection identified by plaitntiffs is too tenuous to ignore the principle of 4(1).  
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
No analysis of this question has been found.  
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
No specific cases have arisen dealing ith the specific rule on product liability. It should be noted that Malta is not party 
to the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Product Liability.  
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
No specific cases have arisen dealing with the specific rule on unfair competition.  
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
No specific cases have arisen dealing with the specific rule on environmental damage.   
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
No specific cases have arisen dealing with infringements of intellectual property rights.  
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
No specific cases have arisen dealing with the specific rule on industrial action.    
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
 
 




Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
Article 10 has ot been subject to any court decision or literature analysis.  
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
Article 11 has ot been subject to any court decision or literature analysis.  
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
Article 12 has ot been subject to any court decision or literature analysis.  
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
No public discussion has taken place in Malta on this matter.  
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
No difficulties are alluded to in the literature or case law as relates to this question. As Cachia note: ‘A foreign 
applicable law will be applied only to matters of substance. In accordance with the principle forum regit processum, 
Maltese law enjoys a privileged status on issues which are characterised as matters of procedure. Once an issue is 
characterised as procedural, Maltese law applies to the issue, a principle which is also recognised by at 1(3) of the 
Rome I and Rome II Regulations, which exclude the application of the regulations to evidence and procedure’.842     
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
No significant difficulties are alluded to in the literature or case law as relates to this question. Cachia summarises the 
state of play as follows: ‘the general trend that can be identified from the judgments of the Maltese courts is that where 
the parties do not plead the application of foreign law to the dispute and do not prove its content, Maltese law will 
apply. There is no provision of Maltese law requiring a Maltese court to apply foreign law ex officio. if a party wishes 
to rely on foreign law, that party has to plead its application. The approach of the Maltese courts on the pleading of 
foreign law is similar to the approach in England and indeed, Maltese jurisprudence has made reference to the position 
adopted by the English courts. This is not surprising, since as noted above, in this fear of private international law, any 
lacuna in Maltese law is usually filled by reference to English common law. Moreover, such an approach is consistent 
with the adversarial system of Maltese Civil Procedure’.843 
The content of foreign law is a question of fact and must therefore be proved by the parties. As Cachia futher explains: 
As Maltese procedural law follows the adversarial system, the judge will not, and should not, make his own private 
investigation as to the content of foreign law, but is to rely on the proof brought during the trial. The presentation of the 
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evidence is left to the parties and the court will decide the case on the basis of the facts that have been proved by the 
parties during the judicial process.844 […]   
Given this, in line with Article 562 of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure, the burden of proving the content 
of a foreign law is on the party who pleads its application. As Cachia further explains: ‘In Malta proof of foreign law 
is usually made by means of the evidence of a competent expert on the foreign law in question. The COCP has a 
specific article dealing with evidence of foreign law. Article 563B(1) COCP states that “a person who is suitably 
qualified one account of his knowledge or experience, is competent to give expert evidence as to the law of any other 
foreign state, irrespective of whether he has acted or is entitled to act as an advocate, or in any judicial or legal 
capacity in that state”. This provision essentially operates as follows. The party invoking the application of foreign law 
will produce the evidence of an expert on the content of foreign law. The expert must be suitably qualified to give 
expert evidence as to the fallen law on account of his knowledge or experience. The expert usually submits a report in 
writing which is confirmed on out. He may also give evidence viva voce and he should be available for cross 
examination by the other party. A copy of the legal provisions of the following state may be attached to the report. 
Evidence may also be given by the expert as to the rules of construction recognised by the foreign legal system and 
the manner in which the courts of the foreign state have interpreted the foreign provisions. The other party is not obliged 
to bring his own expert, but if he wants to contest the content of the foreign law as proved by the other party, it is in his 
own interest to bring his own expert in order to prove what he considers to be the real content of foreign law. Where 
the two experts disagree it would be for the court to decide what it believes to be the true content of the foreign law, 
either by preferring the evidence of one expert over the other, or by accepting some parts of the evidence of one 
expert and some parts of the evidence of the other. There is nothing which stops the court from appointing its own 
experts to give evidence on foreign law.’845          
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
This has not been subject to any court decision or literature analysis.  
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
Whilst no specific cases appear to have risen in this regard, Maltese Law has a privileged status where it is mandatory, 
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the dispute or legal relation between the parties. As Cachia notes 
‘hence, the fact that the dispute between the parties is governed by a foreign law does not prevent the applicabition 
of mandatory provisions of Maltese law’.846 For instance, Article 47A of the Consumer Affairs Act provides that ‘the 
provsions of this Part shall apply notwithstanding  any term in a consumer contract which applies or purports to apply 
the law of a non-Member State, if the contract has a close connection with the territory of any Member State’.  
Moreover, as Cachia also argues, ‘it is also an important principle of Maltese Private International Law (…) that the 
application of a provision of the lex causae may be refused if such application is in breach of public policy (ordre 
public) of Malta.847 The Maltese Courts have held that there is a breach of Maltese public policy only where there is 
a breach of a juridical or moral principle which is regarded as being fundamental for Maltese society’. (See Q25 
below)  
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  











21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
No cases have arisen in Malta regarding the specific rule on subrogration neither has this been discussed in the 
literature.  
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
No cases have arisen in Malta regarding the specific rule on multiple liability neither has this been discussed in the 
literature.  
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
The question of habitual residence was discussed in some depth by the Court in Xerri v Zejt Marine Services. In that 
case, the court made the following determinations. First it noted that ‘the place where a company is registered is not 
necessarily the same place where the company has its central administration. The burden of proof fall on the party 
claiming the applicability of the exception (in article 4) to the general rule and cannot be presumed on the simple basis 
of the company’s registration. Every exception to the rule, the court notes, must be narrowly construed.  
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
No cases have arisen in Malta regarding the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi neither has this been discussed in the 
literature.  
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
This question does not arise in the case law. Cachia notes: ‘it is also an important principles of Maltese Private 
International Law (…) that the application of a provision of the lex cause may be refused if such application is in breach 
of public policy (ordre public) of Malta. The Maltese Courts have held that there is a breach of Maltese public policy 
only where there is a breach of a juridical or moral principle which is regarded as being fundamental for Maltese 
society’. Writing in the context of enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards, Bugeja notes that: ‘there is no specific 
definition of ‘public policy’. However, typically the exception is applied to the following circumstances:  
• Cases where interest rates exceed the legally permitted rates.  
• Cases concerning activities that are licensable by public authorities in Malta.  
• Matters that constitute a criminal offence in Malta or that constitute a breach of fundamental human rights.  
• Cases where the foreign pocedures is fundamentally contrary to the principles of natural justice as applied in 
Malta’.848  
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
None of these issues have arisen in the Maltese context or have they been discussed in the Malta specific literature.  
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
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These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
Malta is not a party to the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents. A dissertation (grade 
unknown) for the University of Malta, Valletta notes: ‘One can conclude that the overall position of the Maltese Motor 
Insurer related to the applicable law in cross-border motor accidents, on account of Rome II was indeed improved. 
However, the main issue relating to the quantification of damages, that existed prior the introduction of Rome II still 
poses a major concern to the Maltese insurer and which does not fall under the competence of Rome II. This problem 
reflects the same issue which was raised by the European Parliament in questioning the procedure of the quantification 
of damages in relation to the injured person and which the Commission rejected on the basis that it ‘constitutes 
harmonisation of the Member States’ substative civil law which is out of place in an instrument harmonising the rule of 
PIL.’849 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
No other practical problems have been identified. The only broader question is about the application for the Regulation 
to maritime situations however this has been addressed within the parameters of the regulation.  
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
See reply to Q30 below.  
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
The Rome II regulation and its exclusion of defamation violations has come up in discussions and literature surrounding 
SLAPP. This is a matter of grave concern in Malta, highlighted in no small part by the cases identified after the murder 
of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia in 2017, and the SLAPP actions against various Maltese media outlets that due 
to their size and financial capacity felt they had to withdaw stories faced by actual or threatened lawsuits in other 
jurisdictions. Maltese MEPs have called for EU action on SLAPP, whilst national parliamentarians have also 
recommended the adoption of national legislation to curtail such actions. 850 Jose Herrera noted in an editorial: 
‘Unfortunately, however, defamation was again excluded from the scope’.851 Xuereb in turn argues that because 
defamation is caught by EU rules determining jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments (the Brussels Regulations) but 
is excluded from other rules that determine the applicable law (the Rome Regulations) this has inadvertently facilitated 
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forum shopping in matters relating to defamation.852 As both Xuereb and Borg Barthet contend part of the issue is the 
reality of the Maltese media sector which is not financially in a position to defend foreign lawsuits as a result of its size.  
Xuereb notes: ‘While the reasoning behind these regulations and the related jurisprudence is to ensure equality of arms 
between an individual plaintiff with limited resources and large multinational media groups, in Malta the reverse holds 
true: the plaintiffs that threatened cross-border lawsuits have more resources and deeper pockets than the largest media 
houses in the country combined, let alone individual journalists and bloggers.’ 853 He continues: ‘if there was a 
possibility that applicable law to decide the matter in a foreign court is Maltese law; the maximum damages awarded 
under Maltese law are far lower than those that could be imposed for example under UK law, thus substantially 
reducing the attraction of filing an action in a foreign court for the ‘SLAPP-er’ whose sole purpose is cowing a defendant 
into silence.’854 
Amendments proposed to remedy the situation have focused on the issue of recognition and enforcement of judgments 
rather than on the applicable law question. As Xuereb summarised it: ‘The amendments to the Media and Defamation 
Act tabled by the Opposition in 2018 were an attempt to subject defamation lawsuits filed abroad to the test of Maltese 
public policy. But to conduct such a test, the Courts in Malta would invariably be exercising jurisdiction that they do 
not have, and the Brussels Regulation specifically prohibits courts of Member States to use the test of public policy to 
alter the rules of jurisdiction.’855 This argument was put forward by the Government in its rejection of the proposed 
amendments. Later, the European Commission was reported as stating that ‘The Commission said that an EU member 
state has a right to legislate against SLAPP originating in a jurisdiction outside the EU; and that EU member states have 
a right to protect their nationals against SLAPP originating from within the EU as long as it is done in good faith and in 
line with declared public policy’.856  
The question continues to be debated in Malta and there is a clear political divide on the question, linked to the 
accusations made.  
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
No cases have arisen / analysis undertaken regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation to corporate abuses 
of human rights.  
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
No cases have arisen / analysis undertaken regarding the impact of the development of Artificial intelligence on the 
Rome II Regulation.  
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Article 4  General Rule re: 
Torts/Delicts 
- Narrow interpretation of exceptions in 4(2) and 4(3) 
- Distinction between Registration and Habitual Residence 
even for legal persons  






• The Rome II Regulation is well-known by practitioners and academics having any involvement in or expertise 
on cross-border litigation. Dutch courts apply the Regulation regularly. Between 30 to 50 cases have been 
published per year, but as not all cases are published the real number of courts cases in which the Rome II 
Regulation was is higher (Section 1). 
• The material scope of application has not raised significant problems, also resulting from a Dutch provision 
stating that the rules of the Rome II Regulation also apply in cases that are excluded from the material scope 
of the Regulation. However, a demarcation problem in case law and doctrine became apparent in torts 
relating to director’s liability as to whether this should be considered a tort under Rome II or a company law 
matter that is excluded from the Regulation (Section 2.1). In addition, the application of Rome II in matters 
excluded from the Regulation pursuant to Dutch law, may have undesirable results. This is true for defamation 
cases in particular (Section 3.1). 
• As regards the interpretation of the Regulation, Dutch courts regularly refer to the relevant rules and case law 
of the European Court of Justice on the Brussels I bis Regulation, most notably as regards the concept of non-
contractual liability and the application of Article 7(2) thereof (Section 2.1).    
• In some cases, the demarcation between the general rules of Article 4 and the specific rules on unfair 
competition in Article 6 and intellectual property in Article 8 is not clear, and the case law is not always 
consistent in this respect (Section 2.2). 
• The application of the general rule of Article 4 does not lead to specific problems. In some instances, the 
localisation of the damage proved difficult, particularly in the case of financial damage. In some instances, 
the CJEU case law on Article 7(2) Brussels I bis provided guidelines. Occasionally, Article 4(3) is applied as 
the localisation of the damage was difficult or did not lead to a desirable outcome in terms of a closely 
connected law (Section 2.2).  
• Freedom of choice is exercised occasionally under the Regulation, usually to designate Dutch law as the 
implicitly chosen law during the procedure. In doctrine, occasionally the scope of the prohibition to choose 
the law for cases relating to unfair competition has been questioned as well as the prohibition to select the 
applicable law in intellectual property cases (Section 2.4).  
• The mosaic rule does not pose substantial difficulties in practice, though in the digital context – torts arising 
from internet and social media use – the application of the lex loci damni rule poses challenges. In a 
defamation case to which the Rome II Regulation applied by virtue of Dutch private international law, the 
Dutch Supreme Court resorted to the CJEU case law on Article 7(2) Brussels I bis, in particular e-Date 
Advertising and Martinez, leading to the application of the law of the country where the victim had its centre 
of main interests (Section 2.7 and 3.1).  
• SLAPPs are not (yet) common in the Netherlands, and so far no issues as regards the application of the Rome 
II Regulation have arisen. This may, however, change and this may require special attention (Section 3.2). 
The same goes for human rights violations and foreign direct liability claims, though it can be argued that 
application of the law of the host state in environmental cases as a result of Article 4 may weaken human 
rights protection (Section 3.3). As regards AI and tort liability, so far the application of Rome II has not yet 








The Rome II Regulation is well known in the Netherlands. It is safe to say that all practitioners working at an international 
law firm or dealing with cross-border cases on a more regular basis (judges, bailiffs, etc.) are familiar with the 
Regulation. Businesses and citizens will have less knowledge of the Regulation. Businesses are usually represented by 
lawyers or have in-house lawyers available for legal issues (e.g. insurance companies). Citizens will usually not have 
any direct involvement with the applicable law or should they be involved in international litigation they will usually be 
represented as well.  
The eleven Districts Courts in the Netherlands apply the Rome II Regulation regularly. Over the past five years, thirty to 
fifty cases are published per year. As not all cases are published, it is applied more often in practice. The courts do not 
face particular problems applying the Regulation, although in some instances the scope of applicability (see Section 
2.1.1), the localisation of the place in which the damage occurs (see Section 2.2.1a) and the determination which of 
the provisions applies (See Section 2.2.3 and 2.2.5) raise questions. 
Being a small country there is no huge amount of doctrinal discussion on Rome II, but all handbooks and commentaries 
on private international law cover the Rome II Regulation. In the year after the Regulation was adopted, two major 
journals on private (international) law dedicated a full issue to the Regulation.857 There are a few books dedicated on 
international torts or specific torts, and occasionally articles or PhD dissertations include sections or chapters to Rome 
II. Private international law is part of the curriculum (usually masters) at Dutch universities and Rome II is one of the 
obligatory instruments.  
Rome II has not caused debate at a political level, apart from the (active) Dutch involvement in the Rome II negotiations. 
Doctrinal discussions focus on different issues – not on just one or two in particular –, including on the localisation of 
damage (often in relation to the Brussels I-bis Regulation), prospectus liability, intellectual property, defamation, 
environmental pollution, and in the context of collective redress.   
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
Little difficulties have arisen in determining the material scope. A particularity of Dutch private international law is that 
Article 10:159 of the Dutch Civil Code provides that Rome II applies mutatis mutandis to obligations that can be 
regarded as torts yet fall outside of its material scope, unless a specific rule applies. This means that the same rules 
apply to those obligations that have been excluded from the Regulation in Article 1(2). Article 10:159 Civil Code is 
applied regularly by Dutch courts, either explicitly or implicitly.858 This application vastly broadens the material scope 
of the Rome II Regulation. 
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The most notable exclusion in Article 1(2) concerns torts related to violation of privacy and rights relating to personality, 
including defamation. In these cases, the courts did not have difficulties in deciding on the scope, and applied Rome II 
indirectly on the basis of Article 10:159 of the Dutch Civil Code.  
Regarding directors’ liability, however, uncertainty exists as to which situations do or do not fall under the material 
scope. It is not clear when a situation involving a director, flips from the excluded field of company law, into an included 
sovereign tort claim. This qualification problem has been the topic of discussion in the Netherlands.859 Different conflict 
rules have been applied to similar cases.860 The demarcation between the two fields of law could therefore benefit 
from a clarification. 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, Arts 31-32) 
The fact that the temporal scope focuses on the moment of damage-occurring, rather than the moment of referral, has 
occasionally been forgotten.861 In some cases the moment of damage-occurring could not be pinpointed specifically, 
causing the courts to be unsure whether or not Rome II applied. This could also be caused by the fact that different, 
subsequent links in the chain might be designated by parties as the basis of their tort-claim. In these cases, courts found 
a solution through referring to a combination of both national rules of international private law that were in place 
before Rome II became applicable (specifically regarding tort: Wet Conflictenrecht Onrechtmatige Daad; Act on 
Conflict of Law on Torts) and Rome II. This way it was ensured that all links were brought under some rule of private 
international law. Fortunately, these two instruments usually pointed to the same substantive law.862  
The temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation therefore has led to some difficulties, which are inherent 
to the fact that the moment of occurrence of damage cannot always be easily distinguished. It is to be expected that 
this problem will be somewhat reduced by the passing of time, as more and more of the litigated damages will be 
occurring after the entry into force. 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
Regarding the characterization of the concept of ‘non-contractual obligations’ as well as its relationship to the concept 
of ‘contractual obligations’, there are no specific difficulties apparent from case law and Dutch literature. The 
qualification takes place smoothly and (mostly) implicitly. 863  The fact that both concepts are to be interpreted 
autonomously, with reference to the Brussel I bis Regulation as well, is occasionally explicitly stated864, and also in 
doctrine the interaction between those instruments has been emphasized.865 
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4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
The universal application of the Regulation does not cause particular issues in the Netherlands. Application of the 
substantive law of a non-member state is not very common.866 Sometimes, as if to clarify the reasoning for applying a 
certain law, Dutch courts have explicitly referred to the universal character of the scope.867 In one incidental example 
case a Dutch court seems to have overlooked the universal scope in relation to a claimant resident Switzerland. 
However, this was in a superfluous part of the judgment and ultimately had no effect on the outcome.868  
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation)(Recital 
(7)) 
Dutch courts occasionally mention the autonomous character of the concepts ‘contractual obligations’ and ‘non-
contractual obligations’, with reference to Article 7(1)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation.869 Overall, Dutch courts seem to 
be very willing to read Rome II in light of, and in line with, other EU private international law instruments.870 The 
objective to secure  of recital 7, being consistency between the EU instruments, therefore is generally fulfilled.  
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of : 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
Courts generally do not encounter problems in applying Art 4(1) and identifying the place of direct damage. The 
majority of the cases concern torts where material damage or personal injuries are suffered. Resulting from the lex loci 
damni rule the applicable law is the law where these damages occur. The damage occurs where the good or person 
is situated at the moment the damage is impaired and the location of this place is unproblematic.871  
A difficulty arises with the respect to the localisation of damage in case of unlawful publications or damaging public 
statements, to which Rome II applies mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 10:159 of the Dutch Civil Code, despite 
defamation being excluded from the scope of Rome II. The Dutch Supreme Court, referring to relevant case law of the 
CJEU on Article 7(2) Brussels I bis, ruled that in this case the law of the county where the center of interests is situated 
is applicable.872  
More difficulties emerge with respect to the localisation of pure financial loss. According to doctrine873, and in line with 
the CJEU approach under the Brussels I Regulation, generally the location of the damage takes place by attributing it 
to a specific event or asset of the injured party. The location of this asset is considered to be the location of the tort.874 
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2019, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2019:484, para 3.13, (Somali law). See also: Joris den Hartog, ‘Rome II in de rechtspraak: 
probleemloze toepassing of redenen tot zorg?’ (2020) 3 NIPR 420, 422. 
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If there is no specific asset, the residence of the injured party will be decisive. Specific implementations of Art 4(1) in 
the Dutch courts in difficult situations with pure financial losses are incidental and cause not much follow-up or appeal 
cases. Examples of possible problematic situations regarding the location of damages which the Dutch court ruled are 
unpaid invoices. With unpaid invoices the location of the damage is then the payment location instead of the location 
of processing of the goods.875 In case of directors’ liability, as far as it is not considered as a company law related 
cases, the registered office of the injured party is considered to be the location of the damage.876 In case of torts taking 
place on multiple markets in Europa where it is not clear where the torts occurred, the Dutch court has decided that the 
damage occurred in the country where the production and the sales took place in the Netherlands.877  
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
The Dutch courts have applied Art 4(2) in only a few cases.878 There have been no cases with multiple parties or claims 
judging from the case law, apart from one published case concerning a collective action. The District Court of 
Rotterdam judged that the law of multiple countries is applicable in case of damage of investors in a collective action, 
looking at the parties involved.879 It applied Art 4(2) in so far as the investor and the liable party were resident in the 
same country, while to other parties Art 4(1) was applied, i.e. the law of the country where the stocks were listed as 
the place where the damage occurred.  
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3) 
The escape clause of Art 4(3) is used mostly when there is a manifestly close connection because of a pre-existing 
relationship in the form of a contract.880 In most cases the court referred to the law which was applicable to the 
contractual relationship from which the tort had arisen.881  In some instances, Article 4(3) has been used where the 
localization of the damage within the meaning of Article 4(1) proved difficult.882 There are no major difficulties in the 
implementation of Art 4(3).  
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts 
Financial market torts in which Rome II was applied have not occurred often. According to  doctrine  prospectus liability 
falls under the scope of Article 4.883 In doctrine, it has been argued that Article 4 is not always suitable for prospectus 
liability.884 It may result in a multiplicity of applicable laws and is not geared to the specificities of prospectus liability.  
In one case, a collective action by investors brought in the District Court Rotterdam (see also above, sub b), Article 4 
was sufficiently suitable to localize the damage. In another case, the District Court of Amsterdam ruled that with respect 
to the localisation of a tort resulting from fraudulent tradeable bonds, the general rule of Art 4(1) was difficult to apply 
in view of the multiplicity of claims and damage located in multiple countries.885 Art 4(3) was applied in this case to 
localise the damage for the different claims by means of the close connection.886 
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7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
Art 5 on product liability has been applied in Dutch (published) case law only twice.887 In both cases the courts 
followed the general rule of Art 5 without difficulties. In general the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Products Liability is applicable instead of Art 5 Rome II, since the Netherlands is a contracting party.888 Only where 
the case falls outside the scope of the Convention is the Rome II Regulation applicable.889 This is particularly relevant 
in view of the exclusion of the situation where the property, or right to use, the product was transferred between the 
party held liable and victim, within the meaning of Art 1(1) Hague Product Liability Convention. 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
There are fourteen references of Dutch courts to the rule of unfair competition in the published case law. In most of the 
cases (9) the court applies Art 6(2) and refers back to Art 4(1) since there is only one damaged party (competitor).890 
In the other cases where there is a relationship between unfair competition and other specific Rome II rules, such as 
Infringement of intellectual property rights, the courts seem to have the tendency to decide the applicable law based 
on those specific rules instead of art 6(2).891 Hence it is discussed in doctrine whether the scope of Art 6 is defined 
adequately, since different Member States seem to have different interpretations of what is covered by the unfair 
competition rule. By way of example, slavish imitation in the Netherlands falls under the general rule of Art 4, while 
under Rome II it seems to come under unfair competition based on the Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission 
proposal .892 As a result of this Dutch courts are more reluctant to apply Art 6 and instead apply Art 4.893 
There are other cases where the court decides based law of the county where the competition has been affected, but 
these are a minority. It seems that implementation of other Articles instead of Art 6 does not affect the specific law which 
is applied, since that is almost always the same as in Art 6.894 However it is argued that it might trigger a sense of legal 
uncertainty which is not desirable.895 Therefore in application Art 6 does not seem to be the cause of much courtroom 
disputes. However, the scope of Art 6 can be considered to be too little elaborated, this possibly leads to legal 
uncertainty.  
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
The rule on environmental damage has not been applied much in the Netherlands. Only two cases came before court 
according to published case law. In both cases parties agreed on the application of Dutch law since that damages 
occurred in the Netherlands.896 There has been some doctrinal  discussion about possible voids in Art 7, including how 
to deal with choice of law in the case of environmental damages and material or personal damages due to the 
environmental damages.897 So far Dutch courts have not encountered these possible difficulties.  
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10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
Most of the cases concerning the infringement of intellectual property rights result in judicial decisions where the court 
follows the general rule that the law of the country for which protection is claimed applies. There is little discussion 
about the application of the rule. Often Art 8 is not applied in intellectual property rights cases since there are 
international conventions on the infringement of intellectual property rights which are applied by the Dutch courts, such 
as the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention.898  
In some cases, the demarcation between Article 8 and Article 6 is not clear-cut. In the literature torts like copyfraud 
are considered to come under the scope of infringement of intellectual property rights as well as unfair competition.899 
An example of this is a case where the Dutch court forbid invoking non-existing intellectual property rights in which the 
invoker knew the right didn’t exist. The court assessed the applicable law not with Article 8 nor Article 6 but the general 
Article 4.900 As stated in Section 2.2.3, the application of either to the Articles won’t have much influence on the 
outcome of the applicable law, since Article 6 and 8 are both specifications of Article 4 and thus will almost always 
lead to the same applicable law.901 However, this difficulty in demarcation can cause legal uncertainty. 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
Art 9 has only been applied in the Dutch courts once. In this case the Dutch court considered the applicable law to be 
that of the county where the industrial action took place, Sweden.902 No difficulties arose in this case. 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
There is little Dutch case law regarding the specific rule on unjust enrichment. Occasionally the relation between Articles 
4 and 10 Rome II, or the possible co-existence of claims based on both Articles, is mentioned.903 There is little 
discussion of this provision in literature. Difficulties may arise because of the lack of a defined, autonomous concept of 
‘unjust enrichment’. Possible hardship in distinguishing unjust enrichment from the negotiorum gestio has been touched 
upon in literature.904 However, as these provisions are similar, this seems to be more a theoretical than a practical 
problem. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
Little Dutch case law exists regarding the rule on negotiorum gestio. In doctrine the relationship with Article 4 Rome II 
on ‘regular’ tort has been pointed out.905 If Dutch law is applicable, which can be on the basis of a choice of law as 
well, the gestor gains the right of retention.906 Potential trouble in distinguishing the negotiorum gestio from unjust 
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enrichment has been commented on in literature.907 As these provisions are aligned on content this is unlike to lead to 
difficulties. 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
In doctrine the added value of Article 12(2) Rome II has been questioned.908 Apart from the intrinsic added value of 
Article 12(2) as a whole, the interpretation of subs a-c of Article 12(2) has been dubbed unclear. Dutch discussion 
exists as to whether they are to be considered alternatives or instead as forming a hierarchical order.909 The point of 
discussion has not led to issues in Dutch case law and it has only be applied a few times. In those cases either its first 
paragraph was applied, or a valid choice of law had been made.910  
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
Article 14 is regularly applied by Dutch courts. Most of the cases concern a choice of law during the procedure (usually 
for Dutch law), and the issue evolves around whether it can be considered that an implicit choice of law has been 
made. Circumstances that are taken into account in deciding that parties had the intention to make a choice of law 
include the behaviour of parties during the procedure (especially not refuting a claim by the other party that a certain 
law had been chosen), references to Articles of a specific national code, and the use of legal terminology which is 
specific for the law of a country. No specific difficulties arise in relation to the freedom choice of Article 14. Some 
commentators have challenged the exclusion of a choice of law for intellectual property rights under Article 8(3). In 
addition, the question has been posed whether the prohibition in Article 6(4) only relates to unfair competition that 
also affects the general public, or to all competition cases including those that only involve a specific competitor. 
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
There is no published case law on this provision and there is no discussion in doctrine about this provision. 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
In the Netherlands, conflict of law rules and the applicable substantive law, including foreign law, have to be applied 
ex officio. This is laid down in Article 10:2 of the Dutch Civil Code and generally accepted. Parties thus do not have to 
plead the application of the conflict of law rules or proof the content of foreign law. In commercial practice in particular 
parties do play an important role in informing the court about conflict of law rules and the content of foreign law, and 
often expert opinions are provided on behalf of the parties, but the courts do apply the conflict of law rules on their 
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own account and review foreign law. A limitation under Dutch law is that generally the application of foreign law 
cannot be reviewed in cassation.911   
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
There are two published cases that involve Article 15. In both cases Dutch law was applicable based on Article 4 and 
there were no apparent difficulties.  
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
While overriding mandatory law has been a topic of discussion in the Netherlands, there is no published case law in 
which this provision of Rome II was actually applied. In general, the Dutch courts are reluctant in applying the rules on 
overriding mandatory law, and hardly ever has this resulted in applying foreign law. Overriding mandatory law has 
been occasionally applied under the Rome I Regulation on contractual obligations and in family law cases pursuant 
to a similar provision under domestic private international law.912 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
There is no published case law on this provision, and this provision has been discussed in doctrine only occasionally.913 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
Article 19 has been referred to twice in case law and did not result in difficulties.914 There has been discussion on 
subrogation, but mostly in relation to voluntary assignment under the Rome I Regulation.   
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
There is not published case law on Article 20, however the specific rule of Article 20 has been applied before Rome 
II since it was unwritten law. Those rules did not cause difficulties. 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to:  
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
There is no case law where this provision was a key issue or appeared to be problematic. 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art. 24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art. 25) 
There is no case law evolving around these provisions and appeared to be problematic. 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forum (Art. 26) 
This provision has not been applied by the courts yet, judging from the published case law. One published judgment 
concerns a case that was outside the temporal scope of the Regulation. In that case, the District Court considered that 
that a provision leading to (disproportional) punitive damages under the law of one the States of the US contradicts 
Dutch public policy.915 
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26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
There are five published cases in which Article 28 has been referred to. In all these cases the other conventions were 
applied. The application of these other legal instruments has not been challenged in front of the Dutch courts. The cases 
were not in the areas of environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection, but mostly on traffic 
accidents and product liability.  
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
The 1971 Hague Convention is applicable in the Netherlands. The substantive law of the Convention regarding non-
contractual liability flowing from (international) traffic accidents has precedence, according to Articles 28(2) Rome II 
and 10:158(1)(a) of the Dutch Civil Code.916 The Convention has a broad substantive and a universal formal scope. 
It will therefore generally be applied to international traffic accidents brought before a Dutch court, especially as the 
case law shows willingness to give the convention a broad scope of application.917 While the main rules of the 
Convention and the Rome II Regulation coincide, the importance of the law of the registration of the vehicles may lead 
to different results. The outcome of a case therefore becomes greatly dependent on where the claim is brought. In out 
of court handling of claims this also raises questions. In the Netherlands this issue has been raised because of the 
regular (holiday) traffic to and from Germany, which is not a part of the Convention. Especially regarding lease cars, 
the two instruments may come to point in opposite directions depending on the forum.918  Coexistence of the different 
instruments simultaneously diminishes some of the main objectives of the Rome II Regulation: creating foreseeability 
and legal certainty within a uniform system.919 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
The most important Dutch case regarding the mosaic principle is Dahabshiil.920 This was a case concerning defamation 
to which Article 4 of Rome II became mutatis mutandis applicable through Article 10:159 Civil Code. The Dutch 
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) decided that in the event of violations of privacy or personality rights through internet 
publications, the law of the country where the victim had its centre of main interests applied as lex loci damni. This was 
done in light of the case law on Article 7 of the Brussel I bis Regulation, specifically eDate/Martinez.921 Using the 
‘regular’ mosaic response was deemed undesirable for defamation. This has not been confirmed for other categories 
of non-contractual obligations so far. It shows that the internet and technological advancements might put a strain on 
the satisfaction about the use of the mosaic principle under Rome II, as well as raise question regarding the transposition 
of Brussel I bis. For now, the issue seems mostly theoretic. There has been no real issue in Dutch case law regarding 
the mosaic approach under Article 4. No extensive discussion about the mosaic principle has emerged in Dutch 
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literature either, although it has been pointed out that the principle constitutes a form of depeçage, which possibility is 
not provided for under Rome II.922 
Other practical issues are the qualification of corporate liability and intellectual property rights, specifically in 
establishing the border between these special tort categories and others, such as ‘classic’ tort and unfair competition. 
These issues are discussed more extensively in their own paragraphs.  
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
In the Netherlands, the rights relating to personality and defamation have been brought mutatis mutandis under the 
rules of Rome II through Article 10:159 of the Dutch Civil Code. The aim of this provision was to prevent a gap in 
conflict law. As there are no conflict rules for personality rights and defamation in Rome II itself because of the general 
exclusion, the lex loci damni will apply. In Dahabshiil, the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) ruled that in the event of 
violations of privacy or personality rights through publications on the internet, the law of the country where the victim 
had their centre of main interests was to be regarded as lex loci damni.923 In justifying this, the court referred to the 
case law regarding Article 7(2) of the Brussel I bis Regulation. The interpretation of the CJEU of Article 7(2) has been 
guiding in the application of Article 4 Rome II, including in cases of defamation as a result of the Dutch reference to 
Rome II also for cases that are excluded from the scope of Rome II.924 While this may be generally satisfactorily in 
outcome the fact that different rules may be used in other Member States, undermines the uniform application of conflict 
rules on torts. The absence of a dedicated rule for defamation cases creates a void, and the effect of the (indirect) 
referral to Article 4 Rome II as the rule of conflict has been questioned in Dutch literature.925 As Rome II has a universal 
scope, the lex loci damni can lead to a Dutch court ‘importing’ a legal regime that is very restrictive regarding the 
freedom of expression and press freedom. While the public policy exception might form a solution in some cases, it 
must be used only as ultimum remedium. As of now, no Dutch case law exists on this issue.  
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs)  
As it stands now, Rome II does not contain any special rules on defamation or privacy rights. Member States are 
therefore free to introduce conflict rules, but also their own substantive laws regarding defamation. In the Netherlands, 
the rules of Rome II apply mutatis mutandis to defamation, through Article 10:159 of the Dutch Civil Code, which 
brought the Dutch Supreme Court to apply the law of the country where the victim has its centre of main interests (see 
Section 3.1). The interplay with data protection rules has not been considered in this regard. The existence or amount 
of protection of free speech however differs between Member States and under the current system claimants are able 
to pursue cases in states with the most favourable rules. This forum shopping could ultimately lead to limitations of 
privacy rights and press freedom. Harmonization of the conflict rules on a Union level could make the applicable law 
less dependent on national law, more predictable, and limit forum shopping. In the Netherlands, SLAPPs are still a 
rarity. An example regarding the freedom to protest can be found in a number of cases involving Shell and 
Greenpeace. In 20212, Shell brought Greenpeace before the court of Amsterdam; this case did not come under the 
 
 
922 JA Pontier, Onrechtmatige daad en andere niet-contractuele verbintenissen (3rd edn, Maklu 2015), para 251. 
923 Supreme Court 3 June 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1054, para 3.5.1. 
924 Court of Appeal Amsterdam 25 April 2017, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2017:1629, no. 3.6, NIPR 2017/470. See also Court of 
Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch 1 May 2012, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2012:BW5415, no. 4.8 – 4.11.2. 
925 Laura van Bochove, ‘Onlogisch analogisch: de overeenkomstige toepassing van Europese conflictregels in 
grensoverschrijdende smaadzaken ex artikel 10:159 BW’ in MT Beumers, CC de Kluiver, AM Overheul, FQ van de Pol, LSA 
Trapman (eds.), Vijftig weeffouten in het BW 377, 383; AAH van Hoek, ‘De onrechtmatige daad in Boek 10 BW’ (2010) 7/8 




temporal scope of Rome II though.926 In this case, the court granted Greenpeace the right to peacefully protest. This 
case does not stand on its own. In 2013, the Court of Appeal ruled that Shell’s attempt to have Greenpeace protesters 
criminally convicted would be to no avail.927 By bringing Greenpeace to court, Shell may have essentially tried to 
breach the organization’s fundamental right to protests. Shell succeeded in stopping Greenpeace’s protests in a similar 
recent lawsuit in Scotland. 928 According to the Dutch director of Greenpeace: ‘Shell is trying to take away their 
fundamental right to protest’. 929  Generally, however, going to court is seen as an ultimum remedium in the 
Netherlands.930 Nevertheless, the growing importance of SLAPPs in Europe will also have an effect in the Netherlands, 
and it is important to address (anti) SLAPPs. 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
If a corporation has its headquarters in a Member State, foreign claimants can bring the case before the court of that 
Member State based on Article 63 Brussel I bis. This is what happened in the Nigeria/Shell case before Dutch 
courts. 931 Under Dutch conflict rules on tort prior to Rome II, the Conflict of Laws Tort Act (Wet Conflictenrecht 
Onrechtmatige Daad), Nigerian law was applicable. Rome II was not applicable yet at the time of the damage 
occurring from the oil leak, but as the Regulation does not contain any specific rules on the topic, the lex loci damni of 
Article 4 Rome II would have led to the same result. This negatively affects the chance of claimants succeeding at their 
foreign direct liability claim, as corporations will often choose to ‘do the damage’ in states where legislation regarding 
human rights is less strict. Even though claimants do not receive the broader material protection of the lex fori, they are 
bound to its usually stricter procedural rules.932 Under Rome II, Articles 4(3) or 7 could provide a solution in future 
cases. It remains to be seen how these options will be dealt with by the Dutch courts. Early 2021, the Court of Appeal 
judged in this case that Shell is liable for damages that occurred, due to a negligence in their duty of care. The Court 
ruled that was no violation of human rights by Shell.933 However the case was outside the temporal scope of Rome II 
and no noteworthy rulings were given with regard to Rome II. 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
In foreign literature is has been stated that it is ‘reasonable’ to use Article 4 and that Article 5 Rome II is ‘satisfactory’ 
in cases of AI-tort, because they do not necessarily favour the victim.934 After all, assuming fault of the driver or 
producer will be harder to proof in cases of imbedded, self-learning artificial intelligence. It simply may not be there. 
This may lead claimants to forum shop for systems of law in which risk-liability exists. Unforseeability of the applicable 
law is increased because of the existence of the 1971 Hague Convention regarding traffic accidents and the 1973 
Hague Convention on product liability. Both instruments are likely to be involved in AI torts; both apply in the 
Netherlands. The subject has not been the topic of any real debate in the Netherlands. Although the application of 
Rome II to artificial intelligence has also not yet caused any issue in Dutch courts, simplifying the duality of the 
instruments would lead to more legal certainty and less incentives for forum shopping.  
The recently published resolution of the European Parliament on the civil liability of artificial intelligence sheds some 
new light on suitability of Rome II rules. The resolution addresses the issue of product liability of artificial intelligence, 
which is under the scope the 1973 Hague Convention on product liability. The literature discusses possible pitfalls such 
 
 
926 District Court Amsterdam, 5 October 2012, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2012:BX9310. 
927 Court of Appeal Den Haag, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:10766. 
928 Scottish Court of Session 15 January 2020 [2020] CSOH 7. 
929 ‘Shell daagt Greenpeace voor de rechter’, Greenpeace 25 November 2019, www.greenpeace.org.  
930 TE van der Linden, ‘Strategisch procederen tegen activisten: Over Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP’s) in 
Nederland’ (2020/9) 3 NTBR 65, 77. 
931 District Court Den Haag, 30 January 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854. 
932 LFH Enneking, ‘The Future of Foreign Direct Liability? Exploring the International Relevance of the Dutch Shell Nigeria Case’ 
(2014/10) 1 ULR 44, 48; LFH Enneking, ‘Foreign Direct Liability and Beyond Exploring the role of tort law in promoting 
international corporate social responsibility and accountability’ (2012). Eleven International Publishing, p. 126-128. 
933 Court of Appeal Den Haag, 29 January 2021, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2021:132. 
934 Marek Swierczynski & Lukasz Zarnowiec, ‘Law applicable to liability for damages due to traffic accidents involving 




as the qualification of ‘high risk’ AI-intelligence, and the active role that operators should/can have.935 The intention 
of the resolution is to offer more legal certainty however the commission will have to deal with great challenges 
designing these new artificial intelligence regulations.. Based on the published case law, the issue of Rome II and 
liability in relation to the use of AI  has not yet been addressed in Dutch practice. The operation of Rome II and the use 
of AI has not received specific attention in Dutch literature yet, though the liability of producers, operators and users of 









4. List of national case law 
Author’s note: This overview covers published case law only. Case law is published on www.rechtspraak.nl. Not all judgments are published, but only those having some significance. 
Cases involving elaborated private international law aspects will often be considered having significance. 
Statistics are included on the last page. 
Hoge Raad = Supreme Court 
Gerechtshof = Court of Appeal 
Rechtbank (Rb) = District Court 
 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and reference number  
 
Reference to decision of the Court of 
Justice if applicable 
Date  
Article(s) of Rome 
II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
Hoge Raad ECLI:NL:HR:2018:345 16-03-2018 Art 6 Rome II and WCOD Art 6 not applicable WOCD is 
applicable 
Hoge Raad ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2269 08-09-2017 Art 17  Rome II and insolvency 
directive  
Preliminary question to CJEU About the 
relationship between art 17 and art 13 of 
the insolvency directive 
Hoge Raad ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1054 03-06-2016 
 
Art 4 (1) & (3) Location of damages with 
defamation 
The court ruled that in the case of 
defamation websites on the internet 
which can be access globally, ‘the law of 
the country in which the damage occurs’ 
from art 4 (1), needs to be interpreted in 




where the harmful event occurred or may 
occur’. According to the court a judge is 
free to uses the the definition and 
interpretation of EEX to assess where the 
damages have occurred. Given the ruling 
of the CJEU in eDate Martinez this is the 
place where the victim has his centre of 
interests. The court concluded that this 
centre of interst is also the place where 
the damages occur. So the law of the 
country where the victim has is centre of 
interest is the applicable law,  
Gerechtshof 
Arnhem-Leeuwarden 
ECLI:NL:GHARL:2020:6273 11-08-2020 Art 31 art 32 Application in time Rome II not applicable since damages 
happened before 11-01-2009.  
Gerechtshof 
Amsterdam 










art 4 (1) & (3) 
 
Location of damage and 
close connection to 
country 
Dutch law was applicable, damages 
were in the Netherlands and close 






art 4 (1) Location of damage Torts on multiple markets in Europe, 
however Netherlands is considered to be 
the main market since the sales and 
production happened in the Netherlands. 
Thus the court concluded that tort 
occurred in the Netherlands, so Dutch 








art 4 (1) Location of damage  
Gerechtshof Den 
Haag 





Art 4, art 7 
art 10  
Location of damages 
Unjust enrichment  
In a long-term contractual relationship 
Dutch law is appointed to be applicable. 
The court judged that Dutch law is 
applicable as well based on art 4, for 
carelessness and torts resulting from 
performance of the contract. Art 7 not in 






Art 14 (1) Choice of law  Unjust enrichment. Impoverishment took 
place in Moldavia and enrichment took 
place in the Netherlands. Court accepted 





Art 4 (1) & (3) Location of damge and 
close connection to 
country 
Generally, the law of the county where 
the damages happened is applicable, 
this is Guyana.  In this case the 
Netherlands is closely related since the 
contract form which the torts origins has 
more connection with the Netherlands so 






Art 4 (1) & (3) Location of damage and 
close connection to 
country.  
Plaintiff and respondent have a lease 
agreement according to Dutch law. Torts 
and damages all happened in Belgium 
so Belgium law applicable (art 4 ((1)). 
Respondent argues that there is a closer 




Contract to Dutch law, 
Torts happened all in 
Belgium   
rejects this, since all activities happened 
in Belgium. The fact that it was a lease 
agreement according to Dutch law did 












ECLI:NL:GHARL:2018:3878 24-04-2018 Art 4 art 10 Location of damages 
Unjust enrichment 
All damages and unjust enrichments 











Art 4 (3) Location of damage and 
close connection to 
country 
Close connection to Belgium so Belgian 





Art 31 art 32 Application in time Rome II not applicable since damages 
happened before 11-01-2009. 
Gerechtshof 
Arnhem-Leeuwarden 
ECLI:NL:GHARL:2016:10512 27-12-2016 Art 31 art 32 Application in time Rome II not applicable since damages 
happened before 11-01-2009. No 
temporal expansion of the term through 
art 10:159 BW since art 31 and 32 
explicitly state that it application is limited 






Art 4 (1) Location of damages Dutch law is applicable based on art 4. 




 the corporation is applicable. Since the 
case it based on a non-contractual 



























Art 4 (1) Location of damages The country where the torts or damages 
occur can be explained in the same way 
as the in the CJEU ruling eDate Martinez. 
The country where the victim of the tort 






Art 4 (1) & art 
1(2) sub 1 
Directors liability, 
location of damages  
If the claim of a tort is not based on 
company law then directors liability in not 
covered by the exclusion of the 
regulation of Rome II of art 1(2) sub 1 . 






- -  Rome II not applicable, mainly 

















Art 4 (1) & Art 14 
(1) 
Location of damages and 







art 4 (1) & (3) 
 
Location of damage and 













art 4 (1) & (3) 
 
Location of damage and 
close connection to 
country 
Even though that a Moroccan judge 
ruled about a maintenance decision, 
there is no closer connection with 
Morocco than the Netherlands where 







Art 31 art 32 Application in time Rome II not applicable since damages 













Art 4 (1) & art 
1(2) sub 1 
Directors liability, 
location of damages  
Directors liability excluded if it is based 


























Art 4(1) &Art 8 
(1) 














art 4 (1) Location of damage of 
defamation 
Defamation and its consequences 






Art 31 art 32 Application in time Rome II not applicable since damages 
































Art 31 art 32 Application in time Rome II not applicable since damages 





Art 31 art 32 Application in time Rome II not applicable since damages 
happened before 11-01-2009.  
Rb. Amsterdam ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2020:1565 11-03-2020 Art 4 Location of damages Damages occurred due to money 
transactions from a Cypriot bank. The 
owner of the bank account is a Dutch 
based company, however the damages 
occurred in Cyprus so Cypriot law is 
Applicable.   
Rb. Gelderland  ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2020:1082 22-01-2020 Art 1 (1) sub g 
Art 4  
Location of damages with 
defamation 
Based on 10 (159) BW the articles of 
Rome II are applicable on non-
contractual obligations arising from 
violations of rights related to personality, 
such as defamation. 
Rb. Rotterdam ECLI:NL:RBROT:2019:110 09-01-2019 Art 1 (1) sub g 
Art 4 
Location of damages with 
defamation 
Based on 10 (159) BW the articles of 
Rome II are applicable on non-
contractual obligations arising from 
violations of rights related to personality, 
such as defamation. The damages 
occurred were the plaintiff has his centre 






ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2018:5109 31-08-2018 Art 4  Location of damages with 
defamation 
Based on 10 (159) BW the articles of 
Rome II are applicable on non-
contractual obligations arising from 
violations of rights related to personality, 
including defamation. In this case the 
court judges that the damages occur in 
Georgia, since the broadcasts where 
specifically directed to the Georgian 
public, hence Georgian law is 
applicable.  
Rb. Noord-Holland ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2017:8248 16-8-2017 Art 4  Location of damages with 
financial loan 
Even though that both parties are not 
based in the Netherlands, the plaintiff is 
registered in the British Virgin islands and 
the respondent is a Russian based and 
operating company, Dutch law is 
applicable since it is also applicable to 
the loan on which it non-contractual 
violation is based. 
Rb Amsterdam  ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:5415 9-8-2017 Art 4 Location of damages with 
defamation 
The country where the victim of the tort 
has its centre of interests, is where the 
damages occurred, and therefore Dutch 
law is applicable  
Rb. Midden-
Nederland 
ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2013:7229 18-12-2013 Art 4 Location of damages The non-contractual violation is due to 
not paying pension contribution. The 
place where the damages occurred is 
where the pension was due to be payed, 
so the Netherlands 
Rb. Midden-
Nederland  
ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2013:6196 18-12-2013 Art 4 Location of damages  Place where damages occur in the case 




where payment is received and not the 
place where the goods are fabricated.  
Rb. Rotterdam  ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:BZ2365 23-01-2013, Art 4 Location of damages  Even though that both the plaintiff and 
respondent reside in the Netherlands, 
which is a coincidence, the damages 
have occurred in Belgium and therefore 
Belgian law is most closely related, and 
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• The Rome II Regulation is well known by Polish doctrine and applied by Polish courts, albeit its correct 
application was subject to critique by scholars. The doctrinal controversies are often presented in the light of 
English or German’s doctrine on the subject.  
• The exclusion of defamation from the Regulation’s scope of application was debated in Polish doctrine, 
however with consensus that such inclusion could be more advantageous in the light of challenges posed by 
modern technologies. 
• Polish doctrine was particularly interested by Art. 14 rule, which was a new addition to Polish private 
international law. The freedom of choice was considered as of paramount theoretical importance; however, 
its practical impact was estimated as of lesser magnitude (see Chapter IV). The admissibility of partial choice 
of law is debated in Polish doctrine (see Chapter IV). 
• Other areas of interest include Art. 5 (see Question 7), Art. 6 (see Question 8) and the interplay between the 
Regulation and the 1971 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents (see Question 27). 
In the latter case, Polish doctrine criticised that the Convention takes precedence over the Regulation.  
• Although some scholars have raised more modern issues, such as accidents involving autonomous vehicles 
(see Questions 27 and 32), law applicable to electronic torts or artificial intelligence in the private 
international law (see Question 32), these seem still young and evolving legal matters in Poland.  
• Also, the law applicable to financial torts or is to lawsuits against public participation is not yet well explored 
in Polish literature. 
1. Introduction 
No important data was found as to the citizens’ and businesses’ awareness of the Rome II Regulation. No significant 
discussion is led as to the impact of the Regulation’s provisions on the question of business and human rights.  
The Regulation is known and applied by Polish courts, although the proper knowledge and interpretation of the 
European legal instruments in general is lesser among lower courts. The courts (also on the appellate level) encountered 
difficulties not only in determining the scope of application of the Regulation’s provision, but also the content of the 
foreign applicable law.936 In general, Polish judicatory rarely quotes the decisions of the ECJ and even to the lesser 
extent refers for a preliminary ruling.937 Moreover, Polish academia deplores the lack of a methodological justification 
in court’s decision for the application of the specific rule, particularly in the field of private international law.938 The 
statistics are hard to provide, as Polish common courts are not obliged to publish their decisions online. Therefore, 
according to Polish scholars, the extent of matters relating to European private law treated by Polish courts may be 
greater that it is reflected in the number of cases that in the end are available online.939 
 
 
936  A. Frąckowiak-Adamska, A. Guzewicz, Ł. Petelski, „Skuteczność stosowania przez sądy polskie unijnych 
rozporządzeń: nr 44/2001, nr 2201/2003, nr 864/2007 i nr 4/2009”, Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, n° 
10/2016, p. 8. 
937  A. Frąckowiak-Adamska, A. Guzewicz, Ł. Petelski, „Skuteczność stosowania przez sądy polskie unijnych 
rozporządzeń: nr 44/2001, nr 2201/2003, nr 864/2007 i nr 4/2009”, Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, n° 
10/2016, p. 5. 
938  
939  A. Frąckowiak-Adamska, A. Guzewicz, Ł. Petelski, „Skuteczność stosowania przez sądy polskie unijnych 
rozporządzeń: nr 44/2001, nr 2201/2003, nr 864/2007 i nr 4/2009”, Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, n° 




The doctrinal analysis of the Rome II Regulation is often led by the same scholars. It is particularly visible in the legal 
commentaries, where the same provisions are analysed in different editions still by the same representants of academia. 
In consequence, there is not much difference in opinions on the same subject. By the same token, Polish doctrine often 
quotes European scholars for contra or minority opinions.  The Rome II Regulation is included in all important 
commentaries on private international or civil law. The area of particular interest for Polish academia, presented not 
only in commentaries but also in legal publications and articles, relates to the scope of application of general rule, 
freedom of choice, unfair competition and product liability, also in the light of autonomous vehicles (with proposals of 
the Regulation reform). However, no relevant discussion is noted (as of yet) on the interplay between the Regulation 
and the areas of particular interest, such as SLAPP or human rights abuses by corporations. Also, the question of 
financial market torts caused no considerable discussions within the legal community. In the frame of privacy rights and 
traffic accidents, Polish scholars raised the necessity to adapt the Regulation to the challenges of the modern world 
and regarding the problematic of traffic accidents to give the precedence to the Regulation over the 1971 Hague 
Convention. 
On political level, the Regulation did not generate any relevant debate. Apart inquiries as to the law applicable to 
mining damages taking place in Poland940, the Parliament took into account the Rome Regulations during the reform 
of Private International Law Act in 2011 by introducing Arts. 28 and 33. According to Polish scholars, this provision 
cannot be understood as the basis for the application of the Rome II Regulation (because the position of the EU law in 
the national legal order is the subject of a regulation of a constitutional rank that cannot be changed by a statutory 
regulation).941 However, in the literature it was also underlined that Art. 28 and 33 of Polish Private International Law 
Act could have helped the courts to notice the Rome Regulations.942 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to : 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
The distinction provided for in term “civil and commercial matters” is in Polish law superfluous, in the light of the principle 
of the unity of civil law.943 Polish doctrine is however consensual that this term must be interpreted autonomously, taking 
into consideration, at one hand, the purpose, construction and principles of the Regulation and, at the other, the results 
of comparative analysis of MS legal regimes.944  
According to one prominent Polish scholar, for the purpose of clarity, the exclusion of the liability of State authority 





941 M. Czepelak, „Międzynarodowe prawo zobowiązań Unii Europejskiej”, Warsaw 2012, p. 19 ff. 
942 J. Pazdan et al., „Uwagi o uregulowaniach rozporządzenia Rzym II… i ich stosowaniu na tle doświadczeń polskiej 
judykatury”, Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, vol. 16, 2015, p. 69. 
943  J. Pazdan, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 36, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2015. 
944  J. Pazdan, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 36, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2015; M. Pazdan, „Art 1”, n° 4, in: M. 
Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże Komentarze Becka, Warsaw 2018. 
945  J. Pazdan, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 36, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 




law, acta iure imperii relate to the responsibility of the State Treasury, local government units and other legal persons 
that execute public powers such as defined in art. 417 of the civil code.946 
As for the interpretation of Art. 1, 1st sentence, namely “situations involving a conflict-of-laws” (translated into Polish 
as “conflict-of-laws of different states”), according to doctrine it purports to the application of the Regulation to facts 
with foreign element (international state of facts).947 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts 31-32) 
The distinction provided for in the Regulation between its entry into force (including the lack of the specific date in the 
provision itself) and the date of its application was subject to doctrinal debate and judicial confusion in Poland. Polish 
scholars leaned towards the application of the choice-of-law rules of the Regulation to non-contractual obligations 
that have arisen on or after the date of the Regulation application.948 Therefore, the decision of the CJEU in the 
Homawoo case was welcomed with satisfaction and hope that it would unify the rulings in that matter in the Member 
States.949  
The second issue discussed by Polish scholars touches upon the application of the Regulation where a continuous tort 
gives rise to damages occurring after and before the Regulation’s date of application. In that situation one of the 
recommended solutions is to adopt the principles created to solve the issue of applicable legal provisions change950. 
Regarding Polish courts, they also faced substantial difficulties in the interpretation of Arts. 31 and 32 of the Regulation, 
even after the Homawoo decision. On 13 January 2014 Provincial Court in Cracow based its decision on Art. 4 for 
the damage that occurred in 2006 in Austria. The ruling was reversed in appeal, albeit for a different reason.951 The 
court of Appeal952 however referred to the interpretation of the Arts. 31 and 32 presented in the Homawoo case. 
In the decision from 2013 Polish Supreme Court alluded to the application in time of the Regulation, stating that the 
latter is applicable to the torts occurring after its date of entering into force which may be interpreted as giving more 
importance to the solution of the Art. 31.953 
 
 
946  J. Pazdan, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 36, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2015. 
947 M. Pazdan, „Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe”, Wolters Kluwer Polska, 2016, n° 288. 
948 Ł. Żarnowiec, „Prawo właściwe dla odpowiedzialności za szkodę wyrządzoną przez produkt niebezpieczny w 
świetle przepisów rozporządzenia Rzym II”, Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, vol. 5, 2009, p. 87; 
M. Czepelak, „Międzynarodowe prawo zobowiązań”, p. 84; J. Pazdan, „Zasięg czasowy rozporządzenia Rzym 
II”, in: A. Tarwacka (ed.), Iura et negotia. Księga Jubileuszowa z okazji 15-lecia Wydziału Prawa i Administracji 
Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Wolters Kluwer Polska, 2015, p. 255; M. Szpunar, 
K. Pacuła, „Art. 31”, n° 2, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże Komentarze Becka, Warsaw 
2018. 
949 Ł. Żarnowiec, „Czasowe ramy zastosowania rozporządzenia (WE) nr 864/2007 Parlamentu Europejskiego i 
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3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
The term “non-contractual obligations” should be interpreted autonomously, in the light of the international character 
and purposes of the Rome II Regulation.954 Its scope of application covering also non-contractual obligations arising 
out of strict liability, even if mentioned expressly in Recital II, in any case is not controversial in Polish law.955 The 
meaning of non-contractual obligations poses the risk that all obligations that are not contractual, hence covered by 
the Rome I Regulation, fall into scope of application of the Rome II. According to Polish scholars, such broad 
interpretation is not justified.956 For instance, obligations arising out of unilateral legal actions are not covered neither 
by the Rome II nor by the Rome I Regulations.957 
Art. 2(1), by circumscribing the notion of “damage”, prevents many misunderstanding that might have appeared in 
the lack of thereof, even though this circumscription departs considerably from the Polish legal meaning of this term.958 
Art. 2(2), in regard to future behaviour or future events, opens way to look for the applicable law in order to assess 
also the duty relating to damage prevention.959 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
There is no substantive doctrinal discussion as to the application and interpretation of Art. 3 Rome II Regulation.  
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation)(Recital 
(7)) 
It is widely accepted in Polish doctrine that the Regulation should be given an autonomous interpretation.960 This is 
necessary in order to cover divergent national concepts of various terms and principles used in the Rome II Regulation. 
However, one author pointed out, although in the frame of a general overview of European private international law, 
that the qualification is not in fact autonomous, because it does not take sufficiently into account the comparative 
research in the field of private international law in MS.961 Another author underlines that the legal culture in which 
judges acquired their legal knowledge will inevitably influence their understanding of a given legal institution, which 
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in turn may lead to erroneous solutions.962 This phenomena may be further exacerbated in Poland where courts rarely 
refer for a preliminary ruling to ECJ.963  
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of : 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
The choice made in the Regulation to adopt the rule of the lex loci damni is widely accepted in Polish doctrine, even 
though the Polish Private International Law Act from 1965, that was applicable beforehand, applied a different 
connector, the one of lex loci delicti and this in a very flexible way.964  
In case of damage occurring in different states, Polish scholars propose to follow the principles established for the 
interpretation of the former Polish Private International Law Act, i.e.  
Range of application within the Art. 4 posed a problem for at least one Polish court. In a decision of District Court in 
Kłodzko from 2012, the court ruled that Art. 4(1) of the Regulation admits exception to its general rule and as German 
law has similar provisions relating to financial compensation as Polish one, therefore a court may base its decision 
exclusively on Polish law.965 Polish doctrine points out that such motivation is contrary to the Regulation objectives.966 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
Polish Private International Law Act from 1965 was the first one in Europe to adopt the rule of the common law of both 
parties, therefore the presence of Art. 4(2) in the Regulation is not criticized by Polish doctrine.967 The only critic that 
referred to the lex communis of the parties in Polish Private International Law Act from 1965 referred to the connector 
that was of cumulative character.968 In consequence, the solution of the common habitual residence that was adopted 
in the Regulation was upvoted by Polish scholars.969 The term “habitual residence” is understood as referring to the 
place where the person is physically present and where is the centre of his/her life and interests.970  
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Polish doctrine agrees that Art. 4(2) in a sufficiently clear way expresses the relevant point in time for its application. 
Any previous or later factual change in circumstances do not affect the application of Art. 4(2).971 Companies and 
other bodies, corporate and unincorporated, usually have their habitual residence at the place of their central 
administration as per Art. 23.972 Therefore, Court of Appeal in Katowice correctly applied Art. 4(2) in case of natural 
person and a company both having their habitual residence in Poland.973 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and  
The escape clause is the important exception for the rules provided for in Arts. 4(1) and 4(2), and even though its 
formula is more stringent than the first proposals, it helps to bring more flexibility in the application of the Regulation.974 
To evaluate the existence of the closest connecting factor such considerations as the expectations of the parties as to 
the applicable law can be taken into account.975 Polish doctrine advocates not to apply the escape clause lightly, 
which is also underlined by the expression “manifestly more closely connected”.976 Meanwhile, in practice Polish 
courts encounter difficulties in interpretation of Art. 4(3) and especially confrontation of its two criterions, namely 
“manifestly more closely connected” and close connection of the pre-existing relationship between the parties with the 
tort/delict in question. In its decision from 2014, the Court of Appeal in Szczecin confirmed the application of Art. 
4(3) to the case ruling that the pre-existing contract between the parties was merely a proof of payment before the 
German courts and connection between the damage and the Polish territory was manifestly closer.977  
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
No specific problems have been raised as to the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or 
other financial market torts. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
Polish doctrine regrets that the effort of harmonisation of the law of product liability in the European Union is only partial 
as alongside the Rome II Regulation, in some MS is also in force the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Products Liability (which is of universal application) and in accordance with recital 40 of the Regulation, Denmark 
will apply its national law to the matter.978 It can pose the risk of different judicial solutions within EU and the potential 
forum shopping.979 Especially that Art. 5 introduces a rather complex structure of conflict-of-laws rules and poses 
difficulty in determining its scope of application.980 The standardization effort of conflict-of-laws rules in that matter was 
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however recognised by Polish scholars as to favour the needs for consumers’ protection and to allow foreseeing the 
applicable law with reasonable certainty for commerce.981 Also, the application of the general rule of Art. 4 could 
lead in practice to arbitrary solutions.982 
The difficulties arise as to the several concepts expressed in Art. 5, but not defined herein.983 This is the case of product, 
damage and product liability. The first should not give rise to the application of the definition contained in the Directive 
(EEC) N° 85/734 but receive an autonomous qualification984. The Directive does not concern nor include conflict-of-
laws rules and the rule concerning the applicable law is construed differently than in the Regulation.  
Also, the concepts of ‘damage caused by product’ and ‘product liability’ are not defined in the Regulation. They should 
however be interpreted autonomously, based on what is a meaningful feature of product liability regime. According 
to one Polish scholar, the fundamental characteristic of the concept of “product liability” is the causing of damage by 
a product and placing the liability on a person who participates in product marketing, generally the producer.985  
The term ‘marketing of a product’ is also interpreted in various ways throughout the literature, with Polish scholars 
leaning towards application of its broader conception.986 
Poland is not part to the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability. For a public policy 
clause application in the frame of Art. 5, Polish doctrine quoted the example of the lex causae provisions that deny 
any protection to a victim of a damage caused by a defective product.987 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
The introduction of specific rule on unfair competition is deemed by Polish scholars to be beneficial.988 According to 
one author, the final text of the conflict-of-laws rule seems to be accepted in the doctrine (quoting however French 
scholars).989  
Art. 6(4) excludes the derogation from the applicable law by an agreement between the parties. Albeit, this may be 
justified to protect the interests of third parties, Polish scholars suggest that the choice should be allowed in cases where 
a non-contractual obligation arises out of an act of unfair competition that affects solely the interests of a specific 
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competitor (e.g. the unlawful use of a trade secret)990. However, as such solution is not widely accepted neither by 
European nor Polish doctrine, at least one writer suggested that this question should be solved by the ECJ.991 
For two categories relating to competition, namely unfair competition and restriction of free competition, Art. 6 provides 
different connecting factors, which is due to their different character. It may however require resorting to interpretation 
methods in order to define their scope of application992.  
Polish scholars also raised the issue of choosing the market connector related to acts of unfair competition as posing 
many practical problems for international private law.993 
One author moreover suggests that after introducing the Directive no. 2014/104 the provisions of both the Brussels I 
bis and the Rome II Regulation should be reconsidered, taking into account the specific character of delicts in the field 
of competition law.994 
Polish doctrine is of the opinion that the conflict-of-laws rules in Art. 6 (1) and Art. 8 (1) will usually lead to the 
application of the same law.995 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
The specific rule on environmental damage is closely related to the environmental protection policy of the EU and 
particularly the directive 2004/35/EC. 996  In Poland, such solution is justified pursuant to the principle of 
environmental protection embedded in founding rules of constitutional system.997 Also, the polluter pays principle is 
one of the basic principles of Polish environmental policy.998 
It is generally understood that the scope of Art. 7 covers damages to environment as well as damages sustained by 
persons or property as a result of such damage.999  
The claimant’s right to choose between the law of the country in which the event giving rise to damage occurred or 
where the damage occurred is deemed appropriate.1000 Similar solution was already proposed by Polish scholars in 
regard to the interpretation of Art. 31 of the former Polish Private International Law Act from 1965, albeit such choice 
should have been made by a court, not the claimant. It is now considered in Polish doctrine that the claimant may be 
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better placed to make the decision. According to one author, claimant’s choice of the applicable law is final and it 
cannot be reversed or amended at a later stage of the proceedings1001. 
The possibility to conclude the agreement on applicable law that covers all claims between the parties based on Art. 
14 of the Regulation was criticized by Polish scholars as going against the principle to protect third party’s interests.1002  
Art. 7 does not cross-refer to Art. 4(2) nor Art. 4(3) thus not allowing for the wider application of the theory of closer 
connection (théorie de proximité). According to Polish doctrine, this solution hardens the process of indication of the 
applicable law in comparison to general rule of Art. 4.1003 
It is disputable if an environmental damage caused by a defective product falls into the scope of application of Art. 7 
or Art. 5. There is, in consequence, the necessity to determine precisely in those cases the scope of application of each 
of these articles. According to Polish scholars, the priority should be given to Art. 7, as being more restrictive for the 
person causing the damage and therefore following the polluters pay principle governing Art. 71004. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
Art. 8 adopts the principle of the lex loci protectionis which transcends the idea of sovereign character and territorial 
limits of IPR. According to Polish doctrine, the term of IPR as provided for in Art. 8 should be interpreted broadly, 
involving not only concepts that EU laws refer to, but also international agreements binding on the EU and other 
absolute rights in relation to intangible goods that are protected by the domestic law of the Member States.1005 
The advantage of the solution adopted by Art. 8 (1) is that it allows not to distinguish between its scope of application 
and the one of others conflict-of-laws rules concerning other aspects of IPR, because they use the same connecting 
factor of locus protectionis.1006 
The exclusion of party choice provided for in Art. 8(3), even though deemed as appropriate and not pertaining only 
to infringements of national IPRs, shows the lack of elasticity also in the light of other principles and proposals with 
regards to IPR (such as ALI, CLIP). 1007 Especially that Art. 8 does not include any escape clause. Such a rigid 
application of the principle lex loci protectionis seems to Polish doctrine as impractical and inappropriate for modern 
world challenges, especially for cases involving IPR infringements by Internet.1008 In the literature, it is criticised that the 
European legislator have chosen the territoriality principle that is applicable also to the cases of multi-states scenarios, 
pointing out that other solutions could be more suitable in those situations.1009 Some authors suggest introducing an 
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1003 M. Świerczyński, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 158, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2015. 
1004  M. Świerczyński, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 153 in: Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2015; M. Świerczyński, „Art. 7“, Title 
II, n° 6, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże Komentarze Becka, Warsaw 2018. 
1005  P. Fik, „Art. 8”, n°1, in: P. Fik, P. Staszczyk (ed.), Prawo właściwe dla zobowiązań pozaumownych. 
Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 864/2007. Komentarz, Warsaw 2014. 
1006 M. Świerczyński, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 178 in: Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2015. 
1007 R. Sikorski, „Prawo właściwe dla naruszeń praw własności intelektualnej w postanowień rozporządzenia Rzym 
II”, in: P. Grzegorczyk, K. Weitz (ed.), Europejskie prawo procesowe cywilne i kolizyjne, Lexis Nexis, 2012, pp. 462-
463. 
1008 R. Sikorski, „Prawo właściwe dla naruszeń praw własności intelektualnej w postanowień rozporządzenia Rzym 
II”, in: P. Grzegorczyk, K. Weitz (ed.), Europejskie prawo procesowe cywilne i kolizyjne, Lexis Nexis, 2012, p. 467; 
P. Fik, „Art. 8”, n°1, in: P. Fik, P. Staszczyk (ed.), Prawo właściwe dla zobowiązań pozaumownych. Rozporządzenie 
(WE) nr 864/2007. Komentarz, Warsaw 2014. 
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additional reservation in Art. 8, namely that the infringing party knew or could have foreseen that the infringement 
would take place in a specific country.1010 
The solution provided for in Art. 13 is subject to controversies in Polish doctrine, with some authors indicating its 
practical importance (here, only the point of view of English doctrine is quoted), others considering its irrelevant 
character and finally, some leaning towards its clarification nature rather than a separate conflict-of-laws rule.1011 
According to Polish doctrine, Art. 15 does not broaden the scope of application of Art. 8 (1), thus the applicable law 
will govern only the question of infringement and available remedies.1012 In relation to Art. 8(2), key importance must 
be given to letters c and d of Art. 15. Procedure will be governed by lege fori in accordance with the EU regulations 
relating to a given EU intellectual property law.  
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
Such regulation was not provided for neither in Polish Private International Law Act from 1965, applicable before the 
Rome II Regulation1013. According to Polish doctrine some aspects of this provision are particularly controversial for 
academia, namely its scope of application, the connecting factor and the admission of the choice of law by parties.1014  
The difficulties arise as to the scope of application of Art. 9. Particularly, the concept of ‘industrial action’ poses 
difficulties as to its interpretation. 1015  Polish commentators argued in favour of developing an autonomous 
understanding of that term, as the autonomous qualification of the concepts is rather a rule than the exception in case 
of the Rome II Regulation (with one author expressly stating that the Regulation did not provided for the autonomous 
interpretation of the term which raises important interpretative issues1016).1017 Moreover, the application of the lege fori 
for the definition of the concept of the ‘industrial action’ could result in contradictory interpretations among Member 
States. Application of lex causae to interpret the term of ‘industrial action’, on the other hand, albeit presenting some 
advantages (e.g. elimination of negative effects of forum shopping and the risk of contradicting judgments regarding 
the effects of different damages caused by the same event) would create some tension with the rationale of the rule.1018 
As for the scope of application with regard to the parties of the claim, the discussion in Polish doctrine revolves around 
extending it above the sole liability of natural persons1019 and excluding liability of third parties (such as negotiators, 
mediators, experts, etc.1020). It should be considered as adequate to extend the application of the rule to liability claims 
lodged by third parties. 
 
 
1010  P. Fik, „Art. 8”, n°4, in: P. Fik, P. Staszczyk (ed.), Prawo właściwe dla zobowiązań pozaumownych. 
Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 864/2007. Komentarz, Warsaw 2014. 
1011 P. Staszczyk, „Art. 13”, n° 4, in: P. Fik, P. Staszczyk (ed.), Prawo właściwe dla zobowiązań pozaumownych. 
Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 864/2007. Komentarz, Warsaw 2014. 
1012  M. Świerczyński, „Art. 8“, Title V, n° 1, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże 
Komentarze Becka, Warsaw 2018. 
1013 Ł. Żarnowiec, „Art. 9“, n° 1, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże Komentarze Becka, 
Warsaw 2018.  
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przepisów rozporządzenia Rzym II”, Przegląd Sądowy, April 2011, p. 18. 
1015 Ł. Żarnowiec, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 194, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2015. 
1016 W. Sanetra, „Rozporządzenie dotyczące prawa właściwego dla zobowiązań pozaumownych (Rzym II) a prawo 
pracy”, Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, March 2009, p. 7. 
1017 Ł. Żarnowiec, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 201, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2015. 
1018 Ł. Żarnowiec, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 199, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw, 2015. 
1019 A.M. Świątkowski, „Międzynarodowe prawo pracy. Tom 2 Międzynarodowe prywatne prawo pracy”, C.H. 
Beck, Warsaw 2010, p. 582. 
1020 A.M. Świątkowski, „Międzynarodowe prawo pracy. Tom 2 Międzynarodowe prywatne prawo pracy”, C.H. 




The reference to Art. 4(2) was criticised by Polish scholars, as the application of the different connecting factors can 
lead to the application of different governing laws and in the end lead to unsatisfactory results.1021  
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
The scope of application of the specific rule covers all non-contractual obligations related to unjust enrichment, 
including undue payments. Polish scholars expressed the opinion that the rule applies as well to settlements arising from 
expenses incurred in relation to the object of unjust enrichment1022.  
The difficulties may arise as to the delimitation between Art. 10 Rome II and Art. 12 (1) (e) Rome I.1023 According to 
Polish doctrine, the latter would cover solely the existence of the legal basis for the payment, while the former 
accommodates claims regarding reasons and transfers of value arising from an undue payment.  
Unjust enrichment in the sense of the specific rule may also arise from other obligations than torts or contracts, such as 
family law, property law or inheritance law.  
The concept of pre-existing relationship between the parties should be interpreted broadly and therefore covering also 
the appearance of a relationship and the belief of one party that the payment may be based on it.  
In one decision1024 Polish judges, first applied the Regulation Rome I to assess which law should be applied to parties’ 
relationship (one party claiming that the parties are obligated through loan, and the other that it was a donation) and 
then stated that the same result, namely the application of Polish law, would be achieved to assess claimant’s demand, 
this time through the application of the Rome II Regulation. After presenting the structure of Art. 10 and its accessory 
connections, the court directly applied Art. 10(3) as the disputed funds were transferred on the account in Poland. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
The concept of specific rule for obligations arising out of an act performed without due authority follows the recent 
trend in national jurisdictions, albeit with number of differences, most importantly relating to the connecting factor. 
Polish Private International Law Act from 1965 did not provide for a specific rule for negotiorum gestio and the 
connecting factors for claims arising out of such obligations were linked to parties’ nationality and habitual residence. 
According to Polish scholars, as rule of Art. 11 is materially identical to Art. 10, they could be included in one provision 
covering both of those non-contractual obligations, which would contribute to syntheticism of the Regulation’s text.  
The rule should be construed autonomously and broadly.  
The Polish inadequate translation may cause additional problems with the interpretation of the provision. In particular, 
the introduction of the term “previously” as pertaining to the relationship existing between the parties, could suggest 
that the specific rule applies only if such relationship existed before obligation arose.  
According to Polish scholars, Art. 11 does not cover claims of third parties against agent or principal1025.   
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1022 M. Świerczyński, Ł. Żarnowiec, „Art. 10“, Title II, n° 1, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, 
Duże Komentarze Becka, Warsaw 2018. 
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Wording of Art. 11(2) pertaining to the time when the event giving rise to the damage occurs should be construed 
narrowly1026. 
In Polish doctrine, the wording of Art. 11(3) goes against the applicability of the law of the place of effect in case of 
divergent acts.  
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
Culpa in contrahendo is not uniformly apprehended in European jurisdictions. Multitude of concepts in substantive laws 
is reflected in conflict-of-laws rules that apply different connecting factors to those obligations1027. The answer of the 
European legislature was to introduce a specific rule for non-contractual obligation arising out of dealings prior to the 
conclusion of a contract. The provision in the Regulation is the autonomous concept that views culpa in contrahendo 
as a non-contractual phenomenon, but also recognizes its non-tortious character. Polish translation of Art. 12 employs 
the expression of obligations arising out of commercial dealings which could in consequence imply that the provision 
does not cover civil matters. Polish doctrine is nonetheless unanimous that such conclusion is obviously without 
foundation and the Polish wording should be construed as describing the character of the dealings and not to the 
dealings between the professionals. According to Polish scholars, the scope of application of Art. 12 covers also the 
positive obligation to provide information during negotiations, whereas the breach of duties arising out of conventions 
relating to parties’ behaviour during negotiations does not enter into the scope of application of Art. 121028. The acts 
of third person, such as a person participating in the negotiations as agent, fall outside the scope of application of Art. 
121029. 
In Polish literature it is debated whether Art. 12(2) notwithstanding the possible application of Art. 12(1), should prevail 
for the reasons relating to equity.1030 Polish scholars disagree on whether Art. 12(2) should have been included in the 
Regulation1031. Another doubt relates to the order of priority of connecting factors from Art. 12(2) paragraphs.1032 
In absence of a choice-of-law agreement between the parties, Art. 12 provides for the application of the law that 
would govern the negotiated contract, should it had been concluded. Such solution is positively perceived in Polish 
doctrine1033. The application of the Rome I Regulation, resulting from Art. 12(1), provides for a comprehensive and 
flexible conflict-of-laws mechanism.  
 
 
1026  Ł. Żarnowiec, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 231 in: Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
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1027  M.-A. Zachariasiewicz, „Kwalifikacja "culpa in contrahendo" w prawie prywatnym międzynarodowym”, 
Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, vol. 3/2008, p. 37 ff.  
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2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
One of the widely accepted principles in private international law is the parties’ autonomy of the will in regard to non-
contractual obligations. 1034 In Polish law, parties’ freedom to choose the law applicable to their non-contractual 
relationship appeared only with the Regulation Rome II.1035 A material review of the contents of a choice of law clause 
must be based exclusively on the Rome II provisions, notwithstanding the standards of the chosen law.1036  
The fact that the Rome II Regulation does not include the same or similar provision to Art. 3(5) of the Rome I Regulation 
suggests, according to Polish doctrine, that the latter should not be therefore applied per analogy to the Rome II. The 
validity of the choice of law agreement should be assessed first through interpretation of the Regulation and only 
subsidiarily according to the substantive law.1037  
In Polish doctrine the law applicable to consensus features raises the distortion. The majority of Polish scholars 
advocates for the assessment according to the chosen law1038, while one author stipulates referring to Art. 10(2) of the 
Rome I Regulation to assess one party’s silence in conclusion of the ex-post choice of law agreement1039. 
After the event giving rise to the damage occurred, Art. 14(l)(a) permits an agreement to submit non-contractual 
obligation to a chosen law. Accordingly, Polish doctrine admits that this indicates that relevant point in time is the event 
giving rise to the damage, in opposition to the damage itself, that may appear later on.1040  
The choice of law does not have to be made expressly. Polish Supreme Court in a decision from 2012 stated that the 
implicit choice of law should be based on the facts that allow, after taking into consideration all circumstances of the 
case, to conclude with sufficient certainty that the parties did indeed made corresponding declarations of will regarding 
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4/2009, p. 29; M. Pazdan et al., „W odpowiedzi na ankietę skierowaną do państw członkowskich Unii, dotyczącą 
stosowania Rozporządzenia nr 864”, Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, vol. 12/2013, p. 189.  
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the choice of law.1041 This interpretation was subsequently applied to the case involving the Rome II Regulation.1042 
The doctrine accepts the concept of the implicit choice of law provided that it can be assessed on the factual 
circumstances. The hypothetical will of the parties should be disregarded.1043 
Polish scholars lean towards the opinion that the choice of law included in the Standard Terms and Conditions even 
on the ex-ante basis would be invalid as favouring stronger counterparties and therefore lacking the “freely 
negotiated” element (with one author quoting German doctrine for a contra opinion1044).1045 However, it may be valid 
if such a choice of law clause is included in a negotiated framework contract covering specific implementing 
agreements in a dispute about a non-contractual obligation relating to one of those implementing agreements.1046 
Polish scholarship points out that parties may also proceed to the choice of law indirectly, especially through accessory 
connection of Art. 4(3) Rome II Regulation.1047 In that case, even parties that are not pursuing a commercial activity 
may submit in contract their non-contractual obligations to the law of their choice, however the decision would be 
ultimately assessed by the court. 
Parties to the ex-ante agreement must pursue commercial activities which in Polish literature means that the term should 
be interpreted autonomously and there must be sufficient nexus between the factual circumstances of the event giving 
rise to the damage and the non-contractual liability (pre-tort relationship).1048  
For the ex-post choice of law, the relevant point in time should be the occurring of the event giving rise to the damage, 
and not the damage itself.1049 The choice of law can be also made before the court or the tribunal with one author 
postulating that this point should be strictly determined, preferably before the beginning of the proceedings (these 
considerations were however developed in regard to other European instruments, namely Art. 7(2) Hague Protocol 
on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations and Art. 5(2) 1259/2009 Regulation).1050 
One author analysed the question of the ex-post agreements for the cases of possible future events giving rise to 
damages. Taking into account the strict wording of Art. 2(3)(a), they should be deemed possible on the condition that 
the probability of the future event is sufficiently proven. If, however, the event occurs in reality, the agreement on the 
choice of law must be repeated.1051 To clarify this interpretation, the author proposes to reformulate Art. 14(1)(a) as 
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is in fact implied and to that effect it should take into consideration all the factual circumstances of the case, and, in 
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of one state was not sufficiently clear, the Court asked the parties to expressly assess if they made the agreement as to 
the applicable law, Court of Appeal in Warsaw, I ACa 94/18, 27.03.2019. 
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prywatnym międzynarodowym na tle rozporządzenia Rzym II”, Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, vol. 4/2009, p. 25. 
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n° 53/2011, p. 80.  
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Becka, Warsaw 2018; M. Czepelak, „Wybór prawa właściwego dla zobowiązań pozaumownych w 
rozporządzeniu rzymskim II”, Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego, n° 2/2009, pp. 544-545; Krzysztof Pacuła, „Granice 
swobody wyboru prawa dla zobowiązań pozaumownych na tle rozporządzenia Rzym II” in Michał Gajda (ed.), 
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follows: “The parties may agree to submit non-contractual obligations to the law of their choice by an agreement 
entered into after the event giving rise to the damage occurred or after the justified likelihood of the event giving rise to 
the damage in case it did not occur.”1052 
According to Art. 14 (l) subparagrah 2, a choice of law shall not prejudice the rights of third parties. Polish doctrine 
indicates that in such case, the choice of law agreement is not invalid in its entirety but only limits the effects that 
detrimentally affect third parties (relative ineffectiveness).1053 The doubts in academia concerning the rights of third 
parties relate to the circumstances in which those rights are prejudiced and how they are protected.1054 
In general, Polish doctrine adopts the stance against the admissibility of the dépeçage in case of a complex choice of 
the law applicable to the obligations arising from an illegitimate action. 1055  The partial choice of law is more 
controversial, with one author leaving this question to be resolved by courts.1056 The rationale for such opinion is to be 
found in a rather narrow freedom of choice allowed for in non-contractual obligations and greater difficulties that 
dépeçage would raise in those types of agreements than in case of contractual obligations. Moreover, Polish doctrine 
is of the opinion that the lack of the solution similar to Art. 3(1) in fine of the Rome I Regulation is an argumentum e 
contrario for the admissibility of dépeçage. 1057 
Despite the fact that the Rome II Regulation does not clearly address the issue, it is not disputed by Polish doctrine that 
parties are free to modify or revoke their previous choice of law agreement, provided that the new choice does not 
violate the right of third parties.1058  
The introduction of party autonomy into the choice of law for non-contractual obligations may be one of the most 
innovative part of the Rome II Regulation, however, according to one author, it may have limited impact in practice 
mainly due to ambiguous and incoherent national legal solutions.1059 
 
 
1052 A: Dorabialska, „Ograniczenia wyboru prawa w prawie kolizyjnym”, Przegląd Sądowy, n° 7-8/2018, p. 86. 
1053 J. Pazdan, „Art. 14”, Title II, n° 5 in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże Komentarze 
Becka, Warsaw 2018. 
1054 K. Pacuła, „Wybór prawa a ochrona osób trzecich na tle rozporządzenia o prawie właściwym dla zobowiązań 
pozaumownych (Rzym II)”, in: A. Kozioł, P. Twardoch (ed.), Ochrona osób trzecich w prawie prywatnym 
międzynarodowym = Third party protection in private international law, C.H.Beck, Warsaw 2018, p. 122. 
1055 J. Pazdan, „Art. 14”, Title II, n° 5 in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże Komentarze 
Becka, Warsaw 2018; Krzysztof Pacuła, „Granice swobody wyboru prawa dla zobowiązań pozaumownych na tle 
rozporządzenia Rzym II”, in: Michał Gajda (ed.), Autonomia woli w prawie prywatnym międzynarodowym i 
arbitrażu, Uniwersytet Śląski, Katowice 2015, p. 40. 
1056 M. Czepelak, „Wybór prawa właściwego dla zobowiązań pozaumownych w rozporządzeniu rzymskim II”, 
Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego, n° 2/2009, p. 563. 
1057 Pro: Ł. Żarnowiec, „Prawo właściwe dla odpowiedzialności za szkodę wyrządzoną przez produkt niebezpieczny 
w świetle przepisów rozporządzenia Rzym II”, Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, n° 5/2009, p. 
106 and P. Staszczyk, „Art. 14”, n° 3, in: P Fik, P. Staszczyk (ed.), Prawo właściwe dla zobowiązań pozaumownych. 
Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 864/2007. Komentarz, Warsaw 2014; for contra opinion: A. Dorabialska, „Rozszerzenie 
możliwości wyboru prawa w rozporządzeniach Rzym I i Rzym II”, Studia Iuridica, n° 53/2011. 
1058 K. Pacuła, „Granice swobody wyboru prawa dla zobowiązań pozaumownych na tle rozporządzenia Rzym II”, 
in: Michał Gajda (ed.), Autonomia woli w prawie prywatnym międzynarodowym i arbitrażu, Uniwersytet Śląski, 
Katowice 2015, p. 42. 
1059 K. Pacuła, „Granice swobody wyboru prawa dla zobowiązań pozaumownych na tle rozporządzenia Rzym II”, 
in: Michał Gajda (ed.), Autonomia woli w prawie prywatnym międzynarodowym i arbitrażu, Uniwersytet Śląski, 




2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
Polish scholarship raises the difficulties in separating the issues of presumptions of law and burden of proof from the 
scope of exclusion of Art. 1(3).1060 It is therefore necessary to analyse procedural provisions of lex fori and lex causae 
to determine which of them should be applicable. 1061  According to scholarship, procedural rules that require 
interpretation of parties’ behavior, principles of evaluating the evidence and certain events based on life experience 
do not fall into scope of application of Art. 22.1062 Art. 22 also covers only presumptions of law (in opposition to 
presumptions of facts, that are important in procedures relating to non-contractual obligations, especially in 
determining the course of events causing damages, as accidents).1063 
In relation to Art. 22(2), Polish doctrine estimates that it bares the application of the stricter provisions of the lex causae 
(as per Art. 21) than provisions of the law in force at the seat of the court.1064 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
The provision on applicability of foreign law by Polish courts appear in the Law on the organisation of common courts. 
The rule allows to resort to various means of evidence in order to determine the content of foreign law, especially, by 
asking the Ministry of Justice for information on content of foreign law or ordering an expert opinion. 
There is no substantial debate as to questions of pleading, proof and application of the substantive rules of the law 
applicable under the Rome II Regulation. In the broader context of the European regulations it was only pointed out 
by doctrine that Polish courts sometimes wrongly apply foreign law (see Introduction). In general, Polish courts apply 
foreign law ex officio (according to the Law on the organisation of common courts). However, as pointed out by 
doctrine, it may pose some difficulties as Polish judges receive education in Polish law, knowledge of foreign law 
requires mastering a foreign language, and access to information about foreign law is more difficult.1065 For instance, 
district court in Kłodzko first correctly identified German law as applicable to the case as per the Rome II Regulation, 
and then stated that German provisions are similar to Polish statutes and in the rest of its reasoning applied solely Polish 
law.1066 
In its decision from 2014, Polish Supreme Court reminded that Polish courts have a duty to determine applicable law 
(in the case at hand, according to either the Rome I or Rome II Regulation).1067 In the same decision, the court noted 
that the conflict-of-laws rule indicates the law most closely related to the facts in question and its application does not 
imply a choice between different types of liability, but a choice between using one or another connecting factor. 
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Komentarze Becka, Warsaw 2018. 
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Komentarze Becka, Warsaw 2018. 
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1066 District Court in Kłodzko, I C 390/11, 26.11.2012. 




Polish doctrine raised the issue of the interplay between the Rome II Regulation and Art. 10 of Polish Private 
International Act 2011 that regulates the application of the foreign law (it provides for subsidiary application of Polish 
provisions in case a foreign law cannot be determined). It was pointed out that this provision cannot be used to resolve 
the problem of the impossibility of establishing a connecting factor or the content of the applicable law in the case of 
the Rome Regulations, since they exclude national private international law also in this respect.1068 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
The general scope of application of the lex causæ under the Regulation as provided for in Art. 15 is considered as 
beneficial in practice. The provision contains a non-exhaustive list of matters covered by the lex causæ as opposed to 
procedural matters which are governed by the lex fori (Art. 1(3)). The introduction of Art. 15 is particularly useful in 
the light of different qualifications in Member States of the scope of application of the procedural law, that may cover 
extinction, prescription and limitation in time. The main difficulty that may emerge in relation to scope of the applicable 
law is the lack of compatibility of covered areas with specific provisions of the Regulation. It is apparent e. g. in context 
of Art. 8 and can lead to the false impression that its scope of application is in reality broader1069.  
Polish doctrine discusses if Art. 15 covers also the right and conditions of the set-off in case of contractual and non-
contractual obligations, as Art. 15 (contrary to the Rome I Regulation) does not expressly cover such possibility.1070 
Other than that, the list of Art. 15 does not in principle raises any doubts.1071  
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16) 
The scope of application of Art. 16 overlaps the scope of application of the Rome II Regulation. It encompasses all 
conflict-of-laws rules for the obligations arising out of non-contractual claims. Traditionally, it is considered as playing 
the biggest role in case of Art. 14, i.e.parties’ freedom to choose the law applicable to their non-contractual 
relationships 1072. Even though the European legislator did not provide a definition of the concept of overriding 
mandatory provisions, in Polish literature it is now clear that they should receive the same meaning as provided in Art. 
9 of the Rome I Regulation1073 (especially after Arblade case1074). The controversy around Art. 16 relates to the 
interpretation of the public interest considerations as some rules may aim, at least taken at face value, to protect private 
interests, but still qualify as overriding mandatory rules (for instance as in case of consumer contracts).1075 As examples 
of overriding mandatory rules Polish literature qualifies certain provisions for liability for defective medical and 
pharmaceutical products, the ones concerning employers’ compensation scheme for the acts of their employees or 
 
 
1068 M. Czepelak, „Międzynarodowe prawo zobowiązań Unii Europejskiej”, Warsaw 2012, p. 465 ff. 
1069 M. Świerczyński, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 246 in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2015. 
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Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 864/2007. Komentarz, Warsaw 2014.  
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międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2015. 
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Komentarze Becka, Warsaw 2018. 
1073  Ł. Żarnowiec, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 264 in: Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2015; Ł. Żarnowiec, „Prawo właściwe 
dla odpowiedzialności za szkodę wyrządzoną przez produkt niebezpieczny w świetle przepisów rozporządzenia 
Rzym II”, Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, n° 5/2009, p. 109; M. Mataczyński, „Przepisy 
wymuszające swoje zastosowanie – wybrane zagadnienia”, Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, vol. 
18/2016, pp. 61-62. 
1074 CJUE, Arblade and Leloup joint cases C-376/96 and C-369/96. 
1075  Ł. Żarnowiec, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 264 in: Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 




pertaining to limit the punitive character of allowed damages1076. But not those relating to the liability arising out of the 
use of a prospectus in financial matters.1077  
Polish doctrine underlines that the text of Art. 16 is not conclusive as to the application of the overriding mandatory 
provisions of the law applicable under the Regulation. 1078 It is submitted, albeit not unanimously, that lex causae, 
including its overriding mandatory rules, should be applied if by their scope of application those rules are in connection 
with the situation that has arisen. The same question arises as to the application of the overriding mandatory rules of a 
third country, as it is pointed out that the silence of the Regulation on this subject cannot be construed as barring taking 
them into account.1079 One scholar points out that such application should be directly possible in case of a strong 
connection between that law and the circumstances of the case.1080 Another points out that it remains to be interpreted 
if the ECJ decision in Republik Griechenland case, where it has approved the indirect approach to foreign mandatory 
rules under the Rome I Regulation, should be extended to the Rome II Regulation (especially taking into account the 
different wording of the two provisions).1081 In any case, it should be underlined that in Polish literature the question of 
application of the overriding mandatory rules of a third country was always controversial.1082 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18) 
Before the introduction of the Rome II Regulation, the collision regulations determining the rules applicable for filling 
claims directly with the insurance company of the perpetrator were not regulated in the Polish Private International Law 
Act.1083 Regarding the wording of Art. 18 Rome II Regulation, Polish doctrine is of the opinion that it can raise doubts 
as to the scope of application of the law it points out to: does it cover only the existence of the right to a direct action 
against the insurer or also its admissibility, modalities, scope and content? The Polish doctrine follows the latter 
interpretation.1084 However, Art. 18 of the Rome II Regulation does not precede the substantive law governing the 
insurance contract as per the Rome I Regulation. Taking into account differences between MS in determining what falls 
under the term actio directa, some scholars showed the utility of providing directly in the Regulation its definition.1085 
This stance seemed not to be followed by the Provincial Court in Cracow which in 2013 decided that the choice of 
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1077  M.-A. Zachariasiewicz, „Art. 16”, n° 3, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże 
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Rozprawy Ubezpieczeniowe, n° 12(1/2012), p. 13. 
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law clause contained in the insurance contract is contrary to the Rome II Regulation and therefore applied implicitly 
Art. 18 of that Regulation to derive from it the law applicable also to the content of the insurance relationship.1086 This 
decision was deemed incorrect by Polish doctrine.1087 
The doubts appear also in respect to the hierarchy of applicable rules in case both legal systems, namely lex causae 
and the law applicable to the insurance contract contain the direct action mechanism. In that case, the choice should 
be left to the injured party.1088 The solution that allows to choose the parts of each law that are most favourable to the 
victim was strongly rejected.1089 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19) 
Art. 19 seems not to apply to debtors in rem.1090 However it is presumed that the law regulating the action subrogatoire 
covers also the question of priority between the new and former creditor in case of partial payments.1091 
Polish doctrine pointed out to the lack of consensus as to according to which law it should be assessed whether a claim 
can be subrogated at all.1092 By the way of analogy with Art. 14(2) Rome I Regulation, Art. 19 should also cover the 
question of informing the original debtor about the change of the creditor and the effective payment of the debt.1093 
Polish scholars deplore the fact that the European legislator did not introduce in the Rome II Regulation a similar 
provision to Art. 14(2) Rome I and rule concerning a third party that satisfied the creditor without a duty to do so.1094 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20) 
As Polish translation has employed the term “regressive claim” in Art. 20, which is not defined in the Regulation, it is 
understood in the Polish literature that it should benefit from an autonomous and wide interpretation.1095  
One of the raised questions concerns the applicability of Art. 20, namely if it should also apply in case some of the 
debtors have the obligation towards the creditor based on a contract. Polish doctrine leans toward granting Art. 20 
the broad scope of application.  
The other question relates to the applicable law in case when there is a special relationship between the debtors, which 
regulates also the question of their multiple liability (e.g. associates in a corporation personally liable for a damage 
caused to a third person by unfair competition in connection with the activities of that corporation).1096  
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dla subrogacji w przepisach rozporządzenia „Rzym II”, Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, July 2014, p. 15. 
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In case when the liabilities of different debtors are subject to the laws of different States, there may be an issue of 
qualifying that relation as falling into scope of Art. 20. A leading Polish author is of the opinion that in such case the 
obligations of debtors toward the creditor should be governed by the law that governs the obligation that gave rise to 
the main creditor’s claim.1097  
Art. 20 remains silent on the issue if its applicable only to the situation of the liability of different debtors based on the 
same legal event. In Polish literature the expressed opinion is that of the broad interpretation of that provision, namely 
that it should apply also to debtors’ liabilities arising out of different basis.1098  
In case of the choice of law between the creditor and one of the debtors, its effect towards others should be limited by 
the application of Art. 14(1) 2d sentence (for other opinions Polish commentary refers to German and English 
authors).1099 
Art. 20 Rome II does not introduce the same solution as Art. 16 Rome I Regulation, i.e. that other debtors may rely on 
the defences they had against the creditor to the extent allowed by the law governing their obligations towards the 
creditor. According to Polish doctrine such solution should be allowed as per analogy with Art. 16 (with one 
commentary expressing a strong contra opinion1100).1101 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
Polish doctrine is consistent in treating the concept of habitual residence as an autonomous one, that must be interpreted 
in the light of the Rome II purposes.  
In regard to the place of central administration as the place of habitual residence according to Polish doctrine this term 
seems to be understood as the effective place of central administration.1102 If a company or other body does not have 
a central administration, the place of its habitual residence should be the place of its main (preponderant) activity, 
especially the place from which its business is administered.1103 In Poland, the term “companies and other bodies, 
corporate or unincorporated” covers a wide range of entities that are acting as legal entities without necessarily having 
a legal personality.1104  
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As for natural persons, in case of self-employed persons contracting in the course of their business, the place of their 
habitual residence is at the place of the main company. The latter is the place of economic interests of that person. 
Therefore, such considerations as the place of residence or the place of registration of the business are irrelevant.1105 
Also, for natural person that is not acting in the course of his or her business activity, as the term is not defined by the 
Regulation, a minority opinion considered that subjective circumstances (namely, the intention to stay in a given place) 
should be weighed in.1106  
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
The general exclusion of renvoi is no controversial in Polish doctrine. The one question that may arise is however when 
parties agree to include in their choice of law the rules of the private international law of the specified legal order. In 
that situation, the admissibility of a clause to this effect should be rejected1107. However, another solution may be to 
interpret parties’ choice as in fact a choice of the law indicated by the conflict-of-laws provisions. The solution in each 
case should depend on the interpretation of parties’ intent.1108 
In case of Art. 26, the question raised by Polish scholars concerns the situation where the parties refer in their agreement 
to the law of the State with more than one legal system without designating the specific unit which rules should govern 
their relationship. In that situation, it seems that it should be resorted to either the conflict-of-laws rules of that State that 
may be applicable to designate the law of the specific unit or, if such rules do not exist, to the rule with the closest 
connection to their relation. To present the other solution, namely resorting to the rule of objective connector, Polish 
scholars cite German doctrine.1109  
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
The public policy clause of Art. 26 corresponds to the provision of Art. 7 of Polish Private International Law Act, 
therefore its place in the Regulation does not spark debate within the Polish doctrine. It was pointed out that the courts 
should apply this provision restrictively, only in situations where the application of lex causae provisions clearly could 
not be reconciled with public order of their state.1110 The Polish doctrine points out that the provision does not introduce 
the concept of specific European public order.1111 
Polish Supreme Court did not exclude the application of the provision on public policy in general for the cases of clear 
disproportion between the extent of the damage and the compensation.1112 It also categorically stated that punitive 
damages are against public policy and therefore cannot be awarded based upon the governing foreign law.1113  
 
 
1105 M. Świerczyński, „Art. 23”, n° 5, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże Komentarze 
Becka, Warsaw 2018. 
1106 M. Pazdan, „Prawo prywatne międzynarodowe”, Warsaw 2010, p. 56. 
1107 J. Popiołek, „Art. 24”, n° 2, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże Komentarze Becka, 
Warsaw 2018. 
1108 J. Popiołek, „Art. 24”, n° 2, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże Komentarze Becka, 
Warsaw 2018. 
1109 Ł. Żarnowiec, „Art. 25”, n° 2, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże Komentarze Becka, 
Warsaw 2018, quoting contra German doctrine.  
1110 Ł. Żarnowiec, „Prawo właściwe dla odpowiedzialności za szkodę wyrządzoną przez produkt niebezpieczny w 
świetle przepisów rozporządzenia Rzym II”, Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, n° 5/2009, p. 112; 
M. Pazdan, M. Szpunar, „Conflict of laws rules in Polish consumer protection laws”, in: M. Kępinski (ed.), The 
evaluation of the new Polish legislation in the matter of consumer protection from the European perspective: conference 
proceedings, Poznań 2002, p. 111. 
1111 P. Staszczyk, „Art. 26”, n° 10, in: P Fik, P. Staszczyk (ed.), Prawo właściwe dla zobowiązań pozaumownych. 
Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 864/2007. Komentarz, Warsaw 2014; M. Czepelak, „Międzynarodowe prawo 
zobowiązań Unii Europejskiej”, Warsaw 2012, p. 470. 
1112 Supreme Court, III CSK 21/16, 8.12.2016. 




Court of Appeal in Szczecin decided to resort to the public policy provision and not to apply German law for not 
giving protection to the relationship between the parent and the children. In its opinion, the possibility to demand 
compensation for the death of a relative is a fundamental principle of Polish legal order.1114 Polish scholars were 
hesitant as to the solution adopted by the court.1115 Provincial Court in Szczecin gave effect to the public policy clause 
ruling that culpa in contrahendo in Swiss law results from case-law and doctrine which are not recognised in Polish 
constitution as sources of law.1116 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
The question of the interplay between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments was 
debated in Polish doctrine. Especially, the interaction between Art. 7 and the scope of application of directive 
2004/35/EC was reported, mainly in respect of the definition of environmental damage. 1117  It is understood 
however, that the directive may only serve as an auxiliary instrument in defining the scope of application of Art. 7. 
In relation to Art. 27, Polish doctrine takes into consideration three European instruments, namely the Council 
Regulation (EC) N° 2100/94 on Community Plan Variety Rights and the Council Regulation (EC) N° 6/2002 on 
Community designs, as well as the Regulation 2017/1001 on the European Union trade mark. Regarding first two of 
those legal acts, the discussion evolves mainly around the question if there is a conflict between their provisions and 
the Rome II Regulation; as for the latter instrument the main raised problem touches upon the interplay between Arts. 
129 par. 2 and 130 par. 2 of the 2017/1001 Regulation and Arts. 8 par. 2, 13 and 27 of the Rome II Regulation.1118 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic 
accidents on legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
It is pointed out by Polish academia that the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents that 
falls under Art. 28 is detrimental to European uniformity and encourages forum shopping.1119 The non-unification of 
the rules in that area can lead to the different applicable substantive laws. This problematic may be further exacerbated 
by the spread of autonomous vehicles and, on one hand, differences in regulating responsibility in case of accidents 
among European states and, on the other, the difficulties and costs of gathering the evidence.1120 
For Polish courts, the existence of different provisions on the same matter caused the difficulties in determining the 
proper scope of application of each legal instrument.1121   
 
 
1114 Court of Appeal in Szczecin, I ACa 91/16, 13.04.2016. 
1115 M. Zachariasiewicz, „Art. 26”, Title II, n° 9, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, Duże 
Komentarze Becka, Warsaw 2018. 
1116 Provincial Court in Szczecin, VIII GC 176/17, 10.10.2018. 
1117 M. Świerczyński, „Rozdział XII. Zobowiązania pozaumowne”, n° 154 in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo prywatne 
międzynarodowe. System Prawa Prywatnego. Tom 20b, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2015. 
1118 M. Szpunar, K. Pacuła, „Art. 27”, Title II, n° 1 and 2, in: M. Pazdan (ed.), Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, 
Duże Komentarze Becka, Warsaw 2018. 
1119  M. Świerczyński, Ł. Żarnowiec, „Prawo właściwe dla odpowiedzialności za szkodę spowodowaną przez 
wypadki drogowe z udziałem autonomicznych pojazdów”, Zeszyty Prawnicze, 19.2/2019, p. 105. 
1120  M. Świerczyński, Ł. Żarnowiec, „Prawo właściwe dla odpowiedzialności za szkodę spowodowaną przez 
wypadki drogowe z udziałem autonomicznych pojazdów”, Zeszyty Prawnicze, 19.2/2019, p. 106. 
1121  M. Świerczyński, Ł. Żarnowiec, „Prawo właściwe dla odpowiedzialności za szkodę spowodowaną przez 




In the light of thereof, Polish doctrine proposed either the adoption by the EU of the relevant regulation or introduction 
of the separate provision on the matter in the Rome II Regulation.1122 The latter could reflect the provisions of the 1971 
Hague Convention, which would result in the assimilation of the Convention in the Provision, leaving however as the 
main connector the place of the damage1123. 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach 
The problems raised in regard to the mosaic approach englobe differences in assessment of the same state of facts 
and potential risk of incorrect application of the foreign law.1124 In some areas covered by the Rome II, the application 
of the mosaic approach was deemed to be the most beneficial one.1125 
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
Polish doctrine criticized the exclusion of defamation from the scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, pointing 
out not only the difficulties in construing such conflict-of-laws rule for modern times (especially for cross-border 
situations), but also the lack of political will in including the violations of privacy in the European regulation.1126 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
No meaningful discussion in academia is led in respect of SLAPP and the Rome II Regulation, even though some media 
outlets reported that there are victims of approach related to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.1127 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
The question of corporate abuses against human rights is not yet extensively debated in academia and no relevant 
discussion as to the interaction of the Rome II Regulation and human rights abuses by businesses was found.  
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
 
 
1122  M. Świerczyński, Ł. Żarnowiec, „Prawo właściwe dla odpowiedzialności za szkodę spowodowaną przez 
wypadki drogowe z udziałem autonomicznych pojazdów”, Zeszyty Prawnicze, 19.2/2019, pp. 124-125. 
1123  M. Świerczyński, Ł. Żarnowiec, „Prawo właściwe dla odpowiedzialności za szkodę spowodowaną przez 
wypadki drogowe z udziałem autonomicznych pojazdów”, Zeszyty Prawnicze, 19.2/2019, p. 126. 
1124 E. Figura-Góralczyk, „2. Dystrybutywne stosowanie prawa”, in: Nieuczciwa konkurencja w prawie prywatnym 
międzynarodowym, Warsaw 2017; A. Frąckowiak-Adamska, A. Guzewicz, Ł. Petelski, „Skuteczność stosowania 
przez sądy polskie unijnych rozporządzeń: nr 44/2001, nr 2201/2003, nr 864/2007 i nr 4/2009”, Europejski 
Przegląd Sądowy, n° 10/2016, p. 8. 
1125 E. Figura-Góralczyk, „9. Podsumowanie”, in: Nieuczciwa konkurencja w prawie prywatnym 
międzynarodowym, Warsaw 2017 referring to Art. 6. 
1126 J. Balcarczyk, „Prawo właściwe dla zobowiązań wynikających z naruszenia dóbr osobistych w rozporządzeniu 
o prawie właściwym dla zobowiązań pozaumownych”, Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, vol. 
9/2011, p. 108. 





In the report prepared by the Ministry of Digital Affaires in 2018, it was stated that for the torts relating to AI Art. 4 of 
the Rome II will be applicable and its application does not raise particular doubts (quoting however to support this 
view foreign doctrine)1128. It was however pointed out that there are some exceptions to the general rule of Art. 4 which 
may be more problematic with regard to AI (e.g. is the choice of law included in the algorithm effective or only 
hypothetical).1129 The report raised the issue of lack of any connector specific for AI in Art. 5 and raised the issue of 
possible difficulty in finding the applicable law in case of accidents involving autonomous vehicles (however, in the 
latter case, the report wrongly states that in most European countries the law applicable to the car accidents would be 
the “law from 70’s”).1130 
The issue of AI is not particularly debated in Polish doctrine, as artificial intelligence is still a developing legal area. 
Some reforms were proposed in the context of autonomous vehicles (see Q. 27), touching upon also a possible new 
provision introduced in the Rome II Regulation. In regard to the responsibility of the producer (of the whole vehicle or 
just some of its components), the social interest in supporting the technological development should be taken into 
consideration, leading to the fair sharing of risks accompanying the implementation of innovative solution. In that 
respect, Polish scholars propose to provide a minimum level of protection by guaranteeing the applicability of the law 
of one of the countries in which the vehicle was marketed by reference to Art. 5 of the Regulation.1131 In Polish literature 
it was however stipulated that one provision englobing all matters relating to artificial intelligence algorithms is not 
necessary, nor beneficial, especially in the light of the complex problematics it may pose.1132 Especially, it was 
considered that the dynamically developing economy based on artificial intelligence algorithms does not undermine 
the classic European system of conflict-of-laws rules.1133 In the case of artificial intelligence, however, the use of those 
rules cannot be mechanical and should aim at analysing the circumstances of each individual case.1134  
 
 
1128 Ministry of Digital Affairs, „Rekomendacje przygotowane pro bono, na zaproszenie i pod kierunkiem 
Ministerstwa Cyfryzacji, przez środowiska zainteresowane rozwojem AI w Polsce”, Warsaw 2018, p. 181. 
1129 Ministry of Digital Affairs, „Rekomendacje przygotowane pro bono, na zaproszenie i pod kierunkiem 
Ministerstwa Cyfryzacji, przez środowiska zainteresowane rozwojem AI w Polsce”, Warsaw 2018, p. 181. 
1130 Ministry of Digital Affairs, „Rekomendacje przygotowane pro bono, na zaproszenie i pod kierunkiem 
Ministerstwa Cyfryzacji, przez środowiska zainteresowane rozwojem AI w Polsce”, Warsaw 2018, p. 181. 
1131  M. Świerczyński, Ł. Żarnowiec, „Prawo właściwe dla odpowiedzialności za szkodę spowodowaną przez 
wypadki drogowe z udziałem autonomicznych pojazdów”, Zeszyty Prawnicze, 19.2/2019, p. 130. 
1132 M. Świerczyński, „Sztuczna inteligencja w prawie prywatnym międzynarodowym – wstępne rozważania”, 
Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, vol. 25, 2019, p. 40. 
1133 Ministry of Digital Affairs, „Rekomendacje przygotowane pro bono, na zaproszenie i pod kierunkiem 
Ministerstwa Cyfryzacji, przez środowiska zainteresowane rozwojem AI w Polsce”, Warsaw 2018, p. 181. 
1134 M. Świerczyński, „Sztuczna inteligencja w prawie prywatnym międzynarodowym – wstępne rozważania”, 





4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to decision 
of the Court of Justice 
if applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
District Court in 
Kłodzko  
I C 390/11 
 
 
26.11.2012 Art. 4 General rule for applicable 
law 
 
District Court in 
Strzelce Opolskie   
I C 393/10 12.02.2013 Art. 4 General rule for applicable 
law 
 
Provincial Court in 
Wrocław 
II Ca 1367/12 22.02.2013 Art. 4, 19-20 General rule for applicable 
law 
 
Provincial Court in 
Szczecin 
VIII GC 134/11 13.11.2013 Art. 4 General rule for applicable 
law 
 
The Supreme Court II CSK 250/12 23.05.2013 Art. 4 General rule for applicable 
law. Application in time 
 
The Supreme Court I CSK 697/12 11.10.2013 Art. 26, recital 32 Public policy  
Provincial Court in 
Szczecin 
VIII GC 134/11 12.11.2013 Art. 10 Unjust enrichment  
Court of Appeal in 
Szczecin 




Court of Appeal in 
Szczecin 
I Aca 660/12 7.02.2014 Art. 31 Application in time  
District Court 
Wrocław Krzyki in 
Wrocław 
I C 388/12 13.02.2014 Art. 4, Art. 15 (a) 
and (b) 
General rule for applicable 
law 
 
Provincial Court in 
Warsaw  
II Co 18/14 11.03.2014 Art. 10 Unjust enrichment Decision 
on Polish jurisdiction based 
on Art. 10 of the Rome II 
Regulation  
 
Court of Appeal in 
Szczecin  
I ACa 212/14 29.05.2014 Art. 4 (1) and (2) General rule for applicable 
law 
A German seller and Polish buyers concluded a 
contract for the sale of seeds. The Polish buyer 
withdrew from the contract and the seller 
demanded compensation for the damage it 
incurred in the amount of EUR 27,825. The 
Polish company refused to pay. The German 
Court of first instance awarded the requested 
damages. The second instance court dismissed 
the claim due to the lack of German jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, on February 11, 2011, the 
German seller initiated an enforcement 
procedure, which resulted in collecting an 
amount from the defendant's account. The Polish 
company requested the return of this amount. 
The Polish Provincial Court applied Art. 4(1) of 
the Regulation to the case and in consequence 
based its decision on Polish law. The Court of 
Appeal rejected the submission of manifestly 
closer connection with Germany due to the pre-
existing contract between the parties. It 
recognised, however, such a connection with 




caused by a Polish enforcement authority on 
Polish territory and in Polish currency. 
“Sąd Apelacyjny nie podziela tego poglądu i 
nie dostrzega – tak jak strona apelująca, aby 
nienależyte wyegzekwowanie środków w 
walucie polskiej przez polski organ egzekucyjny 
pozostawało w znacznie ściślejszym związku z 
Republika Federalną Niemiec aniżeli z 
Rzeczpospolita Polską. Przeciwnie sposób 
dokonanej egzekucji, podmioty w niej 
uczestniczące, kraj w którym ta czynność 
została dokonana wyraźnie wskazują na 
związek z Państwem Polskim i jego 
ustawodawstwem. Nie może tego zmienić sama 
umowa, która faktycznie stanowiła dowód w 
sprawie o zapłatę dochodzoną przed Sądem 
Krajowym w H.” 
 
Provincial Court in 
Lublin  
II Ca 226/14 29.05.2014 Art. 4 (1) General rule for applicable 
law 
 
Court of Appeal in 
Cracow  
I Aca 548/14 
 
C-412/10 
Homawoo v. GMF 
Assurances SA 
02.07.2014 Art. 31 and 32 Application in time  
District Court of the 
city of Warsaw  
XV GC 1054/14 11.08.2014 Art. 4(2) Applicability of the law of the 
place of Parties’ residence 
 
Provincial Court in 
Wrocław 




Provincial Court in 
Szczecin 
VIII Ga 227/14 19.12.2014 Art. 18 Applicability of direct action 
against the insurer of the 
person liable 
 
Provincial Court in 
Łódź 
X GC 639/11 02.01.2015 Art. 31 and 32 Application in time  
Supreme Court V CSK 164/14 05.02.2015 Art. 4(3) Manifestly closer connection 
with one country 
The Court considered that if an obligation arises 
from a relationship, where four entities 
participate, three of which are based or have 
their habitual residence in Poland and are linked 
by previous contracts governed by the 
provisions of Polish law, closely related to the 
damage, the application of the correcting 
(escape clause) rule is justified. 
“Jeżeli się weźmie pod uwagę, że w stosunku 
zobowiązaniowym uczestniczą cztery 
podmioty, z których trzy mają siedzibę lub 
miejsce zwykłego pobytu w Polsce i łączą je 
podlegające przepisom prawa polskiego 
wcześniejsze umowy ściśle związane z 
wyrządzającym szkodę czynem 
niedozwolonym, to stosowanie reguły 
korygującej okazuje się uzasadnione” 
Provincial Court in 
Olsztyn 
I C 726/13 24.02.2015 Art. 1(2)(g) Exclusion of defamation from 
the scope of application of 
the Regulation (“Polish death 
camps”) – confirmed by 
Court of Appeal in Białystok 
(I Aca 403/15) 
 
Provincial Court in 
Warsaw 
II C 10/11 05.03.2015 Art. 1(2)(g) Exclusion of defamation from 
the scope of application of 





camps”) – confirmed by 
Court of Appeal in Warsaw 
(I Aca 971/15) 
Court of Appeal in 
Wrocław 
I ACa 1748/14 06.03.2015  Application in time (most 
probably, the court just 
stated the inapplicability of 
the Regulation) 
 
District Court in 
Szczecin 
XI GC 1046/13 23.04.2015 Art. 28(1) The Convention of 4 May 
1971 on the Law Applicable 
to Traffic Accidents 
supercedes the Regulation 
(The Netherlands and 
Poland) 
 
Court of Appeal in 
Białystok 
I ACa 154/15 21.05.2015  Only a lack of contractual 
connector may justify the 
application of the Rome II 
Regulation  
 
Court of Appeal in 
Szczecin 
I ACz 889/15 
 
30.10.2015  Definition of the place where 
the harmful event occurred 
from the Brussels Regulation 
44/2001 is based also on 
the interpretation of the Rome 
II Regulation (if the place 
where the harmful event 
occurred was the place 
where the victim claims to 
have suffered consequential 
damage following the initial 
one arising in another state, it 
would also influence the 





the change of place of 
residence of the plaintiff 
could determine the proper 
jurisdiction and applicable 
law, to the detriment of the 
Defendant).  
Provincial Court in 
Bydgoszcz 
II Ca 266/15 05.11.2015 Art. 31 and 32 Application in time  
Provincial Court in 
Wrocław 
I C 596/11 26.01.2016 Art. 31 and 32 Application in time  
Court of Appeal in 
Szczecin 
I ACa 91/16 13.04.2016 Art. 26 and Art. 28 Public Policy The Court of Appeal confirmed the judgment of 
the Provincial Court in Koszalin (first instance) in 
regard to the application of the Polish law, 
based on Art. 26 and 28 of the Regulation. The 
Plaintiffs requested damages for the emotional 
distress and loss of support they suffered in result 
of the death of their mother in a car accident. The 
Court of Appeal confirmed that Polish law should 
be applied as it grants due protection to legal 
rights. 
“Sąd Okręgowy odnosząc się do żądania 
powodów o zapłatę zadośćuczynienia 
pieniężnego za krzywdę za zerwanie więzi 
rodzinnej powodów z matką B. K. w pełni 
zaakceptował pogląd wyrażony przez Sąd 
Apelacyjny w Szczecinie, iż przy rozpoznaniu 
tego roszczenia ma zastosowanie prawo 
polskie. Powołując się na klauzulę porządku 
publicznego oraz art. 28 rozporządzenia Rady 
Europy WE 864/2007 (Rzym II), zgodnie z 




tego roszczenia jest prawo polskie jako te, 
udzielające należytej ochrony prawom 
chronionym w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej.” 
Provincial Court in 
Katowice 
IX P 10/13 01.06.2016 Art. 4(1) and (2) Applicability of the Polish 
law based on habitual 
residence of the parties 
 
Court of Appeal in 
Szczecin 
I ACa 344/16 08.06.2016 Art. 10(1) A contractual relationship 
existing between the parties 
 
Supreme Court IV CSK 609/15 10.06.2016  Court of Appeal wrongly 
applied Art. 12(1) of the 
Rome II Regulation instead of 
applying the Rome I 
Regulation. 
 
Supreme Court V CSK 536/15 23.06.2016  Application of foreign law The Court did not state the basis of the foreign 
law application (it just confirmed that the Parties 
did not question the application of German law). 
The Court decided that the application of the 
provisions of the German Civil Code required 
taking into account not only the content of the 
Code’s provisions, but also the relevant 
application and interpretation made in German 
case law and literature, including current 
publications in this respect.  
“stosowanie przepisów kodeksu cywilnego 
niemieckiego (k.c.n.) wymagało także 
uwzględnienia nie tylko jego treści (zawartej w 
tekście kodeksu cywilnego), ale także 
odpowiedniej praktyki ich stosowania i wykładni 
dokonywanej w orzecznictwie oraz 
piśmiennictwie niemieckim (art. 1143 k.p.c.). 




meriti do aktualnych, miarodajnych w tym 
zakresie publikacji, przynajmniej o charakterze 
podręcznikowym, analizujących rozumienie 
określonej treści przepisów w praktyce 
niemieckiej.” 
Provincial Court in 
Świdnica 
I C 2019/14  23.06.2016 Art. 32 and 29 Application in time  
Supreme Court IV CSK 21/16 
C-463/07 (on 
jurisdiction) 
21.10.2016 Art. 18 Rome II in 
conjunction with Art. 
11(2) and Art. 
9(1)(b) EC 
44/2001 
The question of jurisdiction 
for direct claims based not 
on the law of the court where 
the claim was brought but on 
the law applicable 
according to the conflict-of-
law rules 
 
Provincial Court in 
Cracow 
I C 1694/13 
 
27.10.2016 Art. 4(2), Art. 18 
Regulation Rome II 
The delimitation of the scope 
of application of the Rome I 
and Rome II Regulations, 
scope of application of the 
Rome II Regulation, direct 
action against the insurer 
The pilot and the victim concluded a contract on 
the basis of which the pilot undertook to transport 
the victim from one point to another by plane. In 
the event of damage, however, a distinction has 
to be made between two concepts, namely 
damage caused by aircraft movement and 
contractual damage. Obligations that may arise 
from the movement of the aircraft are non-
contractual. The obligation to comply with 
certain rules of using an aircraft results from legal 
regulations, not from the contract. Even when the 
airplane user flies alone, he is obliged to follow 
them. So they are not part of the contract. 
Therefore, it should be stated that the liability of 
the pilot (or in fact the pilot's heirs) towards the 




plane crash is a tort, and not an improper 
performance of the contract. 
 
“Zobowiązania, jakie mogą powstać z ruchu 
samolotu, nie są zobowiązaniami umownymi. 
Obowiązek przestrzegania określonych zasad 
posługiwania się statkiem powietrznym wynika z 
przepisów prawnych, a nie z umowy. Nawet jak 
użytkownik samolotu leci sam to ma je 
obowiązek przestrzegać. Nie są więc częścią 
umowy. Dlatego należy stwierdzić, że 
odpowiedzialność pilota (a w zasadzie 
spadkobierców pilota), względem 
poszkodowanego (a w zasadzie jego 
najbliższymi) wynikająca z katastrofy lotniczej 
stanowi czyn niedozwolony, a nie, nienależyte 
wykonanie umowy. 
W przedmiotowej sprawie mieliśmy do 
czynienia w wypadkiem samolotowym w którym 
śmierć poniósł M. K. (1), a zatem wynikające z 
tego zdarzenia roszczenia stanowią roszczenia 
wynikające z czynu niedozwolonego (a zatem 
z zobowiązania pozaumownego) i dlatego do 
określenia właściwości prawa ma zastosowanie 
Rozporządzenie „Rzym II” 
Court of Appeal in 
Katowice 
III APa 32/16 03.11.2016 Art. 4(2) Closer connection with 
Poland (plaintiff and 






Court of Appeal in 
Warsaw 
VI ACa 826/15 04.11.2016 Art. 4 in conjunction 
with Art. 19 
Application of Art. 19 
instead of Art. 4(1) 
 
Provincial Court in 
Gliwice 
X GC 308/12 29.12.2016 Art. 4 General rule of application  
Court of Appeal in 
Białystok 
I ACa 715/16 25.01.2017 Art. 10(1) Rome II in 
conjunction with Art. 
4(1)(a) Rome I 
Unduly received payments 
fall into scope of application 
of Art. 10(1) Rome II 
 
District Court in 
Olsztyn 
X C 1909/15 06.02.2017 Art. 4, Art. 2(1) and 
Art. 15(a) to (c). Art. 
22 
Scope of the applicable law   
Provincial Court in 
Warsaw 
I C 1473/15 07.02.2017 Art. 19 Subrogation, applicability of 
the law governing the 
relationship between the 
third party and the creditor to 
the third party’s right to act 
against the debtor 
 
Supreme Court III CSK 60/16 09.02.2017 Application of Art. 
10(1) Rome II was 
excluded by 
application of Art. 
12(1)(e) Rome I 
Regulation 
  
District Court in 
Szczecin 
X GC 2309/16 24.03.2017 Art. 4(1) Applicable law  
District Court of the 
city of Warsaw 
XVI GC 2892/15 29.03.2017  No obligation relationship 
between the insurers, 
therefore the obligation to 
repair damage is a non-





connection with Poland (both 
insurers based in Poland) 
Provincial Court in 
Świdnica 
IC 1971/16 06.04.2017 Art. 28(1) Applicability of the 
Convention of 4 May 1971 
on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents based on 
Art. 28(1) Rome II 
 
District Court in 
Człuchów 
I C 409/15 04.05.2017 Art. 4(1), Art. 18 Applicable law and direct 
action against insurer 
 
Court of Appeal in 
Cracow 
I ACa 178/17 23.05.2017 Art. 4(1), Art. 28 Provincial Court has wrongly 
applied only Art. 4(1) of the 
Regulation without taking 
Art. 28 into consideration, 
which should lead to the 
application of the 
Convention on 4 May 1971 
on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents 
 
Provincial Court in 
Olsztyn 
IX Ca 22/17 20.07.2017  Non applicability of the 
Rome II Regulation to the 
case on legal portion in an 
inheritance 
 
District Court in 
Warsaw-Mokotów 
I C 1061/12 12.10.2017 Art. 31 and 32  Application in time  
Court of Appeal in 
Katowice 
V ACa 41/17 13.10.2017  Non application of Art. 
10(1) of the Rome II 
Regulation as the obligation 
between the parties should 






Provincial Court in 
Łódź 
X GC 521/17 
C-359/14 and C-
475/14 
22.02.2018 Art. 4(1) Rome II in 
conjunction with Art. 
7 (3) Rome I 
The Court applied the Rome 
II Regulation to determine if 
the law applicable to an 
action for indemnity between 
insurers provided for an 
apportionment of the 
obligation to compensate for 
the damage.  
 
District Court in Łódź-
Widzew 
II C 55/16 30.04.2018 Art. 4(1) and (2) Application of the law of the 
country where both parties 
have their habitual 
residence. Moreover, the 
damage occurred in the 
same country. 
 
Provincial Court in 
Łódź 
XIII Ga 10/18 
C-359/14 
22.05.2018    
Court of Appeal in 
Warsaw  
I ACa 697/17 26.07.2018 Art. 19 Subrogation According to Art. 19 of the Regulation, the law 
applicable to the obligation of a third party 
(contractual provisions of an insurance contract) 
determines whether and to what extent, a third 
party who has a duty or has in fact satisfied the 
creditor in discharge of that duty, is entitled to 
exercise it against the debtor (subrogation). The 
conditions and scope of the debtor's liability for 
damages are still subject to the law applicable to 
the legal relationship with the original creditor, 
despite subrogation. The debtor may therefore 
raise against the subrogated creditor the same 
allegations that it had against the original 





“ Do takiego wniosku prowadzi wykładania 
językowa art. 19 rozporządzenia „Rzym II”, 
według którego jeżeli doszło zgodnie z prawem 
właściwym dla subrogacji do wstąpienia osoby 
trzeciej w prawa zaspokojonego wierzyciela, to 
prawa i obowiązki tej osoby kształtowane są 
przez prawo właściwe dla stosunku 
zobowiązaniowego wiążącego dłużnika z 
pierwotnym wierzycielem czyli statut deliktowy 
(…) prawo właściwe dla obowiązku osoby 
trzeciej określa, czy i w jakim zakresie osoba 
trzecia jest uprawniona do dochodzenia od 
dłużnika uprawnień, które przysługiwały 
wierzycielowi wobec dłużnika, zgodnie z 
prawem właściwym dla wiążącego ich 
stosunku). Takie stanowisko prezentowane jest 
również w doktrynie i orzecznictwie. Przyjmuje 
się, że całość zagadnień związanych z sytuacją 
prawną dłużnika podlega dalej mimo 
subrogacji prawu właściwemu dla stosunku 
prawnego łączącego go uprzednio z 
pierwotnym wierzycielem. Dłużnik może więc 
podnieść wobec wstępującego w prawa 
wierzyciela te same zarzuty, które przysługiwały 
mu względem dotychczasowego wierzyciela. 
Dłużnikowi należy pozostawić możliwość 
odwoływania się do tych przepisów prawa 
właściwego dla subrogowanego roszczenia, 
które służą ochronie jego praw względem 
wierzyciela. W grę wchodzą tu zatem wszelkie 





Court of Appeal in 
Białystok 
I ACa 824/17 30.07.2018 Art. 4(1)  Place of damage The Court of Appeal reversed the judgement of 
the Provincial Court that found the law 
applicable to the case in Art. 28(2) Rome II. It 
pointed out that Art. 4(1) Rome II Regulation has 
direct application. At the same time, the damage 
should be understood a as direct result of a 
prohibited act and the place of damage is the 
place where such damage produces its direct 
consequences. The indirect effect of breaking 
family ties as a result of death of plaintiff’s 
relative does not constitute the place of the 
damage.  
“Szkoda jest rozumiana, jako bezpośrednie 
następstwo czynu niedozwolonego, a miejsce 
powstania szkody, to miejsce, gdzie ujawnia się 
bezpośredni skutek. Szkoda na osobie powstaje 
w państwie, w którym dane dobro zostało 
naruszone. 
W okolicznościach tej sprawy zostało 
naruszone bezpośrednio dobro w postaci życia. 
Śmierć syna powódki to bezpośredni skutek 
czynu niedozwolonego. Szkoda ta powstała 
bezsprzecznie na terenie Niemiec. 
Pośredni skutek w postaci zerwania więzi 
rodzinnych na skutek śmierci syna z powódką 
mieszkającą w Polsce, nie stanowi o miejscu 
powstania szkody, jako bezpośredniego skutku 
czynu niedozwolonego.” 
District Court in 
Wieluń 






Provincial Court in 
Szczecin 
VIII GC 176/17 10.10.2018 Art. 10, Art. 12, Art. 
26 
Unjust enrichment, culpa in 
contrahendo arising out of 
contract. Public policy clause 
If unjust enrichment or culpa in contrahendo 
arise out of preexisting relationships between the 
parties, as in this case, the law applicable to that 
liability is the law of the contract. In Swiss law 
(that applied in this case) culpa in contrahendo 
is construed by case-law and doctrine. 
Meanwhile, in Poland the sources of law are 
enshrined in Art. 87 of the Polish Constitution that 
identifies as the only sources of law the 
constitution, statutes, international treaties, 
decrees and ordinances. In the light of that and 
other provisions, the application of Swiss law to 
the liability resulting from culpa in contrahendo 
would violate the above-mentioned basic 
assumptions of the Polish legal order, which is 
based on statute law. The effect of the 
application of Swiss law would be a situation in 
which the applicable law would not have its 
source in statutory law provisions of law, but 
would be based on the type of liability resulting 
from the views of the doctrine and case law. The 
court therefore applied Polish law to the case at 
hand. 
 
“Na kanwie rozpoznawanej sprawy należało 
stwierdzić, że w tym zakresie zastosowanie 
prawa szwajcarskiego stałoby w sprzeczności z 
podstawowymi założeniami porządku 
publicznego RP. Należy pamiętać, że w Polsce 
system źródeł prawa wymieniony jest w art. 87 
Konstytucji RP, zgodnie z którym źródłami 




Konstytucja, ustawy, ratyfikowane umowy 
międzynarodowe oraz rozporządzenia, a 
źródłami powszechnie obowiązującego prawa 
są – na obszarze działania organów, które je 
ustanowiły – akty prawa miejscowego. 
Stosownie do art. 7 Konstytucji RP organy 
władzy publicznej działają na podstawie i w 
granicach prawa. Władzę ustawodawczą 
(prawodawczą) sprawują natomiast, zgodnie z 
art. 10 ust. 2 Konstytucji RP, Sejm i Senat, a 
wymiar sprawiedliwości sądy i trybunały. 
Zgodnie zaś z art. 178 ust. 1 Konstytucji RP 
sędziowie w sprawowaniu swojego urzędu są 
niezawiśli i podlegają tylko Konstytucji oraz 
ustawom. 
W świetle przytoczonych przepisów Konstytucji 
RP uznanie, że należy zastosować prawo 
szwajcarskie w zakresie odpowiedzialności za 
culpa in contrahendo, prowadziłoby do 
naruszenie ww. podstawowych założeń 
polskiego porządku publicznego (prawnego), 
opartego na prawie stanowionym. Skutkiem 
zastosowania prawa szwajcarskiego byłaby 
sytuacja, w której stosowane prawo nie miałoby 
źródła w prawie stanowionym (przepisach 
prawa), lecz opierałoby się na rodzaju 
odpowiedzialności wynikającym z poglądów 
doktryny i orzecznictwa, skoro culpa in 
contrahendo - jak wyjaśniono – w prawie 
szwajcarskim nie znajduje regulacji w prawie 
stanowionym. Mając powyższe na względzie 




powódki w oparciu o culpa in contrahendo 
zastosowanie znajdzie prawo polskie” 
District Court in 
Szczecin Centrum 
X GC 1717/17 15.10.2018 Art. 2 and 4 Scope of application and 
general rule of applicable 
law 
 
Court of Appeal in 
Katowice 
I ACa 291/18 26.10.2018 Art. 4(1) General rule of applicable 
law 
 
District Court in Łódź-
Widzew 
I C 883/15 05.12.2018 Art. 4(1) General rule of applicable 
law 
 
Provincial Court in 
Poznań 
XII C 983/15 11.02.2019 Art. 2(1) and Art. 
10(3) 
Unjust enrichment The court interpreted Art. 10(3) as providing for 
the place where the unjust enrichment occurred, 
in the case at hand, where the values were 
transferred. 
“ Skoro środki finansowe zostały przekazane 
przez powoda pozwanym do Polski, to ocena 
tego świadczenia, z punktu widzenia 
bezpodstawnego wzbogacenia winna zatem 
być oceniana według prawa polskiego”. 
District Court in 
Zawiercie 
I C 2095/17 20.02.2019 Art. 4 General rule of applicable 
law, the applicability of the 
Polish procedural rules. 
 
Supreme Court IV CSK 417/17 22.03.2019 Art. 18 Possibility of direct action 
against the insurer if 
applicable law allows for it.  
 
Court of Appeal in 
Warsaw 
I ACa 94/18 27.03.2019 Art. 14 (1)(a), Art. 
18 – admissibility of 
the direct action 
Choice of law Parties do not have to observe any form when 
making a choice of law, which may be made 
implicitly. The court referred to a Polish Supreme 
Court judgment which stated that the implicit 




allow, after considering all the circumstances of 
the case, conclusion with sufficient certainty that 
the parties did indeed make similar declarations 
of will regarding the choice of law. 
The court does not presume such choice of 
applicable law, but seeks to verify whether it was 
in fact implied. It assesses all the factual 
circumstances, and, in particular, the behaviour 
of the parties in the course of the proceedings. 
The mere fact that the parties referred only to the 
same Polish provisions in the course of the 
proceedings in the first instance is not sufficient to 
conclude that they made a consciously 
unanimous choice of law. In view of the above, 
by order of March 15, 2019, the parties' 
attorneys were asked to indicate whether the fact 
that both parties refer to the provisions of Polish 
law should be interpreted as a choice of Polish 
law as applicable to the assessment of claims 
within the meaning of Art. 14 (1)(a) of the 
Regulation. 
Należy jednak wskazać na zasadę szczególną, 
która zawarta jest w art. 14 ust. 1 pkt a) 
rozporządzenia i stanowi, że strony mogą 
poddać zobowiązanie pozaumowne 
wybranemu przez siebie prawu, w drodze 
porozumienia zawartego po wystąpieniu 
zdarzenia powodującego szkodę. Wybór 
prawa musi być wyraźny lub w sposób 
dostatecznie pewny wynikać z okoliczności 
sprawy i nie może naruszać praw osób trzecich. 




od stron zachowania jakiejkolwiek formy przy 
dokonaniu wyboru prawa, co prowadzi do 
konstatacji że wybór prawa w omawianym 
zakresie może być dokonany w formie 
dowolnej, w tym w sposób dorozumiany. 
Zgodnie ze stanowiskiem Sądu Najwyższego 
zajętym w wyroku z dnia 20 września 2012 r. 
IV CSK 48/12 „stwierdzenie dokonania 
umownego wyboru statutu kontraktowego w 
sposób dorozumiany powinno być oparte na 
faktach pozwalających w całokształcie 
okoliczności sprawy wnioskować w sposób 
dostatecznie pewny, że strony rzeczywiście 
złożyły zgodne oświadczenia woli co do tego 
wyboru”. 
 
Powyższe wymaga, aby sąd nie domniemywał 
wyboru prawa właściwego, lecz dążył do 
zbadania, czy w istocie doszło do niego w 
sposób dorozumiany. Wymagało to oceny 
wszystkich okoliczności faktycznych, w 
szczególności zachowania stron w toku 
postępowania. Sam fakt, że strony odwołują się 
tylko do tego samego prawa polskiego w toku 
postępowania w I instancji był dla Sądu 
Apelacyjnego niewystarczający, albowiem nie 
musi oznaczać, iż strony dokonały świadomie 
zgodnego wyboru prawa, 
Mając na uwadze powyższe, zarządzeniem z 
dnia 15 marca 2019 r. zwrócono się do 
pełnomocników stron o wskazanie, czy fakt 




przepisów prawa polskiego należy odczytywać 
jako wybór prawa polskiego, jako właściwego 
dla oceny roszczeń w rozumieniu art. 14 ust. 1 
litera a) Rozporządzenia 
Supreme Court II CSK 158/18 15.05.2019 Art. 1(2)(g) Exclusion of the case from the 
scope of application of the 
Regulation 
 
Court of Appeal in 
Warsaw 
VII AGa 595/18 18.06.2019 Art. 1(2)(d) Scope of application. The 
subject matter excluded from 
the application of the 
Regulation 
 
District Court in Nysa I C 1645/17 26.06.2019 Art. 4(2) Applicable law based on 
Parties’ place of habitual 
residence 
 
Provincial Court in 
Tarnobrzeg 
I C 717/17 27.06.2019 Art. 4(1) and (2), 
Art. 27 
Applicable law based on the 
general rule of the place of 
damage and by taking into 
consideration Art. 27 (which 
according to the court refers 
to the Convention of 1971 
on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents that points 
out to the same conflict-of-
law rule. 
 
Court of Appeal in 
Gdańsk 
V ACa 145/19 05.07.2019 Applicability of the 
Rome II Regulation 
  
Provincial Court in 
Szczecin 
VIII GCo 113/19 
 
24.07.2019 Art. 2(1), Art. 4(3) Decision on jurisdiction 
based on the analysis of the 
place of damage also in the 
Place of damage cannot be construed too 
broadly, especially to include the place where 
the claimant is domiciled or where his assets are 






light of the Rome II 
Regulation 
damage there. Art. 4(3) of the Regulation does 
not allow the application of the law of the place 
where the costs of a non-delivery of goods to 
another place were incurred. 
Norma art. 4 ust. 3 cytowanego 
rozporządzenia R. II stanowi, że jeżeli ze 
wszystkich okoliczności sprawy wyraźnie 
wynika, że czyn niedozwolony pozostaje w 
znacznie ściślejszym związku z państwem 
innym, niż państwo wskazane w ust. 1 lub 2, 
stosuje się prawo tego innego państwa. 
Znacznie ściślejszy związek z innym państwem 
może polegać, w szczególności, na istnieniu 
wcześniejszego stosunku pomiędzy stronami, 
takiego jak umowa, ściśle związanego z danym 
czynem niedozwolonym. Twierdzenia faktyczne 
wniosku nie mogą stanowić podstawy do 
przyjęcia, że niewydanie rzeczy w Polsce i 
koszty związane z wydaniem rzeczy i są ściśle 
związane z prawem szwajcarskim.  
District Court in Kalisz I C 3330/17 03.09.2019 Art. 4(1), (2), (3) General rule of applicable 
law with possible corrections 
 
Court of Appeal in 
Warsaw 
V ACa 896/17 12.12.2019 Art. 31  Application in time  
District Court in 
Zawiercie 
I C 2092/17 19.12.2019 Art. 4 General rule of application. 
Application of procedural 
law of the court 
 
District Court in 
Szczecin Centrum 






The Court of Appeal 
in Gdańsk 
V ACa 599/19 27.02.2020 Art. 4(1) and Art. 
18 
General rule of applicable 
law and the possibility of 








• In Portugal, there is a moderate interest in Rome II Regulation amongst practitioners, businesses and citizens. 
• It is considered that It makes it possible to guarantee the predictability of the applicable law, which is essential for 
the proper functioning of the EU internal market, and to prevent forum shopping. Its impact on the lives of 
enterprises and public exercising the fundamental freedoms on which the EU is founded is considered to be 
evident. 
• The relevance of the Rome II Regulation is particularly felt in these areas: traffic accidents; damages caused in the 
performance of a provision of services (doctors, layers, architects, engineers, etc.) and defective product liability. 
1. Introduction 
• Portuguese courts do apply Rome II Regulation 
• There are no statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation. 
• The doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in Portugal is moderate. We may find two PhD thesis (both 
published) that approach the subject. There is another book exclusively dedicated to Rome II Regulation 
• There is no evidence of political debate on the Regulation.  
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to : 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
Portuguese doctrine emphasizes that the category “civil and commercial matters” should be interpreted considering 
the European jurisprudence and the identical category of Brussels I Regulation.1135 
Regarding the exclusion of Art. 1(1) (a), authors point out that the Regulation is not applicable to liability in the context 
of the rupture of engagement before marriage.1136 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, Arts 31-32) 
Two decisions of superior courts have addressed the issue.  
One decision is from the Portuguese Supreme Court, and it was ruled in 2012, in a case filed in 2010 (Proc. no. 
186/10.6TBCBT.S1). The Supreme Court decided that articles 31 and 32 of Rome II Regulation contain a transitional 
rule that only makes it applicable to the harmful facts that occur after 11/01/2009, therefore the moment of the 
proposition of the respective action in court is not relevant for the application of the Regulation. 
The other decision is from the Court of Appeal of Coimbra (Tribunal da Relação de Coimbra). It was also ruled in 
2012, in a case filed in 2010 (Proc. no. 1473/10.9T2AVR.C1). The Court decided that articles 31 and 32 establish 
 
 
1135 ALMEIDA, J. C. Moitinho de, O regulamento Roma II: (lei aplicável às obrigações extracontratuais), 1ª ed., 





the temporal scope of the regulation. However, its interpretation raised doubts, which came to be solved by the CJUE 
in the case C-412/10, connected with a request preliminary ruling. Regarding that case, two positions were being 
debated: on the one hand, it was argued that article 31 did not establish a date in force, which should be determined 
under the general terms of article 254/1 of the EC Treaty, that is on the 20th day after its publication; on the other 
hand, it was argued that article 31 was referred to the date of application established in article 32, that is, 
11/01/2009. The Court considered that the CJUE came to an end for discussion, assuming that articles 31 and 32, 
read in conjunction with article 297º of the TFUE must be interpreted as Rome II Regulation applies to the harmful facts 
that occurred after 11/01/2009. Therefore, in casu (1473/10.9T2AVR.C1), the regulation is not applicable, since 
the harmful facts occurred before its entry into force.  
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
There is no case law that evidence discussion or difficulties. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
No evidence of discussion or difficulties. 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation)(Recital 
(7)) 
Doctrine emphasizes the need to relate Rome II Regulation, Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation.1137 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of : 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
Doctrine considers that the solution (lex loci damni) has its grounds in an option between the protection of the injured 
interests, and the responsible, which is in accordance to the normal evolution of tort law (also seen in the enlargement 
of legal cases of liability with no fault).1138 
This rule is considered adequate for the protection of the injured and the respective expectations of compensation 
(namely when choosing an insurer) and also for the administration of justice, since the court enacted will deal with its 
own legislation. 
The Portuguese Supreme Court has decided (in a ruling of 2014, Process no. 1061/12.5TVLSB.L1.S1) that under the 
terms of article 4/1, the law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising from liability based on lawful or unlawful 
act or based on risk is the law of the country where the damage occurs, meaning that it is irrelevant that the assessment 
or quantification of the damage is done in a different place. Evidently, the referred article highlights the connection 
element relative to the place where the damage occurred, to the detriment of the connection element relative to the 
place where the harmful behaviour occurred. However, due to the usual spatial coincidence of these two elements, 
this priority only assumes relevance in cases of delocalized harmful actions, in which the harmful conduct occurs in a 
state other than that in which the damage occurs. 
The Court of Appeal of Lisbon has ruled in 2013 (Process no. 3774/12.2TJLSB-A.L1-7) that, in a case here two 
vehicles had collided in Spain on September 14, 2009, the Rome II Regulation applies, considering the general rule 
of lex loci damni applicable in cases of non-contractual liability, regardless of the indirect consequences of the offense 
being produced in another country. One of the damaged vehicles, belonging to a company headquartered in 
Portugal, suffered damage that made it impossible to drive and forced its repair. The damage resulting from deprivation 
 
 
1137 ALMEIDA, J. C. Moitinho de, O regulamento Roma II: (lei aplicável às obrigações extracontratuais), 1ª ed., 
Princípia, 2017, p. 35 et seq. 




of use is an indirect consequence of the claim, and therefore Spanish law is applicable. Spanish law prescribes a 
statute limitation in one year to enforce the right, so the lawsuit must be considered prescribed if the defendant was 
challenged on 11/19/2010 and the action was only filed on 3 September 2012. 
In another recent ruling of July 2020 (Process no. 153/19.4T8CBT.G1), the Court of Appeal of Guimarães (Tribunal 
da Relação de Guimarães) stated that concerning the same harmful fact, Rome II Regulation may enforce the law of 
two different legal systems: on the one hand, under article 4, the obligation to compensate is determined by the law of 
the country where the damage occurred; on the other hand, regarding the right to subrogation of credits, article 19 
establishes that such right is determined based on the law that governs the relationship between the insurer and its 
insured, that is, the law that governs the contract in which the active part that intends to exercise the subrogation is 
founded.  
The same Court of Appeal has ruled in 2013 (Process no. 225/12.6TBAMR.G1) that for the purposes of applying 
Rome II Regulation, under the terms of article 4, it is relevant the country where the moral damage or the damage to 
property occurs, which does not have to coincide with the actual damage. In these terms, it is important to clarify the 
concept of damage. Following some jurisprudence from the CJUE, in the scope of interpretation of the concept of 
damage, it is said that the place of damage is the place where the damage is materialized, being this where the 
generating event produced harmful effects in the patrimonial or moral sphere of the injured party. Therefore, in casu, 
priority is given to the country of residence of the injured party, to the detriment of the country where the injury occurred, 
since it was in the country of residence that property damage was suffered and sustained.  
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
It is frequently referred that there is discussion on the circumstance that all parties responsible and all parties injured 
must have the same habitual residence. It is considered that the scope of the solution points out to a negative answer, 
which can result in the considerations of contradictory legislation. 
This example is given by MOITINHO DE ALMEIDA (2017): “A car crash occurred in the state of Michigan, with damages 
for two passengers, one residing in that State, and the other in the State of New York, where the driver also had his/her 
habitual residence. The law of Michigan demands severe negligence; the other just negligence”.  
It is also stressed that Art 4(2) should not be applicable by analogy to those residing in different States although with 
identical legislation.  
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3) 
Doctrine stresses the exceptional nature of this clause, inspired in the art. 4 of the German EGBGB. Its application 
should be scarce. 
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts 
No evidence of discussion or difficulties. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability 
It is consensual that this article as to be read in accordance to the scope of Rome II Regulation. It is also stressed that 
1973 Hague Convention has a different regime and does not covers subjects covered by Rome II Regulation. 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
It is considered that the concept of “unfair competition” should be the one from the Paris Convention of 20th of March 
1983. On the other side, the concept of “acts restricting free competition” should be constructed from the rules of the 
EU that protect competition, with the umbrella of articles 101 e 102 of the Treaty. 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
There are no particular discussion or difficulties. It is considered that the concept of “environmental damage” is the one 
from article 24. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
There are no particular discussions or difficulties. 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 




2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
There is no evidence of discussion on the relation with art. 4. Nevertheless, it is analysed the fact that under some 
legislation, like the Portuguese and German, a claim for the compensation of damage based in unlawful action may 
be presented as a “unjust enrichment” case. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
It is referred that there is discussion on the circumstance that in some legislation (for example, Portugal, Spain, France 
and Italy) it is necessary that the gestio is objectively useful. Nevertheless, it is also stressed that it is a problem of 
material law, with the consequence of irrelevance at the level of rules of conflict. 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
There are no particular discussions or difficulties. 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
There are no cases that may evidence such practical difficulties. 
Regarding “dépeçage” (partial choice of the applicable law, meaning that some law may only be applicable to some 
aspects of a particular case) there is a doctrinal discussion. 
LUIS DE LIMA PINHEIRO considers that the partial choice is not possible, on the argument that it is not expressively referred 
in article 14.1139 
MOITINHO DE ALMEIDA, otherwise, considers that, since the Regulation is silent about the topic, “dépeçage” is 
admissible in these cases: a) when damages have occurred in different countries and respective laws were chosen; b) 
when, in “unjust enrichment”, several requests are filed (damage compensation, payment of expenses, restitution).1140 
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
Since the number of cases is scarce, there are no evidences of such practical difficulties. 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
No evidence of discussion. 
 
 
1139 PINHEIRO, Luís de Lima, “O direito de conflitos das obrigações extracontratuais entre a comunitarização e a 
globalização: uma primeira apreciação do Regulamento Comunitário Roma II”, in Estudos em honra do Professor 
Doutor José de Oliveira Ascensão, Almedina, 2008, p. 1603. 
1140 ALMEIDA, J. C. Moitinho de, O regulamento Roma II: (lei aplicável às obrigações extracontratuais), 1ª ed., 




18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
No evidence of discussion or difficulties. 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
It is stressed that the article 16 does not states about overriding mandatory provisions of other States. This solution has 
the advantage of making dispensable the (always difficult) search for those provisions but has the drawback of 
allowing forum shopping. 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
No evidence of discussion or difficulties. 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
No evidence of discussion or difficulties. 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
No evidence of discussion or difficulties. 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
Doctrine stresses that Rome II Regulation does not defines habitual residence when damages are caused by persons 
acting otherwise than in the course of business. The solution of Brussels I Regulation and Brussels I bis Regulation (in 
the way it is a matter for the legislation of the State Member) may not be adequate.1141   
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
No evidence of discussion or difficulties. 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
It is referred by doctrine that nowadays the “public policy” of a State is a concept that is already influenced by EU 
legislation and principles. 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
No evidence of discussion or difficulties. 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
No evidence of discussion. 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
 
 
1141 ALMEIDA, J. C. Moitinho de, O regulamento Roma II: (lei aplicável às obrigações extracontratuais), 1ª ed., 




No evidence of discussion. 
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
No evidence of discussion. 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
No evidence of discussion. 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
No evidence of discussion. 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 





4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal 
Case name and reference 
number 
 
Reference to decision of the 
Court of Justice if applicable 
 
Date 
Article(s) of Rome 
II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
Supremo Tribunal 
de Justiça 





Is the place where the 
damage assessment and 
quantification take place 
relevant for the purposes of 
interpreting article 4º/1? 
 
- Rome II applies. 
Under the terms of article 4º/1 of Rome II, the 
law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations arising from liability based on 
lawful or unlawful act or based on risk is the 
law of the country where the damage occurs, 
meaning that it is irrelevant that the 
assessment or quantification of the damage is 
done in a different place. Evidently, the 
referred article highlights the connection 
element relative to the place where the 
damage occurred, to the detriment of the 
connection element relative to the place 
where the harmful behaviour occurred. 
However, due to the usual spatial 
coincidence of these two elements, this 
priority only assumes relevance in cases of 
delocalized harmful actions, in which the 
harmful conduct occurs in a state other than 
that in which the damage occurs (IV - Do 






186/10.6TBCBT.S1 01-03-2012 Articles 31 and 
32 
Is Rome II applicable when 
the action was filed after 
2009 but the facts that 
gave rise to it are prior to 
2009? 
 
- Rome II does not apply. 
The articles 31º and 32º of Rome II contain a 
transitional rule that only makes it applicable 
to the harmful facts that occur after its validity 
(11/01/2009), therefore the adjective 
moment of the proposition of the respective 
action in court is not relevant.  
Tribunal da Relação 
de Coimbra 
1473/10.9T2AVR.C1 09-01-2012 Articles 4, n 1 and 
31 
The temporal scope of 
application of Rome II. 
 
 
- Rome II does not apply.  
Articles 31º and 32º of Rome II establish the 
temporal scope of the regulation. However, 
its interpretation raised doubts, which came 
to be solved by the CJUE in the case C-
412/10, connected with a request 
preliminary ruling. Regarding that case, two 
positions were being debated: on the one 
hand, it was argued that article 31º did not 
establish a date in force, which should be 
determined under the general terms of article 
254º/1 of the EC Treaty, that is on 20th day 
after its publication; on the other hand, it was 
argued that article 31º was referred to the 
date of application established in article 32º, 
that is, 11/01/2009. The CJUE came to an 
end for discussion, assuming that articles 31º 
and 32º, read in conjunction with article 
297º of the TFUE must be interpreted as 
Rome II applies to the harmful facts that 
occurred after 11/01/2009. Therefore, in 
casu (1473/10.9T2AVR.C1), the regulation 
is not applicable, since the harmful facts 




Tribunal da Relação 
de Guimarães 
225/12.6TBAMR.G1 29-10-2013 Articles 4 no.1 The concept of damage for 
the purposes of applying 
article 4º and determining 
the applicable law. 
 
- Rome II applies.    
For the purposes of applying Rome II, under 
the terms of article 4º, it is relevant the country 
where the moral damage or the damage to 
property occurs, which does not have to 
coincide with the actual damage. In these 
terms, it is important to clarify the concept of 
damage. Following some jurisprudence from 
the CJUE, in the scope of interpretation of the 
concept of damage, it is said that the place of 
damage is the place where the damage is 
materialized, being this where the generating 
event produced harmful effects in the 
patrimonial or moral sphere of the injured 
party. Therefore, in casu, priority is given to 
the country of residence of the injured party, 
to the detriment of the country where the 
injury occurred, since it was in the country of 
residence that property damage was suffered 
and sustained.  
Tribunal da Relação 
de Guimarães 
153/19.4T8CBT.G1 O9-07-2020 Articles 4 and 19 The enforcement, under 
Rome II, of the law of two 
different countries, 
regarding the same 
harmful fact. 
 
- Rome II applies. 
This case raises interest to the extent that, 
concerning the same harmful fact, Rome II 
enforces the law of two different legal 
systems. On the one hand, under article 4º, 
the obligation to compensate is determined 
by the law of the country where the damage 
occurred. On the other hand, regarding the 
right to subrogation of credits, article 19º 
establishes that such right is determined 
based on the law that governs the 
relationship between the insurer and its 




contract in which the active part that intends 
to exercise the subrogation is founded.  
Tribunal da Relação 
de Lisboa 
3774/12.2TJLSB-A.L1-7 11-07-2013 Article 4, no.1 - Rome II applies. Two vehicles collided in Spain on September 
14, 2009. The Rome II Regulation applies, 
considering the general rule of lex loci damni 
applicable in cases of non-contractual 
liability, regardless of the indirect 
consequences of the offense being produced 
in another country. One of the damaged 
vehicles, belonging to a company 
headquartered in Portugal, suffered damage 
that made it impossible to drive and forced its 
repair. The damage resulting from 
deprivation of use is an indirect consequence 
of the claim, and therefore Spanish law is 
applicable. Spanish law prescribes a statute 
limitation in one year to enforce the right, so 
the lawsuit must be considered prescribed if 
the defendant was challenged on 
11/19/2010 and the action was only filed 








• The entire data base of court cases is available in Romania online on www.rolii.ro . The same data can be found 
in different legislative software platforms that provide different search engines.  
• Romanian courts and scholars are familiar with Regulation Rome II, but they are not enthusiastic in applying its 
provisions. Most of the cases and discussions are related to the law applicable in car accidents in which a 
Romanian party is involved.  
• There are two authors who conducted more detailed analyses (one who detailed the Rome II Regulation in 2008, 
before it entered into force – Mme. OPREA Alina, and the other being a reputed university professor – Mr. 
Alexandru Dragos SITARU – who dedicated a detailed chapter to Rome II in his latest Private International Law 
Treaty). Nonetheless, the courts of law do not cite the opinions expressed by these authors. The case law is 
divided over some issues (especially different interpretations of the split liability between the motor head insurer 
and the trailer insurer in cases like the ones described by ECJ cases C-359/14 and C-475/14) but these are 
not debated by scholars.  
• The concept of "non-contractual obligations” is mainly analyzed based on the Brussels 1 provisions. Under Rome 
II sometimes courts have difficulties in differentiating contractual from non-contractual claims. – detailed at point 
2. 
• Different approach to moral damages. Some apply C-350/14, while others find different ways to connect the 
damage to Romania, especially when the claimant is a relative of the deceased victim – detailed at point 4.a. 
• Court find different arguments to claim applicability of exceptions from 4.2 or 4.3, sometimes without any 
plausible explanation – detailed at point 4.b. 
• In the same way, courts sometime consider that is an implicit choice of law when the parties argue based on 
Romanian provisions. In point 14, we describe how different courts apply the Romanian Civil Code provisions 
that allow the applicability of Romanian law in case the parties do not prove the content of the foreign applicable 
legislation. – detailed at point 13. 
• While there is a clear case law stating the limitation, period is covered by the Rome II applicable law, the courts 
include within the notion of damages different elements varying from surgical treatment in Romania to moral 
damages suffered by relatives in Romania. Also, the penalties seem to be considered in some cases as being 
outside the scope of the applicable law, without any other justification then the search of an equitable treatment 
for the victim and an easier way for the judge. – detailed at point 16. 
• The main issue in Romania is the split of liability between motor head and trailer insurers in case of accidents in 
Germany. The inconsistency of the courts’ reasoning is reflected in a significant number of cases, most of them 
presenting different approaches to the ECJ case-law C-359/14 and C-475/14. In some situations, when the 
two parties are Romanians (two insurers for example, or a National Bureau and a Romanian debtor), the courts 






• How aware are practitioners and users of the Rome II Regulation? 
Many of the practitioners are aware of the existence of Rome II Regulation, however not all of them have an in-depth 
knowledge on the Regulation. There is not much public debate about the Regulation, therefore users (i.e., citizens, business 
environment) are generally not aware of the Rome II Regulation.  
• Is the Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
There is not much case law where courts have applied the Rome II Regulation. In some cases, the parties/ courts only cite 
the Rome II Regulation without referring to specific provisions. There are some cases where parties cite provisions of Rome 
II Regulation, however the judges fail to analyze those provisions. There are roughly around 700 cases that contains 
references to Rome II, 95% of them being related to car accidents in or outside Romania, involving a foreign citizen or 
entity. 
• Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Regulation in your Member State? 
No, such statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in Romania could not be identified. 
• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
There are few doctrinal discussions on the Rome II Regulation in Romania. Most of the legal doctrine on the Regulation is 
descriptive, without substantial aspects being in-depth analysed. There are two authors who conducted more detailed 
analyses (one who detailed the Rome II Regulation in 2008, before it entered into force – Mme. OPREA Alina, and the 
other being a reputed university professor – Mr. Alexandru Dragos SITARU – who dedicated a detailed chapter to Rome 
II in his latest Private International Law Treaty). Nonetheless, the courts of law do not cite the opinions expressed by these 
authors.   
• Are there specific issues that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political level? 
No specific issues were debated, but a significant part of the case law covers different interpretations of the split liability 
between the motor head insurer and the trailer insurer in cases like the ones described by ECJ cases C-359/14 and C-
475/14. 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded matters 
(Art. 1(1)-(2))  
There are not many controversial matters related to the Regulation’s scope of application. In most of the cases, the parties 
and the courts do not debate the scope of application. The Romanian courts do know the difference between contractual 
and non-contractual obligations and exclude the first from the scope of the Regulation.1142  
The Romanian courts generally also apply the distinction between the substantial law applicable to the case and the 
procedural aspects (such as competence) which is known to be regulated by other European Regulations (Brussels I, 
 
 





Brussels 1 bis)1143. In these cases, the analysis of contractual/ non-contractual issues is made under the Brussels I provision, 
and it triggers, sometimes, the dismissal of Romanian courts competence. For example, in the cited case, the court explained 
that the applicable law – German law – does not influence in any way the competence of the courts (Romanian courts) 
determined by following the provisions of Brussels I.   
In other cases, article 1 of Rome II Regulations is cited by the parties or by the courts but its provisions/ impact on the case 
are not analyzed 1144.  
The Romanian legal doctrine related to the Regulation’s scope of application is mainly descriptive. Nonetheless, there are 
some more particular opinions in this respect. For instance, an author noted that it will not be easy for judges to determine 
the category of non-contractual obligations arising out of family relationships, providing that, for instance, the explanations 
issued by the Commission in the draft Regulation (the explicative memorandum) states that an example could be the action 
for recovery of prejudice caused by late payment of alimentary pension1145; nonetheless, the author cites the opinion of 
other European authors according to which actions of third parties against parents for damages caused by minor children 
are within the scope of the regulation).  
The same author noted that, as regards non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies, the direct liability 
of shareholders or directors for prejudices caused to third parties (based on the general alterum non laedere principle), or 
of the financial or legal consultants of the seller towards the buyer of a company should be included in the scope of the 
Regulation. 
The other authors treated this text only in a descriptive manner.  
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts. 31-32) 
No case law and legal doctrine have been identified with respect to the application of article 31. The parties and the courts 
do not refer to the temporal application of the Regulation, thus no difficulties had arisen in relation with the temporal scope 
of application of Rome II Regulation.  
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of “contractual 
obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
We have identified in practice few cases tackling this subject. These all relate to the role that different insurers have in 
relation to the victim and/ or the debtor.  
In one case, where the court analysed the applicable law to insurer's regress action when the liability is split between 
different insurers of the motor head and the trailer due to a car accident occurred in Germany, the court found that the 
effects of the accident, from the perspective of the obligation to repair the damage, are regulated by the Romanian national 
law and not by German law as the applicable law is not the one from the place the accident took place, but the law which 
governs the insurance contract1146. Given that both insurers were Romanian entities and their legal relationship, the court 
held that the applicable law is the Romanian Law1147.  
 
 
1143 Mureș Tribunal, Decision no. 1399/2018; 
1144 Bucharest District 2 Court, Sentence no. 12830/2018; 
1145 OPREA Alina - "Noua reglementare europeana a conflictelor de legi in materie delictuala: regulamentul (ce) no 
864/2007 (Roma II)" (The new european regulation of conflict of laws in tort matters), published in the Romanian Private 
Law Magazine no. 3/2008; 
1146 Decision no. 102/2019 issued by Bucharest Tribunal on 10 January 19; 
1147 Although the appeal court confirmed the reasoning of the first court instance, regarding the applicable law, the appeal 
court changed the ruling, as the plaintiff had paid in the meantime 50% of the damages awarded by the first court, action 





In another case, however, the courts clearly stated that there is no contractual relation between the CASCO insurer 
(subrogated for the rights of the victim) and the insurer of the debtor, even if the two are both from Romania1148.  
Sometimes, Romanian judges have difficulties in differentiating contractual from non-contractual claims. For example, Targu 
Mures First Instance court determined the applicable law to an insurer regress action against the Romanian driver who 
caused the damages due to alcohol use on the grounds of art. 4 (3), although their legal relationship was based on the 
insurance agreement1149. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
While some of the judges apply the foreign law based on Rome II Regulation, other judges were inclined to apply the 
Romanian law based on escape clauses (including by arguing that the foreign law is more closely connected with the 
Romanian law). 
The legal doctrine treats this matter in a descriptive manner. 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital (7)) 
Not applicable 
2.2 Chapter II - Torts/Delicts 
6. The implementation of the general conflict-of-laws rule, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application, and in particular the suitability of it for financial market torts (Art. 4) 
a.  the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
The indirect damages were analyzed from the perspective of relatives of victims from car accidents. The case-law is divided 
especially when moral damages are claimed for deceased victims that were transiting the countries were the accidents 
took place: 
i. Some courts considered that indirect damages are to be classified following the ECJ decision in case C-350/14. 
Therefore, any damage of relatives of victims should not influence the applicable law 1150. In this category a 
significant decision is no. 1963/2017 of the Supreme Court, involving a case in which the relatives of a deceased 
victim of a car accident in Spain, requested damages under Romanian law. The Supreme Court dismissed their claim 
as time barred considering that the limitation period is to be determined under Spanish law.  
ii. In analyzing this Supreme Court decision, legal scholars observed that the case law is divided and that there are 
cases where the courts considered that the relatives justify a direct damage1151. 
 
 
1148 Bucharest Tribunal, Decision no. 20591/2015; 
1149 Targu Mures First Instance court, Sentence no. 4050/2019. 
1150 Arad Tribunal, decision 354/2017. The decision was maintained by the Court of Appeal of Timisoara – 660/2017 
– and by the Supreme Court – decision 2323/2018; 
1151 Laurentiu RADU, Revista Romana de Jurisprudenta no. 3/2018 - Supreme court’s decision analysed. - The author 
agrees that the applicable law is the Spanish law - place of the accident - but mentions that other courts have decided in 
both ways: i) relatives have an indirect damage (Supreme Court decision no 404/2016) and ii) that Romanian law would 






iii. An interesting case observed that direct damages might occur even after the accident. In decision no. 126/2017, 
Mures Tribunal decided that Romanian law was applicable since the victim of a car accident in Hungary, needed 
to follow a surgical treatment in Romania and all the moral damages were suffered in Romania.  
iv. A similar approach with respect to moral damages was adopted by the Dolj Tribunal in decision 206/2015, 
considering that the moral damage of a son for his father’s death in a car accident in Croatia, are present in Romania 
and, as such, Romanian law should apply. Same approach can be found also with the Bucharest Court of Appeal 
– Decision no. 604/2019 – in a case where the court considered that irrespective of where the accident took 
place, since the victim was living in Romania, the direct moral damages are suffered here by the relatives.  
As regards legal doctrine, an author analysed in-depth article 4 of the Rome II Regulation before its entering into force1152. 
With respect to article 4.1, the author noted the following aspects: 
• With respect to ricochet/ indirect damages, the author noted that the solution included in the Regulation is based on 
an objective imputation criterion (the geographic localization of indirect damages or ricochet damages is no longer 
objectively imputable to the responsible party). Further, the author notes that this type of prejudice should be covered 
according to the law that is applicable to the initial prejudice. 
• With respect to the law applicable to the single tort that caused prejudice to more persons having or not the same 
nationality, located in different states or in the same state, the author noted that the issue in question is whether judges 
should seek a single law applicable to that tort or whether the law that applies shall be determined separately, 
considering the situation of each victim. The author cites the opinion of S. Symeonides according to which article 4.1 
refers to the law applicable to “non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict” and not to the law applicable 
to the delict, therefore judges can assess in an individual manner the multiple obligations that may arise out of the same 
delict and to determine the several laws that shall apply. The author further notes that, on the other hand, this is another 
flaw of the text, namely that the Regulation does not regulate the situation when the same delict causes to the same 
victim damages in different member states. The solution at hand is, according to the author, the distributive application 
of the different laws in question. Nonetheless, the author notes that one cannot rule out the application of the escape 
clause if one can prove that the place where the delict occurred is manifestly more closely connected with the 
respective legal situation.  
In another, more recent, opinion, a concern was raised on the very broad and general terminology of recital 17 of the 
preamble when determining where the damage occurred, providing only two insufficient examples1153.  
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art. 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
An overwhelming number of court cases in connection to this article analyze car accidents happening within the EU. The 
courts usually resort to this escape clause whenever both tort parties have their habitual residence in Romania, irrespective 
of the place where the accident happened. However, not seldom do the courts apply this likewise to insurers that regress 
one against each other, although they are not initial parties to the legal relationship but subrogated to the rights of the 
insured. 
A tort case solved on the grounds of art. 4 (2) was an industrial accident caused by a Romanian citizen while unloading a 
truck on German premises 1154. The court applied the Romanian Law in connection to the transportation agreement 
governed by the same Law, considering that the accident was connected to the transport agreement, although it was not 
the freight that was damaged, but a machine of a third party used for the loading process. The judges failed to explain their 
 
 
1152 OPREA Alina, ibidem; 
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reasoning for applying a certain Law since, in this case, art. 4 (3) was also cited and no distinction was made between the 
two.  
To what it concerns this specific article, observations were made in the doctrine in relation to the applicable law when the 
parties' residence is in two different states where there are identical rules related to tort. The author noticed that the 
Regulation does not provide a rule for such a case1155. The law determined according to art. 4.1 of Rome II Regulation 
shall govern the respective tort, irrespective that the identical substantial regulations applicable in the states of residence 
could be more favorable. The author further noted that such a situation is functionally analogue to that when the residences 
of the parties would be in the same state and it should be treated accordingly.  
The article is also analyzed in relation with art. 19 (please see below point 19) since in many cases two Romanian insurers 
(for motor head and trailer) dispute the split of liability.  
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art. 4 (3) 
The cases follow the same pattern when it comes to the application of this article. Mainly, the courts are vested to solve car 
accident regress actions between insurers, especially in the event of victims being indemnified by their CASCO insurer who 
subsequently goes against the debtor’s insurer. The courts’ recurrent reasoning is that, since the insurance policies are 
issued under Romanian Law, the regress actions are closely connected to this Law and that regress action also covers the 
extent of the liability.  
In few cases, the courts applied the Romanian Law arguing that otherwise the Romanian victim’s right would be severely 
affected in absence of the possibility to address the Romanian national court, even though this is more a matter of 
competence and not of applicable law1156. In another case involving a Romanian victim, the court found that Romanian 
Law should apply since the German insurer used his Green Card equivalent to pay the damages and this would be 
equivalent with accepting Romanian Law1157. 
An author criticizes that the Regulation does not indicate any criteria for determining the manifestly more closely connection 
with another country, as well as that the Regulation does not allow to apply this clause to a particular aspect of the tort. It 
is debatable whether cases of pre-existing relationships between the parties (such as contracts) that are closely connected 
with the tort/delict in question involve that the law that should be applied is (a) the exact law applicable to the contract or 
(b) the law where the pre-existing relationship is located. Since the text included in the regulation is not explicit, both 
solutions may be considered. However, the author notes that the explanatory memorandum of the draft regulations 
indicates the first solution1158. 
7. Any difficulties with the rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application 
of 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability in your Member State; 
No relevant case law has been identified with respect to article 5. Romania is not a party to 1973 Hague Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Products Liability.  
The legal doctrine on article 5 of Rome II Regulation is not significantly relevant. Only an author published a detailed 
commentary in which article 5 is also analysed1159. The author noted that the law applicable must be determined according 
to the rules set by the 1973 Hague Convention in those member states that ratified the Convention, and not by those set by 
the Rome II Regulation.  
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With respect to article 5.1, the author notes that it is not clear whether the notion of marketing also includes the publicity 
related to a product in a member state where the product is not actually available. The author considers that modern 
business practice such as online publicity should be included in the concept of marketing. An additional difficulty might 
appear if the product is not marketed in any of the stated referred to under article 5.1 letters a), b) or c) and the rule of 
habitual residence is also not applicable. In such a case, the author considers that one should resort to the general rules 
set by article 4.   
Also, the author criticises that article 5.2 is not fully clear and the provision according to which “where it is clear from all 
the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is more manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that 
indicated in paragraph 1, the law of that other country shall apply” may trigger two interpretations: (a) that the law 
applicable must be of another state than of those determined according to article 5.1; or (b) that article 5.2 allows the 
application of one of the laws determined according to article 5.1 without observing their order of application. The author 
further considers that, from an economic standpoint, the escape clause provided under article 5.2 is not necessarily justified 
because it provides the judge with a very large margin of discretion and, therefore, the clause is not of nature to stimulate 
producers to act more diligently; on the contrary, article 5.2. is susceptible to determine the avoidance of cross-border 
situations/ litigations, which is not desirable.  
The other authors treat this text only in a descriptive manner. 
8. Any difficulties with the specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
No case law has been identified regarding the application of article 6. However, this article was analysed by the legal 
doctrine.  
An author considered that article 6 of Rome II Regulation is partly derogatory from article 4, contrary to point 12 of the 
recitals1160. The author concluded that cross border cartel damages actions fall within the restriction of free competition. 
The author also considered that article 6.3.b is only applicable when the court’s jurisdiction is determined according to 
articles 4.1 and 8.1 of Brussels 1 bis Regulation. 
Another author noted with respect to article 6.1 that the Regulation does not cover the situation in which the unfair 
competition affects several markets, as well as that difficulties might appear in connection with illicit behaviours committed 
through internet1161. The distributive application of the existing laws is not satisfying because of the complexity of the 
situations that it generates: the judges in the states where the unfair competition occurred, authorised to solve claims related 
to the integral covering of the prejudice will have to apply simultaneously the laws applicable to prejudices caused in 
different states.  
Further, the author noted with respect to article 6.3 that the syntagma “where the market is, or is likely to be, affected” might 
raise difficulties: it is debatable whether it is necessary in order to fulfil the condition for the anticompetitive acts in question 
to have been committed on the respective market by an undertaking that effectively exercised activity on the respective 
market or if a wider conception can be admitted to reflect the extremely large territorial scope of certain antitrust legislations 
worldwide. According to the author, an additional difficulty might appear in connection with the scope of application: if 
the consequences of the anticompetitive behaviour were produced within the territories of more states (both EU and non-
EU), the question is whether lex fori will govern only the civil consequences of the said behaviour (while the damages 
caused to free competition will be assessed according to the laws applicable in the affected markets) or if it will also 
determine the standard based on which that anticompetitive behaviour should be assessed. This question is for the author 
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of the utmost importance when non-EU countries are involved. The author considers that if lex fori is that of the state where 
the defendant is incorporated, and this state’s market was also directly and significantly affected by the anticompetitive 
behaviour, lex fori should also be applicable as regards the standard of behaviour based on the rules regarding the public 
policy of the forum.  
In addition, we note that, at a theoretical level, in the academic literature, an opinion was expressed regarding the 
indemnification of the victims whenever a delict occurs in multiple states at the same times. The author thinks that, although 
it seems fair for every illicit act of unfair competition should be sanctioned under the Law its effects occurred, the very same 
act could be interpreted as licit and illicit simultaneously and restrict the victim’s right to claim all damages1162.  
The same author concludes, after having made an analysis of recital 22 and 23 of the preamble, that the acts prone to be 
restricting the competition should be qualified according to the autonomous interpretation principle and based on the 
national law of the state involved, considering the lack of exhaustive definition1163.  
The other authors treat this text only in a descriptive manner. 
9. Any difficulties with the specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
No case law has been identified regarding the application of article 7. The legal doctrine is descriptive on this matter, 
without any detailed/ in-depth analyses. An author deemed that the fact that no exception is regulated within article 7 (i.e., 
the polluter cannot argue that the occurrence of the prejudice in a particular state could not be foreseen) is not necessary 
the best solution1164. The author argues that a provisions related to the predictability of the prejudice would be of nature to 
bring a certain dose of equity: if the polluter foresaw or should have foreseen that the consequences of its actions could 
cause prejudice in a particular state, it should not be allowed to challenge the application of the more severe law of the 
respective state; on the other hand, if the polluter objectively did not foresee the occurrence of the prejudice in the respective 
state, the judges should be able to take into consideration this aspect when the assessment is made with respect to the 
polluter’s liability. The other authors treat this text only in a descriptive manner.  
10. Any difficulties with the specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Art. 8) 
No case law has been identified regarding the application of article 8. However, this article was analysed by the legal 
scholars. An author criticised the correlation between article 8 and article 13. The author considers that although the 
determination of the legislation applicable to a certain claim related to unjust enrichment/ negotiorum gestio based on the 
provision of article 8 is justified, the justification no longer subsists in case of culpa in contrahendo. The author notes that it 
is difficult to understand the pre-eminence of article 8 over article 12 – the simple circumstance that culpa in contrahendo 
occurs when the potential object of the agreement is a trademark, or a patent is not deemed sufficient for ensuring an 
adequate basis for the application of article 8. The other authors treat this text only in a descriptive manner.  
11. Any difficulties with the specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
No case law has been identified regarding the application of article 9.  
However, a legal scholar analysed the legal nature of the economic liability of employees participating in an illegal strike 
and interpreted article 9 and recitals 11, 27 and 28, concluding that the damages that employees need to pay as a 
consequence of their participation in an illegal strike do not fall within the scope of the Regulation1165. According to the 
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author, the Regulation only regulates a conflict rule and the distinction between contractual and non-contractual liability 
should be made according to the national law. The other authors treat this text only in a descriptive manner.  
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
12. Any difficulties with the specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10) 
Only few cases solved by the Romanian courts have been identified with respect to unjust enrichment. In one of the cases, 
the court deemed that the claim of damages based on unjust enrichment arising out of an undue payment does not fall 
within the scope of the Regulation, since the liability is actually contractual1166.  
In another case, the court deemed that, since the alleged unjust enrichment concerns a relationship existing between the 
parties (in the case at hand, a contractual relationship), that is closely connected with that unjust enrichment, it shall be 
governed by the law that governs that relationship1167. Further, the court deemed that the party had an obligation to prove 
that the Romanian law was chosen by the parties to govern their contractual relationship. The court argued that the party 
did not provide proof regarding the law chosen to govern the contractual relationship. The court cited article 3 of Rome I 
Regulation, nonetheless in lack of proof provided by the party with respect to the law applicable, the court failed to 
determine it based on the other provisions of Rome I Regulation. Eventually, the court dismissed the claim on procedural 
grounds.  
In other cases, in relation to unjust enrichment arising out of the use with no right of train wagon transportation in Romania, 
the courts deemed that the Romanian law is applicable, based on article 10.3 of Rome II Regulation1168. The cases were 
related to the use by a company of train wagons without having any contractual relation with the owner the wagons. The 
courts established that the unjust enrichment was characterised, but the defendant was not the entity who beneficiated from 
it, and dismissed the claim based on lack of legal standing. 
This text was also analysed by the legal doctrine. An author noted that the reference to the country in which the unjust 
enrichment took place may raise difficulties because its meaning is not fully clear and because of this lack of clarity it is not 
possible to determine the law applicable when the enrichment occurred on the territories of more states (e.g., frequently in 
case of cross-borders financial transactions) 1169. The other authors treat this text only in a descriptive manner.  
As regards payment of amounts wrongly received, it was interpreted in the doctrine that the law governing the legal 
relationship should that from the place where the payment was received, as an analogy from unjust enrichment1170.  
13. Any difficulties with the specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
No case law has been identified regarding the application of article 11.  
This text was however analysed by the legal doctrine. An author1171 noted that resorting, based on the Regulation, to the 
law where the negotiorum gestio took place might raise difficulties if the patrimony at hand is located on the territories of 
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several states and each part of the patrimony is managed separately. The author deems that in this case it is likely to apply 
the legislation of each state in a distributive manner. The other authors treat this text only in a descriptive manner.  
14. Any difficulties with the specific rule on culpa in contrahendo? (Art. 12) 
Only one case1172 has been identified concerning the application of article 12 of Rome II Regulation. The case concerned 
pre-contractual discussions between a Spanish investor and a Romanian developer for development of projects in 
Bucharest. Damages were claimed for misinformation during these discussions. However, the court did not perform any 
determination of the applicable law and the claim was dismissed based on lack of proof of the misinformation.  
This text was also analysed by the legal doctrine (kindly refer to point 8 above). A concern was raised in connection to the 
dichotomy between a concluded contract and one that was supposed to be entered. The author signalized that the latter 
is subject to difficulties whenever put into practice 1173. Other authors treat this text only in a descriptive manner.  
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
15. The implementation of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties therein and any discussion that has been 
carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
There is not much case law on the application of this article. In practice, this article did not raise many issues provided that 
the parties rarely choose the applicable law to the tort. Nonetheless, there is some case law based on which it could be 
argued that the court held that the parties chose in an implicit manner the law to govern the tort. For instance, in one case 
the court ruled that the Romanian law is applicable since the foreign plaintiff claimed the application of the Romanian law 
and this was not challenged by the defendant1174. In another case, the court decided that the parties have implicitly chosen 
Romanian law since they both have argued their position based on its provisions, although the car accident was in 
Germany1175. 
This text was also analysed by the legal doctrine. An author noted that the parties’ freedom to choose the law applicable 
to the tort hides a risk of fraud in case the parties could choose a foreign law to avoid compliance with imperative provisions 
of the law that would normally be applicable1176. The author further notes that this situation is only artificially “international”, 
but this does not prevent the application of the law chosen by the parties (the author deems that a conflict of laws exists). 
However, this risk s mitigated, according to the author, by the provisions of article 14.2 and 14.3 of Rome II Regulation. 
Nonetheless, the author cites the opinion of P. de Vareilles-Sommieres according to which imperative provisions are rare 
in the field of tort and the parties usually can derogate from tort rules by agreement. The other authors treat this matter only 
in a descriptive manner.  
One author interprets art. 14 (1) a) as applicable to mostly consumers and extends the meaning of commercial activity to 
any professionals, in order to protect the weaker party1177. 
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2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that exclusion 
or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
The Romanian Civil Code regulates under article 2562 that the content of the foreign law is determined by the court by 
attestations from the authorities of the relevant state, by requesting the opinion of an expert or by other adequate means. 
Also, the party that refers to a foreign law has the burden of proof as regards its content. If it is not possible to determine 
the content of the foreign law within a reasonable timeframe, the Romanian law shall be applied.  
Based on the previously mentioned legal provision, the burden of proof with respect to the foreign law is shared between 
the judge (based on the principle of active role) and the parties.  
In some cases, the Romanian courts deemed that since the parties failed to prove the foreign law1178, respectively since the 
proof of the foreign law is difficult to obtain1179, the Romanian law becomes applicable. Cases where the plaintiff’s claims 
were dismissed based on lack of evidence regarding the foreign law have also been identified.1180  
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of the 
substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual obligations. 
The Romanian legislation and practice of the courts of law treat foreign law as a fact that must be proved, as described at 
point 14 above. 
18. Any difficulties, if any, arising in connection with the delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15) or 
the relevance of rules of safety and conduct (Art. 17), the burden of proof (Art. 22) 
Most cases where art. 15 was applied by the courts of law concern car accidents lawsuits and the analysis of the applicable 
law to Insurer's regress action1181. 
• In one lawsuit, where the car accident took place in Romania, the court analysed the applicable law to Swiss 
insurer's regress against the Romanian Insurer, deciding that according to art. 4(1) in conjunction with art. 15 lit. 
a) and h), art. 18 and 19, the law applicable is the Romanian law. However, the court did not make any 
interpretation of art. 15 besides invoking its applicability.  
• In another case where the car accident took place in Germany and the court analysed the applicable law to 
Insurer's regress action when the liability is split between different insurers of the motor head and the trailer, the 
court rejected the appeal because the claimant failed to provide enough evidence of the tort happening. In its 
reasoning, the court based its judgment on cases C359/14 şi C475/14 (para. 52 and 53) providing with 
respect to art. 15 lit. a) and b) from Roma II Regulation that lex loci damni will determine the conditions and extent 
of liability, as well as the reasons for sharing this liability. 
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• In another case, the court found that the German law is applicable and covers, based on art. 15 lit. b), the split 
of liability. The court decided that the Romanian law only covers the right of an insurer to subrogate and pursue 
claims against the trailer insurer.  
• As the German law was not proved with respect to the provision governing the penalties/ interest request, the 
court decided not to grant them. 
• The statute of limitation was considered widely as part of the applicable law. Besides the Supreme Court decision 
no. 1963/2017, we also have identified a case where the court decided that the claim was belated, as the 
statute of limitation applicable had to be calculated according to German law, as lex loci damni, with the 
consequence of considering the deadline being two years from the date that the action accrued, instead of three 
years as the claimant invoked (pursuant to Romanian law) 1182.  
In the academic literature, the term “damages” from letter f) of article 15 was interpreted extensively. One author provides 
a list of damages that fall within “damages sustained personally”, including damages to the human body, mental integrity, 
and mental state, caused by an illicit act of a natural or legal person, or a state organization1183.  
19. The practical application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16) and any difficulties therein 
There are few cases where the Romanian courts made the application of article 16. In two cases, a court applied article 
16 and ruled that the principle of full compensation of damage is an overriding mandatory provision of the Romanian 
law 1184. Therefore, the courts ruled that, irrespective of the law determined to be applicable according to Rome II 
Regulation and irrespective of the fact that such law could limit the scope of damage compensation, the full compensation 
of damage must be complied with based on the mandatory provisions of the Romanian law.  
The legal doctrine on this article is mainly descriptive. An author noted that the public order law must not be mistaken for 
the imperative provisions regulated referred to, for instance, under article 14.2 or 14.3 or under article 3.3. of Rome 
Convention1185. The latter refers to all internal provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement, while article 16 
only pertains to a subcategory of the public order law, namely those rules that are overriding on a particular level. The 
author furthers cites ECJ cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 (Arblade) to show that public order legislation must be 
understood as applying to national provisions compliance with which has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection 
of the political, social or economic order in the relevant member state.  
To what it concerns overriding mandatory provisions, a discussion was made in respect of Rome I Regulation and the 
differences between its art. 9 (3) and Rome II art. 16. Although recital 7 of the preamble of Rome II Regulation calls on the 
correlation between the two Regulations, the author thinks there is a good reason the Rome II does not provide such a rule, 
that being the possibility of the forum to apply the Law of a third state. He puts this restriction on the necessity of predictability 
and certainty required when determining the applicable law to torts1186. 
20. Any difficulties with the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18) 
Even if it does not seem that there are substantial difficulties in applying this article, the Romanian courts usually connect 
art. 18 to art. 4 (1) and apply the Law that governs the non-contractual obligation, even though there are not few those 
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who resort to the escape clause from art. 4 (2) whenever the victims are from Romania and the damages are supposedly 
suffered here (especially when it comes to indirect damages suffered by the relatives of deceased victims) 1187. 
21. Any difficulties with the specific rule on subrogation (art. 19) 
The subrogation is quite controversial and has caused non-unitary judicial practice. The courts cannot tell the difference 
between the third’s party right to subrogate into the victim’s rights and the extent to which this third party is entitled to 
compensation. 
Most common cases refer to truck accidents, especially happening in Germany, and the main problem the courts are 
confronted with is the split liability between different insurers of the tractor unit and the trailer. The way how this is solved 
could really impact insurers whenever they must cover for substantial damages because the Romanian Law holds the trailer 
insurer responsible only if it is proved that the fault could be linked to the trailer, whereas the German Law admits a split 
liability (50%) between the insurers, regardless of who or what caused the accident.  
In most cases, judges cite and try to relate to joined cases C-359/14 and C-475/14, but get to different conclusions. For 
example, the Bucharest Court of Appeal based its judgement (no. 1001/2019) on paragraphs 50-52, 58 and 59 of the 
mentioned ECJ case and resorted to Rome I Regulation to determine the applicable law to the regress action between two 
different insurers (motor head and trailer), deciding that this specific law only governs the right to subrogate. Nevertheless, 
one of the judges had a separate opinion, particularly, that the regress implies both the verification of the existence of the 
right to subrogate and the possibility to regress against other entities. The separate opinion judge did not realise that his 
interpretation leads to overlapping the two laws the judges considers applicable: the law of the place of accident - German 
- establishes the parties responsible, but the responsible parties would be also determined by the regress law, if interpreted 
broadly. This overlapping of the scope of the applicable law would not be consistent with the ratione of the provisions.  
Further proof of the courts’ inconsistency in these types of cases could also lie in the sentence no. 9135/2019 from the 
Bucharest District 1, where the judge failed to formerly apply Rome II Regulation and simply deemed the German Law as 
applicable to the regress action in its entirety. 
A pertinent reasoning was made in 7452/2019 Bucharest District 1 award, in accordance with ECJ Joined cases C-
359/14 and C-475/14. The Court concluded that the persons responsible for the accident and the extent of their liability 
is determined according to the law of the country where the accident occurred, based on art. 4 of Rome II Regulation. Also, 
the insurer's obligation to cover the prejudice and its possibility to resort to subrogation is determined according to the law 
applicable to the insurance contract, based on article 7 of Rome I Regulation. Consequently, the Romanian law is not 
applicable because it only regulates the right of the insurer who indemnified the victim to subrogate in the victim's rights. 
Therefore, the Court deemed the German law is applicable and that it regulates the person to which the prejudice is 
imputable, as well as the extend of liability. Hence, the insurer of the tractor unit is entitled to recover from the other insurer 
half of the damages paid to the victim. 
There is, as well, a rather questionable way of reasoning when applying art. 4 (2) in connection to art. 19. Many Romanian 
courts apply the Romanian Law to regress actions between two Romanian insurers because they both reside in Romania 
without analysing the Law that applies to the tort1188. Sometimes, they justify this escape clause even when one of the 
insurers is incorporated in a different state but is represented in Romania1189. These variations seem to reflect that some 
courts would argue anything to bypass the applicability of foreign legislation.  
Similar matters refer to BAAR Romania’s (Vehicle Insurers’ Bureau) actions against Romanian debtors. It often happens that 
BAAR Romania pays the correspondent agency from another member state whenever the Romanian debtor has no valid 
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insurance policy or lacks it whatsoever and eventually regresses against the initial debtor1190. In these cases, the courts 
regularly apply the Romanian Law, considering that BAAR is obliged to pay the creditor on the grounds of art. 24 of 
Directive 2009/103, without any reflection on Rome II. However, other courts apply the law according to art. 4 (1) of 
Rome II1191 and some fail to justify their choice of applicable law1192.  
A frequent issue arising out of these regress actions regards late payment penalties, awarded differently from court to court. 
For example, Bucharest District 1 Court deemed the German Law applicable to the tort but admitted the claim for penalties 
based on the Romanian Law, therefore creating lex tertia1193. The very same court, in case no. 7452/2019, deemed that 
the German law is applicable and dismissed this claim because the plaintiff did not prove the German law that regulates 
the legal regime of late payment penalties, similarly happening in cases judged by Satu Mare Tribunal when the plaintiffs 
based their claims on the Romanian Law (1829/2020, 3330/2020, 4550/2020, 3795/2020 awards). 
A fair number of judgements simply dismiss cases after settling on the applicable law because the parties do not prove the 
content of the foreign law, in spite of the remedies offered by the law1194. This could speak to the courts’ reluctance to apply 
another law than the one they are familiar with. 
22. Any difficulties with the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
Only one relevant case1195 has been identified with respect to the application of article 20 of Rome II Regulation. The case 
was related to the determination of the law applicable to the insurer’s regress action when the liability is split between 
different insurers of two different parts of a vehicle (e.g., tractor unit and semi-trailer) for a car accident that occurred in 
Germany. Although the case law on similar facts is very common, the parties and the courts had rarely cited article 20.  
In the previously mentioned case, the court deemed based on article 20 of the Regulation that the German law was 
applicable to the right of the insurer that was firstly noticed and fully covered the damages according to the rules set by the 
German law to demand compensation from the other insurer (the other debtor), considering that the law applicable to the 
first insurer’s obligation to satisfy the claim of the creditor was the German law. In other cases, the courts ruled in different 
manners, without resorting to the application of article 20 (kindly refer to points 18 and 19 above).  
The legal doctrine on this article is mainly descriptive and no controversies were identified.  
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
23. Any difficulties with the specific rule on habitual residence (Art.23)  
There are few cases where the courts examine this applicability of this article regarding habitual residence. Usually in 
practice the courts consider as relevant the headquarters place of the legal persons and the domicile for the natural persons, 
without analysing in particularly the habitual residence of the parties. 
As an exception, in one case, the appeal court changed the first court's judgement, stating that the Romanian law is 
applicable in a lawsuit concerning a car accident which took place in Germany and therefore, refused to split liability 
between insurers, considering that both the insurer's and damaged person have their usual residence in Romania and the 
close connection of the insurance contracts with Romania (i.e. the driver is Romanian and the insurance was made in 
 
 
1190  Hunedoara Tribunal 752/2016. Similarly, Bucharest District 1 Court 1925/2018, Buftea First Tier Court 
7267/2018 
1191 Deva First Instance Court, Sentence no. 1767/2015; 
1192 Dolj Tribunal, Decision no. 218/2019; 
1193 Bucharest District 1 Court, Sentence no. 1114/2019; 
1194 Buftea First Tier Court, Sentence no. 9546/2015, 8514/2016, Ilfov Tribunal Decision no. 4083/2018; 





Romania1196. Lastly, the court also mentioned in its reasoning that the decision cannot be affected by the mere fact the 
damaged person has other nationality (i.e. German nationality). 
24. Any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with more than one legal system 
(Art.25) 
No case law or legal doctrine has been identified with respect to articles 24 and 25 of the Regulation.  
25. Any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
No case law has been identified with respect to article 26. Kindly refer to point 17 above with respect to the application 
of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions. 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in specific 
areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 29) 
On a preliminary note, no relevant case law or legal doctrine have been identified with respect to the interaction between 
the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments in the above-mentioned specific fields 
(environmental damages, intellectual property rights and data protection. Nonetheless, a decision of a national court has 
been identified with respect to the application of article 28 in the field of collisions in inland navigation, described below. 
Also, doctrinal commentaries have been identified with respect to articles 27 and 28.  
Article 27 
No case law has been identified with respect to the application of article 27 of Rome II Regulation.  
Nonetheless, an author noted with respect to the relationship between Rome II Regulation and other provisions of European 
law according to article 27 that although the text is clear, certain difficulties may appear with respect to those European 
provisions that regulate “internal market” clauses, potentially together with the proclamation of the principle of the origin 
country (e.g., Directive 2000/31/EC provides under article 3.1 that each member state shall ensure that the information 
society services provided by a service provider established on its territory complies with the national provisions applicable 
in the member state in questions which fall within the coordinated field) 1197. These “internal market” clauses are contrary 
to the principle promoted by Rome II Regulation according to which the rule is that the law of the “destination country” (that 
state where the prejudice is produces) is applicable. Therefore, the coordination of such European instruments is delicate, 
according to the author. More specifically, the author notes that the issue raised by these “internal market” clauses is that 
to know whether (a) they are an implicit rule on conflicts determining that the law of the member state is applicable as 
regards the supplier’s liability; or (b) if these clauses only induce a simple rule of material correction, so that in principle the 
law determined according to Rome II Regulation shall be applied only if it is shown that its application does not constitute 
an obstacle to the activities of the service provider (as set for example by recital 23 of the European E-commerce Directive). 
The author also notes that another possible interpretation would be to consider that these clauses have no influence in 
conflict of laws, because the principle of the country of origin intervenes only in a legal-public dimension, and not in 
relationships between private persons. The author further notes that Rome II Regulation does not provide clarification in this 
regard: the only relevant information is found under recital 35 which states a seemingly obvious idea, that Rome II 
regulation must not affect the freedom of movement of goods and services governed by other European instruments.  
Article 28 
As regards case law, a decision has been identified with respect to the application of article 28 of Rome II Regulation1198. 
The case was related to a prejudice caused by a collision between two ships within the national waters of Romania. In the 
 
 
1196 Bucharest Tribunal, Decision 3544/2019 dated 23 October 2019. 
1197 OPREA Alina, ibidem; 





context of the collision, the Romanian ship was damaged by the Bulgarian ship. The debates in this case concerned the 
duration of the statute of limitation which, according to the Romanian law, consisted in a period of 3 years, while according 
to the 1960 Geneva Convention relating to the unification of certain rules concerning collisions in inland navigation the 
statute of limitation consisted in a period of 2 years. Previously, the first court ruled that the 2 years statute of limitation 
provided by the 1960 Geneva Convention was applicable, and the appeal court annulled the decision of the first court 
and ruled that the general 3 years statute of limitation provided by the Romanian law was applicable. The final court 
applied article 28 of Rome II Regulation and ruled that Rome II Regulation did not remove the application of the 1960 
Geneva Convention, therefore the 2 years statute of limitation regulated by the Convention shall prevail. 
As regards the legal doctrine, an author noted with respect to article 28.1 that the prevalence of the pre-existent 
international conventions, considering the fact that only some of the member states ratified them, is liable to further maintain 
the risk of forum shopping at a European level, despite the fact that its removal was one of the main objectives of the text1199. 
According to the same author, it would had been preferable to affirm the priority of the Regulation even in connection with 
international conventions. On the other hand, the author considered that the European legislator proves inconsistency – for 
instance, Brussels II bis Regulation provide that it must be applied in preference to 1980 Hague Convention on the civil 
aspects of international child abduction.  
Article 29 
No relevant case law or legal doctrine have been identified with respect to the application of article 29.  
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported: 
27. Where relevant, any impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic 
accidents on legal certainty 
Romania is not a party to the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents.  
28. Any other practical problems, including but not limited to the application and treatment of foreign law, the 
suitability of the mosaic approach supported by the Rome II Regulation 
No other practical problems were identified with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
besides those already included in this report. No case law or legal doctrine has been identified with respect to the suitability 
of the mosaic approach of Rome II Regulation.  
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that emerged 
in your Member State: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope of 
the Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in cross-border 
situations 
No cases have been identified with respect to the exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, 
including defamation, from the scope of the Regulation. Nonetheless, an author, criticised the absence from Rome II 
 
 





Regulation of uniform rules regarding liability for violations of personality, considering that the national legislations in this 
area are significantly different1200. The author notes that the incertitude related to the law applicable and the costs and risks 
of abroad litigations have a dissuasive effect on the victims of such violations in what regards the initiation of a litigation. 
Also, the author notes that forum shopping would be encouraged by the absence of uniform European rules on the law 
applicable to such cases.  
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation” (SLAPPs) 
No cases and legal doctrine have been identified with respect to the interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment 
of defamation and data protection, nor with respect to the relevance of SLAPPs. 
31. The extent to which Rome II duly tackles corporate abuses against human rights. 
No cases or legal doctrine have been identified with respect to corporate abuses against human rights. At the same time, 
the Regulations was applied at a reduced scale by the practitioners in Romania to extrapolate the extent to which Rome II 
Regulations duly tackles such matters.   
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation 
No cases or legal doctrine have been identified in this respect.  
 
 
1200 OPREA Alina, "Raspunderea pentru atingerile aduse vietii private si drepturilor personalitatii - aspecte de drept 
international privat" (Liability for violations of privacy and rights relating to personality - international private law aspects), 
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German artist.  
Romanian law applicable 
according to any ROME 
Regulation (contractual or 
tort). However no proof of 
agreement and no proof of 
enrichment of the Romanian 
organiser.  














German artist.  
Romanian law applicable 
based on a retransmission 
argument from Romanian 
former International Private 
law to German law. No 
explanation about the 
incidence of Rome II, 
although it is referred. 











Czech law applicable but 
Romanian court sends the 
creditor in Czech Republic for 
proceedings and refuses to 
apply (no justification) 
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Art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
Romanian law applicable, as 
there is a contract between 
the parties under Romanian 
law, because the parties did 
not made an election of the 
applicable law, and the 
insurer has its headquarters in 
Romania 






Art. 10.1 Unjust enrichement 
caused by an 
undue payment for 
quality control 
services 
A contract exists in simplified 
form. Contractual liability 
rules applicable.  









The appeal court maintained 
the first court's judgement 
which stated that the 
Bulgarian Law was 
applicable due to the place 
where the tort happened, but 
did not refer to the regulation 
or explain any further. The 
appeal court also offered late 
payment penalties. 
7/other EU - 
article 19 of 
Directive 
2000/26/CE 






art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Italy. Appeal. 
Romanian victim 
Both courts apply Romanian 
law to damage determination. 
No justification.  
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Art. 4.2 Wrong car fuel 
use. Both parties 
from Romania 




District 2 - 
First Instance 
Court 





Romanian law applicable, 
only because the claimant did 
not provide evidence of the 
Bulgarian law, even though 
the Court previously decided 
the applicable law was the 
Bulgarian law. 









in Germany when 
loading a truck. 
Romanian law applicable 
since damage was caused by 
a third party in connection 
with the execution of a 
Romanian law transport 
agreement. However, the 
damage was not caused to 
the freight, but to an 
instrument used for loading 






art. 1.1 Scope excludes 
contracts 
Commercial invoices not 
covered by Rome II 







Car accident in 
Bulgaria. 
Damages claim 
against the insurer. 
Action against 
Appeal to District 4 - First 
instance Court Decision no. 
4095/2013. Court of 
appeal considers that 
Bulgarian law is applicable 
7/other EU - 
article 11 (2), 
article 9 (1) b) 
of Regulation 
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RCA insurer pursuant to Rome II.  2001/44/CE 
1599/2019  08-04-
14 
Ilfov Tribunal art. 4.1  
art. 19 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
Based on article 7 from Roma 
I and considering that that 
there has been no evidence 
that the parties have chosen 
the applicable law 
7/Other EU - 
article 7 Rome I 






art. 4.3. The law applicable 
to the plaintiff's 
(Romanian natural 
person) right to 




by the insured 
vehicle as a 
consequence of a 
car accident that 
occurred in 
Austria. 
The court deemed that the 
Romanian law applies based 
on article 4.3 of Rome II 
Regulation, arguing that 
otherwise the debtor's right 
would be severely affected in 
absence of the possibility to 
address the Romanian 
national court. 
7/Other EU - 
articles 19 and 
22 of Directive 
2009/103/EC 







Car accident in 
France. Applicable 
law to Insurer's 
The court applied the French 
Law to the right of regress and 
the Romanian Law to the 







Date  Court/ 
Author name 
and reference 




Issues / subject 
areas  
Findings   Red Flags  ECJ case law 
cited 
Similar Cases  
regress action 
when the liability is 
split between 
different insurers of 
the motor head 
and the trailer 
extent of the damages. The 
court maintained the first 
court's judgement and 
obliged the motor head 






Art. 4 Damages claim 










network as part of 
the goodwill. 
The court applied the 
Romanian Law because the 
distributor was from Romania 
and this is where the damage 
happened. No other 
justification. 










District 6 - 
First Instance 
Court 




Romanian law applied - both 
drivers from Romania 
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art. 4.1. The law applicable 




debtor's civil auto 
liability insurer 
(Romanian 
company acting as 
a representative on 
behalf of a 
Bulgarian insurer).  
The Romanian CASCO 
insurer suffered itself a 
prejudice for which claims 
damages to be covered and 
did not invoke a prejudice 
suffered by another person. 
The CASCO insurer suffered 
the prejudice in Romania. 
Consequently, the Romanian 
law is applicable.  
7/Other EU - 
articles 21 and 
22 of Directive 
2009/103/CE 






art. 4.3. The law applicable 
to the auto civil 
liability insurer's 
(CASCO) regress 






Romania (RCA) the 
expenses borne to 
cover the damages 
resulted from an 
accident caused in 
Hungary by the 
vehicle insured by 
The Court deemed that, under 
article 4.3 of the Rome II 
Regulation, the Romanian law 
is applicable, arguing that 
otherwise the right of the 
victims of car accidents 
produced in other states 
would be seriously affected if 
they were not legally entitled 
to address the national courts 
in the state of origin. Further, 
the Court applied the statute 
of limitation according to the 
Romanian law. 
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District 3 - 
First Instance 
Court 
  CASCO insurer 
regressing against 
the guilty party's 
RCA insurer. 
Conflict of laws 
and jurisdictions. 
The court firstly analyzes the 
conflict of jurisdiction and 
states that the matter does not 
fall within the competence of 
the Romanian Court. No 
further analysis on the conflict 
of laws. 
7/Other EU - 
article 9 of 
44/2001 
Regulation; 
article 21 of 
Directive 
2009/103/CE 









Romanian law applicable 
according to Rome II. Not the 
Geneva Convention for ship 
damage from June 1960 
      
897/2014 10-12-
14 
Iasi Tribunal Art. 4.2 
Art. 4.3 
Industrial accident 
in Germany when 
loading a truck. 
Romanian law applied. 
Appeal in decision no. 
16704/2013. Appeal court 
maintained the solution on the 
applicable law. Changed the 
solution on the merits.  
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Art. 4.1 The law applicable 
to the right of the 
Romanian CASCO 
insurer to regress 
against the insurer 
which acts as a 
representative of 
the Bulgarian RCA 
insurer with respect 
to damages that 
were initially 
covered by the first 




Based on article 4.1 of Rome 
II Regulation, the Court 
deemed that the Romanian 
law is applicable.  
N/A N/A   
113/2017  25-01-
15 
Cluj Court of 
Appeal 
Art. 4.2 Car accident in 
Belgium. 
The first court applied the 
Belgium Law, however, the 
appeal court considered that 
based on Decision of High 
Court of Justice 1/2016 
Romanian law is applicable. 
      
60/2015 10-02-
15 
Dolj Tribunal Art. 4.1 
Art. 18 
Car accident in 
Romania. 
Bulgarian insurer 
Romanian law applicable 
since victims and damage in 
Romania 







Car accident in 
Austria. Romanian 
Austrian law applicable due 
to the place of tort and 
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victim. Applicable 
Law to CASCO 
insurer's regress 










Car accident in 
Germany. Regress 
action.  
Statute of limitation 
applicable according to 
German law. 








The law applicable 
to the right of the 
Romanian CASCO 
insurer to regress 
against the insurer 
which acts as a 
representative of 
the Hungarian 




covered by the first 
in connection with 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Hungary. 
The Court deemed that, 
based on article 4.2. of Rome 
II Regulation, since both 
insurers are incorporated in 
Romania, the Romanian law 
is applicable.  
The Court also argued that 
Rome I Regulation is not 
applicable considering that 
the relationship between the 
two insurers does not arise 
from a contract. 
The Court considered, based 
on an interpretative ruling of 
the High Court of Justice that 
interpreted the provisions of 
the Romanian Commercial 
Code (in force at the date of 
the car accident), that 
subrogation did not occurr 
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right of its own.  
Further, the Court dismissed 
the claim based on the statute 
of limitation rules set out by 













Italian law applicable. 
Limitation applicable 
according to Italian law - 2 
years.  






art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Bulgaria 
Bulgarian law applicable in 
action against insurer. 
Romanian calculation 
applicable based on art. 14 
of Directive 2009/103 
7/Other EU - 
Directive 
2009/103 








The law applicable 




debtor's civil auto 
liability insurer 
(Romanian 
company acting as 
a representative on 
In principle, the applicable 
law is pursuant to art. 4.1. 
that of the state where the 
prejudice occurred, 
irrespective of the country in 
which the event giving rise to 
the damage occurred.  
Nonetheless, as an 
exception, art. 4.3. regulates 
the situation when from all the 
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behalf of a British 
insurer).  
circumstances of the case it is 
clear that the tort is manifestly 
more closely connected with 
another country.  
The court deemed that the 
facts are more closely 
conected with Romania, since 
the CASCO insurance policy 
was issued by a Romanian 
insurer. Therefore, the 




Dolj Tribunal art. 4.1 
Art. 18 






Romanian law since damage 
is considered as the material 
and moral damage of the son 
(funeral costs and life costs in 
Romania) 
7/Other EU - 
Directive 
2009/103 




District 3 - 
First Instance 
Court 
Art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurer’s liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
      
331/2015 18-06- Court of 
Appeal - 
art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Hungary. 
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Car accident in 
France. BAAR 
regress action.  
French law applicable to the 
extent of the damages 




District 3 - 
First Instance 
Court 
  Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The court applies the 
Romanian Law without any 
justification, although the 
claimant based his statement 
on art. 4 from the Regulation. 












against the guilty 
party's insurer. 
Romanian law applicable 
justified on the fact that the 
insurer is Romanian. No 
mention of the place where 
the tort happened. 
7/other EU - 
Directive 
2009/103 







Car accident in 
Germany. 
Romanian victim. 
Applicable Law to 
CASCO insurer's 
The court dismissed the claim 
in connection to the 
applicable law and stated 
that it can't be the Romanian 
Law because of the damages 
7/Other EU - 
art. 9, 11 of 
44/2001 
Regulation 
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suffered by the CASCO 
insurer, but the German Law 
as the place where the tort 
happened. The CASCO 
insurer can not make use of 
the special provisions of 
Brussels I Regulation 
regarding the competence of 
the Romanian courts, because 
those are meant for the 











The court found that 
Romanian law would apply 
since the German insurer 
used his Green Card 
equivalent to pay the 
damages and this would be 
equivalent with accepting 
Romanian law 




District 3 - 
First Instance 
Court 
Art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurer’s liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
7/other EU - 
Directive 
2009/103 
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Art. 19  
Car accident in 
Italy. Romanian 
Insurer. Regress 
action by BAAR  
against Romanian 
debtor 
Romanian law applicable to 
action initiated by BAAR 
against the Romanian debtor 
although accident in Italy. No 
justification on art. 18. Art. 
4.3 and the insurance 
agreement are mentioned.  




District 3 - 
First Instance 
Court 
  Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The court applies the 
Romanian Law only because 
the claimant did not provide 
evidence of the German Law. 




District 3 - 
First Instance 
Court 
Art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
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Appeal to Giurgiu Tribunal 
decision 335/2014. Court of 
appeal considers that 
Romanian law is applicable 
pursuant to Rome II. 
However, within the 
Romanian law, the appeal 
court decides that the Geneva 
Convention should prevail 
over the general limitation 
rules.  
Although not fully relevant, 
the court of appeal claims 
that art. 28 of Rome II is also 
an argument for applying the 
Geneva Convention.  





art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
German law applicable. 
However, granted penalties 
according to Romanian law 
(CSA nr.14/2011 Order). 




District 4 - 
First Instance 
Court 




Romanian law applicable 
since the victim lives in 
Romania (sic!) 
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maintains decision of Dolt 
Tribunal no 206/2015 
7/Other EU - 
Directive 
2009/103 


















No determination of 
applicable law. Claim 
dismissed based on lack of 
proof of breach.  











Romanian law applicable (no 
justification) 
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art. 4.1. The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The court deemed the 
German law as applicable 
between the two insurers. The 
court's reasoning was based 
on a provision of the national 
legislation, according to 
which the insurer grants 
compensation (...) in 
accordance with the 
applicable legislation in the 
state within the territory of 
which the car accident 
occurred. The court admitted 
the plaintiff's claim and 
ordered the semi-trailer's 
insurer to cover half of the 
damages initially paid by the 
insurer of the tractor unit. 





  Work accident in 
Austria. Moral 




Romanian law applicable 
with no justification. 





art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
Romanian law applicable 
because of closer connection 
given the contract. 
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between different 
insurers of the 













against the RCA 
insurer. 
The appeal court maintained 
the first court's judgement 
which stated that the 
Romanian Law was 
applicable due to the fact that 
both insurers were Romanian 
and the tort is closely 
connected to Romania. 










CASCO insurer of 
victim.  






N/A The law applicable 




debtor's civil auto 
liability insurer 
(Romanian 
company acting as 
a representative on 
The court omitted to analyses 
the applicability of the 
provisions of Rome II 
Regulation and deemed the 
Romanian law as applicable. 
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art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
locus damni applies. 
However, the court rejects the 
claim because of lack of 
proof of foreign law (art. 
2562 Civil Code)  










against the RCA 
insurer. 
The first court applied the 
Romanian Law because the 
action was in connection to 
the CASCO insurer's 
damage. The appeal court 
determined the Bulgarian Law 
as applicable, but dismissed 
the appeal because the 
appellant, who was the 
plaintiff in the first court 
action, did not provide 
evidence of the Bulgarian 
Law. The court stated that the 
plaintiff had a considerable 
time to prove it between the 
response to the claim and the 
7/Other EU - 
article 22 of 
Directive 
2009/103/CE 
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Romanian law applicable as 
place of damage 








Applicable law to 
claim against 
insurer 
Locus damni applies 
irrespective of Directive 
2009/103 
7/Other EU - 
Directive 
2009/103 







Car accident in 
Spain. Applicable 
law to Insurer's 
regress action 
when the liability is 
split between 
different insurers of 
the motor head 
and the trailer 
The court applied the 
Romanian Law based on art. 
4.2. and the fact that both 
parties had their usual 
residence in Romania. 










Romanian law applicable for 
moral damages.  
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claim of the victim's 
parents against 
RCA insurer. 
Hungarian law applicable to 
determination of moral 
damages. The claimants did 
not provide relevant 
jurisprudence in connection to 
the Hungarian Law, although 
they were given a reasonable 
time, therefore the court 
applied the Romania Law. 






art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Hungary 
Romanian law applicable (no 
justification) 












Action initiated by 
insurer (BAAR 
Romania who paid 
BAAR France) 
French law applicable to the 
extent of the damages 
7/Other EU - 
Directive 
2009/103 






art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Austria 
The court considered that 
there is no foreign element in 
the case, therefore applied 
Romanian law. 
7/Other EU - 
article 7 Rome I 
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The law applicable 
to the right of the 
Romanian natural 




an Austrian insurer 
for the damages 
suffered as a 
consequence of a 
car accident that 
was caused in 
Austria by another 
person  
The court omitted to analyse 
the applicability of the 
provisions of Rome I 
Regulation and deemed the 
Romanian law as applicable. 






Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Romania. 
Bulgarian debtor.  









Romanian law applicable to 
statute of limitation since 
BAAR paid the damages, not 
as a result of the accident, but 
as a result of the lack of 
insurance, based on a legal 
obligation (Directive 
2009/103 art. 24). Only 
after payment BAAR knows 
the extent of the damage he 
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needs to recover. 
French law applicable to 

















The court applied the 
Romanian Law considering 
that both the claimant and the 
guilty party had their usual 
residence in Romania. The 
court also mentioned that the 
civil action in a criminal trial 
can be solved by applying a 
different law than the one 
applied in the criminal action. 






Art. 18  Law applicable to 
direct claim 
against insurer 
Romanian law applicable 
since the law from the place 
of the accident 




District 2 - 
First Instance 
Court 
Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Germany. Insurer's 
regress action 
when the liability is 
split between two 
different Romanian 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
Romanian law applicable (no 
justification) 
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Romanian law applicable (no 
justification). Second appeal 
in decision 126/2017 Mures 
Court of Appeal 
      
727/2016 05-10-
16 




Romanian law applicable 
since both Romanians 
      
275/2016 06-10-
16 
Arad Tribunal art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Hungary. 
Romanian victim.  
Romanian law applicable. 
Confusion between the rules 
that apply to representation 
and the material rules that 
should apply to the accident 




District 4 - 
First Instance 
Court 




Romanian law applicable 
since the damage was 
suffered by a Romanian  car 
(sic!). 










Romanian law applied. No 
justification.  
      
1685/2016 20-10- Court of 
Appeal - 
Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Hungary. Austrian 
Hungarian law applicable to 
determination of moral 
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Romanian law applicable, as 
at least a part of damage 
took place in Romania. 










Art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
German law applicable, but 
rejected the claim because of 
lack of evidence of foreign 
law 
      
362/2016 15-12-
16 
Bihor Tribunal Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Hungary 
Hungarian law applicable for 
action against insurer 








Car accident in 
Bulgaria. Victims 
are relatives of the 
debtor. Romanian 
insurer. 
Romanian law applicable 
since all parties are 
Romanians and insurance 
agreement is under Romanian 
law 





art. 4.1  Applicable law 
insurer. 
Rome II applicable even if 
insurer agent designated 
7/Other EU - 
Directive 
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Galati according to Directive 
2009/103, based on 





Dolj Tribunal Art. 4.1 
Art. 19 






Holland law applicable since 
place of accident and 
damage. 










than the one in 




the direct damage, 




Romanian law applicable 
were most of the following 
surgical  treatment was 
performed and the moral 
damages happened here 
      
327/2017 03-03-
17 
Alba Tribunal art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Romania. Spanish 
debtor. Romanian 
Romanian law applicable 
since damage in Romania 
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  Producing in 
Germany a good 
that is defective 
and learning of this 
situation in 
Romania through a 
physical impact 
between this good 
and another object 
Appeal to District 4 - First 
instance Court Decision (the 
number is censored). The 
damage occurred in 
Germany, but its effects were 
found in Romania. Lack of 
relevance of Regulation 
864/2007 for establishing 
general competence, since 
this Regulation regulates the 
law applicable to the dispute. 







Car accident in 
France. Applicable 
law to Insurer's 
regress action 
when the liability is 
split between 
different insurers of 
the motor head 
and the trailer 
The claimant filed an appeal 
in order to obtain late 
payment penalties, which the 
first court did not admit, 
because they were not 
grounded on the French Law. 
The appeal court maintained 
the judgement and stated that 
the French Law is applicable 
to both damages and late 
payment penalties. 
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506/2017 04-04-
17 
Alba Tribunal Art. 4.1 
Art. 19 




after payment to 
BAAR Poland 
Romanian law applicable to 
regress. Defendant not liable 
(just employee of the owner). 
Polish law applicable to the 
extent of damages 
      
467/2017 21-04-
17 
Timis Tribunal Art. 4.1 
Art. 19 
Car accident in 
Vienna. BAAR 
regress action.  
The determination of the 
liable person was not made 
under any law. Therfore no 
person could be identified as 
being liable.  
      
354/2017 22-05-
17 
Arad Tribunal Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Slovenia. 
Deceased 
Slovenian law applicable to 
damage determination 
(indirect damages of family 
members). 











  The law applicable 
to the right of the 
medical insurer to 
recover the costs 
related to medical 
services attended 
by the victim from 
the RCA insurer of 
the driver of a 
tractor unit who 
caused a car 
Even though the plaintiff had 
not cited the Rome II 
Regulation, the court deemed 
that the Romanian law was 
applicable based on its 
provisions that were cited ex 
officio by the court. 
Nonetheless, the court's 
analysis was limited to 
referring to article 4 of the 
Regulation, without 
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accident in 
Hungary.  
developing neither the 
arguments based on which 
the Regulation was cited, nor 
the arguments based on 
which the Romanian law was 







Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability 
7/Other EU - 








Ilfov Tribunal Art. 4.1 
Art. 19 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
7/Other EU - 








art. 19 Car accident in 
France 
Romanian law applicable to 
regress action. BAAR 
Romania cannot request 
payment from employee since 
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the company had the 
obligation to have an 
insurance according to 
Romanian law.  
163/2017 21-09-
17 
Bihor Tribunal Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Hungary. German 
insurer. 
Romanian law applicable. 
NO justification. Action 
aimed at obtaining only 
moral damages for death of 
brother 






Timis Tribunal Art. 4.1 
Art. 18 
Car accident in 
Hungary. 
Hungarian insurer. 
Claimant is sister of 
Romanian victim 
Romanian law applicable 
based on 4.2 No other 
argument.  









Car accident in 
Slovenia 
Locus damni applies.  7/Other EU - 
art. 10 of 
1215/2012   
Regulation  
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3701/2017  16-10-
17 
Ilfov Tribunal art. 4 car accident 
outside Romania. 
The court applies Romanian 
law without reasoning 













Italian law applicable.      4 more 
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District 2 - 
First Instance 
Court 
art. 19 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The court firstly qualifies 
whether the liability is 
contractual or extra-
contractual according to the 
Romanian Law, then 
concludes that the Romanian 
Law is applicable and denies 
the right to split liability 
between insurers. 
7/other EU - 
article 7 Rome I 
    
392/2017 01-11-
17 
Arad Tribunal art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Czech Republic 
Czech law applicable. Parties 
failed to prove the content of 
the law, therefore the law 
applied Romanian law based 
on article 2562 Covil Code 





art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's recourse 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability. 
Regarding the penalties, the 
court admitted the requested 
considering applicable a 
national provision (Norme no. 
23/2014) 
7/Other EU - 
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art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Germany 
applicable law decided by 
Supreme Court in Decision 
no. 404/19.02.2016. 
German law should have 
been applied to all aspects, 
moral damages included. 
Including the amount of the 
revenue to which the court 
should refer to. 






art. 4.1. The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The court deemed that the 
German law is applicable 
based on the provisions of 
articles 7.2, 7.4 and 7.4 of 
Rome I Regulation, as this is 
the law of the state where the 
ensured risk occurred. 
Consequently, the court 
admitted the plaintiff's claim.  
7/Other EU - 
article 7 of 
ROME I 
Regulation 




Ilfov Tribunal art. 4.3 Car accident in 
Germany 
Romanian law applicable, 
having regard to the fact that 
the circumstances of the case 
clearly show a closer 
connection with Romania than 







Date  Court/ 
Author name 
and reference 




Issues / subject 
areas  
Findings   Red Flags  ECJ case law 
cited 







Art. 4.1 car accident 
outside Romania. 




Dolj Tribunal art. 4.1 
art. 19 




Romanian law applicable for 
regress. NO indication of the 
law applicable to the 
damage. Court applies 
directly the Romanian law for 
recovery of the amounts from 
the person who had the 
obligation to insure the car 







Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Spain.  
Spanish law applicable to 
damages requested by 
relatives. Limitation period 
determined under Spanish 
law. 









Car accident in 
Italy caused by 
Romanian without 
insurance. 
Action initiated by 
insurer (BAAR 
Romania who paid 
Romanian law applicable for 
regress. German law 
applicable for the extent of 
the damage (NO justification 
of involvement of Germany) 









Date  Court/ 
Author name 
and reference 




Issues / subject 
areas  
Findings   Red Flags  ECJ case law 
cited 
Similar Cases  
BAAR Italy) 













the RCA insurer. 
Romanian law applicable 
because the claimants 
suffered the moral prejudice 
in Romania, irrespective 
where the actual tort 
happened. 







Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Belgium. 
Romanian law applicable (no 
reasoning) 








Art. 4.1  Car accident in 
Germany. 
Romanian victim.  
German law applicable. 
Since claimant did not prove 
its content, the claim was 
dismissed 
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art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's recourse 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability. 
Regarding the penalties, the 
court rejected the request with 
the reason that such penalties 
cannot be granted according 
to Romanian Law. Instead, the 
court found that the German 
law is applicable, and 
therefore considered that it 
cannot be applicable in 
conjuction with Order 
14/2011 regarding the 
calculation of penalties. 
7/Other EU - 
article 7 Rome I 











Applicable law to 
the damages 
claim. 
The appeal court changed the 
first court's judgement and 
applied the Austrian Law due 
to the fact that the tort 
happened in Austria, 
regardless of the nationality 
of the victim and the 
Romanian representative of 
the Austrian insurer. 
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The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The Romanian law shall 
govern the regress between 
insurers since the insurance 
contract is governed by the 
Romanian law. The Romanian 
law entitles the insurer of the 
tractor unit to claim regress 
against the insurer of the 
semi-trailer only if the semi-
trailer contributed to the 
accident because of a 
tehnical issue. Therefore, 
since such a technical issue 
was not proved, the 
Romanian law does not 
recognize the right to regress.  
7/Other EU - 
article 7 of 
ROME I 
Regulation 





art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's recourse 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
7/Other EU - 
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the parties, arising 
out of a contract 
that is closely 
connected with 
that unjust 
The defendant has the burden 
of proof that the Romanian 
law was chosen by the parties 
to govern the existing 
contractual arrangement, in 
accordance with article 3.1. 
of Rome I Regulation no. 
593/2008.  
7/Other EU - 
article 3.1. of 
Rome I 
Regulation 
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art. 4 The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA co-insurer to 
recover from 
another RCA co-
insurer half of the 
damages which 
were initially 
covered by the first 
in relation to the 
victim of a car 
accident that 
occurred in UK. 
The Court did not analyse the 
applicability of the provisions 
of Rome I Regulation and 
dismissed the claim based on 
lack of proof that the policy 
holder was guilty for the car 
accident.  






art. 4 The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
The Court deemed that the 
German law is applicable, 
without developing arguments 
in this respect. Eventually, the 
RCA insurer of the semi-trailer 
voluntarily paid half of the 
damages.  
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fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 







art. 4.1 The law applicable 
in case of split 
insurers' liability for 
car accident, when 
a part of the 
vehicle (the semi-
trailer) is insured 
by an insurer and 
another part of the 
vehicle (the tractor 
unit) is insured by 
another insurer.  
The German law is 
applicable, since the accident 
occurred in Germany. 
Therefore, the Court ordered 
the semi-trailer's insurer to 
cover half of the damages 
that were initially covered by 
the insurer of the tractor unit. 
However, as regards late 
payment penalties, the Court 
solved the claim considering 
the provisions of the 
Romanian law.   






art. 4.2 Car accident 
outside Romania 
Applicable law does not 
trigger competence of 
Romanian courts 












The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to fully 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
The court deemed that the 
French law is applicable 
between the two insurers.  
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semi-trailer the 
damages which 
were initially fully 
covered by the first 















Italian law applicable to the 
damages and Romanian 
applicable to regress action. 
German law is reffered 
without any justification 
      
2520/2018  06-06-
18 
Ilfov Tribunal Art. 4.2 Car accident in 
Germany 
German law applicable in the 
first court, but claim rejected 
because of lack of proof of 
foreign law. In the appeal, 
the court applies Romanian 
law without reasoning. 












Slovenian law applicable to 
damage determination 
(indirect damages of family 
members). Decision 660/ 
2017 from Timisoara Court of 
Appeal 
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N/A The law applicable 
to the right of the 
CASCO insurer of 
a vehicle to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
other vehicle the 
damages which 
were initially fully 
covered by the first 





The Court deemed that it is 
not authorized to solve the 
case, since the accident 
occurred in Republic of 
Moldova and the defendant's 
domicile is in that country, 
based on the provisions of a 
bilateral treaty between 
Romania and Republic of 
Moldova in the field of 
judiciary assistance. Also, the 
Court argued that the 
prejudice was produced in 
Republic of Moldova and, in 
any case, the Romanian law 
is not applicable. 






art. 4.1 Labour related 
accident in Austria. 
Romanian worker 
deceased. Claim 
initiated by wife 
and children 
Romanian law applicable - 
no justification. Tort law 
applicable to labour accident 
in Austria (no contractual 
connection between the 




    
829/2018 13-09-
18 
Timis Tribunal Art. 10.3 
art. 4.3 
Unjust use of train 
cars in Romania 
Romanian law applicable to 
unjust use of trains cars in 
Romania by a Romanian 
entity 
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  Car accident in 
Germany. Insurer 
with terminated 
contract paid the 
damages. Regress 
action against the 
actual insurers of 
the motor head 
and the trailer. 
The appeal court applied the 
Romanian Law without any 
justification. 

















Romanian law applicable 
since no connection of the 
parties with Great Britain   














The court applied the 
Romanian Law to the regress 
action as well as for the tort, 
considering that both the 
victim and the guilty party had 
their usual residence in 
Romania.  
7/Other EU - 
article 7 of 
ROME I 
Regulation 
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Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable, 
because the Regulation 
stipulates that the liability is 
extra-contractual even when 
one of the insures who paid 
goes against the other one. 
      
4083/2018  15-10-
18 
Ilfov Tribunal Art. 4.1 
Art. 19 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
German law applicable, 
because of the place of 
accident. The first court 
rejected the claim because of 
lack of evidence of foreign 
law. In the appeal phase, the 
court applies Romanian law 
without reasoning.  






art. 4 The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of the 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
The court omitted to analyse 
the applicability of the 
provisions of Rome I 
Regulation and deemed the 
Romanian law as applicable. 
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the first in relation 
to a car accident 




















The court applied the 
Romanian Law due to the 
place where the tort 
happened. 
      
5106/2018  29-11-
18 
Ilfov Tribunal art. 4.1  Car accident in 
Germany 
German law applicable. 
However, granted penalties 
according to Romanian law. 
7/Other EU - 
art. 7.2 from 
Regulation no. 
593/2008  






N/A The applicable law 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer half of 
the damages 
which were initially 
fully cover by the 
The Court omitted to analyse 
the applicability of the 
provisions of Rome II 
Regulation and noticed that 
the insurer of the semi-trailer 
did not challenge the 
plaintiff's claims and that it 
had voluntarily reimbursed a 
part of the claimed damages. 
The Court ordered the insurer 
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first in relation to a 
car accident that 
occurred in 
Germany. 
of the semi-trailer to cover the 
rest of the damages (the 
difference between half of the 
damages paid by the insurer 
of the tractor unit and the 
damages reimbursed by the 
insurer of the semi-trailer). 
With respect to late payment 
penalties, the Court solved 
this claim according to the 






art. 1.1 Confusion with 
Regulation Brussels  
Applicable law does not 
trigger competence 
7/Other EU - 
Regulation 
1215/2012 








Car accident in 
Romania. Swiss 
victim.  
Romanian law applicable 
irrespective of the law that 
applies to the relation 
between the insurer and the 
victim 













District 2 - 
First Instance 
Art. 1.1  
Art. 4.1  
Car accident in 
Italy. BAAR 
Romania paid 
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  Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The appeal court used the first 
court's judgement which 
stated that the German Law is 
applicable as res judicata 
and applied the German Law 
without further analysing the 
conflict of laws. (The first court 
dismissed the claim due to the 
lack of proof of the German 
Law.) 





Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Belgium involving 
a vehicle normally 
parked in Belgium 




Applicable law to 
Insurer's action.  
Appeal to District 4 - First 
instance Court Decision (the 
number is censored). Belgian 
law applicable for the 
damages claim. 







Car accident in 
Switzerland 
Switzerland law applicable, 
according to Decision no. 
1/2012 of the Joint 
Committee established by the 
Agreement between the 
European Community and its 
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Member States, of the one 
part, and the Swiss 
Confederation, of the other 
part. However, granted 
penalties according to 









Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
Although the appeal court 
was of the same opinion as 
the first court, that being that 
the Romanian Law is 
applicable due to the fact that 
both insurers were Romanian 
and their legal relationship is 
governed by the Romanian 
Law, the court changed the 
judgement because the 
plaintiff had paid 50% of the 
damages in the meantime 
and it was considered an 
admission of debt. 
7/Other EU - 
article 7 of 
ROME I 
Regulation 







Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
Appeal to District 1 First 
Instance Court Decision no. 
1646/2018. The law 
applied to the car accident 
applies to the split of the 
insurers liability. The German 
50% split of the liability is 
applicable. 
  C – 359/14, 
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Author name 
and reference 




Issues / subject 
areas  
Findings   Red Flags  ECJ case law 
cited 
Similar Cases  










The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The law applicable is 
German law  - the law where 
the accident/prejudice was 
produced. Romanian law is 
not applicable in what 
concern the regress between 
insurers. Regarding the 
penalties, the court admitted 
the requested considering 
applicable a national 
provision 
7/Other EU - 















The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
The law applicable is 
German law  - the law where 
the accident/prejudice was 
produced, Romanian law is 
not applicable in what 
concern the regress between 
insurers. Regarding the 
penalties, the court admited 
the requested considering 
applicable a national 
7/Other EU - 














Date  Court/ 
Author name 
and reference 




Issues / subject 
areas  
Findings   Red Flags  ECJ case law 
cited 
Similar Cases  
the first in relation 
to a car accident 






District 5 - 
First Instance 
Court 
art. 4.1 Physical assault in 
Romania. Mobile 
phone destroyed 
during visit in 
Romania by 
divorced father to 
child in mother's 
house. Father is an 
arab citizen. NO 
clear connection 
with other EU 
country  
Romanian law applied. NO 
justification 





  Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The claimant filed an appeal 
in order to obtain 50% of the 
management fee which he 
paid along with the damages. 
The court applied the German 
Law considering the place 
where the tort happened and 
based on the Internal 
Regulations of the Council of 
Bureaux. 
7/Other EU - 












Date  Court/ 
Author name 
and reference 




Issues / subject 
areas  
Findings   Red Flags  ECJ case law 
cited 






Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Germany. 
Romanian  victim 
deceased. 
Relatives request moral 
damages. C-220/88 reflects 
that the damage is generated 
in the country where the 
accident took place. 
However, since the victim was 
living in Romania, the 
damages were directly 
generated in Romania. 
Therefore, Romanian law 
applicable - Comment - court 
considers that because the 
victim lived in Romania, direct 
damages occurred here. 





Art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 







Date  Court/ 
Author name 
and reference 




Issues / subject 
areas  
Findings   Red Flags  ECJ case law 
cited 








Th law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of the 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
trailer a half of the 
damages which 
were initially fully 
covered by the first 




The Court deemed that article 
19 of Regulation Rome II, as 
it was interpreted by the ECJ, 
provided that subrogation of 
the insurer that indemnified 
the victim, as regards the 
victim's rights against the 
person responsible for the car 
accident is regulated by the 
law applicable to the third 
party's obligation, 
respectively by the law 
applicable to the insurer that 
indemnified the victim of the 
accident. Also, the same 
provisions regulate that the 
law applicable for 
determining the person to 
which the prejudice is 
imputable and the way of 
splitting liability is determined 
according to article 4 and 
following of Rome II 
Regulation, namely the law of 
the country where the 
prejudice was produced. 
Further, the Court concluded 
that the persons responsible 
for the accident and the 
extent of their liability is 
7/Other EU - 














Date  Court/ 
Author name 
and reference 
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areas  
Findings   Red Flags  ECJ case law 
cited 
Similar Cases  
determined according to the 
law of the country where the 
car accident occurred, based 
on article 4 of Rome II 
Regulation. Also, the insurer's 
obligation to cover the 
prejudice and its possibility to 
resort to subrogation is 
determined according to the 
law applicable to the 
insurance contract, based on 
article 7 of Rome I 
Regulation.  
Consequently, the Romanian 
law is not applicable because 
it only regulates the right of 
the insurer who indemnified 
the victim to subrogate in the 
victim's rights.  
Therefore, the Court deemed 
the German law is applicable 
with respect to the tort and 
that it regulates the person to 
which the prejudice is 
imputable, as well as the 
extend of liability. Hence, the 
RCA insurer of the tractor unit 
is entitled to recover from the 
other insurer half of the 
damages paid to the victim.  
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Author name 
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Issues / subject 
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Similar Cases  
penalties, the Court deemed 
that the German law is also 
applicable and dismissed this 
claim because the plaintiff did 
not prove the German law 
that regulates the legal 









The law applicable 
law to the right of 
the RCA insurer of 
a tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer half of 
the damages 
The Court deemed that the 
Romanian law was 
applicable because the 
prejudice was produced in 
Romania. Irrespective that the 
car accident occurred in 
Germany, the payment of the 
damages by the first insurer 







Date  Court/ 
Author name 
and reference 




Issues / subject 
areas  
Findings   Red Flags  ECJ case law 
cited 
Similar Cases  
which were initially 
fully cover by the 
first in relation to a 
car accident that 
occurred in 
Germany. 








The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of the 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer half of 
the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The law of the place where 
the car accident occurred, 
namely Germany, determines 
both the debtors who must 
compensate the damages 
caused to the victim and 
whether liability can be split in 
relation to the victim.  
The Romanian law shall 
govern the regress between 
insurers since the insurance 
contract is governed by the 
Romanian law.  
The Romanian law entitles the 
insurer of the tractor unit to 
claim regress against the 
insurer of the semi-trailer only 
if the semi-trailer contributed 
to the accident because of a 
technical issue.  
Therefore, since such a 
technical issue was not 
proved, the Romanian law 
does not recognize the right 
7/Other EU - 
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cited 
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Art. 4.1 Helicopter 
accident in 
Romania 
Romanian law applicable to 
German victim 
      
218/2019 24-04-
19 
Dolj Tribunal Art. 4.1 
Art. 19 
Car accident in 
Italy. Romanian 
debtor. BAAR 
regress action for 
damages paid to 
BAAR Italy 
Romanian law applicable (no 
justification) 






Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Poland.  
The appeal court dismisses 
the claim because it was 
grounded wrognfully on 
Romanian law. The right to 
opt for claim against insurer is 
irrevocable: cannot go after 
the insurer representative in 
Romania if already asked the 
prejudice from the Polish 
insurer 







Date  Court/ 
Author name 
and reference 




Issues / subject 
areas  
Findings   Red Flags  ECJ case law 
cited 
Similar Cases  
132/2019 07-05-
19 
Dolj Tribunal Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Germany 
Romanian law applicable. 
No justification.  
      
1383/2019  09-05-
19 
Ilfov Tribunal Art. 4.2 Car accident in 
France 
Romanian law applicable 
taking into account also that 
the person whose liability is 
invoked and the persons who 
suffered the damage have the 
residency in Romania 






Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Germany. Motor 
head versus trailer 
insurer.  
German law applicable as 
per C-359/14.  






Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Romania. 
Hungarian debtor 
Romanian law applicable to 
all aspects 
      
1723/2019  31-05-
19 
Ilfov Tribunal Art. 4.2 car accident in 
Germany 
Romanian law applicable 
taking into account also that 
the person whose liability is 
invoked and the persons who 
suffered the damage have the 
residency in Romania 






Art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
7/Other EU - 
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insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
the Romanian Authority's 







art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
7/Other EU - 









art. 4.1. The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The law aplicable is German 
law  - the law where the 
accident/prejudice was 
produced. Romanian law is 
not aplicable in what concern 
the regress between insurers. 









art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
7/Other EU - 
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cited 
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Alba Iulia liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 











Czech law applicable 
according to parties, but court 
analysis Romanian law 








Car accident in 
Luxembourg. 
Request for 
damages paid by 
the repair service 
Romanian law considered to 
be applicable  (no 
justification) 






N/A The law applicable 
to the right of the 
of the CASCO 
insurer of a vehicle 
to recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
other vehicle the 
damages which 
were initially fully 
covered by the first 




Considering the provisions of 
Regulation (EU) no. 
1215/2012, the Court 
deemed that it is not 
authorized to solve the case, 
since the accident occurred in 
Republic of Moldova. 





articles 19 and 
12 of Directive 
103/2009/EC. 
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Author name 
and reference 
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cited 






Art. 4 Car accident in 
England. 
Romanian victim. 




against the insurer. 
The court decided that the 
applicable law is the Czech 
Law because the tort 
happened in the Czech 
Republic. 


















Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability should be applicable 
and not the Romanian 
Authority's directive regarding 
the liability, but the Court 
dismissed the appeal because 
the claimant did not provide 
evidence of the tort 
7/Other EU - 
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Applicable law to 
the damages 
claim. 
The court applied the 
Romanian Law considering 
that the actual damages 
happened in Romania, where 
the claimant lived and where 
he was subject to 
hospitalization. No other 
justification related to Rome II 
Regulation. 
















The law applicable 
to the right of the 
Romanian RCA 
insurer of a semi-
trailer to recover 
from the Romanian 
natural person 
driving the tractor 
unit of the vehicle 
(which was not 
insured) the 




acted as a 
representative of 
The court omitted to analyse 
the applicability of the 
provisions of Rome I 
Regulation and deemed the 
Romanian law as applicable. 
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the Romanian 
insurer in 
Germany, for a 
car accident 








art. 4.1. The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The court omitted to analyse 
the applicability of the 
provisions of Rome I 
Regulation and solved the 
case based on the Romanian 
law, considering the judiciary 
confession of the defendant.  






art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
7/Other EU - 
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motor head and 
the trailer 















German law applicable       
563/2019 01-10-
19 
Ilfov Tribunal art. 4 
Art. 23.2 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
Romanian law applicable, 
because the insurer has its 
headquarters in Romania 
7/Other EU - 
















Romanian law applied. No 
justification. 
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cited 






art. 4.1 The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of the 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer half of 
the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The Court deemed that based 
on article 7 of Rome I 
Regulation the Romanian law 
is applicable.  
7/Other EU - 
article 7 of 
ROME I 
Regulation 
N/A   
3770/2019 14-10-
19 
Ilfov Tribunal art. 4 car accident in 
Germany 
German law applicable, 
because of the place of 
accident. The court reasoned 
that it has no impact that the 
payment was made in 
Romania, the place of 
accident being relevant  
7/Other EU - 









N/A The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
The court omitted to analyse 
the applicability of the 
provisions of Rome I 
Regulation and solved the 
case based on the Romanian 
law, considering the judiciary 
confession of the defendant.  
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of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 











Court decides that German 
law is applicable to regress of 
German Insurer against 
Romanian insurer. (no details) 
      
1034/2019 22-10-
19 
Timis Tribunal Art. 4.1 
Art. 19 
Art. 16 
Applicable law - 
car accident 
Subrogation of car 
service for the 
recovery of the 
insurance 
Maximum amount 
that can be 
recovered by 
subrogee 
Hungarian law applicable. 
Art. 19 allows another party 
to claim the damages 
Art. 16 allows Romanian 
mandatory provisions that 
include the obligation to 
cover all prejudice (art. 10.e 
Law 132/2017) 





Art. 4.1      
Art. 17 of 
Preamble 
Car accident in 
France. Damages 
claim 
Appeal to District 4 First 
Instance Court Decision no. 
3108/2019. French law 
applicable to the accident 
and for the damages claim. 
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Car accident in 
Germany. 
Romanian debtor.  
Romanian insurer regress 
action due to alcohol use by 
driver. Contractual link - 
parties have signed an 
insurance agreement. 
Actually, it was a contractual 
claim 







Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The appeal court changed the 
first court's judgement, stating 
that the Romanian Law is 
applicable and denies the 
right to split liability between 
insurers, considering the 
Romanian insurer's usual 
residence and the connection 
to Rome I Regulation. 
7/Other EU - 













Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
German law applicable for 
the split of liability based on 
para 50-52, 58 and 59 of 
C-359 and C-475/14. 
Rome I applicable for the 
determination of the law 
applicable between the 
insurer and his contractual 
partner in order to see if there 
is a regress action.  
Separate opinion from one 
7/Other EU - 
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judge: he considers that the 
regress implies not only the 
verification of whether the 
insurer subrogates but also if 
he can go after other entities.  
Comment: This interpretation 
in the second opinion leads to 
overlapping the two laws the 
judges considers applicable:  
- he says that the delicti law - 
German - establishes the 
parties responsibles, but also, 
- the regress law establishes 






art. 4.1. The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of the 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
insurer of RCA the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The court omitted to analyse 
the applicability of the 
provisions of Rome I 
Regulation and deemed the 
German law as applicable. 
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cited 






art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Hungary, foreigner 
ensurer 
Applicable law does not 
trigger competence 
7/Other EU -  
art. 11-13 of 
1215/2012   
Regulation  


















art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
7/Other EU - 









art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
7/Other EU - 
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Art. 4.2 Car accident in 
Hungary. 
Romanian victims.  
Romanian debtor. 
Romanian law applicable 
between some parties 
(Romanian victims).  






art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
7/Other EU - 









art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
7/Other EU - 






Timis Tribunal Art. 4.1 
Art. 16 
Car accident in 
Spain. Family 
Deceased.  
Spanish law applicable. 
Spanish law limits the 
members of the family who 
can request damages.  
7/Other EU - 
Directive 
2009/103 
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Romanian principle of full 
reparation applicable as 
mandatory provision, 
therefore other family 








Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The appeal court maintained 
the first court's judgement, 
stating that the Romanian Law 
is applicable and denies the 
right to split liability between 
insurers, considering that both 
insurers were Romanian and 
their legal relationship is 
governed by the Romanian 
Law. 
7/Other EU - 


























Romanian law applicable.        
4198/2019  14-11-
19 
Ilfov Tribunal art. 4.1, 
4.2, 4.3 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
Romanian law applicable as 
place of damage, given that 
the person whose liability is 
invoked and the person who 
suffered the damage have 
their residence in the same 
7/Other EU - 
article 7 Rome I 
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motor head and 
the trailer 
country at the moment of 




Sibiu Tribunal art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's recourse 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
7/Other EU - 














German law applicable as 
place of direct damage 











Romanian law applicable. 
Hungarian victim had the 
obligation to know the law 






art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
7/Other EU - 
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motor head and 
the trailer 







Art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
7/Other EU - 









art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Germany. Regress 
action motor head 
versus trailer 
insurer 
German law applicable as 
per C-359/14. However, 
claimant did not prove the 
content of the applicable law. 
Therefore, art. 2652 of the 
Romanian Civil Code applies 
- Romanian law.  






art. 4.1 The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer half of 
the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
The Court omitted to analyse 
the applicability of the 
provisions of Rome II 
Regulation and noticed that 
the insurer of the semi-trailer 
had voluntarily paid the 
damages initially covered by 
the first insurer. With respect 
to the claim regarding late 
payment penalties, the Court 
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the first in 
connection with a 
car accident that 
occurred in 
Germany. 
solved this claim according to 
the rules set out by the 






art. 4.2 Car accident in 
France. Romanian 
debtor. French and 
Romanian victims. 
Romanian law applies since 
both victim and debtor were 
Romanians.  






art. 4.1 The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The Court deemed the law 
applicable to the case is the 
law where the 
accident/prejudice was 
produced, namely the 
German law, according to 
which the liability is split 
between the insurers of the 
tractor unit and trailer. The 
Romanian law shall govern 
the regress between insurers 
since the insurance contract is 
governed by the Romanian 
law. The Romanian law 
entitles the insurer of the 
tractor unit to claim regress 
against the insurer of the 
semi-trailer only if the semi-
trailer contributed to the 
accident because of a 
7/Other EU - 
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Findings   Red Flags  ECJ case law 
cited 
Similar Cases  
tehnical issue. Therefore, 
since such a technical issue 
was not proved, the 
Romanian law does not 










German law applicable an 
applied to all aspects of the 
action (damage/ split/ 
persons liable) 












art. 19 The law applicable 
to the Romanian 
public health 
insurer's regress 
action against the 
Romanian debtor's 
civil auto liability 
insurer (RCA 
insurer) to recover 
from the latter the 
costs incurred by 
the first, according 
to the rules set by 
the German law, 
with respect to the 
The Court solved the case 
based on the provisions of the 
Romanian law related to tort. 
In its reasoning, the Court 
cited the provisions of art. 19 
of Rome II Regulation, art. 93 
of Regulation (CE) no. 
1408/1971 and certain 
provisions of the bilateral 
treaty in force between 
Romania and Germany in the 
field of social security.  
 
Based on these provisions, 
the Court deemed the plaintiff 
7/Other EU - 
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medical treatment 
and other 
expenses borne in 
connection with a 
German citizen 
who was injured in 
a car accident 
caused by a 
Romanian driver in 
Romania.  
is entitled to recover from the 
debtor's RCA insurer the costs 
borne as a consequence of 
the car accident. The Court 
did not explain in its 
reasoning neither the 
arguments based on which 
the Romanian law is 
applicable neither any 
express mention with respect 
to the applicable law. 
However, the Court further 
analysed the fulfilment of 
conditions to trigger the 
debtor's RCA insurer liability 
as they are regulated under 








Car accident in 
Germany. Insurer 
with terminated 
contract paid the 
damages. Regress 
action against the 
actual insurers of 
the motor head 
and the trailer. 
German law applicable for 
split of liability. Romanian law 
applied to subrogation. 
However, the court applies 
Romanian law to penalties.  
7/Other EU - 
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art. 4 The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
semi-trailer to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
tractor unit half of 
the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The court omitted to analyse 
the applicability of the 
provisions of Rome II 
Regulation and deemed the 
Romanian law as applicable. 
N/A N/A   
4806/2019  19-12-
19 
Ilfov Tribunal Art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
Locus damni applies, 
therefore German law 
applicable. On the merits, the 
court found that the claimant 
did not provided evidence 
that the defendand is the 
owner of the trailer 
7/Other EU - 
article 7 Rome I 
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The law applicable 
to the right of the 
CASCO insurer of 
a tractor unit to 




Romania of the 
Spanish RCA 
insurer of the other 
vehicle, the 
damages which 
were initially fully 
covered by the the 
Insurers' 
Guarantee Fund 
(on behalf of the 
CASCO insurer) in 
relation to a car 
accident that 
occurred in Spain.  
The Court deemed Rome II 
Regulation as applicable. The 
Court deemed that, even 
though the event giving rise to 
the damage occurred in 
Spain, the prejudice was 
produced in Romania 
because the damaged vehicle 
was owned by a company 
incorporated in Romania. 
Therefore, the Romanian law 
is applicable.  Further, the 
Court solved the claims 
related to statute of limitation 
and the recovery of damages 
considering the rules set by 
the Romanian law and 
ordered the correspondent 
Romanian insurance 
company of the Spanish RCA 
insurer to cover the damages 
initially covered by the 
Insurers' Guarantee Fund on 
behalf of the Romanian 
CASCO insurer.  










Czech law applicable. Court 
applied the foreign legislation 
and case law.  
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280/2020 23-01-
20 
Arad Tribunal Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Romania 
Romanian law applicable. 
Foreign insurer 




District 2 - 
First Instance 
Court 
Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Germany. Joint 
liability of principal 




German law applicable as 
place of direct damage 








Car accident in 
Germany. Motor 
head versus trailer 
insurer 
German law applicable. 
Romanian law sets the right to 
subrogate 






Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
France. Romanian 
victim.  
Romanian law was applied in 
frist instance and appeal. 
Used to determine the person 
responsible. No justification.  







art. 4.1. The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
The law aplicable is 
Romanian law, given that the 
damage occurred in Romania 
because the damage is 
represented by the payment 
of full compensation by the 
plaintiff, a payment that was 
obviously made from 
Romania 
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the first in relation 
to a car accident 







art. 4.1 Car accident in 
France 
The court applied Romanian 
law without any analysis. 






art. 4 The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The liability split between the 
two RCA insurers is 
determined according to the 
law governing the tort, 
namely the law of the state 
where the accident occurred 
(i.e., the German law). The 
German law provides that the 
liability is split between the 
two insurers.  
7/Other EU - 
article 7 of 
ROME I 
Regulation and 











District 2 - 
First Instance 
Court 
art. 4.1 car accident in 
Italy caused by 
Romanian without 
insurance. 
Action initiated by 
insurer (BAAR 
Italian law applicable to the 
regress action considering the 
place of accident and 
damage. 
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Romania who paid 
BAAR Italy) 





  Car accident in 
France. Romanian 
victim deceased. 
Relatives asking for 
indirect damages 
from the RCA 
insurer and BAAR 
Romania. 
The court stated that the 
Romanian Law is applicable 
without justifying why. 






art. 4 The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of the 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer half of 
the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The split of liability between 
the two insurers is determined 
according to the law 
applicable in the state where 
the accident occurred (in this 
case, the German law). The 
law applicable to the right to 
regress is the law according 
to which the national court 
analyses if a right to regress 
does or does not exist, and 
not the specific content of the 
payment obligation. 
Therefore, the Court deemed 
that the Romanian law must 
be applied only with respect 
to the existence/inexistence 
7/Other EU - 
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of a subrogation of the insurer 
in relation to the victim's 
rights. The Romanian law 
regulates this subrogation as 
a principle under the Civil 
Code. 
Contrary to the defendant's 
claims, as regards the specific 
content of the payment 
obligation (i.e., whether the 
liability of the semi-trailer's 
insurers exists in relation to the 
victim and, subsequently, in 
relation with the insurer of the 
tractor unit), the Court 
deemed that the German law 
was applicable. 
Consequently, the Court 
found that the payment 
obligation existed as regards 
50% of the damages.  
The Court ordered the 
defendant to pay 50% of the 
damages to the plaintiff.  
As regards legal late payment 
penalties, the Court found that 
the plaintiff did not prove the 
German law and dismissed 
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art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
7/Other EU - 









art. 4.1 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
7/Other EU - 











Car accident in 
Germany 
Romanian law applicable 
since both parties argued 
based on its provisions, 
although no express 
agreement existed.  






art. 4.1 Industrial machine 
not according to 
specifications for 
lavander culture. 
Tort claim against 
producer. 
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liability for goods 

















Romanian law applicable to 
regress action. BAAR 
Romania claimed that 
limitation is applicable from 
the payment date - citing 
Decision no 
6185/02.11.2001. 
Accepted by court.  




District 2 - 
First Instance 
Court 
art. 4.1 car accident in 
Spain caused by 
Romanian without 
insurance. 
Action initiated by 
insurer (BAAR 
Romania who paid 
Spanish law applicable to the 
regress action considering the 
place of accident and 
damage. 
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BAAR Spain) 






art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Greece 
The law applied to the car 
accident is Greek law based 
on locus damni  
7/Other EU - 










Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability 
7/Other EU - 












Art. 4.1 Car accident Locus damni applies in the 
dispute between the car 
service (Romania) and the 
insurer (Hungary) 









Car accident in 
France 
As the claimant failed to make 
the proof of foreign law from 
France, the court rejected the 
claim 
7/Other EU - 
article 7 Rome I 
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art. 4 The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of the 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
trailer a half of the 
damages which 
were initially fully 
covered by the first 




The Court deemed the law 
applicable to the case is the 
law where the 
accident/prejudice was 
produced, namely the 
German law, according to 
which the liability is split 
between the insurers of the 
tractor unit and trailer. 
However, with respect to late 
payment penalties, the Court 
solved the claim according to 
the Romanian law.  
7/Other EU - 















Car accident in 
Germany. Insurer 
with terminated 
contract paid the 
damages. Regress 
action against the 
actual insurers of 
the motor head 
and the trailer. 
German law applicable for 
split of liability. Romanian law 
applied to subrogation  
7/Other EU - 














Car accident in 
Germany. Insurer 
with terminated 
contract paid the 
damages. Regress 
German law applicable to 
accident and covers (art. 
15.b) the split of liability. 
Romanian law only covers the 
right of an insurer to 
7/Other EU - 
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action against the 
actual insurers of 
the motor head 
and the trailer. 
subrogate and to go after the 
trailer insurer.  
German law was not proved 
with respect to the penalties/ 
interest and therefore, the 










Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The law applied to the car 
accident applies to the split of 
the insurers liability. Hence 
the German 50% split of the 
liability is applicable and not 
the Romanian Authority's 
directive regarding the 
liability  
7/Other EU - 






Arad Tribunal Art. 4.1 Car accident . 
Country unknown.  
Romanian law applicable. 
Bulgarian insurer. 
      
468/2020  08-10-
20 
Cluj Court of 
Appeal 
Art. 18 Car accident in 
Hungary 
Hungary law applicable 
based on locus damni. The 
court rejected the request for 
penalties, as the Hungarian 
law did not provided them 
and applying Romanian law 
would have determined a lex 
tertia 
7/Other EU - 
Directive 
2009/103 




District 3 - 
First Instance 
  Trailer entirely 
damaged while 
loading the cargo 
The court applies the 
Romanian Law without any 
justification. 
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Court in Austria. Carrier 
asking for 
damages from the 
Romanian 









The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer a half 
of the damages 
which were initially 
fully covered by 
the first in relation 
to a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany.  
The law applicable is 
German law  - the law where 
the accident/prejudice was 
produced. Romanian law 
applicable to the regress 
between insurers allows the 
regress 
7/Other EU - 













Art. 4.1 Car accident in 
Belgium.  
Belgian law applicable for 
direct damages. Indirect 
damages are not relevant for 
the determination of the 
applicable law 
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The law applicable 
to the Austrian 
prejudiced natural 
person right to 




of a car accident, 
as well as to the 
Austrian insurer's 
regress against the 
Romanian debtor's 
civil auto liability 
Romanian insurer.  
The Austrian plaintiff claimed 
the application of the 
Romanian law, without this 
being challenged by the 
defendant. The defendant's 
(i.e., the insurance company) 
headquarters are in Romania. 
Therefore, the Romanian law 
is applicable and the plaintiffs 
are entitled to be 
compensated for the 
damages.  
7/Other EU - 
article 7 of 
ROME I 
Regulation 






art. 4 The law applicable 
to the right of the 
RCA insurer of a 
tractor unit to 
recover from the 
RCA insurer of the 
semi-trailer half of 
the damages 
which were initially 
fully cover by the 
first in connection 
with a car accident 
that occurred in 
Germany. 
The Court deemed that the 
German law only applies in 
relation with the right of the 
victim to request any of the 
two insurers to cover the 
damages caused by the car 
accident. As regards the 
relationship between the two 
insurers, the Court deemed 
that the Romanian law is 
applicable based on article 7 
of Rome I Regulation.  
7/Other EU - 
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art. 4 Car accident in 
Germany. 
Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
The court states that the 
Romanian Law is applicable 
considering the Romanian 
insurer's usual residence and 
the connection to Rome I 
Regulation. 
7/Other EU - 








Ilfov Tribunal art. 4.2 Applicable law to 
Insurer's regress 
action when the 
liability is split 
between different 
insurers of the 
motor head and 
the trailer 
Romanian law applicable 
(ASF 23/2014 ). The 
claimant did not provided 
evidence that the damage 
was caused due to technical 
issues, which could not be 
seen by the driver 
7/Other EU - 
article 7 Rome I 









Car accident in 
Hungary 
Hungary law applicable 
based on locus damni, but 
considering that the claimant 
invoked Romanian law, 
rejected the claim as 
groundless 







• Based on the sources available to us, Rome II seems to be generally known to Slovak practitioners, the courts 
regularly apply and refer to Rome II. Private international law literature focuses mainly on general 
interpretation of individual provisions of Rome II, we have not identified any specific doctrinal discussion.  
• The doctrine suggests that there is certain ambiguity in determining the law applicable to traffic accidents, 
where Rome II (see 27) is applied instead of the 1971 Hague Convention . The differentiation between 
contractual and non-contractual obligations also seems problematic in certain cases (see 5), as well as the 
characterization of some claims as unjust enrichment (see 12). 
Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
• Chapter I - Scope and Interpretation: On a general level, we have not come across any widely spread 
problems. There seems to be some ambiguity with respect to differentiating between the Rome II and Rome I 
Regulations (see 5). Some doubts aroused regarding claims on unpaid tolls for motorway in a foreign 
country, with respect to exclusion of non-contractual obligations in administrative matters (see 1). The 
characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations" seems problematic in some cases of unjust 
enrichment where the relationship in question relates to a contract within the meaning of Art. 10(1) Rome II. 
These are cases of assignment of a right to payment for a public transport ticket (deadheads) (see 3). The 
courts respect the consistency with the recast Brussels I Regulation without difficulties. With regard to the 
relationship between the Rome II and Rome I Regulations, there appears to be a difficulty regarding claims 
involving assignment of contracts concerning receivables against passengers arising out of lack of a valid 
ticket, see 3. Damages claimed in cases of breach of various questionable agreements were sometimes 
classified as non-contractual (see 5). 
• Chapter II – Tort/Delict: According to our information, no difficulties emerged so far. 
• Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa in Contrahendo: Unjust enrichment represents 
one of the most frequent subject-matters of the proceedings. First of all, there is a line of case law regarding 
Slovak citizens who travelled in the Czech Republic by public transport without a valid ticket. It is 
questionable, whether such cases shall not be subject to Art. 14(2) Rome I Regulation (see 3). In some cases, 
the unjust enrichment related to purchase, transport or insurance contracts, and therefore the characterization 
as unjust enrichment was problematic. Nevertheless, it did not have any effect on the determination of 
applicable law, see 5. 
• Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice: No relevant case law is available to the Reporters. 
• Chapter V - Common Rules: Mostly, the courts determine Slovak law as applicable. When a foreign law 
applies, it is in most cases Czech law, easily applicable for Slovak courts. It seems that the courts have no 
difficulty applying Austrian, German, Polish or Hungarian law (see 17). As to the application of overriding 
mandatory provisions, without any reasoning or any contextual link, the courts only state that Art. 16 Rome 
II Regulation applies, see 19. 
• Chapter VI - Other Provisions: No relevant case law is available to the Reporters. Art. 28 is mentioned only 
in one case which relates to the 1971 Hague Convention (see 27). Unfortunately, the courts do not always 
take into account the application of the 1971 Hague Convention. Some courts correctly gave precedence 
to the 1971 Hague Convention over Rome II. On the other hand, there are cases where the courts applied 
Rome II instead of the 1971 Hague Convention. Usually, these decisions do not give any reasoning as to 
the application of Rome II.  
Comments on areas of interest 
• In all cases concerning violations of privacy, the courts did not apply Rome II, but provisions of the Slovak 
autonomous law, i.e., Sec. 15 of the Slovak PIL Act (see 29). Defamation was concerned only in one case 





• How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State? 
No commentary on the Rome II Regulation ("Rome II") has been published in Slovakia so far, but Rome II is analysed 
in all Slovak textbooks on private international law. The most comprehensive analysis of Rome II is to be found in  
“Introduction to Private International and Procedural Law” (by Csach, Gregová, Širicová and Júdová, in Slovak), 
which analyses the provisions of Rome II in the form of a brief commentary.1201 The book also focuses on conflict rules 
for  non-contractual obligations contained in other legal sources than Rome II with special emphasis on the 1971 
Hague Convention,1202 which in Slovakia shall take precedence over Rome II and in practice is often overlooked. 
Furthermore, the Slovak autonomous regulation of private international law, enshrined in Section 15 of the Slovak 
Private International Law Act,1203 is discussed in detail. Succinct commentary on Rome II is included also in a basic 
textbook “Private International Law” (Štefanková et al., in Slovak),1204 which also covers in detail the questions of Rome 
II applicability. The application of the Rome II Regulation in Slovakia is also discussed in the recent Intersentia 
publication ‘Rome I and Rome II Regulations in Practice’.1205 
Based on the sources available to us, it seems that Rome II is generally known to Slovak practitioners. 
•  Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
In the Slovak case law available to us, the courts regularly apply and refer to Rome II. 
• Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
We have not come across any relevant statistics in the context of our research. 
• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
Slovak literature on private international law focuses mainly on general interpretation of individual provisions of Rome 
II, we have not identified any specific doctrinal discussion.  
• Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political 
level? 
The doctrine suggests that there is some ambiguity in determining the law applicable to traffic accidents, where the 
1971 Hague Convention shall be applied instead of Rome II, otherwise the court would err in its assessment of the 
case, as pointed out explicitly by Csach with reference to the decision of the Regional Court BA.1206   We are not aware 
of any other debate at doctrinal level. Problems may arise in connection with differentiation between contractual and 
non-contractual obligations partly due to the concept and classification of obligations in the substantive law of the 
 
 
1201 CSACH, Kristián, ŠIRICOVÁ GREGOVÁ, Ľubica, JÚDOVÁ, Elena, Úvod do štúdia medzinárodného práva 
súkromného a procesného (in Slovak), 2. vydanie. Bratislava: Wolters Kluwer SR, 2018, 314 p., pp. 169-194 
Csach), hereinafter Csach. 
1202 1971 Hague Convention was published under No. 130/1976 Zb. (Zb. - Collection of laws of former 
Czechoslovakia, now Collection of Laws of the Slovak Republic). 
1203 Act No. 97/1963 Zb., on Private International Law and International Procedure relating thereto (hereinafter “PIL 
Act”) Sec. 15: “Tort claims shall be governed by the law of the place where the damage or the harmful event 
occurred.” 
1204 ŠTEFANKOVÁ, Natália, LYSINA, Peter et al., Medzinárodné právo súkromné (in Slovak), 1. vydanie, Praha: 
2011, C. H. Beck, 600 p., pp. 388-409 (Štefanková), hereinafter Štefanková. 
1205 JÚDOVÁ, Elena, and LEVRINC, Miloš, The Application of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations in Slovakia, in: 
GUINCHARD, Emmanuel, Rome I and Rome II in Practice, Intersentia, London, November 2020, pp. 485-526, 
hereinafter Júdová and Levrinc. 




former Czechoslovakia, where non-contractual obligations did not represent a separate category.1207 Questionable 
may also be the  characterization of certain claims as unjust enrichment.1208  
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
On a general level, we have not come across any widely spread problems. The courts, without difficulties, excluded 
such matters as rights in rem or matrimonial property regime or violations of privacy and rights relating to personality. 
However, there seems to be some ambiguity with respect to differentiating between the Rome II and Rome I 
Regulations, see 2.1.5. 
Doubts may arise regarding claims on unpaid tolls for motorway in a foreign country (Hungary or Czech Republic), 
with respect to non-contractual obligations in administrative matters which are excluded from the scope of the Rome II 
Regulation (Art. 1(1)). The courts applied the law of the country in which the damage occurred under Art. 4(1), without 
further reasoning: 
e.g.   
- District Court in Čadca 16Cb/26/2012, dated 16. 7. 2014 
- District Court in Bratislava I 33Cb/247/2012, dated 19. 1. 2015 
- District Court in Trnava 36Cb/142/2012, dated 26. 6. 2013 
- District Court in Trenčín 39Cb/274/2012, dated 3. 7. 2014 
- District Court in Ružomberok 3C/70/113/2016, dated 19. 8. 2016 
- District Court in Galanta 8C/7/2019, dated 28. 3. 2019, and many others.  
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, Arts 31-32) 
There are multiple decisions where the courts correctly stated Rome II as inapplicable based on its Art. 31. This case 
law also serves as further evidence of the fact that Rome II is well known. 
 e.g.   
- District Court in Prievidza 7C/8/2011, dated 2.9.2015  
- District Court in Považská Bystrica 10 C110/2009, dated 7.12.2012 
- Regional Court in Prešov 14Co/11/2019, 25. 6. 2019 
- Regional Court in Žilina 14Cob/29/2014, dated 25. 6. 2015, etc. 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
The characterization seems problematic in some cases of unjust enrichment where the relationship in question relates 
to a contract within the meaning of Art. 10(1) Rome II. These are cases of assignment of a [receivable representing a] 
 
 
1207 Cf. Sections 415-450 of the former Czechoslovak, now Slovak Civil Code No. 40/1964 Coll., where 
contractual and non-contractual obligations are not systematically differentiated.  
1208 See also Júdová and Levrinc, at p. 499-505. Most of the decisions cited in this book have been independently 




right to payment for a public transport ticket (deadheads). Such a receivable is usually owed to a transport company 
with a seat in Czech Republic by a Slovak citizen which is then contractually assigned by the transporting company to 
a third party which enforces the claim in its position of assignee. It seems that courts shall assess the relationship between 
the plaintiff and the Slovak debtor as a relationship between assignee and debtor in the sense of Art. 14(2) Rome I 
Regulation. Nevertheless, the courts classified these cases repeatedly as unjust enrichment and applied either Art. 
10(3) Rome II or Art. 4(1) Rome II: 
- District Court in Liptovský Mikuláš, 10 C/15/2012, dated 23. 5. 2012 
- District Court in Liptovský Mikuláš 10 C/187/2011. dated 3.7.2013 
- District Court in Rimavská Sobota 14C/108/2012, dated 10. 12. 2012 
- District Court in Rimavská Sobota 14C/13/2012, dated 30. 7. 2012 
- District Court in Michalovce 24C/7/2014, dated 9. 2. 2015 (applied Art. 4(1) Rome II) 
- District Court in Vranov n/T 5C/429/2011, dated 27. 9. 2012 (applied Art. 4(1) Rome II) etc. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
In one of the analysed decisions the court argued that because one party to the proceedings was from a non-Member 
State, Rome II shall not apply, and applied Sec. 15 of the PIL Act. instead. However, this reasoning was clearly an 
isolated case.  
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital 
(7) 
The consistency with the recast Brussels I Regulation is respected without difficulties. With regard to the relationship 
between the Rome II and Rome I Regulations, as noted above, there appears to be a difficulty regarding claims 
involving assignment of contracts concerning receivables against passengers arising out of lack of a valid ticket. 
In addition, according to the court, damages claimed in cases where the defendant with a seat in Slovakia failed to 
deliver goods to the plaintiff with a seat in Germany in breach of an oral agreement between them shall be subject to 
the provisions of Rome I and Rome II Regulations (CISG was not even mentioned). The court concluded that unjust 
enrichment occurred (Art. 10 Rome II) as the buyer paid the purchase price but the goods were not delivered: 
- District Court in Ružomberok 1Cb/12/2013, dated 26. 6. 2013 
Similarly, the characterization seems problematic in a case where an advance was paid but the goods were not 
delivered. No purchase agreement was concluded, the parties had merely agreed to enter into a purchase agreement 
in the future and the plaintiff paid the purchase price based solely on this agreement and an issued proforma invoice. 
The case was classified by the court as a claim for an unjust enrichment and the court applied Art. 10(3) Rome II: 
- District Court in Košice II 36C/99/2014, dated 15. 3. 2016 
As for a transport contract, the defendant had to pay recurring fees associated with delivering the goods. Surprisingly, 
the applicable law was determined on the basis of the place where the damage occurred, despite the existence of the 
transport contract. The court applied Art. 4(1) Rome II without any detailed reasoning: 
- Regional Court in Prešov 1Cob/93/2013, dated 12.11.2014 
In another case, the existence of an international purchase agreement was questioned in a situation where the 
defendant received the goods which were not paid for. The defendant accepted the goods without a legal cause, the 
goods were not ordered. In our view, this case was appropriately classified as a claim for an unjust enrichment, the 
court applied Art. 10(3) Rome II: 
- Regional Court in Trenčín 8Cob/100/2017, dated 20. 12. 2017 
The claim for damages caused by an insurable event in the territory of Slovakia concerned the reimbursement of costs 
which were not directly a result of the traffic accident but occurred in connection with the damage on the courtesy car. 





Regional Court in Žilina 14Cob/45/2019, dated 19.9.2019 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
According to our information, no difficulties have emerged so far. 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
According to our information, no difficulties have emerged so far. 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and  
According to our information, no difficulties have emerged so far. 
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
According to our information, no difficulties have emerged so far. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
Slovakia is not a contracting state to the 1973 Hague Convention. In the case-law available there was no product 
liability case (Art. 5 Rome II).  
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
In the analysed case-law, the provision on unfair competition (Art. 6) was applied once in a case that concerned a 
preliminary injunction. The plaintiff had an exclusive sales contract for the territory of Slovakia. Slovak law was 
applicable as a national legal order of the territory where the direct consequence of the non-contractual obligation 
occurred (referring to Art. 6(2) and Art. 4(1) Rome II), without any detailed reasoning. According to this decision, the 
defendant was obliged to refrain from distributing and offering goods in Slovakia via the internet: 
- District Court in Košice I 27CbPv/3/2015, dated 22. 12. 2015 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
No relevant case law is available to the Reporters. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
Under Art. 8(1) the law of the country for which the protection is claimed shall be applied. Refraining from television 
broadcasting. Plaintiff had a license agreement granted by the Council of the Czech Republic for Radio and Television 
Broadcasting. Preliminary injunction: 
- District Court in Bratislava I 10Ca/9/2019, dated 22. 3. 2019 
The second case concerned the use of photographs on the internet without consent. The law of the country for which 
the protection is claimed was applied pursuant to Art. 8(1) Rome II:  
- District Court in Bratislava I 19Ca/50/2019, dated 17. 10. 2019 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
No relevant case law is available to the Reporters. 




Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
Unjust enrichment represents one of the most frequent subject-matters of the proceedings when Rome II is applied in 
Slovakia. First of all, there is a line of case law regarding Slovak citizens who travelled in the Czech Republic by public 
transport without a valid ticket. In these cases, the plaintiff is a company to which the Czech transporter assigned its 
claim against the Slovak passenger. It is questionable, whether such cases shall not be subject to Art. 14(2) Rome I 
Regulation, according to which the law governing the assigned claim governs the relationship between the assignee 
and the debtor (see No. 3 above). 
Furthermore, in two cases the defendant did not pay for the construction of a house arguing that the contract for work 
was not concluded and the court applied the law of the country in which the unjust enrichment occurred under Art. 
10(3) Rome II: 
- District Court in Zvolen 10Cb/31/2013, dated 15. 5. 2019 
- District Court in Žilina 20Cb/163/2012, dated 31. 1. 2017 (It follows from all the circumstances of the 
case that the non-contractual obligation arising out of unjust enrichment was more closely connected with the 
Czech Republic where the unjust enrichment occurred (construction works), escape clause Art. 10 (3–4)). 
Art.10(3) was similarly applied in a case where the unjust enrichment was a result of invalid legal action: 
- District Court in Prešov 11C/183/2016, dated 8. 3. 2017 
Unjust enrichment was construed in circumstances where one party performed despite the fact that no loan agreement 
was concluded: 
- Regional Court in Prešov 13Co/78/2017, dated 24. 7. 2018 
- District Court in Levice 14C/420/2013, dated 2. 9. 2019 
Listed above are also cases where the unjust enrichment related to purchase contracts, and therefore the 
characterization as unjust enrichment was problematic. Nevertheless, it did not have any effect on the determination 
of applicable law, see No. 5 above. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
No relevant case law is available to the Reporters. 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
No relevant case law is available to the Reporters. 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
No relevant case law is available to the Reporters. 
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 




17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
Mostly, the courts determine Slovak law as applicable. When a foreign law applies, it is in most cases Czech law, 
which is very similar to Slovak law and thus easily applicable for Slovak courts. It seems, from the analysed case law, 
that the courts have no difficulty applying Austrian, German, Polish or Hungarian law.  
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
No such difficulties could be identified in the analysed case law.  
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
In the following cases that all relate to breach of a contractual obligation (delay in payment), the court repeatedly 
applied the Slovak PIL Act to determine Slovak law as applicable, ignoring the existence of the Rome I Regulation/the 
Rome Convention. Without any reasoning or any contextual link, the court only states that Art. 16 Rome II Regulation 
applies:   
- Regional Court in Trnava 10Co/375/2016, dated 13. 9. 2017 (Consumer credit agreement) 
- District Court in Trnava 15C/46/2013, dated 18. 8. 2014 (Gas supply agreement. The plaintiff supplied 
gas to the defendant and the defendant did not pay) 
- District Court in Trnava 37C/112/2015, dated 2. 11. 2015 (Gas supply agreement. Delay in payment for 
the supply) 
- District Court in Trnava 37C/222/2015, dated 13. 7. 2015 (Consumer credit agreement) 
- District Court in Trnava 37C/328/2013, dated 10. 4. 2017 (Consumer credit agreement) 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
No reference to Art. 18. 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
No reference to Art. 19. 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
No reference to Art. 20. 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
No reference to Art. 23 and based on the case law available, there have been no practical problems with determining 
the habitual residence so far. 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
No references to Arts. 24 and 25. 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 




26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
In relation to environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection, Arts. 27, 28, 29 are not applied 
in the analysed case law. Art. 28 is mentioned only in one case which relates to 1971 Hague Convention (see No. 
27 below). 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
Slovakia is a contracting state to the 1971 Hague Convention, which takes precedence over other regulations when 
Slovak courts conduct proceedings concerning claims arising out of traffic accidents with an international aspect. 
Moreover, the 1971 Hague Convention is loi uniforme (Art. 11) and shall therefore be applied regardless of the 
reciprocity and regardless of the fact that a law of a non-contracting state is applicable. In general, the 1971 Hague 
Convention comprehensively covers the determination of the governing law with respect to all issues that may arise in 
connection with traffic accidents, with the exception of recourse actions among persons liable and recourse actions 
and subrogation in so far as insurance companies are concerned (Art. 2 points 4 and 5). The 1971 Hague Convention 
also applies to claims against the insurers of the liable person (Art. 9). 
Unfortunately, the courts do not always take into account the application of the 1971 Hague Convention. Some courts 
correctly gave precedence to the 1971 Hague Convention over Rome II (see also footnote No. 5 above with reference 
to more relevant case law): 
-  Regional Court Bratislava 5Co/515/2013, dated 21. 09. 2016 (Damage, traffic accident in the Czech 
Republic) 
Other courts also ruled in a similar manner, e.g.: 
- District Court in Ružomberok 5C/21/2012, dated 06. 09. 2012 (Damage, traffic accident in the Czech 
Republic) 
- District Court in Lúčenec 14C/162/2013, dated 16. 06. 2016 (Damage, traffic accident in Austria) 
- District Court in Liptovský Mikuláš 8C/166/2015, dated 20. 12. 2017 (Damage, traffic accident in 
Hungary) 
On the other hand, there are also cases where the courts applied Rome II instead of the 1971 Hague Convention. 
Usually, these decisions do not give any reasoning as to the application of Rome II, with the exception of the following 
decision: 
- Regional Court in Banská Bystrica 17Co/54/2019, dated 25. 3. 2020. The traffic accident occurred in 
2013. The plaintiff was a Slovak insurance company, and the defendant was a Slovak citizen who had 
caused a traffic accident in a country "Y" while driving a vehicle without the compulsory motor third party 
liability insurance. The court stated that even though the plaintiff referred to the 1971 Hague Convention (see 
Sec. 22), it was not applicable to the case at hand because Rome II takes precedence over conventions 
concluded exclusively between two or more Member States based on Art. 28(2). Nevertheless, the court 
further added that under both the 1971 Hague Convention and Rome II the relevant criteria to determine the 
law governing the rights arising out of non-contractual obligation in connection with a  traffic accident as well 
as the extent of such liability would be approximately the same. 
The EU law on motor insurance that is often referred to in judgements may be the reason why the courts apply Rome II 
instead of the1971 Hague Convention, without stating their reasons for doing so. These cases usually concern 
insurance. If a reasoning is given at all, the courts often point to two ECJ cases, C-22/12 (Katarína Haasová) and C-




The case Haasová concerned the right to compensation of the partner and the child, who was a minor, and non-
material damage covered by compulsory insurance which resulted from a traffic accident in the Czech Republic. When 
deciding on the relevant legal source, the ECJ referred in “legal context” first to the 1971 Hague Convention and 
second to Art. 28 Rome II. Furthermore, the ECJ stated that, at the outset, it should be noted that the domestic court 
determined the Czech provisions on civil liability as applicable to the facts in the main proceedings in the light of Arts. 
3 and 4 of the 1971 Hague Convention and Art. 28 Rome II, see para 36 of the judgment. Nevertheless, the ECJ did 
not address in detail the relationship between these two instruments. This judgment was thereafter quoted but only in 
the context of Rome II application: 
- Regional Court in Prešov 6Co/123/2017, dated 25. 9. 2018: damage related to the death of a person in 
a traffic accident that occurred in the Member State of the court seized, and was suffered by members of that 
person´s family residing in another state, was classified as "indirect consequences", referring to the Haasová 
case. The applicable law was determined according to Art. 4 Rome II without any reasoning. 
The case Florin Lazar was based on a preliminary question from the District Court in Trieste, Italy. Since Italy is not a 
contracting state to the 1971 Hague Convention, the ECJ was not compelled to address the potential conflict between 
the two instruments and quickly opted for Rome II in a case where the questions related to the damage and indirect 
consequences of the tort/delict. The decision focuses on the interpretation of Art. 4(1) Rome II and it cannot be 
excluded that it may have influenced the Slovak courts when determining the governing law. The decision was quoted, 
for example by: 
- Supreme Court of The Slovak Republic 8Cdo/1361/2015, dated 26. 6. 2017: Damage related to the 
death of a person in a traffic accident that occurred in the Member State of the court seized and was suffered 
by members of that person´s family residing in another state, was classified as indirect consequences. The 
applicable law was determined pursuant to Art. 4(1) Rome II, the 1971 Hague Convention was not 
mentioned). 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
We are not aware of any case law which would deal with the mosaic approach.  
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
In all cases concerning violations of privacy, the courts did not apply Rome II, but provisions of the Slovak autonomous 
law, i.e. Sec. 15 of the Slovak PIL Act (cited above, footnote No. 3). For example: 
- District Court in Bratislava I 11C/25/2012, dated 28. 2. 2012 (Preliminary injunction - violations of privacy 
and rights relating to personality. Defendants: 1. Facebook (US), 2. Google (US), 3. Wikidot (Poland). As to 
defendants 1. and 2., the proceedings were discontinued for lack of jurisdiction. As to defendant 3. (located 
in Poland), the proceedings were discontinued due to the failure to bear the burden of proof in proving the 
urgency of the temporary measures. Art. 1(2)(g)). 
- District Court in Bratislava I 15C/24/2012, dated 28. 2. 2012 (Preliminary injunction. Violations of privacy 
and rights relating to personality, untrue and distorting information published on the internet. According to 
Art. 1(2)(g) the Rome II Regulation does not apply to non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of 
privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation). 
- District Court in Liptovský Mikuláš 6C/69/2011, dated 26. 2. 2013 (Claim for compensation for damage 
to health due to an accident caused by a snow plough on the ski slope resulting in the death of the injured 
party (Polish citizen) in Slovakia – the court applied Art. 4(1) Rome II stating that, be the damage occurred 




1971 Hague Convention, the law of the state where the accident occurred applies anyway. Second claim 
for infringement of personality rights (loss of a child) – the court stated that Rome II did not apply according 
to Art. 1(2)(g) and applied the Slovak PIL Act. 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
In the analysed case law, no problems were noted in this regard. Defamation was concerned only in one case 
mentioned above (see No. 29) against Facebook, Google and Wikidot.  The court came to the conclusion that Slovak 
law shall apply. The proceedings were then discontinued for other reasons. 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
We have not come across any such case. 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 






4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to decision 
of the Court of Justice if 
applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
District Court in Považská 
Bystrica 
10 C110/2009 7. 12. 2012  Art. 4 and 31 and art. 
32 
Damage, traffic accident, 
insurance. 
 
The accident occurred on 17 August 2006. 
Rome II was not applied due to restrictions to 
its temporal applicability.  
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
 
10 C/15/2012 23. 5. 2012 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport. 
Failure to provide a valid transport document 
(ticket). 
The claimed amount was considered an unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant without 
legal grounds. 
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
10 C/16/2012 4. 10. 2012  Art.4 (1) Damage incurred by towing 
away a vehicle  
Without details regarding the applied article 
of Rome II.  
District Court in Čadca 10 C/185/2013 4. 7. 2017 Art.4 (1) Damage to health  
Compensation for loss of 
amenity and loss of 
earnings. 
 
The dispute dealt with a claim for 
compensation for a loss of amenity. 
Plaintiff suffered a work accident in the Czech 
Republic, therefore, the article 4 (1) of the 




Without details regarding the applied article 
of Rome II.  
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
 
10 C/187/2011 3. 7. 2013  Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment  Failure to provide a valid transport document 
(ticket). The claimed amount was considered 
an unjust enrichment of the defendant.  
Without details regarding the applied article 
of Rome II. 
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
 
10 C/313/2012 7. 11. 2013 Art.4 (1) Damage, traffic accident  Without details regarding the applied article 
of Rome II.  
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not 
applied. 
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
10 C/42/2013 31. 7. 2015 Art.4 (1) Damage, traffic accident, 
insurance  
Without details regarding the applied article 
of Rome II.  
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not 
applied.  
District Court in Čadca 10C/77/2010 11. 4. 2012 Art.4 (1) Damage, traffic accident  The plaintiff, a citizen of the Czech Republic, 
and the defendant, a citizen of the Slovak 
Republic, were involved in a traffic accident 
that occurred in Austria. All states are members 
of the European Union; therefore, The Rome II 
Regulation shall apply. 
Without details regarding the applied article 
of Rome II.  
District Court in Lučenec 10 C/63/2013 26. 7. 2013 Art.4 (1) Damage, traffic accident, 
insurance  
Without details regarding the applied article 




The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not 
applied.   
District Court in Bratislava I 10Ca/9/2019 22. 3. 2019 Art. 8 (1) Intellectual property, 
preliminary injunction 
 
Plaintiff had a license agreement granted by 
the Council of the Czech Republic for Radio 
and Television Broadcasting and requested 
preliminary injunction restraining certain 
television broadcasting in Slovakia. 
The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising from an infringement of an 
intellectual property right shall be the law of 
the country for which protection is claimed. 
District Court in Zvolen 10Cb/31/2013 15. 5. 2019 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment Defendant did not pay for the construction of 
a house claiming that a contract for work was 
not concluded. 
Where the law applicable cannot be 
determined on the basis of paragraphs 1 or 2, 
it shall be the law of the country in which the 
unjust enrichment took place. 
Regional Court  in Trnava 10Co/375/2016 13. 9. 2017  Art. 16  Overriding mandatory 
provisions 
Loan agreement – consumer credit contract. 
Without further details regarding the 
application of article 16 Rome II as an 
overriding mandatory provision. 
 
 





Without details regarding the applied article 
of Rome II. 
District Court in Prievidza  11C/147/2008  13. 11. 2014 Art. 4 (3) Damage, traffic accident All parties involved in the litigation were 
members of the European Union, hence, the 
Rome II Regulation shall apply. The traffic 
accident occurred in Germany; therefore, the 
German law shall apply. 
Without details regarding the applied article 
of Rome II . 
District Court in Prešov 11C/183/2016 8. 3. 2017 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment  Invalid legal act. 
District Court in Bratislava I 11C/25/2012 28. 2. 2012 Art. 1 (2)(g)  Preliminary injunction - 
Violations of privacy and 
rights relating to personality 
Defendants: 1. Facebook 
(US), 2. Google (US), 3. 
Wikidot (Poland) 
 
Proceedings were discontinued for defendants 
1 and 2 due to lack of jurisdiction. 
With respect to defendant 3 (located in 
Poland), the proceedings were discontinued 
due to the failure to bear the burden of proof 
regarding the urgency of adjustment of 
relations. 
Without details regarding the applied article 
of Rome II . 
 
Regional Court in Košice 
11Co/128/2014 16. 4. 2015 Art. 1 (2)(g) Damage to health. 
Compensation for  loss of 
amenity 
Damage to health as a result of a traffic 
accident. Defendant was found guilty for 
causing a personal injury. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II . 
Regional Court  in Trnava 11Co/247/2018 
 
10. 12. 2019 
 
Art. 1 Rome II was not applied, the 
subject matter was 
considered a right in rem to 





District Court in Prešov 11Cpr/5/2015 31. 5. 2017 Art. 4 (2) Work accident  Plaintiff (employee) suffered a work accident 
while he was working for defendant 
(employer). 
Both parties had their habitual residence in the 
same country at the time of the accident, 
therefore, article 4 (2) of the Rome II 
Regulation shall apply. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II .  
 
District Court in 
Ružomberok 
11Csp/43/2018 16. 11. 2018 Art. 4 (1) Compensation for health 
care  
Provision of medical services – detention 
centre for intoxicated persons 
District Court in Nové 
Mesto n/V 
12C/156/2014 1. 8. 2014 Art. 4  Damage Compensation for damage from unauthorized 
consumption of electricity. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II .  
Regional Court Prešov 12Co/13/2020 18. 6. 2020 Art. 4 Damage, traffic accident Involved parties were members of the 
European Union, the Rome II shall apply. The 
traffic accident occurred in the European 
Union; therefore, the Rome II shall apply. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II . 
District Court in Rimavská 
Sobota 
13C/15/2019 5. 11. 2019 Art. 4 (1) Compensation for health 
care 
Provision of medical services – detention 
centre for intoxicated persons 
District Court in Košice I 13C/285/2014 14. 2. 2020 Art. 4 (1) Delivery of movable and 
immovable property of a 
company  
The plaintiff demanded the delivery of all 
commercial and accounting documents, as 
well as the company's movable and 




right to recover things from the defendant in 
testimony of the defendant as a witness in 
criminal proceedings in a legal matter of theft.   
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II .  
 
District Court in  Lučenec 13C/79/2015 31. 8. 2017 Art. 4 (1), (2) and art. 
10 (2)  
Damage, unjust enrichment. 
 
Compensation for damage from unauthorized 
consumption of electricity and gas. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II .  
 
Regional Court in Prešov 13Co/78/2017 24. 7. 2018 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment Loan agreement. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II .  
 
Regional Court in Žilina 13Cob/18/2020 17. 6. 2020 Art. 4 (3) Damage  The closer connection with the Slovak Republic 
was established based on the Slovak 
registered office of the carrier responsible for 
the damage and also the Slovak registered 
offices of the parties to the contract of 
carriage, therefore, article 4 (3) shall apply.  
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II .  
 
District Court in Rimavská 
Sobota 
14C/108/2012 10. 12. 2012 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport 
conditions. 





The claimed amount for the fare was 
considered an unjust enrichment of the 
defendant. This is the factual basis of unjust 
enrichment consisting in the material gain 
acquired by defendant without legal grounds. 
District Court in Rimavská 
Sobota 
14C/13/2012 30. 7. 2012 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport 
conditions   
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. The claimed amount is an unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant without 
legal grounds. 
District Court in Prievidza 14C/156/2016 30. 1. 2018 Art. 4 (1) Compensation for health 
care 
Provision of medical services - detention centre 
for drunks 
District Court in Levice 14C/212/2013 25. 4. 2018  Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident  Defendant knocked down a cyclist who 
succumbed to his injuries, thereby interfered 
with the plaintiffs' personal rights, namely their 
rights on privacy and family life. 
Non-contractual obligation resulting from a 
traffic accident should be interpreted as harm 
associated with a death of a person occurred 
in the Member State of the court seized and 
which has been a person resident in another 
Member State should be classified as an 
"indirect consequence" of the accident within 
the meaning of that provision, since constitutes 
an interpretation for determining the 
applicable law and not assessment of the right 
to compensation for non-pecuniary damage 
and interpretation of the concept of 
compensation for non-pecuniary damage 




District Court in Rimavská 
Sobota 
14C/22/2012  30. 7. 2012 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport 
conditions 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. Claim for the fare is unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant without 
legal grounds. 
District Court in Rimavská 
Sobota 
14C/24/2012 24. 5. 2012  Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport 
conditions 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. Claim for the fare is unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant without 
legal grounds. 
District Court in Žilina 14C/242/2013 15. 1. 2015 Art. 4 (1) Damage caused by motor 
vehicle 
According to the reasoning of the judgement 
both The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 and Rome II 
shall apply. No further details included. 
District Court in Rimavská 
Sobota 
14C/286/2013 9. 9. 2013 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport 
conditions 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. Claimed amount is unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant without 
legal grounds 
District Court in Levice 14C/420/2013 2. 9. 2019 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment The subject of the dispute was unjust 
enrichment from the pre-contractual 
negotiations on the loan agreement which was 
not validly concluded. The plaintiff argued that 
the defendant unjustly enrich himself by 
accepting the funds provided by the plaintiff. 





District Court in Levice 14C/63/2007 28. 11. 2017 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident The effect is the property loss of the injured 
party, therefore, where is a centre of 
proprietary interests of the injured party. As the 
applicable law is Czech law, as the original 
right to payment of recourse, i.e., proprietary 
interests of the injured party is located in the 
Czech Republic. 
No further details. 
District Court in Rimavská 
Sobota 
14C/66/2012 15. 11. 2012 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport 
conditions 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. The claimed amount is unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant. 
District Court in Rimavská 
Sobota 
14C/67/2012 18. 10. 2012 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport 
conditions 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. The claimed amount is unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant without 
legal grounds 
District Court in Rimavská 
Sobota 
14C/82/2012 20. 9. 2012 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport 
conditions 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. The claimed amount is unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant without 
legal grounds. 
Regional Court in Prešov 14Co/11/2019 25. 6. 2019 Art. 31 Damage, traffic accident The accident occurred in 2005. 
Rome II was not applied due to restrictions to 




Regional Court in Žilina 14Cob/138/2018 30. 5. 2019 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not 
applied.   
Traffic accident occurred in Slovakia; 
therefore, Slovak law shall apply.   
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
Regional Court in Žilina 14Cob/29/2014 25. 6. 2015 Art. 4 (1) and art. 31  Damage, traffic accident  The accident occurred in 2004. 
Rome II was not applied due to restrictions to 
its temporal applicability. 
Regional Court in Žilina 14Cob/46/2019 26. 9. 2019 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident, 
insurance 
Traffic accident occurred in Slovakia; 
therefore, Slovak law shall apply.   
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not 
applied.   
Regional Court in Žilina 14Cob/45/2019 19.9.2019 Art. 4 (1) Rome II Damage, not directly result 
of the traffic accident, 
insurance 
Claim for damages caused by an insurable 
event in the territory of Slovakia concerned the 
reimbursement of costs which were not directly 
result of the traffic accident but occurred in 
connection with the damage on the spare car. 
The court classified the claim as extra-
contractual, referring to the ECJ case C-
27/02 Engler, in the absence of a freely 
assumed obligation. 
District Court in Rimavská 
Sobota 




No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Trenčín 14Csp/124/2018 2. 12. 2018 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident Damage occurred in Germany, therefore, 
article 4 (1) of Rome II shall apply. 
 
District Court in Bratislava I 15C/15/2011 16. 5. 2013 Art. 4 (2) Traffic accident, damage to 
health 
The accident occurred on 29 August 2008. 
Rome II was not applied due to restrictions to 
its temporal applicability. 
District Court in Bratislava I 15C/24/2012 28. 2. 2012 Art. 1 (2)(g) Preliminary injunction. 
Violations of privacy and 
rights relating to personality  
 
Untrue and distorting information published on 
the internet. 
According to article 1 (2) (g) the Rome II does 
not apply on-contractual obligations arising 
out of violations of privacy and rights relating 
to personality, including defamation. 
 
District Court in Trnava 15C/46/2013 18. 8. 2014 Art. 16 Damage 
Overriding mandatory 
provisions 
Gas supply agreement. Plaintiff supplied gas 
to the defendant and the defendant fail to pay 
for the supply. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II .  
District Court in Trenčín 16C/10/2011 18. 2. 2013 Art. 4 Damage to health  Plaintiff crashed into an unsecured metal 
structure intended for an advertising banner 
and suffered a permanent damage to his 
health. The accident occurred in Slovakia; 
therefore, Slovak law shall apply. 





District Court in Dunajská 
Streda 
16C/32/2016 16. 9. 2016 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Čadca 16Cb/26/2012 16. 7. 2014 Art. 4 (1) Damage – toll  Defendant failed to pay a toll for the 
motorway. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II . 
Regional Court in Trenčín 16CoKR/14/2017 20. 3. 2018 Art. 10 (1 - 3) Unjust enrichment  Loan agreement. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
District Court in Martin  17Cb/131/2017 27. 9. 2019 Art. 4 (3) Damage – escape clause Part of the consignment was stolen. There is a 
closer connection with the Slovak Republic 
with regard to the registered office of the 
carrier in the Slovak Republic that is 
responsible for the damage and also the 
contract of carriage was concluded between 
entities that both have their registered office in 
the Slovak Republic, therefore, article 4 (3) 
shall apply. 
Regional Court in Banská 
Bystrica 
17Co/54/2019 25. 3. 2020 Art. 4 and art. 15 and 
art. 28 
Damage, traffic accident Traffic accident occurred in 2013. According 
to its article 28 (2), Rome II takes precedence 
over the Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971. 
Criterion concerning applicable law to non-
contractual liability for traffic accidents, as 
well as the scope of applicable law determine 
in approximately the same way (cf., article 1, 
articles 4 and 15 of the Rome II with Articles 




District Court in Bratislava II 18C/190/2016 9. 8. 2017 Art. 4 (1) Compensation for health 
care 
Provision of medical services. 
District Court in Prešov, 
Regional Court In Prešov 
18Cb/3/20111, 
1Cob/93/2013 
12. 11. 2013, 
12. 11. 2014 
Art. 4 (1) Damages Defendant paid recurring fees associated with 
delivering the goods. The applicable law was 
determined on the basis of the place where the 
damage occurred, despite the existing 
transport contract. Without reasoning. 
District Court in Košice I 19C/232/2011 3. 7. 2015 Art. 4 (1) Unjust enrichment  Using an apartment without a legal title. 
District Court in Bratislava I 19Ca/50/2019 17. 10. 2019 Art. 8 (1) Preliminary injunction. 
Intellectual property – 
copyright claims 
Use of photographs without consent in a 
literary publication on the internet portal. 
Applicable law from an infringement of an 
intellectual property right shall be the law of 
the country for which is claimed. 
District Court in Žilina 19Cb/45/2012 4. 6. 2019 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident Traffic accident occurred in Slovakia. Decisive 
is where the damage occurred, therefore, 
Slovak law shall apply.  No details regarding 
the applied article of Rome II . 
District Court in Prešov 19Cb/6/2011 28. 2. 2012 Art. 4 (1) Damage, insurance Claim as a result of recourse. 
District Court in Žilina 19Cb/69/2018  12. 10. 2018 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II . 
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not 
applied.   
District Court in Košice I 19Csp/251/2017 24.4. 2018 Art. 4 (1) Compensation for health 
care, insurance 
Provision of health care. Defendant did not 
participate in public health insurance. 
District Court in Bardejov 1C/109/2015 29.6. 2016 Art. 10 (1) Unjust enrichment  Non-contractual obligation arising out of an 
unjust enrichment relates to an existing lease 




District Court in 
Ružomberok 
1Cb/12/2013 26. 6. 2013  Art. 10 Unjust enrichment Defendant did not deliver the goods 
according to sales contract. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II .  
Regional Court in Košice 1Co/424/2017 19. 12. 2018  Rome II does not apply. 
obligations arising out of 
matrimonial property 
regimes are excluded from 
the scope of Rome II. 
Between Slovakia and G. no bilateral 
agreement has been reached to resolve these 
issues, therefore, the Act No. 97/1963 Coll. 
on Private International Law shall apply to 
determine the applicable law. 
Regional Court in Bratislava 1Cob/303/2014 3. 12. 2015 Art. 10 (1) Unjust enrichment Failure to provide legal services. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
District Court in Žilina 20Cb/163/2012 31. 1. 2017 Art. 1 (1) and art.  10 
(3 – 4) 
Unjust enrichment, damage Providing construction works. Based on the 
circumstances of the case, the non-contractual 
obligation arising out of unjust enrichment is 
more closely connected with the Czech 
Republic where the unjust enrichment occurred 
(construction works), therefore, Czech law 
shall apply. 
Regional Court in Prešov 21Co/60/2015 31. 3. 2016 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident  Damage related to a death of a person in a 
traffic accident that occurred in a Member 
State of the court seized and was suffered by 
members of that person´s family residing in 
another state, was classified as indirect 
consequences. 
Regional Court in Trnava 21Cob/211/2013 21. 10. 2014 Art. 2 and art. 4 (1)  Unjust enrichment Gratuitous use of bus stations in the Czech 
Republic to ensure the operation of the 




Without further details as to why art. 4  was 
applied instead of art. 10 related to unjust 
enrichment. 
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš  
22C/1/2017 9. 1. 2018 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident Damage to health, property damage incurred 
by a traffic accident. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not 
applied.   
District Court in Bratislava II 24Cb/46/2013 19. 7. 2013 Art. 4 Damage Damage due to non-fulfilment of the obligation 
to provide co-operation for the ordered 
transport. 
District Court in Bratislava III 25Cb/184/2016 12. 6. 2017 Art. 4 (1) Unjust enrichment  Performance for legal cause which has 
subsequently lapsed.  
Without further s details as to why art. 4 was 
applied instead of art. 10 related to unjust 
enrichment. 
District Court in Michalovce 24C/7/2014 9. 2. 2015 Art. 4 (1) Damage - violation of tariff 
and transport conditions 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. The plaintiff as a legal entity with 
registered office in the Czech Republic and 
defendant is a natural person with abode in 
Slovakia. Parties did not conclude a contract; 
therefore, Rome II shall apply, specifically art. 
4 due to the fact the damage occurred in the 
Czech Republic. 
Without further specification why was applied 




District Court in Bratislava III 25Cb/447/2017 10. 10. 2019 Art. 4 (1) Damage  Defendant was supposed to acquire funds 
arising from the monetization of the machine; 
however, he could not validly acquire 
ownership or even a lien because he was not 
the owner of the machine.  
Without further details as to why art. 4 was 
applied. 
District Court in Trenčín 27C/210/2014 22. 12. 2015 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. Just stated that traffic accident 
occurred in Slovakia, therefore, Slovak law 
according to art. 4 (1) shall apply. 
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not 
applied.   






Respondent was obliged to refrain from 
distribution and advertisement of products via 
internet in Slovakia. Petitioner had an 
exclusive sales contract which territorial scope 
included Slovakia. 
Applicable law is the legal order of the Slovak 
Republic as a territory where the direct 
consequence of the non-contractual delict 
occurred. 
Without further specification of the direct 
consequence of the non-contractual delict. 
District Court in Bratislava I 32Cb/251/2010 12. 1. 2015 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident  The damage arose to the plaintiff in 
connection with his business activities 
performed in the Slovak Republic, and 




law, regardless of the fact that the insured 
event aroused and occurred in Slovakia. 
District Court in Bratislava I 33Cb/247/2012 19. 1. 2015 Art. 4 (1) Damage - toll Defendant failed to pay a toll for the 
motorway. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II . 
District Court in Košice II 36C/99/2014 15. 3. 2016 Art. 10 (1- 3) Unjust enrichment Failure to supply the goods. By crediting the 
funds on the defendant's account unjust 
enrichment took place, therefore, art. 10 (3) of 
Rome II shall apply. 
 
District Court in Trnava 36Cb/142/2012 26. 6. 2013 Art. 4 (1) Damage - toll Defendant failed to pay a toll for the 
motorway. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Trenčín 36Cb/149/2013 20. 8. 2014 Art. 10 (1- 3) Unjust enrichment Defendant received financial proceeds based 
on a schedule resolution that was later 
revoked by the court. Due to lack of  a legal 
clause an unjust enrichment occurred. 
District Court in Trenčín 36Cb/53/2009 25. 11. 2011 Art. 10 (1- 3) Unjust enrichment Loan agreement. Double payment. 
District Court in Trenčín 36Cbi/108/2014 5. 5. 2017 Art. 10 (1- 3) Unjust enrichment Loan agreement. Non-payment for provided 
funds. 




Gas supply agreement. Non-payment for the 
supply. 
Without further details regarding the applied 






District Court in Košice I 37C/204/2012 20. 4. 2017 Art. 4 Damage  Throwing an object on the car. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Trnava 37C/222/2015 13. 7. 2015 Art. 2 (1) and art. 16 Overriding mandatory 
provisions. 
 
Loan agreement.  
Without further details regarding the applied 
article 16 of Rome II as an overriding 
mandatory provision. 
 




Without further details regarding the applied 
article 16 of Rome II as an overriding 
mandatory provision. 
 
District Court in Žilina 38Cb/111/2016 16. 2. 2018 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident, 
insurance 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Žilina 38Cb/294/2016 10. 4. 2018 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident, 
insurance 
Plaintiff is a legal entity with registered office in 
the Czech Republic. Slovak law was 
determined as applicable law according to 
article 4 (1) of Rome II. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Žilina 38Cb/74/2016 26. 1. 2018 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident, 
insurance 
Plaintiff is a legal entity with registered office in 




determined the as applicable law according 
to article 4 (1) of Rome II. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Košice II 39C/131/2012 21. 2. 2013 Art. 4 (1) Compensation for health 
care 
Provision of medical services – detention 
centre for intoxicated persons. 
District Court in Trenčín 39Cb/269/2012 3. 7. 2014 Art. 4 (1) Damage - toll Non-payment of a toll for the motorway.  
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
District Court in Trenčín 39Cb/272/2012 3. 7. 2014 Art. 4 (1) Damage - toll Non-payment of a toll for the motorway.  
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
District Court in Trenčín 39Cb/274/2012 3. 7. 2014 Art. 4 (1) Damage - toll Non-payment pf a toll for the motorway.  
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in 
Ružomberok 
3C/70/113/2016 19. 8. 2016 Art. 4 (1) Damage - toll  Non-payment of a toll for the motorway. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Nové 
Mesto n/V 
3C/70/2014 12. 5. 2016 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment Purchase of a stolen vehicle. 
District Court in Bánovce 
nad Bebravou 
3Cb/5/2016 23. 1. 2018 Art. 4 Culpa in contrahendo, 
damage 
As a result of the breach of the general duty of 
prevention by revocation of the previous 
resolutions concerning the sale of the land and 
the construction of the plaintiff's house by a 





Regional Court in Košice 3Co/647/2015 9. 2. 2017 Art. 2 (1) and art. 4 
(1)  
Unjust enrichment  Unjust enrichment based on use of an 
apartment without a legal title. 
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
4C/11/2012 15. 5. 2012 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment Failure to submit a valid transport document 
(ticket). 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. Claim for the fare is unjust 
enrichment. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
4C/12/2012 20. 3. 2012  Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment Failure to submit a valid transport document 
(ticket). 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. Claim for the fare is unjust 
enrichment. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
4C/125/2012 27. 9. 2012 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment Failure to submit a valid transport document 
(ticket). 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. Claim for the fare is unjust 
enrichment. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Vranov nad 
Toplou 
4C/233/2009 28. 2. 2017 Art. 3 – The 
Convention on the 
Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 
May 1971 
Damage, traffic accident  Traffic accident occurred in 2008. Article 3 of 
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was applied. 
Damage related to a death of a person in a 




 State of the court seized and was suffered by 
members of that person´s family residing in 
another state, was classified as “indirect 
consequences”. 
District Court in Piešťany 4C/259/2008 8. 9. 2014 Art. 1 (2) (b) The Rome II Regulation does 
not apply. From the scope of 
The Rome II Regulation are 
excluded obligations arising 
out of settlement co-
ownership between former 
spouses 
For this matter the Act No. 97/1963 Coll. on 
Private International Law shall apply. 
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
4C/28/2011 27. 10. 2011 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport 
conditions 
Failure to submit a valid transport document 
(ticket). 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. Claim for the fare is unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant without 
legal grounds. 
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
4C/283/2012 2. 4. 2013 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport 
conditions 
Failure to submit a valid transport document 
(ticket). 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. Claim for the fare is unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant without 
legal grounds. 
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
4C/35/2011 27. 9. 2011 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport 
conditions 





Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. Claim for the fare is unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant without 
legal grounds. 
District Court in Piešťany 4C/9/2013 2. 9. 2015 Art. 4 (1) 
 
Damage, traffic accident, 
insurance  
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not even 
mentioned. 
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
4C/92/2012 24. 7. 2012 Art. 10 (3) Unjust enrichment - violation 
of tariff and transport 
conditions 
Failure to submit a valid transport document 
(ticket). 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. Claim for the fare is unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant without 
legal grounds. 
 
District Court in Čadca 4Cb/29/2012 5. 2. 2015 Art. 4 (1) Damage - toll Non-payment of a toll for the motorway.  
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
District Court in Bratislava II 58C/1/2014 7. 10. 2015 Art. 4 (1) Damage 
Loss of consignment, refusal 
of warranty claim, EBAY 
auction 
 
Plaintiff asserted a claim damages to the 
carrier but the plaintiff was informed that the 
consigner had a priority claim. Defendant did 
not complain about the consignment at the 




District Court in Prievidza 5C/149/2011 5. 3. 2012 Art. 4  Damage, traffic accident No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Vranov n/T 5C/429/2011 27. 9. 2012 Art. 4 (1) Violation of tariff and 
transport conditions 
Failure to submit a valid transport document 
(ticket). 
Defendant was obliged to reimburse both fare 
and penalty. Claim for the fare is unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. This is the factual 
basis of unjust enrichment consisting in the 
material gain acquired by defendant without 
legal grounds. 
District Court in Bardejov 5C/43/2009 4. 2. 2013 Art. 31 Unjust enrichment Rome II was not applied due to restrictions to 
its temporal applicability. Rome II is effective 
from 11 January 2009, knowledge of unjust 
enrichment occurred on 18 December 2008, 
i.e. on the day of crediting the loan, therefore, 
the Act No. 97/1963 Coll. on Private 
International Law shall apply. 
District Court in Dunajská 
Streda 
5Cb/12/2013 21. 3. 2014 Art. 4 (1) Damage - toll Non-payment of a toll for the motorway.  
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
District Court in Dunajská 
Streda 
5Cb/13/2013 17. 1. 2014 Art. 4 (1) Damage - toll Non-payment of a toll for the motorway.  
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
District Court in Dunajská 
Streda 
5Cb/2/2013 17. 1. 2014 Art. 4 (1) Damage - toll Non-payment of a toll for the motorway.  
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
District Court in Dunajská 
Streda 




No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
Regional Court in Žilina 5Co/130/2019 29. 10. 2019 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident  Mandatory contractual insurance for damage 
caused by the operation of a vehicle is 
intended to cover a compensation for non-
proprietary damage caused to close persons 
of victims killed in a traffic accident. 
Regional Court in Trenčín 5Co/156/2019 20. 5. 2020 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident Traffic accident that occurred on 1804,2 km 
of the Danube river, which in this part is on the 
joint flow of Slovakia and Hungary, which 
means the state borders on the river are 
determined by the boundaries of the centre of 
the flow. From fairway of the damaged ship, it 
is possible to determine that the collision of the 
ship occurred on the part from the centre of the 
river towards the Slovak bank, therefore, 
Slovak law shall apply.  
Regional Court in Bratislava 5Co/314/2017 29. 1. 2019 Art. 4 and art. 31  Damage, traffic accident. 
 
The accident occurred on 29 August 2006. 
Rome II was not applied due to restrictions to 
its temporal applicability. 
Regional Court in Bratislava 5Co/515/2013 21. 9. 2016 Art. 4 and art. 31  Damage, traffic accident. 
 
The accident occurred on 29 August 2006. 
Rome II was not applied due to restrictions to 
its temporal applicability. 
District Court in Stará  
Ľubovňa 
6C/14/2017 17. 10. 2018 Art. 4 (1) Damage Expenditures related to a traffic accident 
consisting in preventing groundwater 
pollution. 
District Court in Revúca 6C/34/2012 5. 9. 2012 Art. 4 (1) Damage. Violation of tariff 
and transport conditions, 
damage. 





The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be 
the law of the country in which the damage 
occurs, therefore, Czech law shall apply. 
District Court in Brezno 6C/375/2015 10. 5. 2016 Art. 10 (1) Unjust enrichment Double payment for work performed. 
District Court in Revúca 6C/47/2012 8. 10. 2012 Art. 4 (1) Violation of tariff and 
transport conditions. 
The defendant did not have a valid travel 
document (ticket). 
The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be 
the law of the country in which the damage 
occurs, therefore Czech law shall apply. 
District Court in Revúca 6C/48/2012 19. 9. 2012 Art. 4 (1) Violation of tariff and 
transport conditions 
The defendant did not have a valid travel 
document (ticket). 
The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be 
the law of the country in which the damage 
occurs, therefore, Czech law shall apply. 
District Court in Prievidza 6C/6/2018 9. 8. 2019 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident Traffic accident that occurred on 1804,2 km 
of the Danube river, which in this part is on the 
joint flow of Slovakia and Hungary, which 
means the state borders on the river are 
determined by the boundaries of the centre of 
the flow. From fairway of the damaged ship, it 
is possible to determine that the collision of the 
ship occurred on the part from the centre of the 
river towards the Slovak bank, therefore, 




District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
6C/69/2011 26. 2. 2013 Art. 1 (2) (g) Violations of privacy and 
rights relating to personality. 
 
Compensation for damage. 
Damage to health. 
 
Accident on the ski slope 
The accident incurred by a tracked vehicle 
operated by defendant – piste modification on 
31. 1. 2009. 
Damage to health led to death of the injured 
party in Slovakia, therefore, article 4 (1) EC 
Regulation no. 764/2007 shall apply. Due to 
the fact the damage occurred in Slovakia it is 
not relevant to assess whether it was a traffic 
accident or not. 
Rome II does not apply to the second claim 
asserted, i.e. the right to protection of 
personality according to article 1 (2) (g) of 
Rome II, therefore, to determine the applicable 
law, the Act No. 97/1967 Coll. on Private 
International Law shall apply. 
District Court in Revúca 6C/70/2012 10. 10. 2012 Art. 4 (1)  Violation of tariff and 
transport conditions 
Defendant did not have a valid travel 
document (ticket). 
The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be 
the law of the country in which the damage 
occurs, therefore, Czech law shall apply. 
Without further details regarding the applied 
article 4.  
District Court in Partizánske 6Cb/13/2016 20. 12. 2016 Art. 10 (3)  Unjust enrichment  The goods were taken over by the defendant 
in Slovakia, so that the unjust enrichment 
occurred in Slovakia and, therefore, Slovak 
law shall apply. 
Regional Court in Prešov 6Co/123/2017 25. 9. 2018 Art. 4 (1) 
 
Damage, traffic accident Damage related to a death of a person in a 
traffic accident that occurred in the Member 




members of that person´s family residing in 
another state, was classified as, indirect 
consequences. 
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not 
applied. 
Regional Court in Prešov 6Co/56/2018 18. 12. 2018 Art. 4 Damage, traffic accident Damage related to a death of a person in a 
traffic accident that occurred in the Member 
State of the court seized and was suffered by 
members of that person´s family residing in 
another state, was classified as indirect 
consequences. 
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not 
applied. 
Regional Court in Žilina 6Co/609/2015 27. 4. 2016 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident Damage related to a death of a person in a 
traffic accident that occurred in the Member 
State of the court seized and was suffered by 
members of that person´s family residing in 
another state, was classified as indirect 
consequences. 
District Court in Revúca 7C/109/2014 30. 6. 2016 Art. 4 (1) Violation of tariff and 
transport conditions 
The defendant did not have a valid travel 
document (ticket). 
The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be 
the law of the country in which the damage 
occurs, therefore, Czech law shall apply. 
District Court in  Žilina 7C/221/2014 26. 11. 2014 Art. 4 Compensation for health 
care 




District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
7C/255/2011 19. 6. 2012 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident Without further details regarding the applied 
article.  
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not 
applied. 
District Court in Revúca 7C/368/2013 11. 9. 2014 Art. 4 (1) Damage. 
Violation of tariff and 
transport conditions 
Defendant did not have a valid travel 
document (ticket).   
Without further details regarding the applied 
article 4.  
District Court in Bratislava 
IV 
7C/41/2013 13. 2. 2017 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident Traffic accident that occurred in Slovakia. No 
details regarding the applied article of Rome 
II.  
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not 
applied. 
District Court in Revúca 7C/63/2014 30. 6. 2015 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident Traffic accident that occurred in the Czech 
Republic. Law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of a delict shall be the 
law of the country in which the damage 
occurs. 
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II. 
District Court in Prievidza 7C/8/2011 2. 9. 2015 Art. 31 Unjust enrichment Rome II was not applied due to restrictions to 
its temporal applicability. Rome II is effective 
from 11 January 2009, knowledge of unjust 
enrichment occurred on 18 December 2008, 
i.e., on the day of crediting the loan, therefore, 




97/1963 Coll. on Private International Law 
shall apply. 
District Court in  Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
7C/93/2011 15. 5. 2012 Art. 4 (1) Damage, traffic accident, 
insurance  
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not even 
mentioned. 
District Court in Trnava 8C/110/2016 12. 9. 2019 Art. 4 (1) Damage to the car, traffic 
accident, insurance 
Traffic accident occurred in Austria.  
Compensation for damage as a result of an 
insured event.  
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
District Court in Prešov 8C/19/2019 25. 10. 2019 Art. 4 (1) Compensation for health 
care 
Provision of medical services – detention 
centre for intoxicated persons 
District Court in Pezinok 8C/192/2012 30. 5. 2013 Art. 4 Violation of tariff and 
transport conditions  
Defendant did not have a valid travel 
document (ticket). 
 
District Court in Lučenec 8C/21/2012 29. 4. 2015 Art. 10 (1 – 3) Unjust enrichment, 
compensation for damage 
Sale of a real estate. Plaintiff purchased the 
real estate from defendant. The land area had 
been reduced and sold to plaintiff. Part of the 
land was in co-ownership and thus unjust 
enrichment and damage had taken place, 
therefore, art. 10 (3) shall apply. 
District Court in  Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
8C/22/2012 15. 6. 2016 Art. 31 Damage, traffic accident The accident occurred in 2007. 
Rome II was not applied due to restrictions to 




District Court in Pezinok 8C/244/2011 15. 1. 2013 Art. 4  Unjust enrichment Loan agreement. Overdrawing funds. 
Damage shall cover any consequence arising 
out of tort/delict, unjust enrichment. 
Without further details regarding the applied 
article 4 instead of article 10. 
 
District Court in  Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
8C/258/2011 17. 3. 2014 Art. 10 (1 – 3) Unjust enrichment Performance based on a legal cause which 
lapsed 
District Court in  Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
8C/267/2013 10. 10. 2014 Art. 31 and 32 Unjust enrichment Rome II was not applied due to restrictions to 
its temporal applicability. Rome II is effective 
from 11 January 2009, breach of a legal 
obligation (sale of real estate) occurred before 
Rome II entered into force, therefore, the Act 
No. 97/1963 Coll. on Private International 
Law shall apply. 
District Court in Revúca 8C/34/2017 11. 5. 2018 Art. 10 (1 – 3) Unjust enrichment  Provision of accommodation without 
subsequent payment by defendant. Unjust 
enrichment occurred in the Czech Republic; 
therefore, Czech law applied according to art. 
10 (3) of Rome II. 
District Court in Galanta 8C/7/2019 28. 3. 2019 Art. 4 Damage – toll Non-payment a toll for the motorway.  
No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
 
District Court in Vranov n/T 8Cb/89/2012 19. 11. 2012 Art. 10 (1 – 3) Unjust enrichment Double payment 
Supreme Court of The 
Slovak Republic 
8Cdo/1361/2015 26. 6. 2017 Art. 4 (1)  Damage, traffic accident Damage related to a death of a person in a 
traffic accident that occurred in the Member 




members of that person´s family residing in 
another state, was classified as indirect 
consequences. 
Regional Court in Trenčín 8Cob/100/2017 20. 12. 2017  Art. 10 (3)  Unjust enrichment Reception of the goods by the defendant and 
non-payment for the goods. Reception of the 
goods occurred in Slovakia, therefore, art. 10 
(3) of Rome II shall apply. 
Regional Court in Trenčín 8Cob/572/2014 20. 12. 2016 Art. 10 (1 - 3) Unjust enrichment Unredeemed receivables from bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
District Court in Prešov 9C/262/2014 7. 1. 2016 Art. 4 Violation of tariff and 
transport conditions 
Defendant did not have a valid travel 
document. 
The law applicable to a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be 
the law of the country in which the damage 
occurs, therefore Czech law shall apply. 
District Court in 
Ružomberok 
9C/70/2012 26. 11. 2012 Art. 4 (1) Damage to health Plaintiff was attacked by defendant. Civil delict 
occurred in Slovakia; therefore, Slovak law 
shall apply. 
Regional Court in Prešov 12Co/13/2020 18. 6. 2020 Art. 4 Damage, traffic accident No details regarding the applied article of 
Rome II.  
The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents of 4 May 1971 was not even 
mentioned. 
District Court in Liptovský 
Mikuláš 
8C/166/2015   
 20. 12. 
2017 
 
 Damage, traffic accident in 
Hungary 
Hague convention applied 
District Court in Lúčenec 14C/162/2013    Damage, traffic accident in 
Austria 




 16. 06. 
2016 
 
District Court in 
Ružomberok 




 Damage, traffic accident in 
the Czech Republic 
Hague convention applied 







Art. 28 Rome II, 
Hague convention 
Damage, traffic accident in 
the Czech Republic 






• Slovenia is a small EU Member State with a population of approx. 2 million people; therefore, there is less case 
law (a smaller pool of disputes) and less doctrine (a smaller number of researchers) than in the larger EU Member 
States. Accordingly, several specific issues in the field of conflict of laws in non-contractual obligations have not 
yet been tackled neither in case law, nor in the doctrine. 
• Only case law of the four appellate and of the Supreme Court are available for analysis; the prevalence of articles 
of the Regulation applied in this case law might not reflect the ambit of the application of a specific article in the 
case law of first instance courts. The courts do not hold a specific register regarding cross-border disputes. 
• The analysed case law shows that the courts are aware of the Rome II Regulation and apply it when it is applicable. 
• The doctrine analysing the Rome II Regulation is relatively scarce. Martina Repas wrote a presentation of the 
Regulation and of all its articles in a monograph on EU Private International Law in 2018, and Aleš Galič and 
Jerca Kramberger Škerl have analysed the Slovenian case-law regarding the Regulation in an article of 2020. 
Other scientific contribution tackle specific issues, such as the exclusion of party autonomy in certain disputes, the 
law applicable to traffic accidents etc. The doctrine and the practitioners also rely on literature in other EU 
languages, especially English, and quotes from foreign doctrine are not unusual in the judgments. 
• The analysis of the case law shows that several more ‘advanced’ issues pose problems to the courts:  
- Direct actions of victims against the insurers (in two available judgments, the courts did not even examine the 
admissibility of the direct action as a separate PIL issue); 
- Escape clause from Art. 4(3) is overused; the result of the application of this rule is, in all analysed cases, the 
application of Slovenian law. 
- Courts tend to cite different rules as a basis for their decision (most notably Art. 4(2) and Art. 4(3)); it seems 
that this is more the result of uncertainty than a way of making a stronger argument. 
- In all analysed cases relating to product liability, the courts overlooked the application of the Hague Product 
Liability Convention; Courts sometimes overlook the application of the Hague Traffic Accidents Convention. 
- The PIL treatment of direct actions against the insurance company in Slovenian case law is insufficient; in the 
two available cases, the courts did not identify the separate questions of the admissibility of the direct action 
and of the substance of the liability of the insurance company. 
- In one case regarding subrogation, the court applied the law applicable to subrogation also to the question 
of whether the liability of the tortfeasor was prescribed, instead of applying the law applicable to that liability; 
this again shows the difficulty of treating multi-party relationships in PIL; 
• Additionally, several interesting decisions and trends should be reported in the application of the Regulation in 
Slovenia 
- In interpreting the place of the direct damage, the courts refer to CJEU case law regarding the Brussels I (bis) 
Regulation; this shows awareness of the need of a common interpretation of notions in EU Private International 
Law; 
- The Hague Conventions on Traffic Accidents and Product Liability supersede the Rome II Regulation in 
Slovenia (which is often overlooked by the courts); 
- Slovenian doctrine draws attention to the lacuna in Art. 5 (product liability), consisting of the fact that there is 
“no explicit rule for a situation where the product was marketed neither in the country where the person who 
sustained damage was habitually resident, nor in the country where the product was purchased, nor in the 
country where the damage occurred”. 
- Slovenian doctrine criticizes the rule of Art. 6 (unfair competition) in that it seems to totally forbid party 




- Slovenian doctrine points out that it is not clear whether the protection of geographical indication falls under 
the scope of the rule on intellectual property or not (Art. 8); 
- Regarding industrial action (Art. 9), Slovenian doctrine draws attention to, first, the fact that only non-
contractual obligations are covered by the said article, while the Rome I Regulation is applicable to any 
contractual damages, which can lead to the application of law other than that of the state where the industrial 
action was taken (which is a risk for the workers and unions), and second, the fact that it is unclear which law 
is applicable in case of an international industrial action – here, Galič supports the ‘mosaic approach’. 
- No case law was found where parties would choose the applicable law. This might also be the consequence 
of the courts’ extensive use of the escape clause as a way to apply Slovenian law, which the parties might 
otherwise choose in order to avoid costs of obtaining the information on foreign law. 
- Slovenian courts are used of treating the evidentiary procedure as a part of procedural law and thus applying 
the lex fori. The burden of proof is traditionally a substantive law issue, and so is the statute of limitations; 
- Foreign law is deemed as ‘law’ and not ‘fact’, thus the rule iura novit curia applies. The courts have to apply 
the Regulation and the law the Regulation refers to, on their own motion (ie. there is no prerequisite of a 
party’s assertion); they cannot appoint experts on foreign law, but can (and do) use the procedure under the 
Council of Europe Convention on Information on Foreign Law; parties can provide evidence of the foreign 
law, but are not obliged to; courts can use any appropriate means to establish the content of the applicable 
foreign law. 
- The notion of overriding mandatory provisions only exist in Slovenian doctrine, but not in the legislation, 
therefore, the judges are not used to apply this tool; given that such rules are difficult to determine also in the 
European context, Slovenian courts might struggle with their application, when such opportunity arrives; 
- In Slovenia, the term ‘habitual residence’ is only applied in EU or international Private International Law; 
national law does not use this category, but rather those of ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary residence’ which 
both differ from habitual residence; the courts nevertheless seem aware of the specificity of the term. 
- Renvoi exists in Slovenian national PIL, but the courts are aware that it is excluded in the Regulation, which is 
also welcomed in the doctrine in view of providing predictability; 
- Public policy exception from the Regulation was discussed only in regard to the statute of limitations and the 
court refused the application of the exception. Traditionally, Slovenian courts pursue a restrictive use of the 
public policy exception, especially in conflict of laws; exemplary and punitive damages would probably be 
sanctioned by the exception, but there is no case law in this regard yet; 
- Slovenian case law shows that the relationship between the Rome II Regulation and the Hague Conventions 
on Traffic Accidents and Product Liability need rethinking; at least a more prominent mention of the 
conventions would be needed in order to enhance the application of the correct legal text in Member States 
like Slovenia, where both conventions supersede the Regulation; 
- There is no case law regarding the mosaic approach yet; the mosaic approach could prove problematic in 
certain cases (typically as a consequence of the use of Internet); legislative action would be welcome to meet 
the demands of the Internet era; as Repas points out, nuclear accidents as another potential origin of 
dispersed damage are excluded from the scope of application of the Regulation; Galič proposes to use the 
mosaic approach also in cases of an international industrial action. 
- There is a need for legislative action to include defamation and privacy violations into the Rome II Regulation:  
solutions were already proposed by ALI and CLIP Principles; 
- The issue of SLAPPs and a possibility of anti-SLAPP regulation, has not yet been tackled by Slovenian doctrine 
in the frame of private international law. There is, however, a recurrent debate on the chilling effect of lawsuits 
directed against journalists, and the insufficient protection both in relation to the plaintiff, as in relation 
between journalists and their employers; the issue of SLAPPs should undoubtedly be tackled in the debate 
regarding a possible common rule on defamation and violations of privacy. Even better, substantive 




- Corporate abuse of human rights abroad has not yet been handled in Slovenian courts, at least not if we 
have in mind the violations of human rights other than the right to property. There is, however, a debate in the 
doctrine, in the NGO sector and the corporate sector. 
- Artificial intelligence has so far not been tackled by Slovenian conflict of laws doctrine, nor have any related 
cases come up in Slovenian courts; the development of AI undoubtedly is an issue which will have to be 
addressed in private international law, but first (or at least at the same time) substantive rules will have to be 
set on national and, hopefully, EU level.  
1. Introduction 
• How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State? 
Since no empirical studies are available, it is difficult to assess to which extent the Rome II Regulation is known by the 
mentioned stakeholders. 
• Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
It is impossible to give a precise answer to this question, since first, only case law of appellate courts and the Supreme 
court is available online and one cannot systematically analyse the proceedings where there was no appeal, and 
second, it is practically impossible to trace all cases where the Rome II Regulation should have been applied, but 
(incorrectly) was not. As to the second, we searched the case law for cases where the courts applied the provision of 
the national Private International Law and Procedure Act relating to non-contractual damage, in order to see whether 
the court should have in fact applied the Rome II Regulation, and we did not find such cases, which could point to the 
conclusion that the courts (at least the appellate courts and the Supreme Court) are aware of the Rome II Regulation 
and apply it when the case falls into the scope of its application. 
• Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
There are no official statistics. The case law of the appellate courts and of the Supreme Court is freely available online 
and therefore it is possible to analyse it and provide the number of cases and other information about the application 
of the Regulation (please see the Case Summary which is annexed to this report).  
The information about the application of the Rome II Regulation before the first instance courts is available physically 
at the court houses, however, there is no specific record of cross-border cases or even cases where the Rome II 
Regulation was applied, so it is not possible in practice to gather a statistically relevant group of such cases for scientific 
analysis.  
• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
Since the accession of Slovenia to the EU in 2004, the Slovenian doctrine has been more strongly focused on the 
procedural part of the EU Private International Law (the Brussels Regulations, the Enforcement Order Regulation). The 
Rome II Regulation is generally dealt with in a 2018 manual on EU Private International Law,1209 while several specific 
issues are tackled in few academic articles.1210 An analysis of the application of both Rome I and Rome II Regulations 
 
 
1209  M. Repas, V. Rijavec (eds.), Mednarodno zasebno pravo Evropske unije [Private International Law of the 
European Union], Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana 2018, pp. 468–514.  
1210 See e.g. N. Bezjak, Uredba Rim II in (ne)svoboda strank glede izbire merodajnega prava [The Rome II Regulation 
and the (Lack of) Party Autonomy in Choice of Law], praksa, No. 18, 2018, p. 15-16; K. Primožič, Odgovornost za 
škodo na stvareh v varstvu - pasivna legitimacija [Liability for Damage on Things in Custody – the Passive Legal 
Standing], Odvetnik, No. 81, 2017, p. 35; Z. Skubic, Insolventnost zavarovatelja avtomobilske odgovornosti in 
odgovornost držav članic [The Insolvency of the Insurer of Automobile Responsibility and the Responsibility of the 
Member States], Pravna praksa, No. 34, 2013, p. 26; N. Smerdu, Reševanje patentnih sporov v Evropi – de lege 
lata in predvidene reforme [Resolving of Patent Disputes in Europe – de lege lata and the Planned Reforms], Pravna 
praksa, No. 21, 2009, p. 16-18; M. Krisper Kramberger: Varstvo žrtev prometnih nesreč v čezmejnih sporih po pravu 




was recently published in English. 1211  A general presentation of Slovenian Private International Law in English, 
providing context of the application of Rome II Regulation, was published in 2018.1212 The availability of doctrinal 
research from other EU Member States is very important and useful (at least English is understood by most Slovenians), 
however, more Slovenian language publications would be necessary in order to enhance the correct application of 
the Regulation in practice, as well as in order to contribute to the European development of the conflict of laws in non-
contractual relationships. 
• Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political 
level? 
The Rome II Regulation has not been discussed at the political level, outside of the state authorities involved in the 
adoption of the Regulation. No national legal acts or provisions have been adopted in view of a smoother application 
of the Regulation (e.g. regarding the delimitation of the scopes of application of national law and the Regulation. 
As explained above, the doctrine remains mostly, at the time being, on a more general level of presenting the rules of 
the Regulation. When dealing with specific matters, authors have pointed out possible problems concerning traffic 
accidents (the interplay between EU insurance directives, the Rome II Regulation and the Hague Traffic Accidents 
Convention), the need to adopt an EU rule on conflict of laws in defamation and violations of privacy1213 and other 
issues, which will be mentioned in the analysis of specific articles below. 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
Regarding the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, several examples of case-law can be 
mentioned, which tackled the delimitation between contractual and non-contractual obligations. 
In one case the Appellate Court in Ljubljana (No. III Cp 942/2016 of 15 June 2016) struggled with the qualification 
as contractual or non-contractual obligation of the responsibility for damages of the administrators of a company with 
limited responsibility. Instead of applying an existing autonomous interpretation of Article 1/1/d) or, if there is no such 
interpretation, referring a preliminary question to the CJEU, the appellate court criticized the first-instance court for 
 
 
law and the Hague Convention], in: Razsežnosti zasebnega prava: liber amicorum Ada Polajnar Pavčnik [Dimensions 
of Private Law: Liber Amicorum Ada Polajnar Pavčnik], pp. 281-296 (abstract in English: pp. 374-375); A. Galič: 
Kolizijskopravna pravila v delovnih sporih [Applicable Law in Labour Disputes], Delavci in delodajalci, No. 2/3, Year 
13 (2013), pp. 301-323; A. Polajnar-Pavčnik: Novejši razvoj evropskega kolizijskega prava [Recent Developments 
in European Choice of Law Rules], Podjetje in delo, No. 6-7, 2008, pp. 1368-1376; Š. Mežnar: Predlog uredbe o 
kolizijskih pravilih za nepogodbene obligacijske obveznosti (t. i. Rimska II uredba) [Proposal for a Regulation on 
Choice of Law in Non-Contractual Obligations (the so-called Rome II Regulation)], Evro Pravna praksa, No. 2004, 
pp. 23-28. 
1211 J. Kramberger Škerl, A. Galič, in: E. Guinchard (ed.), Rome I and Rome II in Practice, Intersentia, 2020, pp. 527–
550.  
1212 J. Kramberger Škerl: Slovenia, in: J. Basedow et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Private International Law, Edward 
Elgar, 2017, pp. 2638-2649. 
1213 J. Kramberger Škerl, Jurisdiction in on-line defamation and violations of privacy: in search of a right balance, 




resolving this question under Slovenian law, whereas, in the opinion of the appellate court, the qualification should 
have been made under Austrian law since the damage occurred there.1214 
In another case of the Appellate Court in Ljubljana (No. I Cpg 1084/2016 of 25 October 2017), the question arose 
whether a claim for damages because of a failed assignation of claim (the defendant asserted, in view of a set-off, 
their claim for damages against the plaintiff, based on the latter’s non-acceptance of the payment by the third party of 
a claim the defendant assigned to the plaintiff) was of contractual or non-contractual nature. The court decided that 
the claim asserted for set-off was, in substance, the defendant’s defence against the original claim, in that the defendant 
asserted that the fulfilment of their obligation to the plaintiff failed because of the plaintiff’s (in)action. This defence was 
therefore to be governed by the same law (in casu the CISG) as the claimant’s claim for the payment of purchase 
money, and it was of a contractual nature. 
Furthermore, in two cases judged by the Appellate Social and Labour Court (judgments No. Pdp 634/2019 of 12 
December 2019 and No. Pdp 599/2012 of 16 August 2012), the court applied the Rome II Regulation regarding 
the damage resulting from a work accident, which occurred abroad, while the Slovenian employee was sent to work 
there by their Slovenian employer. In one case, the defendant was the employer’s insurer (it was a direct action against 
the insurer), and in the second case, the defendants were the employer and the employer’s client for which the 
employee was performing work at the time of the accident. The court characterised the liability for the damages suffered 
because of the work accident as non-contractual (although the work was performed on the basis of an employment 
contract (see Art. 4/III of the Rome II Regulation). 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, Arts 31-32) 
The rule on the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation does not appear to raise any difficulties in 
Slovenian case law or doctrine. In one case, the Appellate Labour and Social Court decided on a work accident which 
occurred abroad in July 2008 and correctly applied the Slovenian Private International Law and Procedure Act, 
however, without any special notice on the temporal (in)applicability of the Rome II Regulation (No. Pdp 247/2011 
of 19 May 2011).  
In one case (No. I Cp 338/2016 of 5 April 2016), however, the Appellate Court in Ljubljana wrongly stated that the 
regulation was applicable to the cases of unjust enrichment, which came to existence after 11 July 2007 (instead of 
only to cases, which arose after 11 January 2009),  however, it further established that the unjust enrichment could 
only have occurred in 2009 (without giving the precise date), so the application of the Rome II Regulation was possibly 
correct. 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
See answer to Q1. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
The accessible case law (i.e. the case law of appellate and supreme courts) does not reveal any issues as to the 
universal application of the Regulation. 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation)(Recital 
(7)) 
Regarding the interpretation of the same notions in different instruments of the EU Private International Law, we can 
mention case law of the Appellate Court in Maribor regarding the damage, which occurred in Slovenia as a 
consequence of a harmful act committed in Austria (Appellate Court in Maribor, No. I Cp 615/2016 of 23 August 
2016, and many cases that followed and concerned the same mass harm event; see Case Summary Form) where the 
 
 
1214 Cf. A. Galič in: J. Kramberger, A. Galič: The Application of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations in Slovenia, in: E. 




court applied the CJEU interpretation of the place where damage occurred under the Rome II Regulation to the question 
of jurisdiction under the Brussels I bis Regulation.  
In the doctrine, Repas draws attention to the fact that the notion of non-contractual obligations should not be interpreted 
in an exactly same way in the both mentioned instruments, since Article 7/2 of the Brussels I bis Regulation is an 
exception to the general rule in Article 4 of that regulation, which is not the case regarding the application of the Rome 
II Regulation.1215 This view is certainly relevant, but could prove problematic in light of Recital No. 7 to the Rome II 
Regulation which advocates the same interpretation of notions in both regulations. 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1)  
In a series of cases concerning a mass harm event of flooding of the river Drava, the question arose whether the 
damage sustained by different parties in Slovenia was a direct, but distant damage, or else it was indirect damage 
(the latter was claimed by the defendant) for the purposes of the Brussels I bis Regulation. The defendant referred to 
CJEU case No. C-350/14 (Lazar), but the court explained that the case at hand was different and that the damage 
sustained by Slovenian parties was indeed a direct (although) distant damage. 
In the Appellate Court of Ljubljana judgment No. I Cp 2219/2017 of 18 April 2018 regarding a skiing accident in 
Italy, the court explained that the country where the damage occurred was Italy, since only primary damages are 
relevant for the determination of the place where damage occurred, with no regard to the place where indirect 
consequences of the accident are suffered by the victim. 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
The Appellate Labour and Social Court issued two judgments (Nos. No. Pdp 634/2019 of 12 December 2019 and 
Pdp 599/2012 of 16 August 2012) concerning work accidents which occurred abroad. It applied the Rome II 
Regulation and concluded that since the employer and the employee were domiciled in Slovenia, Slovenian law had 
to be applied. In the first case, the employer’s client was also sued beside the employer, thus the question could arise 
about the applicability of Article 4(2) regarding such “additional” defendants. However, the court also determined the 
existence of a closer link of the case with Slovenia (the escape clause of Art 4(3)) and thus somehow dodged the 
necessity of tackling the above mentioned dilemma. The same “tactic” was used by the Appellate Court in Ljubljana in 
the judgment No. III Cp 764/2014 of 12 June 2014, where the employee who suffered damage in a work accident 
abroad, sued “only” the employer’s insurer and not also the employer. The court applied both Art 4(2) and Art 4(3) 
to determine that Slovenian law was applicable.  
Both cases nevertheless point out that the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) can also be applied outside of the 
relationship between the victim and the tortfeasor. 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and  
In the above mentioned judgment by the Appellate Social and Labour Court (No. Pdp 634/2019 of 12 December 
2019) the work accident and the direct damage occurred in Belgium. The case is interesting because of the reasoning 
of the court regarding Article 4/III. The court judged that the closest connection existed with Slovenian law, because 
the basis of the plaintiff’s work was an employment contract between him and the employer, who were both domiciled 
in Slovenia. The second defendant (a Belgian company) argued that the closest connection existed with Belgium, 
because the accident happened there and the basis for the work was a contract between the Belgian client and the 
 
 




Slovenian employer, under which the client was responsible for the safety of the working conditions. The court 
disagreed. 
In a similar case (Pdp 599/2012 of 16 August 2012), the same appellate court decided on the claim of a Slovenian 
employee against the Slovenian employer. The case was about a work accident which occurred while the employee 
was sent to work in Italy. The court again applied the Rome II Regulation and decided that the case was more closely 
connected with Slovenia and thus Slovenian law had to be applied. 
A closest connection with Slovenia was also found by the Appellate Court in Ljubljana in a case where a work accident 
occurred in Italy, but the employee (as plaintiff) and the employer were domiciled or established in Slovenia. The sole 
defendant was the employer’s insurance company. The plaintiff demanded the application of Italian law, which would 
presumably provide a higher amount of damages, whereas the court determined that the connection with Italy was 
such that the escape clause in favour of Slovenian law had to be applied (No. III Cp 764/2014). 
The doctrine criticizes the application of the escape clause in Slovenian case-law as being too broad: the courts seem 
to depart too quickly from the basic rule of lex loci damni and apply the escape clause which is and exception and 
should be interpreted narrowly. Galič proposes two possible reasons for such approach: first, the influence of the 
interpretation of Slovenian choice of law rule for torts, which promotes a primary use of the closest connection criterion 
(even though the wording of Article 30 of the Slovenian Private International Law Act poses a combined rule of lex loci 
delicti commissi and lex loci damni as the primary connecting factor),1216 and second, the fact that in all accessible 
case, the application of the closest connection criterion led to the application of the lex fori.1217 In her presentation of 
the escape clause in Art. 4(3) Repas also explains that a narrow interpretation is necessary, also in light of the 
foreseeability of the applicable law.1218 
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
For the time being, there is no Slovenian case-law or doctrinal discussion on the appropriateness of Art. 4 in relation 
to financial market torts. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
Slovenia has duly notified the Commission on the continued application of the Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Product Liability of which Slovenia was a party at the time of the adoption of the Rome II Regulation. The 
case-law analysis shows that Slovenian courts are not always aware of the prevalence of the Convention over the 
Regulation. In fact, no case-law of appellate courts or of the Supreme Court was found applying the Hague 
Convention. 
Thus, in a Supreme Court case (No. III Ips 32/2015 of 20 September 2016) the court applied the Rome II Regulation 
(without mentioning the Convention). It examined the possibility of application of Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation. 
The court deemed that since it was not possible to either establish that the product was marketed in Slovenia (where 
the damage occurred), or that the case was closely connected to any specific country, Article 5 as lex specialis could 
not be applied and Article 4 was applicable as lex generalis. 
The case was returned for retrial and the Appellate Court in Ljubljana (No. I Cpg 664/2017 of 20 July 2017) then 
repeated the interpretation of the Supreme Court and applied Slovenian law on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome II 
Regulation. 
Galič criticizes (beside the incorrect application of the Regulation instead of the Convention) such interpretation of the 
relationship between Articles 4 and 5 of the Rome II Regulation and draws attention to the lacuna, consisting of the 
fact that there is “no explicit rule for a situation where the product was marketed neither in the country where the person 
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1217 A. Galič in J. Kramberger Škerl & A. Galič, The Application of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations in Slovenia, in: 
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who sustained damage was habitually resident, nor in the country where the product was purchased, nor in the country 
where the damage occurred”. The author deems that the interpretation that in a situation where lex loci damni cannot 
be applied on the basis of Article 5 because the product was not marketed in that state, it would be inconsistent to 
apply such law anyway, on the basis of Article 4.1219 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
Article 6 regarding unfair competition was applied once by the Appellate Court in Ljubljana (No. V Cpg 164/2018 
of 5 April 2018). The court stated: “The defendant has an international chain of fast-food restaurants, however, not 
yet in Slovenia. This chain is not as well-known as some other chains, but it is active in a large number of EU Member 
States, among them in the majority of the bigger EU Member States. For this reason, it is in a different position as if it 
was only active in one, maybe also territorially limited market. Thus, it is also present in the Slovenian market where it 
can offer a franchise, or it can, on its own, via a daughter company, provide goods and services. This is, however, not 
the only reason. An average Slovenian consumer, as well as an average tourist can know the chain of restaurants of 
the plaintiff from other states. This is not disputed in the appeal. In this way, the plaintiff is present in Ljubljana market of 
restaurant services already at this moment. The plaintiff is thus present in the market also in this way and not only as a 
provider of a franchise. The first instance court rejected a part of the plaintiff’s claims because the defendant did not 
infringe copyrights of the plaintiff. However, the protection of copyright and the protection from unfair competition have 
different legal bases. Therefore, it is possible to protect against unfair competition also signs and data which are used 
by the plaintiff, even though they are not protected under copyright. Regarding the claims in relation with unfair 
competition, the Slovenian court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5/III of the Regulation No. 44/2001. Slovenian 
law is applicable (Article 6/I of the Rome II Regulation).” 
Repas draws attention to several issues regarding Art. 6. First, regarding the unclear scope of application of Art. 6(3), 
ie. whether it applies to all acts of restricting the free competition or does Recital 23 restrict its application to acts 
prohibited in the TFEU. Repas deems that such narrowing of the scope of application would not be appropriate.1220 
Second, Art. 6(2) provides for the application of the general rule of Art. 4 in cases where an act of unfair competition 
affects exclusively the interests of a specific competitor. It is unclear whether consequently also party autonomy is 
allowed, ie. that also Art. 6(4) is excluded.1221 
Furthermore, Bezjak criticizes the strict rule on the prohibition of party autonomy in Art. 6(4) and deems it should have 
been (at least) nuanced.1222 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) was not yet applied in the accessible Slovenian case-law of 
appellate courts and the Supreme Court. We know, however, that there were multiple proceedings instituted by 
Slovenian victims of the flooding of the river Drava in 2012, which was allegedly the result of a mismanagement of the 
river in Austria by the Austrian electricity provider Verbund. The Appellate Court in Maribor namely examined 
numerous appeals against first instance courts’ decisions that Slovenian courts have jurisdiction, because the damage 
occurred in Slovenia. The appellate court rejected all such appeals, stating that the damage, which occurred in 
Slovenia, was indeed a direct damage, as also required by the CJEU for the purposes of interpretation of Article 4 of 
the Rome II Regulation.  
 
 
1219 A. Galič in J. Kramberger Škerl & A. Galič, The Application of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations in Slovenia, in: 
E. Guinchard (ed.), Rome I and Rome II in Practice, Intersentia, 2020, p. 541, 542. 
1220 Repas in: M. Repas, V. Rijavec (eds.), Mednarodno zasebno pravo Evropske unije [Private International Law of 
the European Union], Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana 2018, p. 495. 
1221 Repas explains the two possible solutions, but does not take a stand. Repas in: M. Repas, V. Rijavec (eds.), 
Mednarodno zasebno pravo Evropske unije [Private International Law of the European Union], Uradni list Republike 
Slovenije, Ljubljana 2018, p. 498. 
1222 N. Bezjak, Uredba Rim II in (ne)svoboda strank glede izbire merodajnega prava [The Rome II Regulation and the 




It will be interesting to see whether first instance courts interpret this damage as environmental damage and apply 
Article 7 of the Regulation, or else as ‘classic’ damage and apply Article 4. In the event of the application of Article 7, 
the victims would be able to choose the application of Austrian law, which is unprobable. 
No controversies or problems were pointed out in the doctrine regarding the rule on environmental damage. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
Article 8 was applied in several judgments of the Appellate Court in Ljubljana (Nos. II Cp 1356/2012 of 24 October 
2012, II Cp 1356/2012 of 29 May 2013 and II Cp 1909/2014 of 1 October 2014). All cases concerned the 
management of small author’s rights by a collective organization in Slovenia regarding works of non-Slovenian 
authors. The court applied the rule of lex loci protectionis of Article 8/I of the Rome II Regulation. In these cases, the 
defendant asserted that the plaintiff (a Slovenian collective organization) could only manage small rights on foreign 
authors’ work for which the plaintiff’s foreign “sister” organization mandated the plaintiff. The court deemed that such 
view was wrong and incompatible with the principle of equal treatment of foreign and domestic authors from Article 
176/II of the Slovenian Copyright and Related Rights Act.1223 
Another case by the same Appellate Court (No. II Cp 2009/2009 of 30 September 2015) concerned a lawsuit 
between a Croatian company, which demanded payment for use of a copyrighted work, as well as damages because 
of such use, from a Slovenian company, which reproduced the work. The court applied Slovenian Private International 
Law and Procedure Act to the examination of the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the author and, by 
applying Croatian substantive law, established that there was no transfer of author’s rights, but only a mandate under 
which the plaintiff had the power of representation of the author. The reasoning of the court is somewhat unclear, but 
it seems that the court applied Slovenian law on the basis of Article 8 of the Rome II Regulation and rejected the claim, 
because there was no transfer of author’s rights to the plaintiff who therefore had no right to demand payment because 
of infringed copyright (i.e. only the holder of the corresponding right could have demanded such payment). 
In examining the rule on intellectual property, Repas points out that it is unclear whether the geographical indication, 
which falls into the scope of intellectual property under Slovenian and several other national laws, is encompassed by 
Art. 8 of the Regulation (or else by Art. 6 within the protection of competition).1224 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) was not yet applied in the accessible Slovenian case-law. This provision 
has, however, gained attention in the doctrine. Galič deems that the rule of Article 9 is appropriate, but points to two 
issues that can still prove problematic.1225 First, only non-contractual obligations are covered by the said article, while 
the Rome I Regulation is applicable to any contractual damages, which can lead to the application of law other than 
that of the state where the industrial action was taken (which is a risk for the workers and unions). Second, it is unclear 
which law is applicable in case of an international industrial action – here, Galič supports the ‘mosaic approach’.1226 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
 
 
1223 Zakon o avtorski in sorodnih pravicah, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 21/1995, with further 
amendments. 
1224 Repas in: M. Repas, V. Rijavec (eds.), Mednarodno zasebno pravo Evropske unije [Private International Law of 
the European Union], Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana 2018, p. 504. 
1225 A.  Galič, Kolizijskopravna pravila v delovnih sporih [Conflict of Law Rules in Labour Disputes], Delavci in 





Slovenian national law treats unjust enrichment and negotiorum gestio as two different quasi-contracts. Nevertheless 
(or precisely because of this) the judges must be attentive to the fact that the two notions must be interpreted 
euroautonomously and therefore have to refer any potential doubtful situations to the CJEU for interpretation. 
Repas welcomes the rule of Art. 10(1), because it mitigates the difficulties of combining different legal systems, but 
points out a possibly problematic situation where the enrichment is connected to multiple existing legal relationships.1227 
One decision could be found where the Appellate Court in Ljubljana applied Article 10 of the Rome II Regulation (No. 
I Cp 338/2016 of 5 April 2016). The court referred the case back to the first instance court for retrial, because the 
nature of the relationship between the parties was not sufficiently clarified. The plaintiff namely asserted that they issued 
invoices for wellness equipment, which was ordered by the defendant and provided by a third person (the plaintiff 
allegedly acted as intermediary). The plaintiff allegedly paid the provider but did not receive payment from the buyer, 
which was therefore unjustly enriched. If the first instance court found that there was unjust enrichment, it should apply 
Article 10 of the Rome II Regulation. The appellate court wrongly stated that the regulation is applicable to the cases 
of unjust enrichment, which came to existence after 11 July 2007 (instead of only to cases, which arose after 11 
January 2009),1228 however, it further establishes that the unjust enrichment could only have occurred in 2009 (without 
giving the precise date), so the application of the Rome II Regulation was possibly correct. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
13. + 14. The rules on negotiorum gestio and culpa in contrahendo were not yet applied in the accessible Slovenian 
case law. 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
We have not found any example of application of Article 14 (Freedom of choice) in the accessible Slovenian case 
law. 
Given that Slovenian courts are very quick to establish an implicit choice of law in contractual obligations, it could be 
surprising that this is not the case in non-contractual obligations. However, traditionally, party autonomy has been the 
main connecting factor for contractual obligations in Slovenian private international law, whereas the closest 
connection was the main connecting factor for non-contractual obligations in the previously applicable legislation (as 
per interpretation of the Supreme Court). One can guess that this traditional mind-set is one of the reasons why the 
courts, in the accessible case law, seemed not to examine whether there was (at least implicit) choice of law. 
In one academic article, the autonomy in non-contractual obligations was specifically addressed and the author 
criticized the total exclusion of autonomy in Articles 6/IV and 8/III of the Rome II Regulation.1229 In the author’s 
opinion, such regulation is appropriate only when public interest is endangered, while party autonomy could be 
permitted in cases where the damage is only sustained by the parties in the proceedings. 
 
 
1227 Repas in: M. Repas, V. Rijavec (eds.), Mednarodno zasebno pravo Evropske unije [Private International Law of 
the European Union], Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana 2018, p. 508. 
1228 The interpretation of the application ratione temporis of the Rome II Regulation was given by CJEU in Deo Antoine 
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Regarding the time when the parties must pursue a commercial activity, in order to be able to conclude a choice of 
law agreement, Repas aligns with several foreign authors in that such activity must be exercised at the time of the 
conclusion of the agreement and not necessarily at the time when the dispute arises.1230 
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
We did not detect any difficulties with the exclusion of evidence and procedure from the scope of applicability of the 
Rome II Regulation. The traditional rule of ‘lex fori regit processum’ is well known and followed. On the practical level, 
problems can arise from the sometimes insufficient knowledge of the judges and other practitioners of the EU 
procedural regulations, such as the Evidence Regulation, the Service Regulation, or else the Brussels I bis and other 
regulations. 
Different than in some other countries, rules on evidence (admissible evidence, procedure with proposing, producing 
and taking the evidence, evaluation of evidence etc.) are contained in the Slovenian Civil Procedure Act and there is 
no confusion about them being of procedural nature. In Slovenian procedural law, all types of evidence are admissible 
as proofs of any disputable facts (i.e. there is no ‘evidentiary rule’, except from the (rebuttable) presumption of the 
veracity of the content of a public document). 
Likewise, there is no confusion about the burden of proof being a question of substantive law (cf. Art. 22 of the Rome 
II Regulation). Slovenian lawyers are also used to distributive conflict of laws rules regarding formal validity of legal 
acts, such as Art. 21 of the Rome II Regulation, as well as to the fact that the questions of formal validity are questions 
of substantive law and not procedural questions.  
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
If a dispute has a cross-border character, the Slovenian court of its own motion has to apply choice-of-law rules to 
determine the applicable substantive law. If the applicable law is a foreign law, the court has to determine its content 
ex officio, since foreign law has the same status as domestic law and the iura novit curia rule applies. There is thus no 
requirement for the parties to request the application of foreign law or an obligation to adduce evidence regarding 
the content of such law. 
According to Article 12(3) of the Slovenian Private International Law and Procedure Act (PILPA), however, the parties 
may contribute to establishing the content of the applicable foreign law in that they may submit to the court a public 
document or other document issued by a competent foreign authority providing this content. If the court has any 
difficulty in determining the content of the applicable foreign law, it can request relevant information from the Ministry 
of Justice or, as provided by Article 12(2) PILPA, ‘establish its content in another suitable manner’. If the court deems it 
necessary, the Ministry will carry out the procedure under the 1968 European Convention on Information on Foreign 
Law. Thus, the Ministry, as the transmitting authority under the Convention, will contact the receiving authority of the 
state the law of which is applicable to the case before the Slovenian court in order to receive information on the content 
of that law. 
The Yugoslav Act on Private International Law of 1982, the predecessor of the PILPA, provided that foreign law had 
to be applied according to its sense and its terms. This provision was omitted in the PILPA, since it is self-evident – albeit 
difficult in practice – that foreign law must be applied as in its country of origin, including its interpretation in the case 
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law and theory. The non-application or erroneous application of foreign law may be corrected by the appellate court 
via an appeal or the Supreme Court through a legal remedy called revision.1231 
When applying foreign law, the court will only apply the substantive provisions and will normally apply Slovenian 
domestic procedural rules (lex fori regit processum). Regarding the distinction between procedural and substantive 
issues, it has been ruled (under the PILPA) that the standard of proof constitutes a procedural issue, meaning that, 
according to the Civil Procedure Act, the court has to be ‘convinced’ of the veracity of the fact that is being proven. 
Thus the Slovenian Civil Procedure Act must be applied.1232 On the other hand, it is a generally accepted view that the 
rules governing the burden of proof are based in substantive and not in procedural law.1233 Equally, under Slovenian 
law, prescription (statute of limitations) is a substantive issue, meaning that the lex causae applies (Article 8 PILPA). 
Currently, foreign law cannot be ascertained by experts as a means of evidence. The doctrinal explanation for this is 
that the expert evidence as means of evidence can only be provided on matters of fact, whereas foreign law is 
considered a question of law, like for domestic law. We believe that this should change, following the examples of 
Austria and Germany, for instance. Without questioning the status of foreign law as the law and not as a fact, there 
are strong practical reasons for allowing the court to appoint experts for the applicable foreign law. When establishing 
the contents of a foreign law, the iura novit curia principle can only mean that the court must ascertain the foreign law 
ex officio, it does not impose restrictions on how it is ascertained. It is extremely difficult to apply foreign law correctly 
without knowing the foreign system – as well as the foreign language – very well, which cannot be expected from 
judges. The option to appoint a lawyer practising in the foreign legal system would be of great help in terms of saving 
time and improving the accuracy of the final decision. 
In practice, the courts’ approach to determining the foreign law has been quite flexible. Information provided online 
has been deemed sufficient, as have (official) translations of foreign judgments (in casu, an Austrian judgment applying 
Greek law, which was the applicable law in a case before a Slovenian court).1234 In another case, the appellate court 
even accepted (although describing it as ‘awkward’) the approach of a first instance court, which determined the 
content of the applicable German law by relying on its (assumed) similarity with Slovenian law. The first instance court 
reasoned that the relevant Slovenian legislation had been adopted following the German model, and that it could thus 
be concluded with a sufficient degree of probability that the German law was identical.1235 In any case, the Slovenian 
courts reject the view that the content of foreign law can only be established via the Ministry of Justice.1236 If the content 
of the applicable foreign law cannot be established, the court applies Slovenian law.1237 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
We found two cases of the Appellate Court in Ljubljana where the court explicitly referred to Article 15 of the Rome II 
Regulation. In the first case (No. I Cpg 1084/2016 of 25 October 2017), the court just generally referred to Article 
15 as an argument that the law determined by Article 4 was indeed applicable to the claim for damages in question. 
In the second case (No. II Cp 2314/2018 of 12 June 2019, the court explained that the applicable law was indeed 
applicable also to the statute of limitations. The court, however, made an error in defining the applicable law in the first 
place (see Q 21 of this National Report). 
We could not find any doctrine raising issues regarding Art. 15 of the Rome II Regulation. 
 
 
1231 It must, however, be noted that the application of a wrong conflict-of-law rule leading to the application of the 
same substantial law as the correct conflict-of-law rule does not constitute an erroneous application of law as one of 
the reasons for appeal or revision. See e.g. Appellate Court in Koper, No. Cpg 172/2016 of 14 September 2016. 
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19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
There is no accessible case law in which court would deal with overriding mandatory provisions in non-contractual 
obligations. 
The doctrine tackled the issue of overriding mandatory rules of third states and the need to find a common solution for 
Rome I and Rome II Regulations.1238 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
In one available judgment (No. I Cpg 23/2016 of 5 April 2016) the Appellate Court in Ljubljana struggled with the 
question of applicable law concerning direct actions against the insurer. The court overlooked the need to (also) 
examine the admissibility of such action under the law applicable to non-contractual obligation.1239 It should have 
namely applied the Hague Traffic Accidents Convention (in case the convention was not applicable, Article 18 of the 
Rome II Regulation would have to be applied). The court thus did not examine the possibility of a direct claim under 
the law applicable to the non-contractual obligation, i.e. lex loci damni,1240 but only  regarding to the law applicable 
to the insurance contract (determined pursuant to the Rome I Regulation) and (wrongly) concluded that such action 
was not admissible. 
In an earlier case (No. III Cp 764/2014 of 12 June 2014), the same court did not even examine the separate conflict 
of law question of the admissibility of the direct action. 
We did not find other case-law regarding direct actions, however, we deem it is safe to assume that this issue needs 
more attention in the doctrine and judicial training, with additional focus on the possible application of the Hague 
Traffic Accidents Convention. 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
In the judgment No. II Cp 2314/2018 of 12 June 2019, the Appellate Court in Ljubljana dealt with the question of 
subrogation under Article 19 of the Rome II Regulation. The plaintiff was an Austrian social security institution, which 
claimed to have been subrogated into the rights of the victim of a traffic accident, to which the plaintiff had paid 
compensation for their injuries out of the social security scheme. The defendant was the insurer of the person who 
caused the accident. Pursuant to Article 19 of the Rome II Regulation, the court applied Austrian law to the question of 
the existence of the subrogation. There was, however, another question to be solved – that of the statute of limitations 
of the claim for the compensation. The court deemed that this question was inseparately linked to the question of the 
subrogation, that Austrian law had to be applied as well. As Galič points out, the reasoning regarding the statute of 
limitations was erroneous. Since the statute of limitations concerned the (possibly) subrogated claim, which was the 
claim of the victim against the tortfeasor, it should be examined under the law applicable to that claim.1241 The court 
also overlooked the applicability of the Hague Traffic Accidents Convention, which it should have applied to find the 
applicable law to the ‘original’ claim between the victim and the tortfeasor (Article 3 of the Hague Convention) and 
which also applies to the statute of limitations (Article 8/1(8) of the Hague Convention). 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
We found no case law or doctrine on the question of multiple liability (Art. 20). 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
 
 
1238 J. Kramberger, A. Galič: The Application of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations in Slovenia, in: E. Guinchard (ed.): 
Rome I and Rome II in Practice, Intersentia, 2020, p. 533. 
1239 Cf. Repas in: M. Repas, V. Rijavec (eds.), Mednarodno zasebno pravo Evropske unije [Private International Law 
of the European Union], Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana 2018, p. 513. 
1240 Cf. A. Galič in: J. Kramberger, A. Galič: The Application of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations in Slovenia, in: E. 
Guinchard (ed.): Rome I and Rome II in Practice, Intersentia, 2020, p. 539, 548. 
1241 A. Galič in: J. Kramberger, A. Galič: The Application of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations in Slovenia, in: E. 




Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
We found two judgments where the courts had to determine the habitual residence of the parties. There did not appear 
to be any difficulty. We would, nevertheless, like to point out that the term ‘habitual residence’ does not exist in 
Slovenian national law, where only two categories of residence exist: permanent and temporary, which are defined 
by Slovenian administrative law and depend on individual’s registration, rather than on the individual’s actual 
whereabouts. ‘Habitual residence’ in the sense of the Regulation thus sometimes does not correspond neither to 
permanent nor to temporary residence of a person (but nevertheless usually does at least to one of them). 
The first case where habitual residence was important, was the Appellate Labour and Social Court case No. Pdp 
599/2012 of 16 August 2012 about an accident at work, which occurred in Italy. The court opted for an exception 
from lex loci delicti commissi on the basis of Article 4/II, since the habitual residence of the injured party and of the 
employer was in Slovenia. The court than additionally stated that the case was also more closely connected to Slovenia 
(Article 4/III). In this case, there was no doubt about the residence of both parties and therefore no need to interpret 
the notion of habitual residence. 
The second case was more interesting from the point of view of habitual residence. It was also about a work accident, 
this time in Belgium. The Appellate Labour and Social Court (No. Pdp 634/2019 of 12 December 2019) applied 
Slovenian law pursuant to Article 4/II, because both parties were habitually resident in Slovenia and because the case 
was more closely connected to Slovenia (Article 4/III). It must however be mentioned that the defendant was working 
for a Slovenian employer and also had his social insurance in Slovenia, however, he originally came from Bosnia. 
After the accident, he went to live with his family in Bosnia and returned to Slovenia only for medical treatment. He told 
the court that he could not have lived in Slovenia with the low income he was receiving during the convalescence and 
that he needed his family’s help in everyday life. It can thus be concluded that the defendant had his habitual residence 
in Slovenia at the time of the accident, but (arguably) changed it after the accident. We deem that the court’s decision 
to take into account the habitual residence at the time of the accident was correct. 
Regarding the habitual residence of natural persons who do not pursue a business activity, Repas advocates for a 
euroautonomous interpretation.1242  
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25) 
There is no case-law where the courts would mention the exclusion of renvoi under Article 24 or where a law of a state 
with more than one legal system had to be applied under Article 25 of the Regulation. 
The exclusion of renvoi is welcomed by the doctrine,1243 since it enhances legal certainty in the EU. We can, however, 
report that Article 6 of the Slovenian Private International Law and Procedure Act provides for renvoi in all cases, with 
the exception of cases where parties chose the applicable law. The practitioners must therefore be attentive to the 
different type of referral in the Rome II Regulation. 
Also the rule of the PILPA regarding states with more than one legal system is different than that in the Rome II 
Regulation. Article 9 namely provides for the application of the national conflict of law rules for finding the applicable 
law. 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
There is no accessible case-law where the court would apply the public policy exception from the Rome II Regulation. 
In general, cases where public policy is invoked in the conflict of law rules, are very rare (and, in the accessible case-
 
 
1242 Repas in: M. Repas, V. Rijavec (eds.), Mednarodno zasebno pravo Evropske unije [Private International Law of 
the European Union], Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana 2018, p. 413. 
1243 See eg. Repas, who underlines the need for the predictability of the result of the conflict of law operation. In: M. 
Repas, V. Rijavec (eds.), Mednarodno zasebno pravo Evropske unije [Private International Law of the European 




law, the courts never actually rejected the application of a foreign law on that basis), contrary to those regarding the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments. 
One case can nevertheless be mentioned, even though the court applied the Slovenian national legislation. The 
Appellate Court in Maribor namely addressed the question whether foreign rules on the statute of limitations of civil 
claims can be contrary to Slovenian public policy. The court stated: ‘Each mandatory (imperative) rule is not a part of 
the public policy, but only those, of which a violation would endanger the legal and moral integrity of the domestic 
legal order. That said, it is completely clear that rules on the statute of limitations regarding civil claims do not fall into 
the scope of public policy.’1244 
Slovenian courts did not yet face a foreign law prescribing punitive damages. We deem that such law would currently 
be considered contrary to Slovenian public policy (as permitted by Recital 32 of the Rome II Regulation), where 
compensation in civil matters is still considered to bring ‘satisfaction’ to the victim and not to penalize the tortfeasor. 
We can mention a partly surprising doctrinal opinion that the public policy, protected by the Regulation, is not ‘some 
supranational public policy, but public policy of a particular Member State of the EU’.1245 The general view in Slovenia 
is, however, that supranational sources of fundamental rights and values (most notably the European Convention of 
Human Rights) equally enter into the scope of the ‘national’ public policy protected in Private International Law.1246 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
Slovenia is a party to the Hague Traffic Accidents Convention and to the Hague Product Liability Convention and has 
notified the Commission that those conventions, when applicable, prevail over the Rome II Regulation. The relationship 
between the two conventions, the Regulation, and sometimes even the national PIL rules has sometimes proven difficult 
for the courts to decipher. Since the mentioned conventions are the most prominent legal instruments to which Article 
28 applies, it could be useful to include in the Regulation an explicit referral to them, as a guidance to the stakeholders. 
The doctrine has identified several difficulties in the interpretation of the relationship between the Rome II Convention, 
the Hague Traffic Accidents Convention and the Directive 2009/103/EC relating to insurance against civil liability 
in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability.1247 
In the case No. I Cpg 292/2018 of 21 April 2020, the Appellate Court in Ljubljana had to resolve the dispute 
between an Austrian social security institution which paid compensation to the victim of a traffic accident in Slovenia 
(plaintiff) and a Slovenian insurer of the person who caused the accident (defendant). The court explained that that the 
Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 of the coordination of social security systems did not provide for a conflict of law rule, 
but for the obligation of all Member States recognize the subrogation, where the institution responsible for providing 
benefits is, under the legislation it applies, subrogated to the rights which the beneficiary has against the third party. It 




1244 No. I Cpg 10/2016 of 12 April 2016. 
1245 Repas in: M. Repas, V. Rijavec (eds.), Mednarodno zasebno pravo Evropske unije [Private International Law of 
the European Union], Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana 2018, p. 480. 
1246 See e.g. J. Kramberger Škerl, Evropeizacija javnega reda v mednarodnem zasebnem pravu [Europeanisation of 
Public Policy in Private International Law], Pravni letopis, 2008, pp. 355-375. 
1247 See e.g. Z. Skubic, Insolventnost zavarovatelja avtomobilske odgovornosti in odgovornost držav članic [The 
Insolvency of the Insurer of Automobile Responsibility and the Responsibility of the Member States], Pravna praksa, 
No. 34, 2013, p. 26 (the author analyses the CJEU case Csonka No. C-409/11 of 11 July  2013), and M. Krisper 
Kramberger: Varstvo žrtev prometnih nesreč v čezmejnih sporih po pravu Evropske unije in Haaški konvenciji 
[Protection of Victims of Traffic Accidents in Cross-Border Disputes under the EU law and the Hague Convention], in: 





2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
Slovenia is a party to the 1971 Hague Convention and we found 21 judgments of appellate courts and the Supreme 
Court where it was applied. A recurrent issue in this case law is the question of the amount of compensation for non-
pecuniary damages, specifically when the “living standard” in the state whose law is applicable, is lower than that in 
Slovenia where the victim lives, and the typically determined amounts (or even non-binding scale of compensation, 
adopted by the Supreme Court of the relevant country)1248 are thus lower than in similar cases in Slovenia. Mostly, 
the courts explain that in applying foreign law, they are also bound by the criteria of that law regarding the 
compensation for non-pecuniary damages. That said, the applicable criteria mostly left some place for taking into 
account all circumstances of the case, which then gave the Slovenian court the possibility to at least partly adjust the 
amount of compensation to the living environment of the victim. 
Even the Slovenian Constitutional court issued a decision regarding this convention (No. Up-1802/08 of 16 
December 2009).1249 The Constitutional court was seized by an individual who claimed a violation of the principle of 
equal treatment from Article 14 of the Slovenian Constitution, because, to resume, the Slovenian courts did not apply 
Slovenian law with which the case was closely connected, but Croatian law as the law of the state where the accident 
occurred. The court examined the question whether it could interpret the possible exception from lex loci delicti 
commissi, enacted in Article 4 of the Convention (under certain circumstances, the law of the state of the registration of 
the vehicle of the victim is applied) as enabling the application of Slovenian law. The decision against such 
interpretation was adopted with 5 votes against 3. One of the dissenting judges wrote a dissenting opinion in which 
she advocated for a broader interpretation of the exception, which would enable the application of a closely 
connected law, in line with the recent development of the tort statute in EU private international law, namely the Rome 
II Regulation.1250 
Nevertheless, we deem that the parallel system of application of the Rome II Regulation in the states which are not 
parties to the 1971 Hague Convention and the application of the Convention in the contracting states, with only one 
mention of the Convention in the Regulation (Art. 30 – Review clause) does not contribute to legal certainty. In a 
situation where lawyers and parties already have to navigate in the dispersed EU private international law legislation 
and its diverging relations with national laws, the application of the Hague Convention can be easily overlooked by 
parties, attorneys and judges alike. One such case is a very recent judgment of the Appellate Court in Ljubljana (No. I 
Cpg 292/2018 of 21 April 2020) where the court applied the Rome II Regulation to the claim for damages arising 
from a traffic accident, without even mentioning the Hague Convention. 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
We can mention two problems exposed in the doctrine. First, the need for addressing the lacuna in the relationship 
between Articles 4 and 5, i.e. the application of lex loci damni in cases of product liability, where the product was not 
 
 
1248 Such scales exist in numerous countries and are adopted by different bodies. For example, in Italy, such scale is 
found in the so-called 'Court of Milano Tables'. 
1249  ECLI:SI:USRS:2009:Up.1802.08. For an analysis of this judgment and the general analysis of the victims’ 
protection in cross-border traffic accidents, see: M. Krisper Kramberger: Varstvo žrtev prometnih nesreč v čezmejnih 
sporih po pravu Evropske unije in Haaški konvenciji [Protection of Victims of Traffic Accidents in Cross-Border Disputes 
under the EU law and the Hague Convention], in: Razsežnosti zasebnega prava: liber amicorum Ada Polajnar Pavčnik, 
pp. 281-296 (abstract in English: pp. 374-375). 




marketed in the state where damage occurred (see point 7 of this report for further precisions).1251 And second, the 
need for an explicit referral to Product Liability Convention and the Traffic Accidents Convention in the Rome II 
Regulation, in order to “remind” judges and practitioners in the contracting states of the existence and prevalence of 
these conventions over the rules of the Regulation. 
Regarding the mosaic approach, we could not find any case law where it could be applied (i.e. where damage would 
occur in different states). Repas advocates for the use of this approach in in cases of ‘dispersed’ damage.1252 However, 
Repas points out and we agree that   the mosaic approach could prove problematic in certain cases (typically as a 
consequence of the use of Internet). In the field of jurisdiction, the CJEU already found a satisfactory solution in the 
cases E-Date and Martinez, however, there was more place to manoeuvre since the wording of Article 7/2 of the 
Brussels I bis is broader than that of Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation. In choice of law, the ‘solution’ to defamation 
and violations of privacy via the internet was the exclusion of these fields from the scope of application of the Rome II 
Regulation, which can only be a temporary state of affairs. Solutions for a choice of law rule were also already 
proposed by ALI and CLIP Principles. Legislative action would therefore be welcome to meet the demands of the Internet 
era. Repas points out that another potential origin of dispersed damage is excluded from the scope of application of 
the Regulation, namely nuclear accidents, whereas there is a special rule concerning environmental damages.1253 On 
the other hand, Galič proposes to use the mosaic approach also in cases of an international industrial action.1254 
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
Based on the exclusion of the scope of application of the Rome II Regulation of violations of privacy and right relating 
to personality, Article 30 of the Slovenian Private International Law and Procedure Act is applicable to determine the 
applicable law. This is the general article of the PILPA concerning non-contractual obligations, which is applicable for 
all such obligations which fall outside of the scope of application of EU acts and international treaties. 
We found only one judgment concerning cross-border defamation (Appellate Court in Ljubljana, No. I Cp 
1024/2012 of 28 November 2012). It was about a television documentary about high ranked Slovenian politicians 
and other persons presumably involved in corruption when Slovenia bought military tank from a Finnish company. The 
documentary was first aired in Finland and then in Slovenia. Pursuant to Article 30 of the PILPA, the court applied 
Slovenian law, since the lawsuit only concerned the airing of the documentary in Slovenia and the damage resulting 
from that airing, which was the violation of the plaintiff’s personal sphere and could thus only occur in Slovenia. 
Problems, relating to the lack of a common conflict of law rule for defamation and violations of privacy as well as 
regarding the relationship between national conflict of law rule and the Directive on Electronic Commerce, were 
addressed in Slovenian doctrine.1255 Further problems could arise, in the opinion of the author of this National Report, 
 
 
1251 A. Galič in J. Kramberger Škerl & A. Galič, The Application of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations in Slovenia, in: 
E. Guinchard (ed.), Rome I and Rome II in Practice, Intersentia, 2020, p. 541, 542. 
1252 Repas in: M. Repas, V. Rijavec (eds.), Mednarodno zasebno pravo Evropske unije [Private International Law of 
the European Union], Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana 2018, pp. 481, 482. 
1253 Repas in: M. Repas, V. Rijavec (eds.), Mednarodno zasebno pravo Evropske unije [Private International Law of 
the European Union], Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana 2018, p. 482. 
1254 A.  Galič, Kolizijskopravna pravila v delovnih sporih [Conflict of Law Rules in Labour Disputes], Delavci in 
delodajalci, No. 2-3, 2013, p. 317–320. 
1255 J. Kramberger Škerl: Mednarodna pristojnost in kolizijsko pravo EU za internetne kršitve zasebnosti in osebnostnih 




regarding the GDPR. We support the solution proposed by the European Parliament in the European Parliament 
resolution of 10 May 2012 with recommendations to the Commission on the amendment of Regulation (EC) No 
864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) as a well-balanced rule. In the meantime, 
we deem that the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding Article 8 can provide some guidance 
for the national courts in applying substantial law of any country, or else, rejecting the application on the basis of public 
policy exception from their national legislations.  
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
Regarding the treatment of defamation and data protection, the concerns arise mainly from the exclusion from the 
Rome II Regulation (see Q 29 of this National Report).  
The issue of SLAPPs and a possibility of anti-SLAPP regulation, has not yet, to our knowledge, been tackled by 
Slovenian doctrine in the frame of private international law. There is, however, a recurrent debate on the chilling effect 
of lawsuits directed against journalists (both in front of the courts as in front of the Honour Tribunal of the Association 
of Journalists), and the insufficient protection both in relation to the plaintiff, as in relation between journalists and their 
employers. 
The issue of SLAPPs should undoubtedly be tackled in the debate regarding a possible common rule on defamation 
and violations of privacy. Even better, substantive regulation of this field could be adopted on the EU level. 
One case that could also be analysed from the point of view of SLAPPs was the above-mentioned case (Q 28 of this 
National Report) about the defamation lawsuit by a high-ranking politician against the authors of a documentary 
supposedly revealing corruption.  
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
Corporate abuse of human rights abroad has not yet been handled in Slovenian courts, at least not if we have in mind 
the violations of human rights other than the right to property. There is, however, a debate in the doctrine, in the NGO 
sector and the corporate sector.1256 
A famous cross-border case in which Slovenia lost in front of the European Court of Human Rights, is Alisic et al. v 
Slovenia et al. (ECHR, Grand Chamber, 16 July 2014) was about the violation of the right to property (Article 1 of 
the 1st Protocol to the ECHR) concerning the savings of several citizens of ex-Yugoslavia by a Slovenian state-owned 
bank. Slovenian courts previously rejected the plaintiffs’ claims. 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
Artificial intelligence has so far not been tackled by Slovenian conflict of laws doctrine, nor have any related cases 
come up in Slovenian courts. 
We deem that the development of AI undoubtedly is an issue which will have to be addressed in private international 
law, but first (or at least at the same time) substantive rules will have to be set on national and, hopefully, EU level. In 
light of the universal application of the Rome II Regulation, even an EU legislative action, which would at least bring a 
common definition of AI, will not suffice to prevent problems arising from different understanding of the notion in 
different legal areas, as well as the different speed of the development of national legislations in this regard. This field 
should thus be closely monitored and specific rules added to the Rome II Regulation, if necessary. 
 
 
Rights via the Internet], in: M. Damjan, M. Ahtik (eds), Pravo v informacijski družbi, Ljubljana: IUS Software, GV 
založba, 2014, p. 191-215. 
1256 For an overview, see e.g. Jernej Letnar Černič, Človekove pravice v gospodarstvu [Human Rights in Business], 





4. List of national case law 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and reference number  
 
Reference to decision of the Court of 





Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
Appellate Labour 
and Social Court 




No. Pdp 599/20121258 
(ECLI:SI:VDSS:2012:PDP.599.2012) 





decision on the 
Slovenian 
national conflict 




of the Rome II 
Regulation 
would bring the 
same result) 
Applicable law for 
damage sustained in a 
work accident, which 
occurred in Italy; the 
defendant is the insurer of 
the employer (direct 
claim). 
Exception from “lex loci 
delicti commissi”: habitual 
residence of the injured 
party and the employer is 
in Slovenia; additionally, 
the case is more closely 
connected to Slovenia. 
The court stated: “[T]he connecting 
factors refer to Slovenian law: the 
employer has their seat in Slovenia; the 
employee was sent to work from 
Slovenia; with the exception of the time 
directly after the accident the plaintiff 
received medical treatment in Slovenia, 
where he also registered his temporary 
residence. These circumstances are not 
altered by the fact that the defendant is 
the employer’s insurer.” 
 
 
1257 In Slovenia, there are four appellate courts with general jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters: in Koper, Ljubljana, Maribor and Celje. The Appellate Labour and Social 
Court (located in Ljubljana) is a specialized court with jurisdiction in labour and social security disputes. 




Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
(Sl. Višje sodišče v 
Ljubljani) 






Infringement of intellectual 
property rights 
 
The court stated: “The [Slovenian] 
Copyright and Related Rights Act, 
referring to international treaties, protect 
also foreign musical works; for questions 
related to the foreign element, this Act is 
applicable before national courts on the 
basis of lex loci protectionis (Article 8/I 
of the Regulation No. 864/2007 […]). 
The appellants view that the plaintiff (a 
Slovenian collective organization) is 
entitled to manage small rights on works 
of foreign authors only regarding issues 
for which its sister organizations 
mandated it – i.e. only regarding works 
of foreign authors who are members of 
sister organizations, is erroneous and 
such view is not compatible with the 
principle of equal treatment of foreign 
and domestic authors from Article 
176/II of the Act (if the defendant’s view 
was valid that the foreign author should 
assert their economic author’s rights 
individually, which is incompatible with 
the legally imposed collective protection 
of rights).” 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
No. II Cp 2926/2012 
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2013:II.CP.2926.2012) 
29 May 2013 Art. 8/I Infringement of 
intellectual property rights 
 
The court stated: “The repertoire of the 
plaintiff sustains of all already published 
musical non-stage works, whether the 
author is domestic or foreign. 
The view that the plaintiff is only entitled 




foreign authors insofar as the sister 
organizations mandated them – i.e. only 
with the works of foreign authors who are 
members of sister organizations, is 
contrary to the current legislation and 
erroneous.” 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
No. III Cp 764/2014 
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2014:III.CP.764.2014) 
12 June 2014 Art. 4/II, III Direct action of an 
employee against the 
employer’s insurer 
The court did not examine the 
admissibility of the direct claim under Art. 
18 of the Rome II Regulation and simply 
found that it was admissible under 
Slovenian law. 
As to the substance of the insurance 
company’s liability, the court examined 
the liability of the insured person, ie the 
employer (no mention of the scope of 
liability under the insurance contract). 
Even though the accident and thus the 
damage occurred in Italy, the court 
applied Slovenian law, since both the 
employer and the employee were 
domiciled in Slovenia and because the 
case was more closely connected with 
Slovenia. 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
No. II Cp 1909/2014  
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2014:II.CP.1909.2014) 




The court stated: “The first instance court 
correctly applied the Slovenian law, 
namely on the basis of the Regulation EC 
No. 864/2007. According to Article 8 
of that regulation the law of the state for 
which protection is claimed, or, if there is 




intellectual property right, the law of the 
state in which the act of infringement was 
committed, applies to non-contractual 
obligations arising from the infringement 
of intellectual property rights. 
The reference to Article 182 of the 
Copyright and Related Rights Act does 
not alter the applicable law, because the 
authors’ works were not distributed to the 
public directly via satellite.” 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana  












Relationship between the 
Hague Convention and 
the Rome II Regulation in 
Slovenian law; 
Lex loci actus 
Facts: Traffic accident in Austria  
The court stated: “The Hague 
Convention (Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Traffic Accidents) prevails 
over the [Slovenian] Private International 
Law and Procedure Act, since the latter 
provides in Article 4 that it is not 
applicable to relations regulated in 
another act or international treaty. Also 
the Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 […] 
is not an obstacle to the application of 
the Hague Convention, since Article 28 
of the Regulation provides that the 
Regulation does not affect the 
application of international treaties to 
which one or more Member States are 
parties at the time of the adoption of the 
Regulation and which determine conflict 





Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 




Art. 8 Infringement of 
intellectual property rights 
 
 
The court stated: “on the basis of Article 
8 of the Rome II Regulation, the first 
instance court correctly applied the 
Copyright and Related Rights Act, since 
the plaintiff demands protection of the 
author’s right in the Republic of Slovenia. 
As far as the claim concerns a demand 
for payment for the use of small author’s 
rights, the view of the first instance court 
that the Copyright and Related Rights Act 
determines the obligatory collective 
management of such rights is thus 
correct. However, insofar as the claim 
concerns the damages because of the 
infringement of the moral author’s right 
(Article 169 of the Copyright and 
Related Rights Act), the Appellate Court 
adds that moral author’s rights cannot be 
transferred, and the claim for damages 
relating to non-pecuniary damage 
following the infringement of such right, 
can only be transferred if it was 
determined in a final judgment or in a 
written agreement (Article 197/1 in 
connection with Article 197/II of the 
[formerly applicable] Obligations Act). 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
No. I Cpg 23/2016 
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2016:I.CPG.23.2016) 





Direct claim of the victim 
against the insurer 
The court stated: “The plaintiff and the 
second defendant did not conclude any 
contract, which would, at a first glance, 
justify the application of the Rome II 
Regulation. However, it is important to 








Rome I to the 
existence of a 
direct claim) 
second defendant to pay compensation 
for damage sustained by the plaintiff, 
originates from the contractual 
relationship between the first and the 
second defendant, namely if the first 
defendant had not insured their liability 
at the second defendant, the latter would 
not have any obligations resulting from 
the asserted harmful event (because the 
second defendant did not cause the 
damage). The obligation of the second 
defendant to cover civil liability of the first 
defendant against the plaintiff thus results 
from the insurance contract concluded 
with the first defendant, therefore the law 
applicable to such obligation has to be 
determined pursuant to the Rome I 
Regulation. 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana  
No. I Cp 338/2016  
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2016:I.CP.338.2016) 





The case concerned unpaid invoices 
issued by the plaintiff, who was an 
intermediary between the defendant as 
the buyer and a third person as the 
provider of ordered equipment. The 
plaintiff alleged that she paid the 
provider for this equipment and thus 
replied them in the legal relationship with 
the defendant, which the latter denied. 
(summary in English provided by Aleš 
Galič) 
The court referred the case back to the 
first instance court for retrial, because the 




parties was not sufficiently clarified. If the 
first instance court found that there was 
unjust enrichment, it should apply Article 
10 of the Rome II Regulation. The 
appellate court wrongly states that the 
regulation is applicable to the cases of 
unjust enrichment, which came to 
existence after 11 July 2007 (instead of 
only to cases, which arose after 11 
January 2009),  however, it further 
establishes that the unjust enrichment 
could only have occurred in 2009 
(without giving the precise date), so the 
application of the Rome II Regulation 
was possibly correct. 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
No. III Cp 942/2016 
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2016:III.CP.942.2016) 
15 June 2016 Art. 4/I Qualification of non-
contractual damage 
(first instance court 
applies Slovenian law to 
such qualification and, 
consequently, to the 
question whether Rome II 
is applicable; 
Appellate court deems 
that, under Rome II, 
qualification must be 
made under Austrian law) 
* Author’s note: the court 
ignored that there should 
be euroautonomous 
interpretation of whether 
The court stated: “The first instance court 
applied the wrong substantial law, 
because it did not apply Austrian law to 
the contentious relation in view of the 
basis of the claim, as is determined in 
Article 4/I of the Rome II Regulation. 
The first instance court correctly cites 
Article 4/I of the Regulation […] 
according to which the law of the state 
where the damage occurred is 
applicable to the non-contractual 
obligation for damages; however, the 
court then finds itself in a logical trap, by 
verifying whether there is in fact non-
contractual obligation for damages and 
by applying Slovenian law to that 




the obligation at stake is a 
non-contractual 
obligation and whether 
the application of Rome II 
is not excluded in Art. 
1/1/d). 
pursuant to Article 148 of the 
[Slovenian] Obligations act, which 
regulates the responsibility of the legal 
entity for damages caused by its organ, 
there is no passive standing of the 
defendant; it then refuses to apply Article 
131 of the Obligations Act and 
concludes that also the provisions of the 
[Slovenian] Companies Act which 
regulate the responsibility for damages 
of the administration of the limited 
responsibility company, there is no basis 
for such responsibility of the defendant 
according to the plaintiff’s claim. One 
can therefore see that the court 
evaluated the conditions for the 
existence or inexistence of the 
defendant’s (non-contractual) 
responsibility for damages asserted by 
the plaintiff, only according to Slovenian 
legislation, which is contrary to the cited 
provision of the Regulation. It took the 
wrong path of evaluating under 
Slovenian law whether there is 
defendant’s non-contractual 
responsibility, instead of, pursuant to 
Rome II Regulation, assessing also this 
question under Austrian law. 
Supreme Court of 
the Republic of 
Slovenia 




Articles 4, 5 Applicability of Article 5 – 
question whether the 
product was marketed in 
Slovenia 
The court stated: “Article 5 of the Rome II 
Regulation is lex specialis in comparison 
to its Article 4, since it determines the law 







* Not all facts of the case 
are known, but the court 
probably forgot about the 
application of the Hague 
Convention on Law 
Applicable to Products 
Liability 
 
obligations arising from damage caused 
by defective products, while Article 4 of 
the Rome II Regulation generally 
concerns non-contractual obligations 
arising from a harmful act. 
In the case at hand, the question must first 
be resolved whether the product was 
marketed in the Republic of Slovenia 
where the plaintiff as victim has their 
habitual residence (point a) of Article 
5/I of Rome II Regulation). If the answer 
to this question is negative then it must be 
verified whether other connecting factors 
from Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation 
exist. 
However, since it is not possible to 
determine, based on the content of the 
claim, where the product was marketed 
or a close connection with the law of any 
of the countries, Article 5 of the Rome II 
Regulation is not applicable. Article 4 of 
the Rome II Regulation is thus applicable, 
since the claim contains all the facts 
needed for such application.” 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
No. II Cp 3249/2016 
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2017:II.CP.3249.2016) 
20 March 2017 Art. 28 Relationship between the 
Rome II Regulation and 
the Hague Convention on 
the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents: 
The court stated: “The appellate court 
first establishes that the case at hand is a 
case with a foreign element, since the 
traffic accident occurred in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The first instance court correctly 




The Hague Convention 
prevails in relation to third 
states. 
of the Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Traffic Accidents, of which both 
countries are signatories, Bosnian law 
has to be applied. Article 3 of the 
convention namely determines the 
applicability of the law of the country 
where the traffic accident occurred. The 
first instance court correctly explained 
that Bosnian law would also be 
applicable pursuant to the Rome II 
Regulation, which provides in Article 4 
for a general rule that the law applicable 
to non-contractual responsibility for 
damage is the law of the country where 
the damage occurred (lex loci damni). 
However, this Regulation only prevails 
over the concluded convention among 
the Member States, and does not 
prejudice the application of international 
conventions to which one or more 
Member States are parties at the time of 
the adoption of the Regulation and which 
lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to 
non-contractual obligations (Article 28 
of the Regulation). 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
No. I Cpg 664/2017 
(between the same parties as in the case 
III Ips 32/2015) 
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2017:I.CPG.664.2017) 







application of Art. 4, 
since no basis for the 
application of Art. 5 
The court stated: “The plaintiff asserted 
that the damage resulted from the 
delivery of a defective product. The 
second defendant supposedly caused 
the damage with their actions. The 
damage occurred in the Republic of 








the defendant asserted any 
circumstances, which would exclude the 
application of Slovenian law, this law is 
thus applicable (Article 4/I of the Rome 
II Regulation.” 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 






Claim for payment of 
price under a contract of 
sale; defendant demands 
set-off with a claim based 
on the plaintiff’s alleged 
responsibility for 
damages because of a 
failed assignation; 
Court finds that Rome II is 
not applicable for the 
claim asserted for set-off, 
but the same law would 
have been applicable 
even if Rome II was 
applicable. 
The court stated: “The assertion in the 
appeal that the first instance court should 
have applied Italian or, respectively, 
Austrian substantive law for the decision 
on the existence of the claim for 
damages which was asserted for set-off, 
is incorrect. In the procedure at hand, the 
defendant (the Slovenian company) 
asserted for set-off a claim for damages 
against the plaintiff (the Italian company 
F. S.p.A., Italy) resulting from an 
unsigned assignment, because of which 
the person who placed the order and 
who is at the same time the assignee (the 
Austrian company W., Austria) retained 
the payments to the defendant in the 
amount of 50,000,00 EUR. In 
substance, this is a reproach of a 
violation of the obligation of the plaintiff 
regarding the acceptance of the 
fulfilment (the payment) of the defendant, 
which originates in the same contractual 
relationship (the contract of sale) 
between the plaintiff and the defendant, 
as does the asserted claim of the plaintiff 
(the payment of the price), and 




correctly assumed that the plaintiff and 
the defendant implicitly agreed on the 
application of Slovenian substantial law. 
The application of Slovenian law (and 
the UN Convention on International Sale 
of Goods, the CISG) was not disputed in 
the appeal. On the mentioned grounds, 
also the existence of the claim for 
damages, which is asserted for set-off, 
thus has to be established under the 
Slovenian substantial law. For the claim 
asserted for sett-off, this law would have 
been applicable even if the court 
considered that it was a non-contractual 
claim for damages, since Slovenian law 
would have been applicable under 
Article 4/I and 4/III in connection with 
Article 15 of the Rome II Regulation.” 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
No. V Cpg 164/2018  
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2018:V.CPG.164.2018) 
5 April 2018 Art. 6/I Unfair competition The court stated: “Regarding the claims 
in relation with unfair competition, the 
Slovenian court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Article 5/III of the Regulation No. 
44/2001. Slovenian law is applicable 
(Article 6/I of the Rome II Regulation).” 
The case concerned the dispute over the 
use of a distinctive sign which the 
defendant used in Slovenia, but which is 
already in use by the plaintiff for the 
same activity in numerous other Member 
States, so that it could come to a 
confusion. The court explained that the 




copyright, however, it was protected 
under the distinct rules on unfair 
competition. 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
No. I Cp 2219/2017 
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2018:I.CP.2219.2017) 
18 April 2018 Art. 4/I Definition of place where 
the damage occurred = 
only the place where 
primary/direct damage 
occurs 
(the jurisdiction of 
Slovenian courts is 
rejected regarding the 
insurer of the ski slope 
manager) 
The court stated: “Taking into account the 
cited provision of Article 13/II [of the 
Brussels I bis Regulation], the first 
instance court correctly went to establish 
which law was applicable, pursuant to 
the Rome II Regulation, in the case at 
hand. It ensues from Article 4/I that the 
law applicable for a non-contractual 
obligation arising from a harmful action, 
is the law of the state where the damage 
occurs, with no regard to the state where 
the harmful event causing the damage 
occurred, and with no regard to the state 
where indirect consequences occurred. 
In the case at hand, that state is Italy, 
where the physical injuries of the plaintiff 
occurred because of a fall on the ski 
slope, as the court of first instance 
correctly determined, therefore Italian 
law is applicable on the basis of the 
mentioned provision. In view of the 
reproaches in the appeal, it is necessary 
to additionally explain that such solution 
is in conformity with the European case 
law, pursuant to which only primary 
damages are decisive for the 
identification of the place where the 
damage occurred. This is only the place 




protected legal good (body, patrimony) 
and it is not essential if the victim suffers 
the damage also later in another place 
or where further or indirect damages of 
the victim occurred, all reproaches in the 
appeal which go in the opposite sense, 
are not founded.” 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
No. I Cp 522/2019 
(the same event as in the case I Cp 
2219/2017) 
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2019:I.CP.522.2019) 
3 April 2019 Art. 4/I Definition of place where 
the damage occurred = 
only the place where 
primary/direct damage 
occurs 
(the jurisdiction of 
Slovenian courts is 
rejected also in relation to 
the ski slope manager) 
The court stated: „Concerning the Rome 
II Regulation and the CJEU judgment No. 
C–350/14 of 10 December 2015, 
where the court refers to the place of the 
direct damage as the connecting factor 
to be taken into account for the 
determination of the applicable law, 
Italian law is applicable to the case at 
hand.” 
Appellate Court in 
Maribor 
No. I Cp 295/2019 
(ECLI:SI:VSMB:2019:I.CP.295.2019) 
11 June 2019 Article 28/I Relation between Rome II 
Regulation and the 
Hague Convention on 
Law Applicable to Traffic 
Accidents 
(the Convention prevails) 
The court stated: “In the case at hand it is 
not possible to apply the Rome II 
Regulation which is applicable to the 
conflict of laws in non-contractual 
obligations in civil and commercial 
matters (Article 1), because the 
Regulation, according to Article 28/I 
does not prejudice the application of 
international conventions to which one or 
more Member States are parties at the 
time of the adoption of the Regulation 
and which provide for conflict of law 
rules for non-contractual obligations. The 
Member States of the EU in which the 




(Republic of Slovenia and Czech 
Republic) were namely already parties, 
at the time of the adoption of the Rome II 
Regulation, of the Convention, which is 
also a more specific act than the Rome II 
Regualtion which applies generally to 
non-contractual obligations in civil and 
commercial matters, whereas the 
Convention regulaties exclusively non-
contractual liability for damage in 
relation to traffic accidents with a foreign 
element (lex specialis derogate legi 
generali). […] Notwithstanding, the 
second instance court, in view of the 
plaintiff’s assertion in the appeal, adds 
that, in the case at hand, Croatian law 
would have also been applicable under 
Article 4/I of the Rome II Regulation, as 
the law of the country where the damage 
occurred.” 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
No. II Cp 2314/2018 
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2019:II.CP.2314.2018) 
12 June 2019 Articles 15/I 
(h) and 19 
Subrogation of rights from 
social security and statute 
of limitations 
The court applies Article 19 to the 
question of subrogation of rights of the 
victim of a traffic accident against the 
person who caused the accident and 
determines the applicability of Austrian 
law. 
When the defendant (the tortfeasor) 
invokes the statute of limitations 
regarding the claim for compensation, 
the court decides to equally apply 
Austrian law, on the basis of Article 15. 




have applied Slovenian law as the law 
of the place where the accident 
occurred, pursuant to the Hague Traffic 
Accidents Convention. 
Appellate Labour 
and Social Court 








Victim and perpetrator 
habitually resident in the 
same Member State; 
Closest connection with 
Member State other than 
the state where damage 
occurred. 
The court stated: “The assessment of the 
first instance court that Slovenian 
substantial law is applicable to the 
resolution of this dispute is correct. The 
first instance court correctly established 
that the plaintiff was injured while he 
performed work abroad (in Belgium) 
and that he performed the work on the 
construction site of a Belgian client, with 
his working instruments, following his 
orders and under his control. Taking into 
account further findings that, by 
concluding the employment contract of 9 
September 2011, the plaintiff and the 
second defendant established an 
employment relationship in Slovenia for 
the performance of carpentry work 
abroad and that the plaintiff was, on the 
basis of this contract, sent to work for the 
client in Belgium, the first instance court 
correctly concluded that the harmful 
event is more closely connected with 
Slovenia than with the state where the 
damage occurred (Article 4/III of the 
Rome II Regulation), therefore domestic 
law has to be applied in the case at 
hand. The second defendant incorrectly 




connection with the harmful event is 
demonstrated by the contract on 
business and technical cooperation, 
because pursuant to the provisions of this 
contract the client was obliged to take 
care of the security of workers on the 
construction site. However, as the 
appellate court already emphasised in 
its decision No. 16/2018, the contract 
on business and technical cooperation 
or any other contract by which the 
employer and the client agree on the 
obligations regarding the safety 
measures or regarding the liability for 
possible damage, can only be binding in 
their mutual relationship and not 
regarding the victim – the worker. The 
basis for the application of Slovenian 
law is, furthermore, also Article 4/II of 
the Rome II Regulation which provides 
that in the case where the person claimed 
to be liable (first and second defendant) 
and the person sustaining damage (the 
plaintiff) both have their habitual 
residence in the same country at the time 
when the damage occurs, the law of that 
country shall apply (Slovenian law).” 
Appellate Court in 
Ljubljana 
No. I Cpg 292/2018 
(ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2020:I.CPG.292.2018) 
21 April 2020 Art. 4/I (in 
relation to Art. 
85 of the 
Regulation (EC) 
Law applicable to the 
claim for damages of a 
victim of a traffic accident 
against the perpetrator 
The court stated: “The defendant 
correctly points out in the appeal that the 
first instance court, when deciding on the 
case at hand, will have to take into 






question of the existence and the amount 
of the assigned claim for damages is the 
law of the state where the traffic accident 
occurred (pursuant to the Rome II 
Regulation, the law applicable in the 
case where the damage results from a 
traffic accident is the law of the state 
where the traffic accident occurred), 
namely the Slovenian law. As results 
already from the cited reasons of the 
CJEU judgment No. C-397/96, the 
rights of the victim against the liable 
person are assessed under the law of the 
state where the traffic accident occurred, 
and only such rights can then be 
transferred to the bearer responsible for 
the attribution of a public payment.” 
 
In the following case law, the Rome II Regulation was referred to for purposes of argumentation only and was not applied to determine the applicable law in the case at hand. 
 Court Case Number Date Article of the Rome 
II Regulation 
  
1. Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Slovenia 
 
 
No. Cpg 3/2019-3  
(ECLI:SI:VSRS:2019:CPG.3.2019.3) 
 








In proceedings for 
recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral 
award, the defendant 
invoked that the 
contractually agreed 
penalties for non-
execution of contract 




policy, in analogy with 
punitive damages from 
the Recital 32 of the Rome 
II Regulation. 
The court stated that the 
Rome II Regulation was 
applicable to non-
contractual obligations 
and its content could not 
simply be copied to 
contractual legal field. 
2. Appellate Court in Maribor 
 
(further case-law based on 
the same mass-harm event of 
the Drava river flooding and 
regarding the interpretation of 
the place where the damage 
occurred: 
- Appellate Court in 
Maribor, No. I Cp 
615/2016 of 23 
August 2016, 
- Appellate Court in 
Maribor, No. I Cpg 
297/2016 of 30 
August 2016, 
- Appellate Court in 
Maribor, No. I Cpg 




Art. 4 Interpretation of the 
place where 
damage occurred 
under the Rome II 
Regulation for the 
purposes of the 
(same) 
interpretation of 
Article 7/2 of the 




A plaintiff domiciled in 
Slovenia sued a 
defendant domiciled in 
Austria for damages 
resulting from the flooding 
of the river Drava, 
arguably caused by the 
(in)action of the 
defendant concerning the 
retention of the water in 
the Austrian part of the 
river. 
 
The dispute revolved 
around the jurisdiction of 
Slovenian courts pursuant 
to Art. 7/2 of the Brussels 




294/2016 of 30 
August 2016, 
- Appellate Court in 
Maribor, No. I Cp 
1270/2016 of 20 
December 2016,  
- Appellate Court in 
Maribor, No. I Cpg 
527/2016 of 19 
January 2017, 
- Appellate Court in 
Maribor, No. I Cp 
30/2017 of 7 
February 2017, 
- Appellate Court in 
Maribor, No. I Cp 
261/2017 of 14 
March 2017, 
- Appellate Court in 
Maribor, No. I Cp 
165/2017 of 14 
March 2017, 
- Appellate Court in 
Maribor, No. I Cp 
615/2016 of 13 
April 2016. 
The defendant asserted 
that Austrian courts had 
jurisdiction, because the 
damage sustained in 
Slovenia was indirect 
(consequential) damage, 
which, under the CJEU 
case-law regarding the 
Rome II Regulation (case 
No. C-350/14 of 10 
December 2015), was 
not relevant for the 
determination of the place 
where damage occurred. 
 
The court accepted 
jurisdiction, stating that the 
damage in the case at 
hand was in fact a direct 
distant damage and thus 
Slovenia was the place 
where damage occurred 
for the purposes of the 
application of the Brussels 









• The application of the specific (general and special) rules of the Rome II Regulation by the courts in 
Spain does not in general reveal any serious problems in their understanding, although case law shows 
an often too brief analysis of the issues of applicable law. Moreover, many of the Regulation’s rules 
have not been applied in practice. 
• The problems in applying the Rome II Regulation in Spain seem to be of general origin, not linked to 
the specific content of the provisions, with its application facing two main difficulties: (i) the Spanish 
system of application of foreign law requiring proof of the law by the parties, in the absence of which 
the question is settled under Spanish substantive law; and (ii) the often inadequate understanding by 
legal operators of the relationships between legal provisions emanating from different sources (in 
particular between the Rome II Regulation and the 1971 and 1973 Hague Conventions on the Law 
Applicable to Traffic Accidents and on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, respectively). In 
addition, the erga omnes scope of the text is not always properly understood. 
• The Regulation has been the subject of considerable academic attention. The issue that has aroused 
the most academic interest has been the absence in the Rome II Regulation of a conflicts rule about 
damage to rights relating to violations of privacy and rights relating to personality. As regards 
defamation, the need for a common rule, based on the victim's habitual residence, is emphasised; 
although there are still differing opinions advocating the application of the law of the alleged 
tortfeasor’s habitual residence.  
1. Introduction 
Spanish practitioners and businesses’ legal advisors are generally aware of the existence of the Rome II 
Regulation and its main rules, although in many cases it is only a superficial knowledge extending to the general 
rule and some of the special ones, but not to its interaction with other rules (such as the The Hague Conventions) 
or the correct interpretation of some articles (such as Art. 3 on universal scope). Most citizens are not familiar 
with the Rome II Regulation or any other Private International Law rules. 
The Rome II Regulation is generally known and applied by Courts in Spain. Nonetheless, some cases show a 
rather “automatic” application, without complex reasoning of the international aspects of the case and the effect 
on application of the rules, or their interaction with other private international law rules. In other cases, a more 
accurate approach and understanding of the rules is shown, as explained in the answers to some of the 
questions below. 
On the other hand, there are several court cases where the Regulation is applied, but not the foreign law to 
which it leads, since the foreign law is not proven to the court, as explained in section 2.5 of this report. 
To the best of my knowledge, there are no relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation 
in Spain. There is, however, a study conducted as part of an EU project on the application of several EU law 
instruments, the Spanish results of which were published in C. OTERO GARCÍA-CASTRILLÓN/S. BENAISSA 
PEDRIZA, “Informe sobre la aplicación en España de los instrumentos comunitarios de derecho internacional 
privado: reglamentos 44/2001 y 1215/2003 (Bruselas I/I bis), 2201/2003 (Bruselas II bis), 4/2009 
(Bruselas III), 593/2008 (Roma I) y 864/2007 (Roma II)”, in C. OTERO GARCÍA CASTRILLÓN (dir.), Justicia 
civil en la Unión Europea: evaluación de la experiencia española y perspectivas de futuro, Dykinson, Madrid, 
2017, pgs.15-52. 
In contrast with the situation described above, academic discussion of the Rome II Regulation in Spain is 
significant. The areas where scholars have shown special interest are mainly defamation and the absence of a 
rule regarding personality rights in the Regulation; torts in financial markets; torts resulting from a violation of 




mainly that of defamation, have caused a debate at an academic level, there is not, to the best of my knowledge, 
debate at a political level regarding them.  
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any 
difficulties in applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of 
any excluded matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
In general, the scope and Interpretation of the Regulation has not raised relevant problems in Spain. Perhaps 
the aspect in relation to which Spanish courts may have the most difficulty - not only in relation to the Rome II 
Regulation, but also in relation to other applicable law texts - is that of their universal scope. 
No special difficulties have emerged in relation to Rome’s II material scope as concerns the concept of “civil 
and commercial matters” or in the definition of the exact scope of excluded matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)). 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts. 31-32) 
The same may be said, in general, as regards the determination of the temporal scope of application of the 
Rome II Regulation (Arts 31-32). The only court case where the application of the Regulation was excluded on 
this ground correctly understood that the damage occurred before it was applicable, since it concerned 
damages resulting from the violation of industrial property rights in Spain between 1993 and 2005 (ECLI: ES: 
SJMM :2014 :5). There is, however, one case where it was considered that the Regulation applied even if the 
damages could be considered to occur in 1999. It is, notwithstanding a case where very reduced attention was 
paid to applicable law, since the internal rule in Spain (Art. 19.9 of the Spanish Civil Code) was considered to 
lead to the same conclusion that Rome II Regulation (ECLI: ES:APGI:2014:1614. This case is further explained 
in section 2.3 below). 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations" and its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” has also not presented difficulties in Spain in general. In case 
ECLI:ES:APM:2018:13812, that concerned damages resulting from the violation of intellectual property rights, 
the question was discussed, but adequately decided by the court. This case is explained in section 2.2 below. 
In some cases concerning internal situations (not implying conflicts of laws and, thus, being cases where the 
Regulation does not apply) where it is discussed if the case is contractual or related to torts, the Regulation is 
used to clarify the concept, so there is a certain influence of European Union’s law in internal law even in cases 
where the former does not necessarily apply. The following cases may be cited as examples: 
ECLI:ES:JMBI:2019:1107; ECLI: ES:APBI:2019:2254; ECLI:ES:APL:2018:804; ECLI:ES: APM:2018:2844; 
ECLI:ES:JMBI:2016:4321; ECLI:ES:APCC:2015:911; ECLI:ES:JMIB:2015:2174; ECLI:ES:APBA:2015:42; 
ECLI:ES:APBI:2013:1881; ECLI:ES:APA:2013:1362; ECLI:ES:APBI:2012:2694; ECLI:ES:APPO:2009: 2891; 
ECLI:ES:TS:2008:7354. These cases have not been included in the case law list, since they concern situations 
where the Regulation has not been applied to decide about applicable law, that was not an issue, but just as a 
tool of interpretation of internal material rules. As an example, in case ECLI:ES:APPO:2009: 2891 the claimant 
had commissioned certain refurbishment works on a house of her property which resulted in its collapse. The 
defendant, the insurance company of the person in charge of the works, argued that the damage was not 
covered by the insurance policy, since it only covered non-contractual liability and the damage resulted from a 
contractual relationship.  The court, while admitting the existence of grey areas in the delimitation of this 
qualification, concluded that the action that caused the damage exceeded the contractual sphere because it 
could not be considered, in strict terms, a breach of the obligations of the lessee of the work, but rather a breach 
of the general duty not to cause damage to the property of others. The  regime of non-contractual liability was 




the strict scope of the agreement, since it was unrelated to the nature of the business, even if it occurred in its 
execution.  In support of this contractual classification, the court uses arguments that are peculiar to Spanish civil 
law and, furthermore, refers to the distinction between contractual and non-contractual liability that the EUCJ 
makes in application of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations (depending on the existence of a situation in which 
there is an obligation freely assumed by one party towards another) citing for this purpose the judgments in the 
cases C-189/87, C- 261/90, C-51/97, C-96/00; C-334/00; C-167/00 (which relate to that distinction 
in application of the Brussels Regulations). 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
As regards the universal scope of the Regulation, the question has generally not arisen, since in most cases 
decided by Spanish Courts, the application of Regulation Rome II lead to the application of the law of a member 
State of the European Union or to Spanish law. There is, however, a case where the court of Appeal of Lleida 
deciding on the question did not apply Rome II Regulation, since it misunderstood its universal scope 
(ECLI:ES:APL:2015:955). The case concerned damages caused in a ski accident occurred in Andorra. Both the 
person who caused the damage and the victim had their habitual residence in Lleida (Cataluña, Spain). The 
victim alleged the application of Rome II Regulation and argued that Art. 4.2 together with Art. 25 lead to 
Catalan law, according to which the statute of limitation for this action was three years. The court decided that 
the Regulation did not apply since it only applies to conflicts of laws and jurisdiction (sic.) among member States 
of the European Union, and Andorra is not one of them. As a consequence, the applicable law was decided in 
accordance with Art. 10.9 of the Spanish civil code, that lead to the law of Andorra, according to which the 
action had prescribed.  
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU 
private international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I 
Regulation) (Recital (7)) 
The relationship of Rome II Regulation to other European Union private international law instruments and the 
consequences on the interpretation thereof seem to be quite clear for Spanish courts. Such relation is mentioned 
in one case (ECLI:ES:APM:2011:13407A) where Rome II Regulation is used to interpret and apply the concept 
of non-contractual liability, as regards a claim concerning unfair competition and its inclusion in art. 5.3 of 
Regulation 44/2001 (the case only concerned the jurisdiction of Spanish courts and no question of applicable 
law was decided, so this case is also not included in the list of Spanish case law) and also in some of the cases 
where reference to Regulations Rome I and II is made in order to decide the qualification in internal cases, 
mentioned in section 2.1 of this report. Such reference shows the understanding of the inter-relation of texts since 
the point of departure is the mutual exclusion of cases included in each of them.  
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State 
with respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art. 4(1) 
The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict contained in Art. 4 regarding the approach to identifying the 
place of direct damage (Art 4(1)) does not seem to pose relevant problems of understanding in Spanish case 
law, although some court decisions pay insufficient attention to that issue, as in some of the cases presented 
below in this section.  
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art. 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
There are no cases decided by Spanish courts in which the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving 




c. the approach to the escape clause in Art. 4(3) 
The escape clause of Art. 4(3) has been considered in several cases in Spain, but does not seem to be 
controversial. Only in one of them was it considered that Spanish (and not German) law should be applied 
because it was manifestly more closely connected to the case (ECLI: ES:APT:2015:1638). A claim was brought 
for damages suffered by a person with habitual residence in Germany due to acts that had been declared a 
criminal offence in that country. Civil liability was claimed in Spain. The court considered that, even if the tort 
could be considered to have occurred in Germany, where the victim suffered an economic loss, the situation 
was more closely connected with Spain, because the economic loss suffered had its origin in the delivery by the 
victim of certain amounts to the author of the damage, who managed his rights in an open succession (“sucesión 
abierta”) in Spain, and in relation to assets also located there, for the payment of taxes allegedly due in the 
country, which were never paid. 
The other two cases concerned damages resulting from traffic accidents (also referred in section 2.7 below). In 
the first (ECLI:ES:APB:2020:491), the question is presented as one concerning Art. 4(3), but what is really 
elucidated in it is what the relevant damage is and the exclusion of indirect damages. The case was decided 
under the Rome II Regulation, without any reference to the 1971 Hague Convention. The accident had taken 
place in England, but the plaintiffs understood Spanish law to be applicable because it was more closely 
connected to the tort, since they underwent most (and many) medical treatments and follow-ups in Spain. The 
court did not accept this argument: it understood that the law of the ‘country in which the damage occurs’ must 
be applied, as it appears from Art. 4.1 and Recitals 17 and 18 of the Rome II Regulation, regardless of the 
country or countries where there could be indirect consequences, so that in cases of personal injury or property 
damage, the country where the damage occurs must be the country where the injury was suffered or the property 
was damaged, respectively (Recital 18). Art. 4(2) is an exception to this general principle, creating a special 
connection where the parties are habitually resident in the same country, and Article 4(3) is to be understood 
as an ‘escape clause’ from Article 4(1) and (2) where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the 
damage is manifestly more closely connected with another country. After citing the cases of the ECJ C-350/14 
(Lazar) and joined cases C- 359/14 and C-475/14 (ERGO Insurance), the Spanish court concluded that the 
law of the place of the accident (England) applied and also determined the conditions and extent of liability, as 
well as the grounds for apportionment of such liability (Art. 15 a) and b)). 
The second case concerned damages resulting from a traffic accident that occurred in Portugal and involved 
two cars registered in Spain and Portugal respectively. No reference to the 1971 Hague Convention was made. 
The Spanish driver and passenger of the Spanish car claimed against the insurer of the Portuguese car. Liability 
was not discussed, but only the law that applied to quantification of the damage (and the application of the 
scales provided by each law). The court of first instance applied Portuguese law since it was the place where 
the damage occurred, but the claimants appealed alleging that Spanish law was more closely connected to the 
case, given that both injured persons were Spanish nationals, so Spanish law should be applied in accordance 
with Art. 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation. The Court of Appeal of Pontevedra rejected this argument and 
considered that, even if the case presents an obvious link with Spain, it is not closer than the one that it presents 
with Portugal, which is the country of one of the vehicles involved and of the nationality of the defendant 
(ECLI:ES:APPO:2012:2888). 
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts 
There is no case law in Spain concerning Rome II and prospectus liability or other financial market torts, but this 
question has been the object of some academic interest. The damage caused by the violation of information 
obligations in this sector is classified as non-contractual and the authors agree that the place of the damage is 
the affected market (S. SÁNCHEZ FERNÁNDEZ, El folleto en las ofertas públicas de venta de valores 
negociables (OPV) y responsabilidad civil. Ley aplicable, La Ley, Las Rozas, Madrid, 2015; F.J. 
GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ, “The law aplicable to the prospectus liability in the European Union”, in C. PELLISÉ 
DE URQUIZA (Coord.), La unificación convencional y regional del Derecho internacional privado, Marcial 
Pons, Madrid, 2014, pgs. 120-144; S. CORNELOUP, “Roma II y el derecho de los mercados financieros: el 
ejemplo de los daños causados por la violación de las obligaciones de información”, Anuario español de 
Derecho internacional privado, 11, 2011, pgs. 63-87 ). On the basis of this criterion, S. SÁNCHEZ points out 
that the affected market is the one where the offeror has marketed the securities and that whenever there is more 




system should be closed with the closer connection clause, limited to the affected markets: when a claim is 
brought before the courts of any of the defendants’ domicile or the Member State of origin, as place of the event 
giving rise to the damage, and that State is one of those in which securities have been marketed, it must be 
possible to apply the lex fori to all investors, irrespective of the market where they acquired the securities. This 
author also excludes the possibility of applying the rule for culpa in contrahendo. S. CORNELOUP agrees on 
the criterion of the affected market completed by the exception clause that provides the required flexibility. This 
author adds that where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have their 
habitual residence in the same country, the victim should have the possibility to choose between the law of the 
marketplace and the law of the common habitual residence, whereas a choice of law according to art. 14 
should be excluded. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
As regards product liability, Spain is party to the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products 
Liability, but this fact is sometimes ignored by the Courts.  
In a recent case (ECLI:ES:APM:2020:3518), the Court of Appeal of Madrid decided that Spanish law applied 
to a case where a claimant lost vision in one eye from using a medical product manufactured by a German 
company. The defendant was the German insurer of the company, and discussion concerned the possibility of 
a direct action against it, permissible under Spanish law but only allowed by German law in some instances. 
The Court decided that Spanish law applied, according to Arts. 4, 5.1 and 18 of the Rome II Regulation, and 
no reference was made to the Hague Convention.  
In a case concerning the same defendant and also regarding product liability damage and the availability of a 
direct action against the manufacturer’s insurer (ECLI: ES:APM:2019:16074), the Court of Appeal of Madrid 
applied Spanish law under Art. 5.1 of the Rome II Regulation, without mentioning the Hague Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Products Liability. 
By contrast, in case ECLI:ES:TS:2015:181, the Supreme Court (and before, the Barcelona Provincial Court- 
ECLI:ES:APB:2012:6351- and a Barcelona Court of First Instance-ECLI:ES:JPI:2010:100) used the 1973 
Hague Convention,without any reference to Rome II Regulation, to determine the law that should be applied to 
a claim concerning the damages caused by a defective flight instrument installed on an aircraft which caused it 
to crash, leading to the application of the laws of New Jersey and Arizona. 
8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) has been applied in several cases by Spanish Courts but no 
relevant problems seem to have arisen. 
In case ECLI: ES:APM:2017:17979, the claimant, a German company, alleged that the Spanish defendant 
produced and sold a roulette slot machine that was a copy of ones produced by the claimant, and that had 
“Germany” written on the front, creating confusion in the market. The slot machines were produced and sold in 
Spain to distributors that sold them in Namibia, where they were used, and where the claimant also sold its 
products, competing in that market. The Spanish company claimed that Namibian law applied, since the unfair 
competition affected the Namibian market; but the court rejected this argument, considering that Art. 6 of the 
Rome II Regulation should be interpreted as Spain being the relevant market, since it was in Spain that the slot 
machines were produced and sold by the defendants and it was a third party who sold them in Namibia. 
In the ruling of the Provincial Court of Cordoba (ECI:ES:APCO:2017:666), Spanish law was applied under 
Arts. 6 and 4 of the Rome II Regulation because the case concerned an act of unfair competition that exclusively 
affected the interests of a specific competitor, and Spain was the country where the damage occurred, which 
was not disputed by the parties.  
Similarly, the Supreme Court's ruling (ECLI:ES:TS:2017:1910) states that Spanish unfair competition law does 
not apply to conduct in Serbia, since an action for unfair competition under Spanish law cannot be brought 
against conduct in another State, directed at the citizens of that State, and having effect in that State. Arts. 6 and 
4 of the Rome II Regulation lead to Serbian law. The court emphasized that the fact that the criteria for 




applicability, as Article 3 of the Rome II Regulation provides. The appellant's arguments concerning online 
accessibility, through the Serbian company’s website offering the product alleged to be a copy, were not 
accepted, since there were no circumstances from which it could be deduced that this website offered products 
or services to Spanish consumers, as it did not even have a version in Spanish or any other language spoken in 
Spain. 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no Spanish case law concerning article 7 on environmental damage. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
Article 8 on the infringement of intellectual property rights has been applied in some case law that does not 
show any specific problems in the understanding of the rule and its consequences. 
In one of the cases (ECLI:ES:APM:2019:4801), the claimant Japanese company sued two Spanish companies 
for commercializing an audiovisual work property of the claimant, in Spain, without its consent. The application 
of Spanish law under Article 8 of the Rome II Regulation was not discussed, since Spain was the territory for 
which protection was sought (lex loci protectionis). 
The same lack of difficulty ascertaining the lex loci protectionis is evidenced in ECLI:ES: APM:2018:13812, 
concerning a claim for unauthorised use of a musical work, to which Spanish law was applied. The interesting 
thing about this case is that it had been presented by the claimant as a contractual claim, and it was the Appeal 
Court of Madrid which decided that it was a non-contractual one, so the applicable law should be decided 
according to the Rome II Regulation. The claimant, a Spanish company, had acquired the rights to a song from 
its English parent company, which had, in turn, acquired them from the author. The defendants, two Spanish 
companies, used a modified version of the song in an advertising campaign. The contract transferring the rights 
from the author to the parent of the claimant was subject to English law, which it was alleged by the defendants 
should also apply to this claim. The Court of Appeal of Madrid considered that English law should not apply, 
since the claim was not a contractual one, but a claim in tort, since even if the claimant obtained its rights from 
a contract, the claim did not concern the contract and was not against the counterparty, but a third party who 
had infringed the rights. Since protection was sought for the violations in Spain, that country was the locus 
protectionis and Spanish law applied. The court added that Spanish law could not be avoided by an agreement 
between the parties, and that it did not extend to matters such as the transfer and acquisition of property rights, 
which should be decided according to Art. 10.4 of the Spanish Civil Code, which also contains the lex loci 
protectionis principle. 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
There is no case law on the specific rule on industrial action, nor, as far as I know, much academic interest in 
this rule. 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for 
tort/delict in Art. 4. 
The specific rule on unjust enrichment has been addressed by Spanish courts in a case where it was decided 
that the enrichment did not derive from a contract and thus, according to Art. 10 of the Rome II Regulation, 
should be governed by Spanish law, as the law of the country of habitual residence of both parties 
(ECLI:ES:APO:2016:2820). 
In case ECLI:ES:APGI:2014:1614, the plaintiff, a British national residing in England, like the defendant, 
brought an action for unjust enrichment as a consequence of breaking the promise of marriage. The alleged 
enrichment concerned the acquisition of real estate both in England and in Spain, allegedly in view of the 
celebration of the marriage. The court considered that the action must be regarded as a non-contractual 




II Regulation (without investigating the possible exclusion of the case from its material scope) and Article 10.9 
of the Civil Code, which establishes that ‘[i]n the case of unjust enrichment, the law by virtue of which the transfer 
of the patrimonial value in favor of the enriched party took place shall be applied.’ It was considered that both 
rules led to English law because, at the time the contract of sale giving rise to the damage was entered into, 
both parties were residing in England (even where both the contract and the break-up of the relationship 
between the couple occurred long before the entry into force of the Rome II Regulation). This is a case in which 
the court resolved the question of applicable law in a quasi-automatic way, concluding it was insufficiently 
proven.  
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
There is no case law on the specific rules on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) or culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12). 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any 
difficulties therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding 
possible reasons which would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
Case law does not contain cases where the rule on freedom of choice (Art. 14) has been applied. 
Academics have paid limited attention to this rule. Those who deal with it stress its limited practical usefulness, 
given the way in which cases of non-contractual liability are presented; and point to its effectiveness in 
overcoming problems of classification as contractual or extracontractual, in cases where the choice of law has 
been included in a contract, and the parties want to apply it to issues related to the contract which, nevertheless, 
in some States could be classified as non-contractual.  
The literature has sometimes criticized certain aspects of the Regulation. In particular, A. ESPINIELLA “La 
autonomía de la voluntad en el Reglamento (CE) n1 863/2007 (“Roma II”) sobre la ley aplicable a las 
obligaciones extracontractuales”, Noticias de la Unión Europea, 299, 2009, pp. 95-109) argues that (i) the 
limits to freedom of choice in the cases covered by Articles 6 and 8 are not adequate because the underlying 
justification of these rules suggests that those limits should not extend beyond what is strictly necessary. Choice 
of law should be allowed, even in those cases, for issues such as the amount or assessment of damages or the 
transmissibility of the right to claim. The same applies to acts of unfair competition that exclusively affect the 
interests of a competitor; (ii) in relation to Article 14.3, this author criticizes that only the mandatory rules of the 
forum State are taken into account, and not those of a State that might be more closely connected, such as the 
State whose law would be applicable in the absence of a choice; (iii) he also contests the advisability of allowing 
depeçage in certain cases as a result of the choice,(iv) he affirms that there is a need to clarify whether different 
choice of law agreements would be possible in the case of a plurality of parties. The author understands that it 
can be argued against this admission that it would lead to a splitting up of the applicable law, whith the risk of 
inconsistent results (i.e: the same person to the same facts may be declared liable for a victim and exonerated 
in relation to another;  the existence, nature and damage assessment, as well as prescription, could be ruled by 
different laws even if the cases concerned the same facts), but he stresses in favour of these multiple agreements 
that such unequal solutions would be accepted by each of the parties and that they are not against the wording 
of the Regulation; (v) he also considers that some uncertainty arises from the lack of regulation of matters such 
as the form of the agreement and consent. Most of this reflexions are shared by S. LEIBLE (“El alcance de la 
autonomía de la voluntad en la determinación de la ley aplicable a las obligaciones no contractuales en el 
Reglamento Roma II (The scope of autonomy in determining the law applicable to non contractual obligations 
in the Rome II Regulation)”, Anuario Español de Derecho internacional privado, VII, 2007, pgs. 219-240). As 
regards the relationship between choice of law and other sector-specific rules on non-contractual matters, such 
as the 1971 and 1973 Hague Conventions, A. ESPINIELLA considers that the former takes precedence and 




2.5 Chapter V – Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art. 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to 
that exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
No difficulties have emerged in Spanish case law with respect to the scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and 
procedure’ in Art 1(3) or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22). 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual 
cases of the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-
contractual obligations. 
Regarding proof and application to individual cases of the substantive rules of the law applicable under the 
Rome II Regulation, Spanish law (articles 281.2 of the Spanish Act on Civil Procedure and 33.2 of the 
International Juridical Cooperation Act) requires, for foreign law to be applied, that it be proven by the parties, 
with only limited exceptions. Case law shows that sometimes the applicability of foreign law is adequately 
ascertained, but the court refuses its application because the parties have not proven its being in force or 
contents, leading to the merits of the case being decided according to Spanish law (see, for example ECLI: 
ES:APB:2020:5205; ECLI: ES:APM:2019:773; ECLI: ES:APB:2018:6940; ECLI: ES:APPO:2014:1255).  
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its 
relationship to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
Case law does not show any problems relating to the delimitation of the scope of the applicable law, since that 
question does not seem to have been addressed (Art. 15(a)-(h)).  
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16) 
There are no cases applying the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16). 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18) 
On the other hand, the application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable 
(Art. 18) has been addressed by several cases. 
In ECLI: ES:APM:2020:3518, the damage, caused by a defective product, had occurred in Spain, but the 
insurance contract was subject to German law. As mentioned in section 2.2 of this report, the Appeal Court of 
Madrid did not apply The Hague Convention of 1973, but the Regulation, and considered that the exercise of 
the direct action, permitted by Spanish law, was appropriate, even if the German law applicable to the contract 
did not permit it in the circumstances of the case. Art. 18 was applied in a similar case as well (ECLI: 
ES:APM:2019:16074). 
A court of first instance of Bilbao correctly understood the aforementioned precept in case ES:JMBI:2018:3950, 
in which it considered Czech law to be applicable (which was both the law governing the insurance contract 
and the law of the place where the damage occurred), although lack of proof of this led to resolution of the 
dispute in accordance with Spanish law. 
In case ECLI:ES:APB:2020:8359, the Court of Appeal of Barcelona unduly applied Art. 18 of the Regulation 
because it incorrectly qualified as direct and action that was brought by the insurer of a transport company, 
who had compensated the recipient of goods for their loss during transport, against the insurer of the company 
that had actually carried out the transport because it had been subcontracted by the first carrier. 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19) 
There are no cases applying the rule on subrogation (Art. 19). 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art. 20) 
The specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20) does not seem to have been applied by courts and academic work 
is also scarce on this issue (see the paper by I. HEREDIA, “Las deficiencias de la regla de responsabilidad 




285, which points out the problems posed by this Article in cases where the obligations of the different co-
responsible parties are subject to different legal systems, as a result of the provisions of the Regulations, which 
sometimes point to laws different from those of the place of the damage). 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both 
to persons covered by Art. 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business 
The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business, does not seem 
to have posed any specific problems in Spain, since it has not been addressed by case law and the academic 
interest raised by it is very low. 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art. 24) and States 
with more than one legal system (Art. 25) 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
The same may be said as regards the rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24), public policy of the forum (Art. 26) 
and States with more than one legal system (Art.25). Spain is a country where different legal systems co-exist, 
but only in case ECLI:ES:APL:2015:955 (see section 2.1 of this Report) was an application of Article 25, and 
Catalan law as a consequence, claimed. Since the Court incorrectly decided that the Rome II Regulation did 
not apply to the case, no analysis of the rule was developed. There is limited scholarly interest on the subject 
(see J.M. FONTANELLAS MORELL, “Remisión a un sistema no unificado en el Reglamento Roma II: la 
plurilegislación española en la materia a examen”, Anuario español de Derecho internacional privado, 16, 
2016, pgs. 1220-1229). 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, 
in specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 
27, 28, 29) 
No difficulties seem to have emerged as regards the interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU 
and international legal instruments, in specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights 
or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 29), having regard to case law.  
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents 
on legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
An analysis of Spanish case law in the application of the Rome II Regulation shows that the most common cases 
are those relating to road traffic accidents. Spain is a party to the 1971 Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Traffic Accidents, but this text is often ignored by our courts, which resort to Art. 4 of the Rome II 
Regulation to decide the issue.  
This is the case in the ruling of the Provincial Court of Barcelona (ECLI:ES:APB:2020:5205), in which the parties 
to the proceedings agreed that the legal text to decide the applicable law was the Hague Convention of 1971, 
but this was rejected by the court, which affirmed the application of Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation. The 
court's argument was that the Spanish model of Private International Law combines rules of institutional origin 
(i), rules of conventional origin (ii), and rules of State origin (iii); that the rules of institutional origin prevail over 
the rules of conventional and State origin; and that, in turn, the rules of conventional origin prevail over those of 
State origin. Thus, an European Union Regulation will always prevail over a Convention since, otherwise, many 
situations would arise in which the Member States would not comply with European Union Regulations by 
invoking a particular Convention, or even their domestic law. This would cause legal uncertainty and violate the 
community of law that makes up the European Union. The court decided that the principle of specificity which 




specific and particular it may be, can never derogate from or contradict a Regulation. Moreover, added the 
court, the 1971 Hague Convention would not apply in any event because it had not been ratified by Portugal. 
Along the same lines, the judgment of the Barcelona Provincial Court (ECLI:ES:APB:2020:491) considered 
English law to be applicable to the case (the running over of two Spaniards, residing in Spain, in England), in 
accordance with Art. 4 of the Rome II Regulation, without even considering the possibility that the 1971 Hague 
Convention might be applicable. The same is true of the rulings of the Provincial Court of Madrid 
(ECLI:ES:APM:2019:773), concerning an accident that occurred in Portugal; the Provincial Court of Barcelona 
(ECLI:ES:APB: 2016:9245), relating to an accident that occurred in England, to which it was understood that 
English law applied, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Rome II Regulation (in this case, reference was made to 
the fact that the Regulation could cease to apply if there were a bilateral agreement); the Provincial Court of 
Pontevedra (ECLI:ES:APPO:2014:1255), which considered Portuguese law to be applicable under Article 4.1 
of the Rome II Regulation, although it resolved the case in accordance with Spanish law due to the lack of proof 
Portuguese law; and the Provincial Court of Pontevedra (ECLI:ES:APPO:2012:2888) which applied the 
Portuguese law of the place of the accident, in accordance with Art. 4.1 of the Rome II Regulation, not 
considering that the case had closer links with Spain (Art. 4.3). The latter issue is detailed in section 2.2 of this 
report.  
In contrast, other judgments correctly identify the 1971 Hague Convention as the instrument that applies to 
determine the law applicable to damages caused by traffic accidents. This is the case with the judgments of the 
Provincial Court of Madrid (ECLI:ES:APM:2019:11054) and the Provincial Court of Barcelona (ECLI:ES: 
APB:2018:6940) or the Provincial Court of Tarragona (ECLI: ES:APT:2020:1277A), although in the latter case 
French law is not applied due to lack of prove. 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach 
Spanish case law does not show problems with respect to the mosaic approach, since situations where it would 
be applied do not seem to have been brought before Spanish courts.  
3. Comments on areas of interest 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the 
scope of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ 
rules in cross-border situations 
The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope of 
the Rome II Regulation has aroused much academic interest in Spain, but there is no case law on the subject. 
The majority of academics consider that the best solution is to amend the Rome II Regulation to include a rule 
on the matter based on the application of the law of the victim's habitual residence, without prejudice to the 
possibility of the parties choosing the applicable law in accordance with Art. 14, and possible application of 
an escape clause based on closest connection (see, for example, M. AMORES CONRADI/E.TORRALBA 
MENDIOLA, “Difamación y Roma II”, Anuario español de Derecho internacional privado, VII, 2007, pgs. 
251-265; E. TORRALBA MENDIOLA, “La difamación en la era de las comunicaciones: ¿Nuevas? perspectivas 
de Derecho Internacional Privado Europeo”, Indret: Revista para el Análisis del Derecho, 1, 2012, pgs. 1-35), 
although there are some dissenting opinions (L. GARCÍA GUTIÉRREZ, “Reglamento «Roma II» y derechos de la 
personalidad: reflexiones para formular una norma de conflicto que preserve adecuadamente el ejercicio del 
derecho a la información y de la libertad de expresión”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, 43, 2012, 
pgs. 851-874. This author proposes, as a general rule, the application of the law of the habitual residence of 
the alleged tortfeasor). 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and 
data protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation 
(SLAPPs) 
There seem to be no relevant interest on the matter of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) in 




echoed the existence of this type of claims and the problem they represent. Similarly, Greenpeace has 
denounced at least one case which has occurred in Spain: it concerns a lawsuit brought by a meat production 
company located in the north of Spain (Galicia), which had been accused on televisión by a local farmer of 
producing meat without taking into account the effects on the environment, and of filtering chemicals and 
antibiotics into groundwater, also contaminating surface water. Apparently, this information was corroborated 
by official data and various scientific reports. Five months later,the farmer received a burofax from the legal 
services of the company claiming 1 million euros in damages. It is, however, a purely domestic case, that does 
not raise the application of Rome II Regulation (https://es.greenpeace.org/es/en-profundidad/coren-contra-
manuel/). 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights 
and lays down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability 
The Rome II Regulation has not been applied to corporate abuses against human rights by Spanish courts, but 
the matter has raised some academic interest as is shown by the works by M. REQUEJO ISIDRO (Violaciones 
graves de derechos humanos y responsabilidad civil (Transnational Human Rights Claims), 
Thomson/Aranzadi, Pamplona, 2009) and M. ÁLVAREZ TORNÉ (“El Derecho internacional privado ante las 
vulneraciones de derechos humanos cometidas por empresas y respuestas en la UE”, REDI, 2013, 65(2), pgs. 
157-190). 
M. REQUEJO ISIDRO considers that the rules on torts do not adequately respond to the needs linked to the 
protection of human rights but admit that, in the face of difficulties in finding adequate solutions, they can be a 
useful, even if not ideal, tool. In this regard, and for international cases, the author notes the limited usefulness 
of the rules laid down in the Rome II Regulation for dealing with corporate abuses against human rights and 
proposes certain solutions, some of them de lege ferenda, to approach them. In particular (i) allowing victims a 
choice of law, similar to that in Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation; (ii) reconsidering an application of Article 4, 
only for these cases, which would not only take into account the place of the dammage, but also the place 
where the event giving rise to the damage occurred and that could be useful when the ”intelectual perpetrators” 
of the damage are in a State other than that in which the damage occurred; (iii) establishing a special “European 
Union public policy” clause integrating the defence of human rights. In addition, this author also stresses the 
need to work on procedural mechanisms, regulating class actions and ensuring systems of legal aid. M. 
ALVAREZ TORNÉ refers to the usefulness in this field of Articles 16 (overrriding mandatory provisions), 17 (rules 
of safety and conduct) and 26 (public policy of the forum)of the Rome II Regulation to enforce higher standards 
of conduct (providing that they exist in the forum). 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on 
the suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
There seem to be no relevant interest on the impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II 
Regulation, and in particular on the suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability.  
As regards the impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation or on Private 
international law, in general, to the best of my knowledge there are no relevant doctrinal works in Spain. The 
question has indeed aroused interest in the sphere of substantive law and there are, therefore, works that 
analyse its implications in the labour sector or in patent law, for example. Regarding this late field of law, the 
possibility of considering an artificial  intelligence system to be an inventor has been analyzed (see M. 
MAROÑO GARGALLO, ”El concepto de inventor en el Derecho de patentes y los sistemas de inteligencia 
artificial”, Cuadernos de Derecho Trasnacional, 2020, 12, 2, 510-526, who reaches a negative conclusion 
at least as long as such systems need to be assisted or require human activity of sufficient intellectual stature, it 
being considered that only if the human contribution was ancillary could the answer be different). In relation to 
labour law, the need to guarantee workers that decisions affecting them (promotions, dismissals, bonuses, etc.) 
are not taken only on the basis of computerised processing or on the basis of automatically created profiles and 
the right of workers' representatives to have access to the algorithm used in the processing of data concerning 
workers affected by a business decision is also stressed (F. BERNAL SANTAMARÍA, “Big data: gestión de 
recursos humanos y el derecho de información de los representantes de los trabajadores”, Cuadernos de 
Derecho Trasnacional, 2020, 12, 2, 136-159). In my view, since that substantive interest exists, it is only a 




4. List of national case law1259 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and reference 
number  
 
Reference to decision of 
the Court of Justice if 
applicable 
Date  Article(s) of Rome II 
 
Issues / subject areas 
 
 
Findings (only for key cases) 
Court of Appeal 
Barcelona 
Roj: SAP B 8359/2020 
ECLI:ES:APB:2020:8359 
23/09/2020 18 
The action was incorrectly 
qualified as a direct action 
 
Court of Appeal 
Tarragona 




Traffic accident. The Hague 
Convention (1971) is 
applied, but not French law 
due to lack of prove. 
 
Court of appeal 
Barcelona 
Roj: SAP B 5205/2020 
ECLI: ES:APB:2020:5205 
19/06/2020 4 
Traffic accident. The Hague 
Convention (1971) was not 
applied, even though it was 
plead by the parties. 
Portuguese law of the place 









proven to the Court, which 
decided on the merits 
according to Spanish Law. 
Court of Appeal- 
Madrid 
Roj: SAP M 3518/2020 
ECLI: ES:APM:2020:3518 
07/05/2020 1, 4, 5 and 18 
Product liability. The  Hague 
Convention (1973) was not 
mentioned. 




Roj: SAP B 491/2020 
ECLI: ES:APB:2020:491 
Case C-350/14 and 
joined cases C-359/14 
and C-475/14 of the 
EUCJ are mentioned. 
31/01/2020 4 
Traffic accident. No 
reference to The Hague 
Convention (1971). 
Application of Rome II 
Regulation- Lex locus 
damni. Direct damage. 
Closer connections 
 
Court of Appeal- 
Madrid 
Roj: SAP M 16074/2019  
ECLI: 
ES:APM:2019:16074 
10/12/2019 5 and 18 
Product liability. No 
reference to The Hague 
Convention (1973). 
Direct action against insurer 
 
Court of Appeal- 
Madrid 




28- The Hague 
Convention (1971) 
Traffic accident. Correctly 
applies The  Hague 
Convention (1971). 
 
Court of Appeal- 
Zaragoza 
Roj: SAP Z 680/2019 
ECLI: ES:APZ:2019:680 
17/04/2019 4.1 
Damage caused by the 
negligent conduct of a bank 
 
Court of Appeal 
Madrid 









Court of Appeal- 
Madrid 
Roj: SAP M 773/2019 
ECLI:ES:APM:2019:773 
17/01/2019 1 and 4.1 
Traffic accident. No 
reference to The  Hague 
Convention (1971). 
Portuguese law was not 
proven to the courts. 
Spanish law was applied. 
Attention was paid to the 
Portuguese rules of safety 
and conduct (circulation 
code). 
 
Court of appeal- 
Palma de Mallorca 
Roj: SAP IB 2410/2018 
ECLI: ES:APIB:2018:2410 
13/12/2018 4.1 and 15 
Accident caused by a ship 
that broke a fiber-optic 
cable between Ibiza and 
Formentera causing lack of 
data in both islands 
 
Commercial Court 
(Sec. 2)- Bilbao 
Roj: SJM BI 3950/2018  
ECLI: ES:JMBI:2018:3950 
15/10/2018 
4.1, 15, 18 and 
19 
Direct action 
Damage to products during 
transport 
 
Court of appeal- 
Madrid 





Lex loci protectionis 
The  case had been presented by the claimant 
as a contractual claim. The Appeal Court of 
Madrid  decided that it was a non-contractual 
one, so the applicable law should be decided 
according to the Rome II Regulation. The 
claimant, a Spanish company, had acquired 
the rights to a song from its English parent 
company, which had, in turn, acquired them 
from the author. The defendants, two Spanish 
companies, used a modified version of the 




transferring the rights from the author to the 
parent of the claimant was subject to English 
law, which it was alleged by the defendants 
should also apply to this claim. The court  
considered that English law should not apply, 
since the claim was not a contractual one, but 
a claim in tort, since even if the claimant 
obtained its rights from a contract, the claim 
did not concern the contract and was not 
against the counterparty, but a third party 
who had infringed the rights. Since protection 
was sought for the violations in Spain, that 
country was the locus protectionis and 
Spanish law applied. The court added that 
Spanish law could not be avoided by an 
agreement between the parties, and that it did 
not extend to matters such as the transfer and 
acquisition of property rights, which should be 
decided according to Art. 10.4 of the Spanish 





Roj: SAP B 6940/2018 
ECLI:ES:APB:2018:6940 
13/07/2018 
4 and 28- The 
Hague Convention 
(1971) 
Traffic accident. Parties had 
alleged Rome II, but the 
court applied  The Hague 
Convention (1971) that led 
to French law. 
French Law was not proven 






Court of Appeal- 
Oviedo 
Roj : SAP O 293/2018 
ECLI:ES:APO:2018:293 
7/02/2018 4 
Lex loci damni 
French law was not applied 
because it was not proved. 
 
Court of appeal- 
Madrid 
 






The claimant, a German company, alleged 
that the Spanish defendant produced and 
sold a roulette slot machine that was a copy 
of ones produced by the claimant, and that 
had “Germany” written on the front, creating 
confusion in the market. The slot machines 
were produced and sold in Spain to 
distributors that sold them in Namibia, where 
they were used, and where the claimant also 
sold its products, competing in that market. 
The Spanish company claimed that Namibian 
law applied, since the unfair competition 
affected the Namibian market; but the court 
rejected this argument, considering that Art. 6 
of the Rome II Regulation should be 
interpreted as Spain being the relevant 
market, since it was in Spain that the slot 
machines were produced and sold by the 
defendants and it was a third party who sold 
them in Namibia. 
Court of appeal- 
Córdoba 
Roj: SAP CO 666/2017 
ECLI: ES:APCO:2017:666 





Roj: STS 1910/2017 
ECLI:ES:TS:2017:1910 
17/05/2017 6 and 3 
Unfair competition 
Damage-relevant market 
Spanish unfair competition law does not 
apply to conduct in Serbia, since an action for 
unfair competition under Spanish law cannot 




Universal scope of Rome II 
Regulation 
directed at the citizens of that State, and 
having effect in that State. Arts. 6 and 4 of the 
Rome II Regulation lead to Serbian law. The 
court emphasized that the fact that the criteria 
for determining the applicable law 
designated the law of a non-Member State is 
not an obstacle to their applicability, as 
Article 3 of the Rome II Regulation provides. 
The appellant's arguments concerning online 
accessibility, through the Serbian company’s 
website offering the product alleged to be a 
copy, were not accepted, since there were no 
circumstances from which it could be deduced 
that this website offered products or services 
to Spanish consumers, as it did not even have 
a version in Spanish or any other language 
spoken in Spain. 
 
Court of appeal- 
Oviedo 




Habitual residence of the 
parties 
 
Court of appeal- 
Barcelona 
Roj: SAP B 9245/2016 
ECLI:ES:APB:2016:9245 
01/09/2016 4 and 15 
Traffic accident. No mention 
to The Hague Convention 
(1971). 
Attention was paid to the 
English rules of safety and 





Court of appeal- 
Lleida 
 
Roj: SAP L 955/2015 
ECLI:ES:APL:2015:955 
27/11/2015 4.2 and 25.1 
No application of Rome II 
Regulation because of an 
incorrect understanding of 
the universal scope of the 
Regulation. 
 
Court of appeal- 
Tarragona 
Roj: SAP T 1638/2015 
ECLI:ES:APT:2015:1638 
14/07/2015 4.3 
Civil liability arising from a 
criminal offense. 
A claim was brought for damages suffered by 
a person with habitual residence in Germany 
due to acts that had been declared a criminal 
offence in that country. Civil liability was 
claimed in Spain. The court considered that, 
even if the tort could be considered to have 
occurred in Germany, where the victim 
suffered an economic loss, the situation was 
more closely connected with Spain, because 
the economic loss suffered had its origin in the 
delivery by the victim of certain amounts to the 
author of the damage, who managed his 
rights in an open succession (“sucesión 
abierta”) in Spain, and in relation to assets 
also located there, for the payment of taxes 
allegedly due in the country, which were 
never paid. 
Supreme Court 
Roj :STS 181/2015 
ECLI:ES:TS:2015:181 
13/01/2015  
Product liability. The Hague 
Convention  (1973) was 
applied without any 
reference to the Rome II 
Regulation, ratifying the 
decisions of the Court of 







and of the Court of First 
Instance (Roj: SJPI 
100/2010, 
ECLI:ES:JPI:2010:100). 
Court of appeal- 
Girona 




Unjust enrichment derived 
from breaking a promise of 
marriage. 
 
Court of appeal- 
Vigo 




Traffic accident. No mention 
of The  Hague Convention 
(1971). 
Foreign law was not proven 
to the court. Spanish law 
applied. 
 
Superior Court of 
Madrid 
Roj : SJM M 5/2014 
ECLI:ES:SJMM:2014:5 
09/01/2014 31 
No application of Rome II 
Regulation because the facts 
occurred before it entered 
into force. 
 
Court of appeal- 
Pontevedra 
Roj: SAP PO 2888/2012 
ECLI: 
ES:APPO:2012:2888 
06/11/2012 4. 1 and 4.3 
Traffic accident. No 
reference to The Hague 
Convention (1971). 
The Court does not accept 








• Section 1: the Rome II Regulation is completely unknown outside the legal community and not so well known 
within it. It is not a widely used instrument. 
• Paras. 1–5: Questions of scope and interpretation have given rise to little practical problems.  
• Paras. 6–11: The only one of the questions concerning the chapter on torts/delicts that has given rise to any 
difficulties concerns the interpretation of Art. 9. 
• Paras. 12–14: Cases concerning unjust enrichment, negotiorum getio or culpa in contrahendo are highly 
unusual in national substantive law and no cases on choice of law are to be found in the available databases. 
• Para. 15: In practice the application of Art. 14 on freedom of choice has not given rise to any problems. 
• Paras. 16–22: The question of the application of foreign law has been discussed on a general level and 
there is case-law from the Supreme Court. However, that case-law did not specifically concern the Rome II 
Regulation. 
• Paras. 23–26: No known problems. 
• Paras. 27–28: There has been some criticism of the mosaic approach leading to higher cost and extended 
duration of proceedings. 
• Paras. 29–32: No change in the Swedish position concerning the exclusion of defamation etc. from scope 
is to be expected. 
1. Introduction 
• How aware of the Rome II Regulation are practitioners, businesses and citizens in your Member State? 
Outside the legal community it is highly unlikely that businesses and citizens in general are aware of the Rome II 
Regulation or even private international law. Most practicing lawyers, perhaps excluding those that work for 
insurance companies, would not be familiar with the Regulation as it is seldom used in practice. However, the 
Regulation is covered in the most widely used textbook in private international law and there is a monograph in 
the Swedish language so most practitioners could easily find out what they need to know should the need arise.  
• Is the Rome II Regulation generally known and applied by courts in your Member State? 
No, it is very rarely used. International tort cases are not frequent with the exception of traffic accidents that are 
generally dealt with by insurance companies. 
• Are there any relevant statistics regarding the application of the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
The case summary for Sweden most probably includes all the cases in which Swedish courts have ever applied 
the Rome II Regulation. Databases have improved and now generally include cases from courts of first instance 
and appellate courts. However, it cannot be excluded that there are cases from lower courts that have not been 
included in the commercially available databases.  
• How important is the doctrinal discussion on the Rome II Regulation in your Member State? 
It has petered out. There were a few articles in law journals when the Regulation was adopted and legal doctrine 
dealing with matters for which the Rome II Regulation is of relevance will of course include it in the discussion, see 
the dissertations by Lundstedt and Sinander referred to in the list of doctrine. The only monograph on the Regulation 
was published in 2014 and it is unlikely that anyone would write another in the foreseeable future.  





• Are there specific issues concerning the Rome II Regulation that have caused debate at a doctrinal or political 
level? 
When the Regulation was negotiated the question of choice of law for defamation and the protection of privacy 
was discussed in the press, which adopted a very negative attitude towards harmonisation of the choice of law 
rules concerning this matter. What is more, trade unions were quite active in pushing for what became Art. 9 of 
the Regulation. 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to : 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
There is one case concerning the material scope of the Regulation and it dealt with the question of whether a case was 
international or not, see case # 12 in the list of cases. 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, Arts 31-32). 
Several of the cases have involved the temporal scope of the Regulation (cases # 2, 3, 4, 5,8, 9, 10 in the list of 
cases). However, they have not involved difficulties of interpretation. The court has simply noted that for reasons of 
temporal scope the Rome II Regulation is not applicable to the case at hand. 
3. The characterization of the concept of “non-contractual obligations”, its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
There are no cases in which this has been an issue. 
4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
There are no cases in which this has been an issue. 
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation)(Recital 
(7)) 
There are no cases involving the relation to other EU PIL instruments and one cannot, based on Swedish case-law, 
draw any general conclusions about the methods of interpretation of the Rome II Regulation. 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of : 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art 4(1) 
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art 4(3), and  
d. the suitability of this set of rules to govern cases of prospectus liability or other financial market torts  
There are no cases in which this has been an issue. 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 




8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
Generally speaking the Swedish Courts have completely failed to observe that there is something as the Rome II 
Regulation in cases concerning the Swedish Marketing Act. When an injunction against particular market has been 
sought by a competitor they see the application of Swedish rules on marketing (which is a question of unfair 
competition) as a public law matter and apply the ‘country of effect principle’ developed earlier in Swedish case-law 
and do not understand that the first question is whether Swedish law is applicable at all according to Art. 6 Rome II 
Regulation and the second question is to ask whether it is applicable according to its own rules on territorial 
applicability. However, it should be noted that in most cases this makes no practical difference as Art. 6 Rome II and 
the effects principle established in earlier Swedish case-law lead to the same result. A recent case from 
Marknadsdomstolen (after 2016 replaced by Patent- och marknadsöverdomstolen) confirming this practice is MD 
2015:7 (se para. 110). I have not listed any cases in the case-list since strictly speaking they are not cases on the 
application of the Rome II Regulation; they are cases in which the Rome II Regultion should have been applied. 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
There are no cases concerning the application of Art. 7. 
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
See case # 10 in the case-list. Since Swedish law was invoked as the lex protectionis, it was declared applicable 
according to Art. 8 Rome II. The case was an interim judgment on the applicable law. The question of whether Swedish 
intellectual property law was applicable according to its own rules on applicability was not tried in this case. 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
The only one of the questions above that has given rise to any difficulties is the interpretation of Art. 9. The Swedish 
Labour Court (case # 1 on the case-list) was faced with the question of whether that rule included the question of the 
legality as such of the industrial action or whether the question was left to national law. In the end the court did not 
decide the matter since it would not affect the outcome whether the Regulation or national PIL was applied. 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
There have been no cases on choice of law for unjust enrichment. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
There have been no cases on choice of law for negotiorum gestio. 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
There have been no cases on choice of law for culpa in contrahendo. 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
In the only case to be found concerning Art. 14 (case # 7 in the case-list)the parties agreed on the applicable law 
during proceedings and that posed no legal difficulty. No suggestions concerning a revision of Art. 14 have been 




2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22). 
There is no case-law concerning this question. 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
There is no case-law concerning this question. The questions of the pleading, proof and application of foreign law has 
been the subject of both academic discussion and case-law from the Supreme Court. However, that discussion has 
been general and not restricted to cases of non-contractual obligations and the case-law did not pertain to the 
application of the Rome II Regulation. 
In legal writing the application of foreign law is discussed in i.a.: 
• Jänterä-Jareborg, M. Svensk domstol och utländsk rätt, Uppsala 1997 (monograph on the application 
of foreign law). 
• Sinander, E. & Lindqvist, G., Ska svensk domstol utreda innehållet i utländsk rätt, SvJT 2015 p. 749-
758. 
• Hellner, M., Rom II-förordningen: tillämplig lag för utomobligatoriska förpliktelser, Stockholm 2014 
(specifically for Rome II on pp. 286-289) 
• Bogdan, M. & Hellner, M., Svensk internationell privat- och processrätt, 9:e uppl., Stockholm 2020 
(textbook on PIL, matter dealt with on pp. 49-58) 
 
Recently, the Supreme Court has decided on issues concerning the application of foreign law twice: 
• NJA 2017 p. 168 (Mahr): foreign law is to be applied ex officio. 
• NJA 2016 p. 288 (Betalningserklæringen): if the content of foreign law cannot be ascertained it is 
presumed to be identical with the lex fori (however, the level of proof required is not high, cf. NJA 1987 
p. 885) 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
There is no case-law concerning this question. 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16)  
There is no case-law concerning this question. 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18)  
There is no case-law concerning this question. 
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19)  
There is no case-law concerning this question. 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art.20)  
There is no case-law concerning this question. 
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 




There are no known problems relating specifically to the Rome II Regulation and no case-law. Almost all cases 
concerning habitual residence are from the area of international family law. 
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art.24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art.25). 
There are no known cases concerning States with more than one legal system. It is also difficult to imagine cases were 
the rejection of renvoi would cause difficulty in application. 
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26) 
There are no known problems relating specifically to the Rome II Regulation and no case-law. 
26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29) 
There are no known problems relating specifically to the Rome II Regulation and no case-law. 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems  
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that has 
been reported on: 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State). 
Sweden is not a party to the 1971 Hague Convention. 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach  
The author of this report has anecdotal evidence that the mosaic approach has been considered problematic by tort 
victims who would have liked a general possibility to apply the law of the place were the event leading to the damage 
occurred, just like in Art. 7. The mosaic principle increases the costs and duration of proceedings. As much as it would 
be desirable, the sources of this information cannot be revealed since it has been given whilst consulting and is subject 
to non-disclosure agreements. 
3. Comments on areas of interest 
These areas are of particular interest for the Commission. Please be as precise as possible regarding any issue that 
emerged in your Member State regarding: 
29. The exclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, from the scope 
of the Rome II Regulation and any difficulties arising out from differences among Member States’ rules in 
cross-border situations 
30. Any comment regarding the Interplay of the Rome II Regulation with the treatment of defamation and data 
protection, and, in these areas, the relevance of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) 
31. The extent to which Rome II Regulation has been applied to corporate abuses against human rights and lays 
down an effective set of rules to regulate non-contractual liability; 
32. The impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the Rome II Regulation, and in particular on the 
suitability of the rules that it contains to regulate non-contractual liability. 
Sweden was opposed to the inclusion of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation 
when the Rome II Regulation was negotiated in the Council. The reasons for this position are mainly two: (1) When 
balancing the interests of freedom of expression and protection against defamation, Swedish law is very much 
balanced in favour of freedom of expression and application of foreign law would be seen as a step in the wrong 




constitutional acts. Hence, the room for application of foreign law is extremely limited, if not non-existent. The situation 
has not changed and it is unlikely that the Swedish position would change in the foreseeable future. 
Regarding SLAPPs for defamation, it is so difficult under Swedish domestic law to obtain damages for defamation that 
that in itself works as anti-SLAPP legislation. The risk of legal action with the purpose of intimidating free speech has 
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reported as AD 
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22.11.2011 9 Legality of industrial 
action within scope of 
Art. 9? 
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both lead to the application of Swedish 
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Court of Appeal) 
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reported as RH 
2014:34  
19.6.2014 31 Law applicable to 
damages for genocide 
committed before entry 
into force of Rome II. 
Rome II not applicable, older rule in 
autonomous Swedish law not 
influenced by Rome II (Rome II not 
applicable by way of analogy). 
3 Svea hovrätt B 9296-10 28.10.2011 31 Law applicable to 
damages for actions 
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Rome II not applicable, older rule in 
autonomous Swedish law not 
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applicable by way of analogy). 
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damages for non-
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autonomous Swedish law not 
influenced by Rome II (Rome II not 




5 Svea hovrätt T 11011-14 16.12.2015 31 Law applicable to 
damages for actions 
carried out before entry 
into force of Rome II 
Rome II not applicable, older rule in 
autonomous Swedish law not 
influenced by Rome II (Rome II not 
applicable by way of analogy). 
6 Svea hovrätt PMT 3491-16 16.3.2020 8.1 Law applicable to 
copyright infringement 
Swedish law applied as lex loci 
protectionis (infringement of Swedish 
copyright). 
7 Göta hovrätt (Göta 
Court of Appeal) 
T 3598-12 7.4.2014 4.2; 14 Law applicable when 
both parties have same 
habitual residence.  
Law applicable to set-off. 
Law of country of common habitual 
residence applied to claim.  
Swedish law applicable to right to set-
off since both parties had so agreed 
during proceedings. 
8 Hovrätten för Nedre 
Norrland (Court of 
Appeal for Southern 
Norrland) 
B 560-10 10.6.2011 31 Law applicable to 
damages for physical 
assault committed before 
entry into force of Rome 
II. 
Rome II not applicable, older rule in 
autonomous Swedish law not 
influenced by Rome II (Rome II not 
applicable by way of analogy). 
9 Hovrätten över Skåne 
och Blekinge (Court of 
Appeal for Skåne and 
Blekinge) 
T-1170 30.5.2012 31 Law applicable to 
product liability incurring 
before entry into force of 
Rome II. 
Rome II not applicable, older rule in 
autonomous Swedish law not 
influenced by Rome II (Rome II not 
applicable by way of analogy). 
10 Stockholms tingsrätt 
(Stockholm District 
Court) 
T 2409-12 13.5.2013 8; 31 Law applicable to 
infringement of copyright 
Law applicable to 
infringements of 
copyright committed 
Swedish law applicable to 
permissibility and damages 
concerning linking by Google to 
materials copyrighted under Swedish 




before entry into force of 
Rome II 
Rome II not applicable to older 
infringement, older rule – lex loci 
delicti commissi – in autonomous 
Swedish law not influenced by Rome II 
(Rome II not applicable by way of 
analogy). Infringement acts 
considered to have been carried out in 
country of protection (Sweden). 
11 Stockholms tingsrätt  B 1636-14 9.5.2016 8; 15 Law applicable to 
infringement of copyright 
Law applicable to infringement 
(Swedish law) applied to question of 
whether sole owner of a British limited 
company was personally liable to pay 
a penalty payment for infringement of 
Swedish copyright law. 
12 Stockholms tingsrätt T 14416-17 22.10.2019 1 International situation 
involving a conflict of 
laws or not? 
The fact that a Swedish party sold his 
rights in previous proceedings to an 
Estonian company entirely owned by 
himself in order to escape 
responsibility for costs of proceedings 
does not by itself make the dispute 
international. Hence Rome II is not 
applicable, there is no question of 
applicable law and the court applied 
lex fori to the question of his personal 




United Kingdom and Ireland 
Executive Summary 
• The principal focus of this report is the judgments of the Courts of England and Wales which have decided 
the large majority of the cases on Rome II. Reference is also included to the judgments of the Courts in Scotland 
and Ireland. 
• Practitioners dealing with cross border litigation are familiar with Rome II.  
• The experience and knowledge of judges varies but there is a considerable degree of specialist expertise, 
including in the Commercial Court. 
• There is significant high level, doctrinal discussion on Rome II. 
• The central concept of ‘non-contractual’ obligations has been considered. 
• Issues concerning the temporal scope have been determined by the Courts. 
• Article 4(1) has been applied regularly (and correctly) in the context of straightforward personal injury cases. 
An initial difficulty in its application to fatal accident claims has been resolved. The application of 4(1) in 
claims for financial loss has proved to be more difficult. The judgments demonstrate that the courts are seeking 
to develop a principled approach. 
• Article 4(2) has given rise to a number of technical issues, including the identification of the person claimed 
to be liable. There has been limited consideration of the concept of habitual residence and, as yet, no 
consideration of the identification of the person sustaining damage in the context of secondary victim claims. 
• Article 4(3) has been raised frequently. In personal injury cases it has, so far, only been deployed to enable 
the Court to apply the law of the place of the damage – in cases where Article 4(2) has operated to displace 
that law. In financial loss claims the Courts have found more scope for the exception to apply. 
• Articles 5, 8, 9 and 13 have not been considered and Articles 6 and 7 only in passing.  
• Article 11 has not been considered.   
• There is currently an issue as to whether a claim for knowing receipt falls within Article 10 or Article 4. Article 
10(1) has been held not to apply where no relationship existed between the parties prior to the facts giving 
rise to the claim. 
• The doctrinal debate as to whether Article 12 applies to a misrepresentation by a non-contracting party has 
been referred to by the Court in passing. 
• There has been limited consideration of Article 14. The Courts are aware of the potential issues concerning 
the scope of choice of law agreements and, in particular, whether non-contractual obligations are covered. 
• The Courts have grappled with a number of difficult issues concerning the scope of the applicable law under 
Article 15. The Court of Appeal has given guidance on the meaning of “law applicable” in Rome II: it includes 
not only hard rules but also practices, conventions and guidelines routinely applied.  
• It has been decided that the rules of the forum relating to expert evidence are to be applied. 
• The English court has considered the potential overriding status of a number of rules of English law on two 
occasions: in neither did the court conclude that Article 16 applied. 
• Article 18 has not been controversial in the courts. 
• The operation of Article 19 has been considered briefly in one case. 
• Article 20 has been considered briefly in a claim for equitable contribution between insurers. 
• Article 26 has been raised once, but the Court held that it did not apply.  
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• Pleading and proof of foreign law. The English court’s traditional approach to foreign law – which is treated 
as a matter of fact – has been questioned in the context of Rome II. In 2021, guidance may be given by the 
Supreme Court on the question of whether the presumption that English law is the same as foreign law (in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary) is consistent with the mandatory choice of law rules in Rome II. 
• Assessment of personal injury damages under foreign law. Issues have arisen in practice concerning the 
application of foreign law in this context. 
• There are a significant number of decisions in claims arising out of financial torts. These are mainly addressed 
in the context of Article 4.  
• In a number of claims concerning environmental damage/corporate abuse of human rights, claimants have 
relied on Article 7 but this has not been controversial to-date. 
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1. Introduction 
There have been a significant number of cases on Rome II decided by the Courts of England and Wales and judgments 
are handed down on a very regular basis.1260 Many of the issues concerning Rome II first arose in the context of cross-
border personal injury claims. In that context the law applicable can be particularly significant due to the differences 
between national laws on liability, limitation and the assessment of damages which may, in part, explain why so many 
Rome II issues have been litigated in personal injury claims. More recently the Courts have had to focus increasingly 
on Rome II issues in the context of financial claims. A number of judgments have considered the difficult issue of locating 
damage in cases of financial loss. Issues of characterisation are starting to become evident in practice, particularly 
relating to the scope of the general rule in Article 4 and of the specific rules in other Articles, including 10 and 12. 
Practitioners dealing with cross border litigation are generally familiar with Rome II. The experience of judges varies 
but there is a high level of expertise amongst many. Both practitioners and judges have been assisted by the extensive 
academic commentary on Rome II and judgments frequently refer to such commentary. Professor Andrew Dickinson’s 
monograph “The Rome II Regulation” (2008 OUP) is regularly cited by the Courts and has been particularly influential 
in the development of the law. There have been a number of seminars and meetings to discuss the issues arising under 
Rome II, including an event held by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law in 2019 to mark the 10th 
anniversary of the Regulation, at which leading academics, judges and practitioners from the United Kingdom and 
other Member States presented papers and participated. 
2. Analysis of the Rome II Regulation 
2.1 Chapter I – Scope and Interpretation 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
1. The determination of the material scope of application of the Rome II Regulation, including any difficulties in 
applying the category of “civil and commercial matters” or in defining the exact scope of any excluded 
matters (Art. 1(1)-(2)) 
The Courts have not yet given detailed consideration to the concept of “civil and commercial matters” in the context of 
Rome II1261; nor have the exclusions in Article 1(2) been examined. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there has been no more 
 
 
1260 This Report refers to a further 5 judgments handed down since the Interim Report (October 2020). 
1261 In Jacobs v MIB [2010] EWHC 231(QB) (Owen J), at first instance, the Claimant raised the possibility that the 
claim was not a “civil and commercial matter” within the scope of Rome II, but this was not pursued.  
 
 688 
than passing consideration of the phrase “in situations involving a conflict of laws”, which defines the raison d’être of 
the Regulation.1262 
The scope of acta iure imperii was examined in the context of a personal injury claim brought against the Ministry of 
Defence by a British soldier engaged on an army training exercise in Canada. The parties agreed that the scope of 
acta iure imperii should be consistent with the Brussel I Regulation. The Judge concluded that, as the solider was on a 
training exercise at the time and not carrying out a “military operation”, there was no positive exercise of the 
defendant’s public powers and, consequently, the matter was not acta iura imperii1263. 
2. The determination of the temporal scope of application of the Rome II Regulation (Arts. 31-32) 
The first cases on Rome II in the English courts raised the issue of its temporal scope. The reason this became an issue 
was that Rome II was generally accepted to have effected a very significant change in English law in relation to the 
law applicable to the assessment of damages. Pre-Rome II, English courts applied English law to the assessment of 
damages, regardless of the law applicable to the claim. This was on the basis that the assessment of damages was 
“procedural” and thus, for the law of the forum.1264 Article 15(c) of Rome II reversed this long-established position in 
English law and required the assessment of damages to be governed by the applicable law. As the difference in value 
of compensation assessed under English law and other laws was frequently significant, the issue of whether Rome II 
applied became significant. There were conflicting decisions of the High Court1265 and a reference to the CJEU was 
made. This determined that Rome II applied where the events giving rise to damage occurred after 11 January 
2009.1266 The result of the ruling was that in a straightforward personal injury case arising out of accident, Rome II 
applies if the accident occurred after 11 January 2009. 
Further issues as to the temporal scope have arisen in more complex cases, where the event giving rise to the damage 
and the damage are separated in time. In such cases, the focus has been on identifying the event giving rise to damage. 
For example, in a product liability context concerning metal hip implants, the Court has considered whether the event 
giving rise to damage is the manufacture, distribution or implant of the defective product. The Court held that the 
appropriate event was the date of manufacture/ circulation of the defective product.1267 The issue has also arisen – 
but not yet been determined - in the context of long-tail personal injury claims arising out of exposure to asbestos. 
3. The characterization of the concept of "non-contractual obligations", its relationship to the concept of 
“contractual obligations” and any difficulties in relation to characterisation (Arts. 1(1), 2) 
The ambit of the central concept of “non-contractual obligations” was considered by the Court of Appeal in Committeri 
v Club Med [2018] EWCA Civ 379. The claim arose out of an accident in France, which occurred in the course of a 
team building trip organised by the Claimant’s employers, BNP Paribas Bank in London. The issue arose because there 
was a choice of law clause in favour of English law in the contract pursuant to which the trip took place. If the claim 
was characterised as contractual, the choice of law clause applied, resulting in English law. If the claim was properly 
characterised as non-contractual, the choice of law clause had no application and French law governed the claim. 
French law was favourable as it provided for strict liability whereas English law required proof of fault. The Court of 
Appeal considered the CJEU authorities (and two English cases applying the CJEU cases) and concluded that, whilst 
there was no direct contractual relationship between the claimant and Club Med, the claim was contractual. The Court 
held that the claim was, in essence, for breach of the obligations under the contract and the existence of the contract 
was “indispensable” to the claim. Although the claim was based on the strict liability obligation imposed by the French 
Code de Tourisme, that obligation was not independent of the obligation under the contract: the correct analysis was 
that the contract was the source of the relevant obligations and the Code merely enhanced the claimant’s pre-existing 
rights under the contract. 
 
 
1262 See Jacobs v MIB [2010] EWHC 231 (QB); Jacobs v MIB [2010] EWCA Civ 1208. 
1263 Rai v MOD [2016] 5 WLUK 135. 
1264 See Harding v Wealands [2006] UKHL 32. 
1265 Homawoo v GMF Assurance SA [2010] EWHC 1941 (QB) per Slade J, Bacon v Nacional Suiza [2010] 
EWHC 2017 (QB). 
1266 Homawoo v GMF Assurances C-412/10. 
1267 Allen v Dupuy International [2014] EWHC 753 (QB).  
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4. The universal application of the Regulation (Art. 3) 
There has been no consideration of Article 3. The Courts have had no issue with applying Rome II to cross-border 
claims - even where there is no EU connection other than forum.   
5. The approach to interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, and in particular its relationship to other EU private 
international law instruments (including the recast Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation) (Recital 
(7)) 
Courts have had no difficulty in accepting that, as an EU Regulation, Rome II requires to be interpreted consistently 
with the CJEU jurisprudence and that key concepts are to be construed “autonomously”. 
The approach of the Courts evidences the need for consistency with the other EU instruments on private international 
law, in particular, Brussels 1 Regulation and Rome I, as required by Recital 7. Moreover, there is some evidence that 
Courts are sensitive to the distinction between jurisdiction rules and choice of law rules – and particularly that the 
choice of law rules in Rome II are designed to identify a single law, whereas this constraint is often absent in the context 
of Brussels I.1268 This approach is in line with the views of Professor Andrew Dickinson, who notes that as the character 
and objective of rules on applicable law differ to that of jurisdiction, “consistency [in the interpretation of the two 
regulations] does not demand complete fidelity”.1269 
2.2 Chapter II - Tort/Delict 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
6. The general conflict-of-laws rule for tort/delict, and difficulties that have arisen in your Member State with 
respect to its application (Art. 4), and in particular: 
a. the approach to identifying the place of direct damage in Art. 4(1) 
In straightforward personal injury cases arising out of an accident, the Courts have had little difficulty in applying Article 
4(1) in line with Recital 17: the law of the country in which the damage occurs is applied regardless of the location of 
the indirect consequences of the accident.1270 So, where a road traffic accident occurs in France causing personal 
injury but with financial consequences felt in other countries, the place in which damage occurs under Article 4(1) is 
France and the law applicable is French law.1271 
Fatal accidents proved to be slightly more challenging for the courts. In Brownlie v Four Seasons Holdings Inc [2015] 
EWCA Civ 665, the Court of Appeal (incorrectly) held that English law applied to a claim by a dependant arising out 
of a fatal accident in Egypt. The Court of Appeal’s approach was not strictly followed in subsequent cases1272 and, by 
the time the appeal in Brownlie was heard by the Supreme Court, the CJEU had given judgment in C-350/14 Lazar 
(EU:C:2015:802) and it was common ground between the parties that Egyptian law, as the law of the place of the 
accident, applied.1273   
Identifying the place of damage in cases of financial loss is, unsurprisingly, proving to be challenging: it is notoriously 
difficult to pinpoint the location of damage in the absence of a physical manifestation of it.  The Courts have started to 
explore the issues and are seeking to develop a principled approach to locating financial damage for the purposes of 
Article 4(1) but the proper approach to the issue is still open to question.  
 
 
1268 Erste Group Bank AG v JSC ]2015] EWCA Civ 379 at [89]-[91]; Pan Oceanic Chartering Inc v Unipec [2016] 
EWHC 2774 (Comm). 
1269 See Fatal Accidents – the law applicable to claims by family members, Andrew Dickinson, LQR 2016, 132 at 
212. 
1270 An early example is Jacobs v MIB [2010] EWHC 231 (QB). 
1271 Pickard v Marshall [2015] EWHC 3421 (QB), [2017] EWCA Civ 17. 
1272 Marshall v MIB [2015] EWHC (QB) Dingemans J. 
1273 See Four Seasons Holdings Inc v Brownlie [2017] UKSC 80.  
 
 690 
Cases where the Courts have been required to apply Article 4(1) to financial damage often arise in the context of 
fraud claims and concern the torts of conspiracy or dishonest assistance. The variation in the factual scenarios 
underlying the disputes undoubtedly contributes to the difficulty in developing a clear approach. 
One common factual scenario is where the claim is based on non-receipt of money. For example, a claim for 
commissions due to be paid to a specific party in a certain country, but because of the fraud they were received by 
another party in a different country. The Courts have considered whether the direct damage in such a case is the non-
receipt of commissions due, or the fact that those commission were received by another party elsewhere. Cockerill J 
has recently endorsed the analysis that the direct damage is the place where the commission should have been 
received by the victim. In reaching that conclusion, Cockerill J indicated that her analysis was not restricted to cases 
where there is an express positive contractual obligation to pay in a particular country, but rather was of more general 
application focused on the nature of the harm where the money was not, but should have been, received.1274 
Another not infrequent factual scenario is where a victim pays out money to purchase goods which, by reason of a 
fraud, do not in fact exist. In such circumstances the Courts have considered whether the place of direct damage is the 
place where the goods should have been handed over, had the fraud not occurred, or the place from where the money 
was paid out to purchase the goods. In ED&F Man Capital Markets [2019] EWHC 166 (Comm), the issue arose in 
the context of a fraud which had at its heart the production of forged warehouse receipts to evidence that non-existent 
goods were in existence in warehouses in Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. The Judge held that England was 
the place of direct damage because England was place from which payment was made and payment had been made 
on the basis of the forged receipts which had been received by the victim of the fraud in England. The place of direct 
damage was not the place the goods would have been handed over but for the fraud.1275 
In MX1 v Fardad Farahzad [2018] EWHC 1041 (Ch), Marcus Smith J, relying on Professor Andrew Dickinson’s 
analysis, considered whether a principled answer lies in identifying the place at which the victim performs or fails to 
perform an act which results in irreversible loss. Applying that approach, in that case the Judge held that the relevant 
financial damage – being irreversible or concrete loss - occurred at the place where the Claimants entered into 
agreements, in England.1276 The Judge rejected the Defendant’s argument that, in cases where damage occurs in 
multiple jurisdictions, the location of the relevant damage for Article 4(1) should be where the predominant loss occurs. 
The Judge held that Article 4(1) had to be applied purposively and, properly applied, the claim in respect of the loss 
in each country was to be governed by the law of that country. The Judge noted that the consequent fragmentation of 
applicable laws was anticipated in the Explanatory Memorandum.  
b. the approach to the first rule of displacement in Art. 4(2) in cases involving multiple parties or claims 
A number of issues have arisen under Article 4(2). These include identifying the “person claimed to be liable”, the 
operation of the rule where there are more than two parties to proceedings, and the proper approach to identifying 
habitual residence. 
Where a claim is brought against a body which is obliged to satisfy the liability of an underlying tortfeasor, the Courts 
have considered whether the person claimed to be liable is the underlying tortfeasor or the body that would in fact be 
satisfying a judgment. The most common scenario arises in the context of liability insurance. In that context, it has been 
held that the relevant habitual residence is that of the underlying insured tortfeasor and not that of the insurer.1277 
There are yet unanswered questions in relation to the meaning and application of the “person sustaining damage” in 
the context of secondary claimants, or “ricochet” claimants. Examples of such claims, which are increasingly common, 
include where a dependant of an injured or deceased victim seeks to recover in respect of their loss of dependency. It 
is not yet clear whose habitual residence is relevant in such a context. 
 
 
1274 FM Capital Partners v Marino [2018] EWHC 1768 (Comm). A similar analysis was adopted by Carr J in Pan 
Oceanic Chartering Inc v UNIPEC [2016] EWHC 2274 (Comm). 
1275 ED&F Man Capital Markets Limited [2019] EWHC 1661 (Comm). 
1276 See Andrew Dickinson “The Rome II Regulation” at paragraph 4.67 in the context of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. And see Hillside (New Media) Ltd v Baasland [2010] EWHC 3336 (Comm). See also Shenzen 
Senior Technology v Celgard [2020] EWCA Civ 1293. 
1277 Winrow v Hemphill [2014] EWHC 3164 (QB). 
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The Courts have concluded that Article 4(2) applies even in cases where there are claims between more than two 
parties.1278 Academic commentary had suggested that there was scope to argue that the use of  the singular “person” 
in the text of Article 4(2) excluded the possibility of Article 4(2) operating in multiparty cases. This argument was 
rejected by Dingemans J in Marshall v MIB [2015] EWHC 3421 (QB) who, by his approach to Article 4(3), resolved 
the practical problems caused by Article 4(1) and Article 4(2) resulting in different laws applying to different 
defendants in the same proceedings. 
There has been limited consideration of the key concept of habitual residence. Slade J’s review in Winrow v Hemphill 
[2014] EWHC 3164 (QB) considers the caselaw and some commentary and provides pointers for other cases. Other 
cases in which this issue has arisen have, so far, been settled before being resolved by Court decision. Further guidance 
on the proper approach to habitual residence for individuals is required and will be helpful in practice. 
c. the approach to the escape clause in Art. 4(3) 
The Courts are well versed in the operation of Article 4(3) and its role as an escape clause. The Courts have accepted 
that the burden is on the party seeking to rely on Article 4(3) and that it applies only in exceptional cases: the 
requirement that a country be “manifestly” more closely connected imposes a high hurdle. 1279 The Courts have 
emphasised the need to take into account “all the circumstances” and have suggested that for a law to apply pursuant 
to Article 4(3), the ‘centre of gravity’ of the tort must point towards that law.1280 The authorities support an argument 
that, in certain cases, the law applicable to related claims may be relevant in applying Article 4(3).1281 
There was an issue at an earlier stage as to whether Article 4(3) could be used to apply the law which would otherwise 
have been designated by Article 4(1) or Article 4(2). This issue arose as a result of the wording of Article 4(3) "other 
than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2". However, in Marshall v MIB the Court accepted that a law designated by 
Article 4(1) but excluded by the operation of Article 4(2), can nonetheless apply pursuant to Article 4(3).1282 
There may be evidence of a variation in approach emerging in the operation of Article 4(3) in different types of case. 
In personal injury cases, Article 4(3) has only been used to enable the Court to apply the law of the place of the 
accident, which had been displaced pursuant to Article 4(2).1283 In this context there have been no cases where Article 
4(3) has applied to designate a law other than that applicable pursuant to Article 4(1). 
In cases of financial damage, often by their nature centred around claims of fraud and/or conspiracy, Article 4(3) has 
been applied by the Courts to designate a different law. For example, where as a result of a conspiracy money had 
not been repaid under a loan agreement, the place where all the conspirators were based - which was also where 
the conspiracy was hatched and where the conspirators sought to gain a commercial advantage - was held to be 
manifestly more closely connected to the tort.1284 
7. The rule on product liability (Art. 5) and, where relevant, the interaction with the application of 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability; 
Article 5 has not yet been considered in the Courts. 
 
 
1278 Pickard v Marshall [2015] EWHC 3421 (QB), [2017] EWCA Civ 17, see also Owen v Galgey and others 
[2020] EWHC 3546 (QB). 
1279 See Owen v Galgey and others [2020] EWHC 3546 (QB), FM Capital Partners v Marino [2018] EWHC 
1768 (Comm); Fortress Value Recovery Fund ILLC v Blue Skye Special Opportunities Fund LP [2013] 2 BCLC 351; 
Winrow v Hemphill; Pickard v Marshall [2015] EWHC 3421 (QB), [2017] EWCA Civ 17 and Stylianou v Suncorp 
[2013] EWHC 2188 (QB). 
1280 Fortress Value Recovery Fund ILLC v Blue Sky Special Opportunities Fund LP [2013] 2 BCLC 351. 
1281 See Marshall v MIB and Avonwick Holdings Ltd v Azitio Holdings [2020] EWHC 1844. 
1282 Pickard v Marshall [2015] EWHC 3421 (QB), [2017] EWCA Civ 17. 
1283 See Marshall v MIB and Owen v Galgey and others. 




8. The specific rule on unfair competition (Art. 6) 
Article 6 has been mentioned in passing by the Courts, but no substantive issue has yet required determination. In a 
claim by numerous retailers against MasterCard (alleging that merchant service charges paid to banks in respect of 
transactions using the defendant’s card were too high), the location of the relevant market under Article 6(3), was 
noted to be common ground: “where the market is, or is likely to be, affected” is the country in which the Merchant 
retailer was based at the time of the transaction upon which a merchant service charge was paid.1285 In the context of 
a jurisdiction challenge, it was briefly noted that a claim for equitable breach of confidence would probably be 
regarded as an act of unfair competition within Article 6.1286 It has also been held that a passing off claim fell within 
Article 6 rather than Article 8.1287 
9. The specific rule on environmental damage (Art. 7) 
Recently, there have been the first references to Article 7. It has been mentioned, but not considered in detail, in cases 
alleging damage suffered as a result of pollution.1288 In a claim following the death of a worker who fell from height 
whilst involved in the demolition of an oil tanker at a shipyard in Bangladesh, Jay J considered Article 7 briefly and 
without the benefit of full argument. He held that the Claimant had a real prospect of success that English law applied 
pursuant to Article 7 as, although the proximate cause of death was the fall from height in Bangladesh, it was arguable 
that the accident resulted from a chain of events which led to the vessel being grounded and involved damage to a 
beach and tidal waters and that accordingly Article 7 could be engaged.1289  
10. The specific rule on infringements of intellectual property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
11. The specific rule on industrial action (Art. 9) 
Articles 8, 9 and 13 have not been considered in detail by the Courts. 
2.3 Chapter III - Unjust Enrichment, Negotiorum Gestio And Culpa In Contrahendo 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to the 
implementation of: 
12. The specific rule on unjust enrichment (Art. 10), including its relationship with the general rule for tort/delict 
in Art. 4. 
There is currently an issue as to whether a claim for knowing receipt falls within Article 4 or Article 10. Cockerill J 
invited submissions on the issue at in FM Capital Partners Ltd v Marino [2018] EWHC 1768 (Comm) [482] but the 
parties did not accede to her invitation and she did not address it further. The issue was raised in ED&F Capital Markets 
Limited v Come Harvest [2019] EWHC 1661 (Comm). In that case, the knowing receipt claim was pleaded alongside 
a conspiracy claim (which was subject to Article 4). The Court did not need to resolve the issue as to whether Article 4 
or 10 applied as, in the circumstances of that case, both Articles led to the same law – partly as the claims were all 
related.  
As unjust enrichment claims frequently arise against a backdrop of a pre-existing relationship between the parties, in 
cases where Article 10 does apply, the law applicable to such claims will most often be resolved by the application 
of Article 10(1). In Banque Cantonale de Geneve v Polevent Limited [2015] EWHC 1968 Teare J held that Article 
10(1) has no application where no relationship existed prior to the facts that gave rise to the index claim. Consequently, 
Article 10(1) was held not to apply to the claimant bank’s claim in circumstances where an individual, masquerading 
 
 
1285 Deutsche Bahn AG v MasterCard Incorporated [2018] EWHC 412 (Ch). 
1286 Conductive Inkjet Technology v Uni-Pixel Displays [2013] EWHC 2968 (Ch), noting that, as the act affected 
exclusively the interests of a specific competitor, the claim would probably be governed by Article 4, pursuant to 
Article 6(2). 
1287 Lyle & Scott Limited v American Eagle Outfitters [2021] EWHC 90 (Ch). 
1288 Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell [2017] EWHC 89 (TCC) at [55]. 
1289 Begum v Maran (UK) Limited [2020] EWHC 1846 (QB). 
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as someone else, requested the transfer of funds to an account that he controlled, and the claimant, assuming the 
individual to be honest, complied with the request. 
13. The specific rule on negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) 
Article 11 has not been considered by the Courts. 
14. The specific rule on culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) 
Article 12 has only received passing comment to-date. In the context of a hearing considering an order for an injunction 
Bryan J noted that there was a debate in the academic commentary as to whether a misrepresentation made by a non-
contracting party would fall within Article 12 at all, highlighting the fact that both leading textbooks (Dicey, Morris and 
Collins on The Conflict of Laws and Andrew Dickinson on Rome II) indicated that such a claim could fall outside Article 
12.1290 
2.4 Chapter IV - Freedom of Choice 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
15. The implementation in legal/business practice and by courts of the rule on freedom of choice, any difficulties 
therein and any discussion that has been carried out in your Member State regarding possible reasons which 
would justify the need to rethink it (Art. 14) 
There has been little direct consideration of Article 14. The Article, and in particular the more restricted regime it 
contains for agreements on choice of law for non-contractual obligations in comparison to contractual obligations, 
was a central part of the context of the dispute in Committeri v Club Med (see above). In Bazhanov v Fosman [2017] 
EWCH 3404 (Comm), the Judge, having noted the requirements of Article 14, held that an alleged oral choice of 
jurisdiction was insufficient to be a choice of law – and that, in any event, there was no evidence that non-contractual 
obligations were within the scope of the agreement.1291 
2.5 Chapter V - Common Rules 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to: 
16. The scope of the exclusion of ‘evidence and procedure’ in Art. 1(3) and any difficulties in relation to that 
exclusion or to questions of formal validity or the burden of proof (Arts. 21-22) 
See 18 
17. The approach in your Member State to questions of pleading, proof and application to individual cases of 
the substantive rules of the law applicable under the Rome II Regulation governing non-contractual 
obligations. 
Foreign law is treated as a matter of fact in the English court. The Court is not taken to know foreign law and is not 
permitted to carry out its own research into foreign law. As a result, English procedural rules require that foreign law 
must be pleaded and proved, usually by expert evidence, or occasionally other means. The established position is 
that, in the absence of satisfactory evidence of foreign law, the Court will apply English law. This is traditionally referred 
to as the “presumption” that English law is the same as foreign law, but it is now more frequently referred to as a 
“default rule”.1292 
The English court’s traditional approach to foreign law and the application of the presumption has been challenged in 
a number of recent cases on different grounds. In the context of claims governed by Rome II, it has been argued that 
 
 
1290 Angola v Perfectbit [2018] EWHC 965 (Comm) 
1291 Bazhanov v Fosman [2017] EWHC 3404 (Comm); and see Pan Oceanic v Unipec [2016] EWHC 2774 
(Comm) holding that Article 14 did not apply as it had not been established that the agreement was freely 
negotiated. 
1292 Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws 15th edition, Chapter 9, 9R-001 
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the “presumption” is incompatible with Rome II and, in particular, the mandatory nature of the choice of law rules it 
imposes on Member States. That argument has so far been rejected on the basis that it is a rule of evidence of the 
English Courts.1293 The Supreme Court may give guidance on this issue in 2021. 
18. The delimitation of the scope of the applicable law (Art. 15(a)-(h)), including any difficulties as its relationship 
to the issues addressed at points 16 17 above) 
The Courts have grappled with a number of difficult issues concerning the scope of the applicable law. In a landmark 
decision, Wall v Mutuelle de Poitiers SA [2014] EWCA Civ 138, the Court of Appeal gave guidance on the meaning 
of the “law applicable” in Article 15. This was the first large claim where, pursuant to Rome II, the English court was 
required to assess compensation according to foreign law, in this case French law. Liability was not in issue and the 
initial dispute between the parties concerned the correct approach to expert evidence to assist the Court in determining 
the value of the claim. The Claimant sought to adduce evidence from numerous experts of different disciplines, in line 
with a standard English approach, whereas the Defendant argued that the Court should adopt the more streamlined 
method of 1 medico-legal expert, in accordance with a French style approach. The Court of Appeal held that, as 
Rome II did not apply to evidence and procedure pursuant to Article 1(3), the English approach to expert evidence 
should be adopted, albeit that the assessment of damages had to be carried out in accordance with French law. 
Having decided the specific point relating to expert evidence, the Court of Appeal went on to consider the meaning 
of “law applicable” and in particular whether it should be construed narrowly – to include only rules or ‘hard law’ or 
broadly to include practices and conventions or ‘soft law’. This issue arose against the background that, in the context 
of assessing damages, many systems of law have very limited legal rules. Many have a general principle of full 
compensation but even applying that same principle, the courts in different jurisdictions apply practices and 
conventions and guidelines built up over time – and arrive at vastly different awards. The question was how that reality 
should be reflected in practice. The Court held unanimously that “law” for the purposes of Rome II included practices, 
guidance and conventions, or “soft law” as Longmore LJ described it. The decision is very important in practice and is 
the starting point for all cases where foreign law is applicable. It has not proved to be easy to apply in practice, 
particularly when combined with the Court’s ruling that English style evidence is the correct approach. 
Article 1(3) and 15 are commonly raised together. By way of example, the Courts have recently considered a 
provision of the applicable law which required proceedings to be both issued and served before limitation would be 
interrupted. The claimant contended that the matters of issue and service were purely procedural, within Article 1(3), 
and therefore governed by English law as the law of the forum. The defendant contended the matters were within the 
applicable law’s rules on limitation and applied pursuant to Article 15(h). The Court concluded that, as service of 
proceedings was an essential step, integral to the applicable law’s limitation rules, it could not be downgraded to a 
matter of mere procedure and accordingly Article 15(h) applied.1294 The Court noted that to hold otherwise would 
result in limitation being different depending on the forum which would be antithetical to Rome II’s objective of 
providing certainty and clarity of outcomes. 
Disputes have arisen as to whether a rule of English law is a limitation on the content of a right such as to fall under 
Article 15(a) to (h), or whether it is, in reality, a procedural bar to the exercise of the right. The English law rule against 
“reflective loss” was considered by the Court in KMG International NV v Chen [2019] EWHC 2389 (Comm). That 
rule of English company law prevents a shareholder bringing a claim in respect of a diminution to their shareholding 
on the basis that the company was the primary sufferer of loss rather than the shareholder. It was argued that this rule 
determined the admissibility of an action - so as to be a procedural bar - rather than determining the substance or 
content of a party’s rights.1295 The Court held however, that Article 15 should be construed widely to promote certainty, 
and Article 1(3) construed narrowly, concluding that the rule against reflective loss fell within Article 15(f). 
 
 
1293 OPO v MLA [2014] EWCA Civ 1277 per Arden LJ; FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) v Brownlie [2020] EWCA Civ 996. 
1294 Anjali Pandya v Intersalonika General Insurance Company SA [2020] EWHC 273 (QB). 
1295 See KMG International NV v Chen [2019] EWHC 2389 (Comm). The English company law rule referred to is 
known as the rule against “reflective loss”. (For a detailed discussion of the development of the rule see Sevilleja v 
Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31.) 
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Article 1(3) has been held to be applicable rather than Article 15 in the context of the procedural rules governing an 
application for a declaration of non-infringement (“DNI”) of a patent. It has been held that where a party sought DNIs 
in respect of infringements of the English designation of a patent alongside the French, Spanish and Italian 
designations, in the English Court, the English law rules on the steps required to get a DNI were matters of procedure 
and went to admissibility of the action rather than the content of the rights.1296 
Whether or not interest on damages falls within Article 1(3) or Article 15 has been controversial. In one case the Judge 
held there were persuasive arguments that the rate of interest was part of the applicable law and that any procedural 
power conferred on the Court to award interest should be exercised in line with the applicable law.1297 More recently, 
however it has been held that the award of interest is a matter that falls within Article 1(3) as it is a discretionary 
procedural remedy which English judges are permitted by statute to award and that where a judge exercises their 
discretion there is no obligation to do so in line with the applicable law.1298 
Where the Court is applying foreign law and will be required to make factual findings, it has been argued that the 
Court should apply the standard of proof required by the applicable law. In dismissing that argument and holding that 
the standard of proof was a matter of evidence and procedure for the forum, Dingemans J noted that Article 22 refers 
to “presumptions of law” and the “burden of proof” but does not mention the standard of proof.1299 
19. The application of the rule on overriding mandatory provisions (Art. 16) 
In the context of Rome II, the Courts have not yet concluded that a provision of English law is an overriding mandatory 
rule which applies irrespective of the law applicable. In KMG v Chen, it was argued, unsuccessfully, that a rule of 
English company law preventing a shareholder in certain circumstances from suing in respect of the diminution of a 
shareholding they held in a company was an overriding mandatory provision.1300 In Syred v PZU, the Court held that 
an English law rule on the assessment of damages requiring state benefits paid or likely to be paid by reason of the 
injury to be disregarded from an assessment of damages did not apply in circumstances where the applicable law 
would take account of such benefits.1301 
Although pre-Rome II English courts were not averse to according overriding effect to a provision of English law1302,  
in the context of Rome II the Courts have demonstrated they appreciate the standard for the application of Article 16 
is high: the provision must be crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic order so as to require 
compliance by all persons present in the national territory and all legal relationships within the state.1303 
20. The application of the specific rule on direct action against the insurer of the person liable (Art. 18) 
Article 18 has not been controversial in the Courts. Claimants continue to make frequent use of direct actions. The 
increased scope for reliance on such actions under the law of the tort in addition to the law of the insurance contract 
has proved to be important in practice. (The availability of such actions under English law is significantly less than under 
many other systems of law.)  
21. The application the specific rule on subrogation (Art. 19) 
The operation of Article 19 was considered briefly in Bianco v Bennett [2015] EWHC 625(QB), a claim in respect of 
sums paid to the family of an Italian man killed in an accident in England. The sums were paid by an Italian workers’ 
 
 
1296 Actavis UK Limited v Eli Lilly & Co [2015] EWCA Civ 555. 
1297 AS Latvijas Krajbanka v Antonov [2016] EWHC 1679 (Comm). 
1298 Troke and another v Amgen Seguros [2020] EWHC 2976. 
1299 See [24] and [25] of Dingemans J’s judgment in Pickard v Marshall [2015] EWHC 3421 (QB) cf Gilmour v 
Linea Directa [2017] SC EDIN 81. 
1300 KMG International NV v Chen [2019] EWHC 2389 (Comm). 
1301 Syred v PZU SA [2016] EWHC 254 (QB). 
1302 (1) The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association – Forces Help (2) The Ministry of Defence v 
Allgemeines Krankenhaus Viersen [2020] EWCA Civ 926. This decision is currently the subject to an application for 
permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. 
1303 See Christopher Hancock QC’s judgment in KMG International NV v Chen [2019] EWHC 2389 (Comm). 
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compensation fund and the deceased’s employer. The Judge held that the claim failed due to the way it was pleaded 
but he also considered the law applicable to the subrogated claim pursuant to Article 19. 
22. The application of the specific rule on multiple liability (Art. 20) 
Article 20 has not been considered in detail by the Courts. In XL Insurance Company SE v AXA and AIG [2017] EWHC 
3383 (Comm), the Court briefly considered whether Article 20 applied to a claim for equitable contribution between 
insurers. The Court concluded that Article 20 would be unlikely to apply as the insurer’s obligation to its insured under 
a policy of insurance is contractual: for Article 20 to apply the relevant underlying obligation must be non-contractual. 
The Judge noted that the paradigm case under Article 20 is contribution between joint tortfeasors and, given the scope 
for dispute on the wording of Article 20, it is likely that cases will arise concerning its application in other cases. 1304  
2.6 Chapter VI - Other Provisions 
Please indicate the general trend, in your Member State and if any difficulties have emerged with respect to:  
23. The implementation of the concept of habitual residence in the Rome II Regulation, with reference both to 
persons covered by Art. 23 and natural persons acting otherwise than in the course of business  
As noted above in relation to Article 4(2), issues have arisen in practice as to the habitual residence of individuals, not 
acting in the course of business.  
24. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rules on exclusion of renvoi (Art. 24) and States with 
more than one legal system (Art. 25)  
There has been no substantial consideration of the operation of Article 24. 
Whilst Article 25(2) expressly provides that Rome II is not required to apply to conflicts solely between the laws of 
constituent territorial units, legislation has been passed to apply rules equivalent to Rome II to intra-UK cases.1305 On 
a related note, issues have arisen in practice as a result of the existence of the different legal systems with the United 
Kingdom. For example, in relation to the application of Article 4(2) where parties have their habitual residence in 
different parts of the United Kingdom.  
25. The application of and any difficulties with the specific rule on public policy of the forums (Art. 26)  
Article 26 has been raised, but only unsuccessfully to date. In the case concerning the rule against reflective loss 
(considered above in the context of Article 16) it was also argued that Article 26 was engaged. The Judge rejected 
the argument that Article 26 applied, noting that whilst Article 16 was focused on the mandatory nature of an English 
rule, Article 26 was focused instead on the application of the foreign law and whether it ran contrary to English public 
policy. The Judge considered that whilst the Dutch law provision in question might be contrary to a substantive rule of 
English law, the rule was not to be equated with infringing a fundamental principle.1306 
In practice, arguments have been raised that extremely low (or extremely high) levels of damages available under the 
applicable law might be manifestly incompatible with public policy, usually identified as a policy of adequate 
compensation for a victim. Such arguments have not yet been considered by the Courts. 
 
 
1304 The position regarding contribution claims under the pre-Rome II English choice of law rules is controversial: see 
(1) The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association – Forces Help (2) The Ministry of Defence v Allgemeines 
Krankenhaus Viersen [2020] EWCA Civ 926 which is currently subject to an application for permission to appeal to 
the Supreme Court. 
1305 For England, Wales and NI: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (England and Wales and 
Northern Ireland) Regulations 2008. For Scotland: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Scotland) 
Regulations 2008. 
1306 KMG International NV v Chen [2019] EWHC 2389 (Comm) 
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26. Practical interaction between the Rome II Regulation and other EU and international legal instruments, in 
specific areas such as environmental damages, intellectual property rights or data protection (Arts. 27, 28, 
29)  
Articles 27, 28 and 29 have not yet received detailed consideration. 
2.7 Comments on other Practical Problems 
27. The impact of the application of the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents on 
legal certainty (where relevant for your Member State) 
28. Any other practical problems with respect to the application or interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, 
including but not limited to the suitability of the mosaic approach 
Assessment of damages in personal injury claims: Following the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Wall v Mutuelle 
de Poitiers – see paragraphs 36-37 above, this continues to be a problematic area in practice and numerous issues 
remain unresolved.  
3. Comments on areas of interest  
There are a significant number of decisions in the context of financial torts. These are mainly addressed in the context 
of Article 4.  
In a number of claims concerning environmental damage/corporate abuse of human rights, Claimants have relied on 




4. List of national case law 
 
England and Wales 
Court or tribunal  
Case name and 
reference number  
 
Reference to decision 






Issues / subject areas 
 
 





Group v Middle East 
News and others 
 




06/11/2020 Article 1 
Judge notes in passing but without 
detailed analysis that there was a 
powerful argument that malicious 
falsehood fell within Rome II as it 
was not a claim for defamation and 
was a claim targeted at economic 







BVC v EWF 
[2019] EWHC 2506 
(QB) 
HHJ Parkes QC 
26/09/2019 Article 1 Alleged harassment carried out via 
email. Concluded that though Rome 
II did not apply to claims arising 
from violation of privacy and rights 
relating to personality, that did not 
include harassment.  
 
Court of Appeal Committeri v Club 
Med 
9/08/2018 Article 1 Whether a claim was properly 
characterised as contractual or non-
contractual. 
Claim in respect of injuries suffered in a climbing 
accident whilst on a holiday booked with the 
Defendant. Considered that the booking 
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[2018] EWCA Civ 
1889 
 
contract was indispensable to the claim for 
breach. Accordingly, the claim was not non-
contractual [48] to [59]. 
High Court Rai v MOD 
[2016] 5 WLUK 135 
HHJ Gargan 
9/05/2016 Article 1 Injury sustained during armed forces 
training exercise abroad did not 






[2015] EWHC 811 
(Comm) 
Blair J 
25/03/2015 Article 1 Conclusion that bailment on terms 
was contractual rather than non-
contractual [63] – [81]. 
 
Court of Appeal Jacobs v MIB 
[2010] EWCA Civ 
1208 
 
27/10/10 Article 1 Question as to whether there was a 





Owen v Galgey and 
others 
[2020] EWHC  
Linden J 
21/12/2020 Article 4 Application of Article 4(3). 
Conclusion that Article 4(3) was 
engaged to revert to the Article 4(1) 
law. 
Detailed treatment of Article 4(2) 






Limited v Azito 
Holdings Limited 
14/07/2020 Article 4 Application of Article 4(1) and 
Article 4(3). 
Detailed treatment of Article 4(3) at 









ED&F Man Capital 
Markets Limited 
[2019] EWHC 1661 
(Comm) 
Daniel Toledano QC 
4/07/2019 Article 4 Applicable law of unlawful means 




Consideration of identifying direct damage for 
unlawful means conspiracy claim. Underlying 
issue was non-receipt of a product paid for. 
Conclusion that the direct damage was where 
the money had been paid out for the product 
[59] to [69]. 
Further noted the debate as to whether a 




FM Capital Partners v 
Marino 
[2018] EWHC 1768 
(Comm) 
Cockerill J 
11/07/2018 Article 4 and 
Article 10 
Applicable law of conspiracy, 





Cockerill J noted it was common ground that she 
should apply Article 4 to the knowing receipt 
claim despite the academic debate as to whether 
Article 10 or Article 4 is applicable [482]. 
Detailed consideration of the location of 
damage in a financial loss claim [481] -  [520]. 
High Court 
Chancery Division 
Mx1 v F 
[2018] 1041 (Ch) 
Marcus Smith J 
8 May 2018 Article 4 Applicable law to a lawful/ 
unlawful means conspiracy claim 
where the substance of the claim 
were tweets said to cause damage 
to C’s business. 
The touchstone for identifying damage in cases 
of financial and non-material loss is reversibility 
i.e. the point at which an act or omission taken 
by a victim which will cause that victim loss, 
ceases to become reversible by their own 
actions. In this case a point of irreversible loss 
occurred at the point a contract was made with 
a third party in England and Wales to uncover 
the identity of who sent the tweets [39] and [40]. 
Supreme Court Brownlie v Four 
Seasons 
19/12/2017 Article 4 Court of Appeal held that English 




Court of Appeal [2017] UKSC 80 
[2015] EWCA Civ 
665 
 
03/07/2015 dependant arising out of a fatal 
accident in Egypt. Common ground, 
following Lazar, in the Supreme 
Court that the Court of Appeal were 
wrong to do so and that Egyptian 





Pickard v Marshall 
[2017] EWCA Civ 
17 (application for 
permission to appeal) 






Article 4 Application of Article 4 to a road 
traffic accident in France involving 
an uninsured French national, and 
two British nationals. 
Article 4(2) applies to the claims against 
individuals of like habitual residence regardless 
of there being more than two parties involved. It 
was not confined to cases where there are only 
two parties. 
Article 4(3) could apply to return to a law 
designated under Article 4(1) but excluded by 
Article 4(2). 




Chartering Inc v 
UNIPEC 
[2016] EWHC 2774 
(Comm) 
Carr J 
10/11/2016 Article 4 and 
Article 14 
Application of Article 14 and 
location of financial loss for Article 
4. 
 
Article 14 did not apply because whilst a party 
had played a part in negotiating the terms of an 
agreement containing a choice of law clause, it 
had not negotiated on its own behalf and it was 
hard to see how there had been a “genuine 
opportunity to influence its contents”. 
Consideration of the location of damage in a 
financial loss claim [183] to [210]. 
Court of Appeal Erste Group Bank AG 
v JSC ‘VMZ Red 
October’ 
[2015] EWCA Civ 
379 
17/04/2015 Article 4 Consideration of applicable law of 
conspiracy claim 
Article 4 must be given an autonomous 
interpretation, broadly in line with the treatment 
of the Brussels regime, noting the important 
distinction that under the Brussels regime a C 
may choose between the place where the 
harmful event occurred and the place where 
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 damage was sustained whereas Rome II sought 
to identify an applicable law. Application of 




Winrow v Hemphill 
[2014] EWHC 3164 
(QB) 
Slade J 
06/10/2014 Article 4 Early consideration of issues under 
article 4(2) and article 4(3). 
Detailed consideration of habitual residence 




Stylianou v Suncorp 
[2013] EWHC 2188 
(QB) 
Sir Robert Nelson 
24/07/2013 Article 4 Interaction between recital 33 and 
Article 4(3), concluding that recital 
33 cannot override a proper 




Alliance Bank v 
Aquanta 
[2011] EWHC 3281 
(Comm) 
Burton J 
14/12/2011 Article 4 and 
Article 10 
Question of the law applicable to 
claims in respect of dishonest and 
knowing receipt and whether 
knowing receipt fell within article 4 






Hillside (New Media) 
Limited v Bjarte 
Baasland 
[2010] EWHC 3336 
(Comm) 
Andrew Smith J 
20/12/10 Article 4 Considers where immediate loss 
was suffered in a case where a 
betting company sought a negative 
declaration against a gambler who 
had lost substantial money placing 
bets and sought to contend that the 
betting company were liable for the 
same. Noted that the claimant 
suffered loss when he placed bets 
and thus funds left his online wallet, 








Lyle & Scott Limited v 
American Eagle 
Outfitters 
[2021] EWHC 90 
(Ch) 
Miles J 
20/01/2021 Article 6 and 
Article 8 
Question of whether Article 6 or 
Article 8 governed a passing off 
claim relying on Dicey [72]. 
Concluded it fell under Article 6. 
 
Court of Appeal Shenzen Senior 
Technology v 
Celgard 
[2020] EWCA Civ 
1293 
 
9/10/2020 Article 6 and 
Article 4 
Claim for unfair competition 
affecting exclusively the interests of 
a specific competitor, and so under 
Article 6(2), Article 4 applies. 





Deutsche Bank AG v 
Mastercard 
[2018] EWHC 412 
(Ch) 
Barling J 
09/03/2018 Article 6 “Where the market is or is likely to 
be affected” is the country in which 
the Merchant was based at the time 
of the transactions when the 




Conductive Inkjet v 
Uni-Pixel 
[2013] EWHC 2968 
(Ch) 
Roth J 
7/10/2013 Article 6 Claim for equitable breach of 
confidence probably regarded as 
an act of unfair competition 
exclusively effecting the interests, in 
this case, of a specific competitor, so 
article 4 applies by article 6(2). 
 
High Court Begum v Maran 13/07/2020 Article 7 Consideration of whether it was 
reasonably arguable that a fall from 






[2020] EWHC 1846 
(QB) 
Jay J 





Okpabi v Shell 
[2018] EWHC 1768 
(TCC) 
Fraser J 
26/01/2017 Article 7 Article 7 raised in passing at [55].  
High Court 
Commercial Court 
Banque Cantonale v 
Polevent 
[2015] EWHC 1968 
(Comm) 
Teare J 
10/07/2015 Article 10 Application of Article 10(3).  
High Court 
Commercial Court 
Angola v Perfectbit 
[2018] EWHC 965 
(Comm) 
Bryan J 
26/04/2018 Article 12 Noted the debate that a claim by a 
contracting party against a non-
contracting party for 





Bazhanov v Fosman 
[2017] EWHC 3404 
(Comm) 
Daniel Toledano QC 
17/01/2018 Article 10 and 
14 
No basis for application of Article 
14, and application of Article 10 
meant that only Article 10(3) was 






Troke and others v 
Amgen Seguros 
[2020] EWHC 2976 
(QB) 
Griffiths J 
6/11/2020 Article 15 The award of interest falls within 
Article 1(3), and judges, when 
exercising their discretion over 
interest under the law of the forum, 
were not obliged to award interest 







Pandya v Inters 
Alonika 
[2020] EWHC 273 
(QB) 
Tipples J 
28/01/2020 Article 15 Scope of Article 15(h) vs Article 
1(3): to stop limitation under Greek 
law one must serve as well as issue, 
accordingly service could not be 





KMG International v 
Chen 




13/09/2019 Article 15, 16 
and 26 
Question of whether the reflective 
loss principle is a rule of procedure, 
overriding provision or rule of public 
policy 
Judge considered that the reflective loss rule was 
a rule that limited liability and fell within article 
15(f) so it was a matter for the applicable law 
rather than the law of the forum. Also held that 
the rule was not an overriding provision or part 




Folkes v Generali 
Assurances 
[2019] EWHC 801 
(QB) 
Nicol J 
02/04/2019 Article 15 Process of awarding an interim 
payment is part of the procedure of 





AS Latvijas v Antonov 
[2016] EWHC 1679 
(Comm) 
Leggatt J 
08/07/2016 Article 15 Issue was whether interest was 
governed by applicable law and 
concludes that it was persuasive that 
the applicable law rather than the 
law of the forum would govern the 
same, and that any procedural 
power the Court has to award 
interest should be exercised in line 
with the applicable law. 
 
Court of Appeal Actavis UK Limited v 
Elli Lilly 
25/06/2015 Article 15 Whether a party applying for a DNI 
in respect of the UK, French, Italian 




[2015] EWCA Civ 
555 
 
patent, needed to satisfy only the lex 
fori, English test, for the availability 
of such a declaration or, needed to 
satisfy the requirements of the 
respective foreign laws. 
Concluded the rules were about the 
admissibility of an action and were 
therefore procedural. 
Court of Appeal Wall v Mutuelle de 
Poitiers 
[2014] EWCA Civ 
138 
 
20/02/2014 Article 15 Whether expert evidence fell within 
Article 1(3) or Article 15 
Where the applicable law has certain 
requirements or practices regulating expert 
evidence, should the court give effect to the 
same, or do the rules of the forum prevail? 
Concludes that expert evidence is a matter for 
the law of the forum [15] – [20], [39] – [45] and 
[48]. 
Important decision on the meaning of 
“applicable law”. The applicable law for the 
purposes of Rome II includes not just black letter 
rules but also judicial practices or guidelines 




Syred v PZU 
[2016] EWHC 254 
(QB) 
Soole J 
12/02/2016 Article 16 Whether a provision that benefits 
paid or likely to be paid following 
personal injury should be 






Bianco v Bennett 
[2015] EWHC 626 
(QB) 
Warby J 
12/03/2015 Article 19 The law applicable to a right of 
subrogation is distinct and must 
remain distinct from the law 
applicable to the beneficiary’s rights 






XL Insurance Co v 
AXA 
[2017] EWHC 3383 
(Comm) 
HHJ Waksman QC 
22/12/2017 Article 20 Tentative remarks that Article 20 did 
not apply where the underlying 
obligation was contractual rather 
than non-contractual [46] and [47]. 
 
Court of Appeal FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) 
LLC v Brownlie 
[2020] EWCA Civ 
996 
 
29/07/2020 Pleading and 
Proof 
Issue as to the English Court’s 
approach to foreign law 
(applicable under Rome II) and in 
particular whether there is scope for 
a party to rely on the traditional 
presumption that foreign law is the 
same as English law.  
This important issue will be the subject of a 
judgment of the Supreme Court in 2021. 
High Court 
Commercial Court 
Iranian Offshore v 
Dean 
[2018] EWHC 2759 
(Comm) 
Baker J 
22/10/2018 Pleading and 
Proof 
Approach of English Court to 
foreign law. 
 
Court of Appeal OPO v MLA 
[2014] EWCA Civ 
1277 
 
09/10/2014 Pleading and 
Proof 
The presumption that English law is 
the same as a foreign law when the 
foreign law is not pleaded and 






Allen v Depuy 
International 
[2014] EWHC 753 
(QB) 
Stewart J 
18/03/2014 Article 31 Temporal scope of Rome II in a 
product liability claim. 
Concludes that, on the facts, for a product 






Homawoo v GMF 
Assurance SA 
[2010] EWHC 1941 
(QB) 
Slade J 
Reference made to 
CJEU, C-412/10 
27/07/2010 Article 31 Temporal scope of Rome II. CJEU determined that Rome II applied where the 






Gilmour v Linea 
Directa 
[2017] SC EDIN 81 
Sheriff P J Braid 
14 November 
2017 
Article 15 and 
1(3) 
Whether applicable law governs 
both burden of proof and standard 
of proof. 
Held that the Judge should 
approach the matter as far as 
possible in the manner of a Spanish 
judge so within Spanish law. 
 
Sheriff Court Fitzsimmons v MIB 
[2020] EDIN 32 
Sheriff Kenneth J 
McGowan 
13 May 2020 Article 1 Argument that a requirement of the 
Greek Auxillary Fund that a driver 
take all reasonable steps to assist in 
the identification of the driver of the 
vehicle at fault, was a matter for the 
law of the forum and not part of the 






High Court SPV Sam Dragon v 
GE Transport Finance 
Ltd 
[2012] IEHC 240 
McGovern J  
15/06/2012 Article 4 Application of Article 4. Concludes 
that Korea is the “country most 
closely connected with the alleged 
wrong” [18]. 
 
High Court ICDL GCC v Sharikat 
and another 
[2011] IEHC 343 
Clarke J 
4/8/2011 Article 4 Judge expressed an unwillingness to 
have claims against two closely 
linked defendants determined by 
separate laws despite the 
conclusions reached by application 
of Article 4(1). 
Judge considered this was 
dépeçage. Dicey considers this is 
not an example of dépeçage 
because it was two separate claims 










2.4 Comparative table 
The following comparative table summarises the issues (x) identified per provision in the legal studies conducted across the Member States.  
 
 AT BE BG HR CY CZ EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK 
Material scope (Art. 1)    x      x x        x    x x    
Temporal scope (Arts. 31-32) x   x     x x x x       x x       x 
Concept of "non-contractual 
obligations" (Art. 2) 
x   x     x x x x  x        x x     
Universal application (Art. 3)           x    x             
General rule (Art. 4)  x x  x      x x x       x x x  x   x 
Suitability of Art. 4 for financial 
market torts  
        x x    x              
Product liability (Art. 5) and 
interaction with the application 
of 1973 Hague Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Products 
Liability  
         x          x    x    
Unfair competition (Art. 6) x x  x      x            x  x    
Environmental damage (Art. 7)         x x                  
Infringement of intellectual 
property rights (Arts. 8, 13) 
 x       x x    x      x  x      









 AT BE BG HR CY CZ EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK 
Unjust enrichment (Art.10) x  x   x    x            x x    x 
Negotiorum gestio (Art. 11) x         x                  
Culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12) x         x    x     x x  x      
Freedom of choice (Art. 14) x   x   x  x x    x              
Exclusion of ‘evidence and 
procedure’ (Art. 1(3)) and 
relation to Arts. 21-22 
         x                  
Pleading, proof and application 
of the substantive rules of the law 
applicable 
           x  x x          x  x 
Scope of the law applicable 
(Art. 15) 
        x x  x               x 
Overriding mandatory 
provisions (Art. 16)  
         x                  
Direct action against the insurer 
of the person liable (Art. 18) 
         x          x    x x   
Subrogation (Art. 19)          x x           x  x    
Multiple liability (Art. 20)          x          x        
Concept of “habitual residence”  
(Art. 23) 
  x      x            x       
Exclusion of renvoi (Art. 24) and 
States with more than one legal 
system (Art. 25) 









 AT BE BG HR CY CZ EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK 
Public policy (Art. 26)         x        x           
Interaction with other EU and 
international legal instruments 
(Recital 7, Arts. 27, 28, 29) 
x x  x     x x  x     x   x    x    
Traffic accident cases, and the 
impact of the application of the 
1971 Hague Convention on the 
law applicable to traffic 
accidents on legal certainty  
x   x           x  x  x    x x x   
Suitability of the mosaic 
approach 
x       x  x  x  x      x    x  x  
Personality rights (including 
defamation), treatment of data 
protection, SLAPPs 
x   x     x x  x      x      x x   
Corporate abuses against 
human rights 
         x         x         













3. Empirical Study 
 
A consultation was conducted across all the Member States via an online survey and qualitative individual 
interviews. The resulting data was collected from stakeholders including academics, lawyers, and judges.  
Information on the practical problems deriving from the application of the Regulation was collected and 
served to identify gaps in the Regulation and make recommendations for future action during the review 
process. 
The following Empirical Study comprises: 
- An overall analysis of the data laying out the answers of the respondents, analysing the key issues 
identified, and listing the suggested improvements.  
- An analysis of the data per issue, including those of particular interest to the Commission: privacy, 
personality rights, data protection and SLAPPs, business and human rights, artificial intelligence, 
and personal injury claims. 











3.1 Overall analysis of the data 
In total, 102 respondents participated to the survey. Stakeholders comprise: 
57 academics  
28 lawyers  
6 judges 
1 business representative  
10 categorising themselves as “other”, including stakeholders with multiple professions (academic/lawyer, 
senior law clerk, arbitrator, consultant). 
 
 
Respondents covered a range of different sectors, most prominently consumer protection / product liability, 











The respondents represent 27 Member States (Denmark excluded). 3 stakeholders with a specific expertise 









 Surveys Interviews Total 
AT 5  5 
BE 4  4 
BG 2  2 
HR 1  1 
CY 2  2 
CZ 3  3 
EE 3  3 
FI 2  2 
FR 5 1 6 
DE 4  4 
EL 4 1 5 
HU 4 2 6 
IE 1  1 
IT 6 1 7 
LV 1 1 2 
LT 4  4 
LU 1  1 
MT 3  3 
NL 2 1 3 
PL 5  5 
PT 2 2 4 
RO 1  1 
SK 3  3 
SI 4  4 
ES 3  3 
SE 3  3 
UK 12  12 
BHR 2 1 3 











Participating stakeholders have a good command of the Rome II Regulation and practical experience with 
its application. 87% of the respondents categorised them as “very familiar” (55%) and “familiar” (32%) 
with the Rome II Regulation. 44% of the respondents refer frequently to Rome II in their practice, and 52% 
refer to it occasionally. Academics commented that they refer to Rome II in their research, academic writing, 
teaching, and some in their advisory work as consultants. Practising lawyers commented they referred to 
Rome II in cases involving inter alia personal injury, business and human rights, competition, and intellectual 
property rights.  
In their practice, stakeholders refer most prominently to the general rule of Article 4 (84%). The provisions 
regarding the scope of applicability (Arts. 1 and 2), and the scope of the law applicable (Art. 15) are then 
referred to most frequently (with respectively 54%, 48% and 47% of the respondents referring to them in 
their practice). Article 14  allowing parties to choose the applicable law is applied by 44% of the 




ANSWER CHOICES– RESPONSES– 
Art. 4 General rule 84.21% 
80 










ANSWER CHOICES– RESPONSES– 
Art. 2 Non-contractual obligations 48.42% 
46 
Art. 15 Scope of the law applicable 47.37% 
45 
Art. 14 Freedom of choice 44.21% 
42 
Art. 16 Overriding mandatory provisions 42.11% 
40 
Art. 3 Universal application 38.95% 
37 
Art. 23 Habitual residence 29.47% 
28 
Art. 26 Public policy of the forum 28.42% 
27 
Art. 6 Unfair competition and acts restricting free competition 27.37% 
26 
Art. 28 Relationship with existing international conventions 26.32% 
25 
Art. 17 Rules of safety and conduct 24.21% 
23 
Art. 18 Direct action against the insurer of the person liable 22.11% 
21 
Art. 5 Product liability 20.00% 
19 
Art. 7 Environmental damage 17.89% 
17 
Art. 10 Unjust enrichment 17.89% 
17 
Art. 12 Culpa in contrahendo 17.89% 
17 
Art. 31 Application in time 17.89% 
17 
Art. 8 Infringement of intellectual property rights 16.84% 
16 










ANSWER CHOICES– RESPONSES– 
Art. 24 Exclusion of renvoi 15.79% 
15 
Art. 19 Subrogation 14.74% 
14 
Art. 20 Multiple liability 14.74% 
14 
Art. 27 Relationship with other provisions of Community law 14.74% 
14 
Art. 32 Date of application 12.63% 
12 
Art. 11 Negotiorum gestio 11.58% 
11 
Art. 9 Industrial action 6.32% 
6 
Art. 25 States with more than one legal system 6.32% 
6 
Art. 13 Applicability of Article 8 5.26% 
5 
Art. 29 List of conventions 5.26% 
5 
Art. 30 Review clause 3.16% 
3 
Art. 21 Formal validity 2.11% 
2 
Total Respondents: 95   
 
The participating stakeholders expressed a general satisfaction with the operation of the Rome II Regulation 
in their practice, with 63% of them declaring themselves “satisfied” (6% “very satisfied). 21% were 














Of the features of Rome II, most respondents were of the opinion that the Art. 4 general rule “works well” 
(62%). Half of all participants thought that Art. 3 (universal application) “works well” (50%), while there 
was moderate support for Arts. 1 (scope – 43%), 2 (non-contractual obligations – 36%) and 14 (freedom 
of choice – 27%). Most Rome II provisions were deemed to “work well” by 10-21% of respondents. Those 
provisions receiving approval from less than 10% of respondents were: Art. 30 (review clause – 1%), Art. 
9 (industrial action – 3%), Art. 13 (applicability of Art. 8 – 5%), Art. 25 (states with more than one legal 
system – 6%), Art. 29 (list of conventions – 6%), Art. 19 (subrogation – 7%), Art. 21 (formal validity – 7%), 
Art. 32 (date of application – 8%), Art. 20 (multiple liability – 9%), Art. 27 (relationship with other provisions 
of Community law – 9%), and Art. 31 (application in time – 9%). Note, however, the potential influence of 
unfamiliarity: all the provisions in this list were identified as ones to which respondents refer to frequently in 













These satisfaction levels may also be underrepresentative. For example, four participants commented that 









only selected articles that work well where there would be ‘scope for concern’, ignoring articles that were 
‘straightforward’. Another included some articles which they described courts as not having had ‘major 
problems’ with, but ‘in specific situations’ generating difficulties of interpretation, such as in identifying 
whether a claim is contractual or non-contractual for the purposes of Arts. 1 and 2. Respondents may 
therefore have varied in their degrees of selectiveness. 
In addition to receiving the highest rate of approval, Art. 4 (general rule) also had the highest number of 
respondents who thought that it was “in need of improvement” (29%). This includes 7 respondents of the 
opinion both that Art. 4 works well and needs improvement (9% of all respondents to this question). Arts. 1 
(scope) and 14 (freedom of choice) also ranked highly in both “working well” and “needing improvement”, 
Art. 1 receiving 43% approval with 28% calling for improvement, and Art. 14 27% approval with 18% 
need for improvement. 
18% of participants also identified Art. 5 (product liability) as requiring improvement, while Arts. 6 (unfair 
competition – 16%) and 16 (overriding mandatory provisions – 16%) also ranked highly. Most provisions 
were identified as needing improvement by 5-15% of respondents. No respondents thought that Art. 29 (list 
of conventions) needed improvement, but note also the relatively low level of approval (6%) and frequency 
of interaction (5%) (see above). 
Fewer than 5% of respondents identified the following provisions as in need of improvement, with an asterisk 
to indicate that these articles also received particularly low levels of support, and italicised to indicate that 
fewer than 15% of respondents frequently engage with this provision (see above): Art 13* (applicability of 
Art. 8 – 1%), Art. 21* (formal validity – 1%), Art. 24 (exclusion of renvoi – 1%), Art. 25* (states with more 
than one legal system – 1%), Art. 11 (negotiorum gestio – 3%), Art. 19* (subrogation – 3%), Art. 27* 
(relationship with other provisions of Community law – 3%), Art. 30* (review clause – 3%), Art. 12 (culpa 





















Half of all respondents to this question responded with a comment, of which the vast majority (78%) saw 
participants further explain their identified problem(s) and/or suggest solutions. Other comments included 
that no change is necessary (13%), that they are unsure (5%), or that their responses only represent a 
selection of the most significant areas for improvement (3%). 
The explanatory comments include a broad range of specific suggestions with limited overlap between 
respondents. One common theme not captured by the numerical measure included above was a call for 
Rome II’s scope to be expanded to include violations of personality rights, specified in 23% of comments. 
Several comments also suggested specific reforms to the Art. 14 choice of law provisions, which the majority 
of respondents indicated that parties rarely make use of. This is not uniform, however, with one participant 
describing such clauses as ‘a standard practice’ in their experience. Where they are used, wording varies, 
but respondents gave examples of clauses governing disputes ‘arising out of a contract, including non-
contractual claims’, ‘arising out of contract, tort or otherwise’, and arising ‘in connection with this contract’. 




When asked about judicial application of Rome II, 42% of participants responded that courts in legal 
systems with which they are familiar had had difficulties in applying its provisions, while 49% noted courts’ 












Most participant comments about difficulties encountered in applying Rome II can be categorised as either 
relating to difficulties in applying specific provisions, or to judicial tendency to overlook or refuse to apply 
Rome II altogether. 
Comments on the difficulties in ascertaining the content of foreign law highlight procedural divergence 
between Member States, specifically in the roles of judges; parties; experts; national organisations, for 
example the Member State’s Ministry of Justice or the Portuguese Centre of Comparative Law; and 
reference to foreign embassies and jurisdictions, including under European Convention on Information on 
Foreign Law (‘the London Convention’). Many participants highlight the inadequacy of existing expertise, 
particularly in the context of less frequently encountered legal systems or linguistic barriers. Several also 
refer to the lengthiness of processes for ascertaining foreign law, particularly where national bodies or 
foreign jurisdictions are engaged. One respondent proposes a European-level institute for comparative law 
to provide expert advice to Member State courts on the content of foreign laws. 




As regards compatibility with Rome I, while broadly praising the complementary nature of the Regulations, 
many respondents identified shortcomings with the existing regime. As to scope, comments included that 
‘dovetailing between the two [Regulations is] too readily assumed’; that there is a ‘grey zone’ between 
Rome I and II where positive and negative conflicts arise regarding the Regulations’ applicability; that 
characterisation of claims is a difficult issue; that the scope of non-contractual obligations encompassed by 









the exclusion of personality rights. Three respondents suggested consolidating Rome I and Rome II into a 
single instrument. 
To improve the coherence of specific provisions, two participants commented that the rules on overriding 
mandatory provisions under Art. 9 Rome I are superior to their equivalent under Art. 16 Rome II, one 
suggesting that the definition in Art. 9(1) Rome I be imported into the latter. Two participants noted difficulties 
in labour law, concerning the scope and purpose of Art. 9 (industrial action) and the relationship between 
employment contracts and tort. Two respondents also noted the interaction between Rome I and Rome II in 
interpreting choice of law agreements about non-contractual obligations. One of these suggested 
expanding Art. 15 Rome II to include such cases, although the other described the question as ‘academic’. 
In product liability, one respondent commented that it is not clear where contractual liability ends and non-
contractual liability begins. Another noted the difficulties faced by courts in differentiating between 
contractual and non-contractual issues in the context of motor vehicle insurance in traffic accidents. A further 
respondent questioned whether the scope of the set-off rule in Art. 17 Rome I encompasses the set-off of 
non-contractual obligations, or solely contractual ones. A question was also raised as to the relationship 
between Rome I and Rome II in the context of corporate social responsibility. 
Compatibility with Brussels I bis receives more praise, in particular thanks to common interpretation as 
developed in case law, although one comment suggests that the need for consistent interpretation has been 
overemphasised by national judges given CJEU ‘confusion’ on the matter. One participant suggests that ‘it 
does not make any sense’ for victims (eg of road traffic accidents and direct injury) to be entitled to issue 
proceedings in their home country under a foreign law. 
Specific problem areas identified include personality rights, financial and indirect damages, and a lack of 
harmonisation of the concepts contractual and non-contractual obligations. One respondent opines that Art. 
7(2) of Brussels I bis (connecting factor for matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict) has been 
‘interpreted in a claimant-friendly manner’ on economic injury, and that it undermines Art. 9 Rome II when 
industrial action in one country causes economic damages in another. Another respondent suggests that it 
is unclear whether the scope of Art. 7(2) Brussels I bis extends beyond core ‘tort, delict and quasi-delict’ to 
concepts identified as specific categories in Rome II, such as unjust enrichment, culpa in contrahendo and 
negotiorum gestio. That same respondent also notes and questions divergence between domicile and 
habitual residence under Brussels I bis and Rome II respectively. 
Several respondents highlight difficulties arising from areas reserved for the national law when applying 
Rome II and Brussels, specifically issues of characterisation; the permissibility of judicial orders with effects 
in more than one country, for example where the order would prohibit conduct in or remove a product from 
another Member State; and divergent levels of damage awards resulting in forum shopping and the 
obtaining of negative declarations to establish jurisdiction. 
Participants were less familiar with Rome II’s interaction with other international conventions, such as the 
Hague Conventions on traffic accidents and product liability, with 45% responding that they did not know 
whether Rome II works well alongside them, and several comments that the respondent’s Member State was 
not party to the identified conventions. Of those who expressed an opinion, 59% thought that Rome II does 












Most participants focussed on the Hague Conventions given as examples in the question. Many reported 
that the Conventions work well alongside Rome II, one participant stating that ‘the position has now 
regularised’ following some initial disputes around applicable law. 
As a conceptual matter, several respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the ‘two track system’ for parties 
and non-parties to the Conventions, as it results in different legal treatment of the same fact in different parts 
of the Union, and encourages forum shopping. In particular, one respondent commented that the tendency 
of Convention party states to apply the Conventions even where the dispute involves a non-party Member 
State appears to run counter to the principles of Rome II. However, others observed that such difficulties 
would be difficult to overcome given that pre-existing international obligations prevail over EU law under 
both the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
and that limiting such international conventions to ensure uniformity among Member States would be difficult 
to achieve under international law. 
From a practical perspective, numerous comments referred to ‘uncertainty’ and ‘confusion’ under the current 
system, describing the relationship between the Conventions and Rome II as ‘unclear’. One proposed 
including specific mention of relevant Conventions in the Rome II Regulation. Another suggested improving 
the drafting of Art. 28 Rome II to make even clearer that it encompasses Conventions to which not all 
Member States are party. One participant advocated denouncing both Hague Conventions on traffic 
accidents and product liability because of the difficulty of their relationship with Rome II. 
Assessing the merits of the Conventions themselves, one participant was of the opinion that the Hague 
Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents works well except where compensation is claimed by 
a co-driver from the driver of the car and both are domiciled in the same country. The respondent suggests 









all EU Member States, indicating that Art. 4 of the Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic 
accidents did not meet this criterion of simplicity. One respondent went further, describing the Hague 
Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents as ‘an old and quite backward, way too complicated 
legal instrument that should not be in use between the European Member States.’ 
When considering international conventions more broadly, one participant advocated for more 
coordination at the EU and international level to address modern developments, such as in the field of 
technologies. 
Some respondents also commented more generally on improvements that would support the  work of judges 
in national courts across the Member States, to contribute to a better application of Rome II as well as others 
EU instruments. Two respondents (a Greek academic and a Greek lawyer) pointed out the need for 
additional training for judges on cross-border disputes, to ensure a better understanding and application of 
the EU instruments. The need for the development of an efficient database encompassing all domestic 
decisions and/or an easier access to materials and databases on EU Private International Law was 











3.2 Analysis of the data per issue  
3.2.1 Privacy, personality rights, data protection and SLAPPs 
11 of the 102 respondents identified data protection as one of their fields of expertise, and one respondent 
identified personality rights and defamation as their field of expertise. This includes one lawyer and 10 
academics, 3 of whom are also lawyers. The experts represent 10 Member States: Cyprus (1), Lithuania 
(1), France (1), Austria (1), Belgium (1), the UK (1), Portugal (1), Italy (2), Czech Republic (1), and 
Hungary (1).  
 
 
When asked about the need for specific rules in some areas, 66% of all the respondents answered that the 
sector of defamation and privacy needed a common set of EU choice of law rules. Two respondents noted 
that including relevant provisions on defamation and privacy in Rome II would lead to a better compatibility 
with the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I bis Regulation. 3 respondents mentioned that the inclusion of 
such rules would address the risks of forum shopping, and 5 respondents further added this would support 











41% of all respondents identified problems in their Member States caused by the exclusion of violations of 
privacy and personality rights, including defamation, from the scope of Rome II. Out of the 22 respondents 
who identified issues, 14 specifically pointed towards the uncertainty and lack of clarity that comes with the 
application of domestic rules: the lack of harmonisation at the EU level regarding applicable law to 
violations of privacy and personality rights creates a patchwork of rules across the Member States. One 
Latvian academic qualified those rules as “underdeveloped and inappropriate”. One Portuguese academic 
added that the exclusion of personality rights and defamation created problems before Portuguese courts 
because there are divergent interpretations as to what is included in personality rights. One Polish 
academic/lawyer described Article 16 of the Polish Act on International Private Law as “very difficult to 
apply”. One academic/lawyer from Belgium with practical experience in cases involving cross-border 
defamation pointed out that the exclusion of defamation from the scope of Rome II complicated the position 
of the victims significantly. In one of the cases he was involved in, it led to significant investments in expert 
reports on the content of foreign law. Two other respondents also commented on the risk of forum shopping.  
 
Regarding the interplay of the Rome II Regulation with data protection, four respondents answered that the 
relationship between Rome II and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) should be thoroughly 
addressed.  
Four respondents commented on Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). Three of them 
argued that the lack of relevant choice-of-law rules in Rome II incites forum shopping, and they were of the 
opinion that specific rules are needed. One Belgian academic and lawyer based this observation on his 











67% of the respondents are of the opinion that Rome II should contain specific provisions on violations of 
privacy and personality rights. Among them, 6 respondents suggested to apply the law of the centre of 
interest and/or habitual residence of the victim. 5 respondents suggested that general rule of Article 4 (law 
of the country in which the damage occurs) should apply. 4 respondents suggested a choice-of-law rule 
allowing the claimant to choose between the law of the place where the damage occurred and the law of 










3.2.2 Business and Human Rights 
 
When asked about the need for specific rules in some areas, 46% of all the respondents answered that the 
sector of business and human rights needed a common set of EU choice of law rules. 
31 of the 102 respondents identified business and human rights as one of their fields of expertise. Among 
those respondents are 20 academics, 4 of whom are also lawyers, 9 lawyers and 2 judges. The BHR experts 
represent 17 Member States: Belgium (2), Finland (2), Poland (1), Germany (2), Italy (4), France (2), 
Hungary (1), Sweden (1), the Netherlands (2), the UK (2), Latvia (1), Lithuania (2), Czech Republic (1), 
Malta (1), Spain (3), Greece (2) and Portugal (2).     
11 of the 102 respondents have been involved in cases in which the Rome II Regulation has been applied 
to corporate abuses against human rights, including 5 academics/BHR consultants from Portugal, the 
Netherlands, the UK, Finland and Greece, 2 academics/lawyers from Belgium, 3 lawyers from Italy, the 












56% of the BHR experts replied that  issues emerged from the application of the Rome II Regulation to 
corporate abuses against human rights. Respondents commented that Rome II was not sufficiently tailored 
to the specificities of corporate human rights abuses, and 8 out of the 14 respondents who identified issues 
specifically mentioned the application of Article 4 as problematic. According to them, the application of the 
law of the place where the harm occurred is ill-fitted to the nature of such cases and ultimately constitutes 
an obstacle to access to justice, in particular because of the lack of efficient enforcement, shorter limitation 
statutes, and liability and damages issues in the host states. The KiK case in Germany, the Boliden case in 
Sweden and the Shell case in the Netherlands (first instance) were cited as examples.  
Three BHR experts also identified issues regarding  the determination of the notion of “environmental 












50% of the BHR experts identified issues with the interplay of the Rome II and Brussels I bis Regulations in 
cases of corporate abuses against human rights. Among the issues identified were Article 33 and 34 of 
Brussels I bis, and the determination of the place where the harmful event occurred, in particular relating to 
Article 7(2) of Brussels I bis and Article 7 of Rome II. One academic also cited the Vedanta case and in 












73% of the BHR experts are of the opinion that a set of special rules tailored to the specificities of corporate 
human rights abuses is needed in Rome II. Out of the 19 experts who believe specific rules are needed, 7 
of them pointed out to the mechanism of Article 7 of Rome II as a good solution. One of the experts further 
commented that the introduction of specific criteria leading to the application of the law of the place of 
incorporation / establishment of the parent company enhance the accountability of MNCs and would 
strengthen predictability and legal certainty for victims. Another respondent referred to the European 
Parliament’s draft proposal1307 and its Article 6a allowing victims to choose between the law of the country 
in which the damage occurred (lex loci damni), the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the 
damage occurred (lex loci delicti commissi) and the law of the place where the defendant undertaking is 
domiciled or, lacking a domicile in the Member State, where it operates. Another respondent designated 
Article 11 of the Second Revised Draft of the Binding Treaty1308 as a better option, less complex and 
demanding than Article 6a of the Draft proposal.  
On the contrary, two respondents were of the opinion that amending Rome II was not necessary, and they 
favoured the protection of human rights abuses victims through mandatory due diligence and the application 
of Article 16 of Rome II. They suggested that the provisions of the European Parliament’s Draft proposal on 
corporate due diligence and corporate accountability  should be imperative and thus qualified as overriding 
mandatory provisions under Article 16 of Rome II. One of those two experts nonetheless noted that 
mandatory due diligence at the EU level was “ambitious” and required a “firm commitment” from the EU in 
the protection of human rights. 
One BHR expert suggested a mechanism similar to Article 26 of Rome II (public policy) but specifically 




1307 European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft report with recommendations to the Commission on 
corporate due diligence and corporate accountability (2020/2129(INL)). Available at 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/JURI-PR-657191_EN.pdf>. 
1308United Nations Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG), Second Revised Draft of the proposed binding 












3.2.3 Artificial Intelligence 
13 of the 102 participants in the empirical study identified AI as one of their fields of expertise. This 
comprised 11 academics, two of whom were also lawyers, one further lawyer and one judge. The AI 
experts represented 9 Member States: Poland (3), Cyprus (2), Hungary (2), Belgium (1), Finland (1), 
France (1), Germany (1), Italy (1) and the UK (1). There were significant overlaps with other areas of 
expertise, most notably competition, business and human rights, data protection, IP and personal injury: 
 
Only two of the 102 respondents were aware of Rome II having been applied to cases involving AI. Both 









identified cases involving damage caused by autonomous vehicles and drones, engaging Rome II’s product 
liability rules.  
 
The responses highlight low incidences of cases involving Rome II and AI, and low exposure to the issues. 
As one respondent stated, difficulty in applying Rome II to AI contexts is currently theoretical, but as it might 
be a problem in future, it may be helpful to address the issue in a proactive manner. By contrast, another 
respondent suggested that it may be too early to try to regulate AI, while one noted that AI’s rapid and 
unpredictable development may render any statutory rule outdated within a couple of years. 
It may also be difficult to address problems arising from applying Rome II to AI cases when it is not yet clear 
how national legal systems will respond to AI. One expert participant noted that AI raises issues of liability 
in the first instance (as a matter of substantive national law), and that a deeper integrated approach may 
be needed in the EU or internationally in order to redefine notions of liability to incorporate damage by AI 
systems. 
In terms of conflict of laws in AI cases, 64% of AI experts responded that it would be helpful to have a 
common set of EU choice of law rules specifically dealing with AI, compared to 37% of all respondents. Of 
the AI experts, 58% thought that Rome II is suited to address non-contractual liability in AI cases, while 42% 
responded that it is not, such that special rules are needed. While the proportion of AI experts who believe 
that Rome II is not suited to AI at first looks far higher than the proportion of general respondents (22.22% 
ill-suited/40% adequate), once the general respondents who selected ‘Don’t know’ are removed, the 











The uncertainty as to whether AI is a product falling within Rome II’s product liability rules was highlighted 
by three respondents. The scope of the product liability rules will affect how readily AI systems can be 
addressed by Rome II and its current doctrine. Some other respondents also supported integrating AI’s 
specific aspects into the existing Rome II framework, one noting the reliance on lex loci damni that could 
arise from difficulty in determining the place where the action occurred; and another suggesting a closer 
connecting factor to the corporation with control of the device in question, to ensure accountability in AI 
systems. 
One academic expert in AI commented on all sections of the empirical study from an AI perspective, noting 
specific issues where AI overlaps with other sectors of interest. Specifically, the respondent identified that AI 
governance systems may not be able to address privacy and personality rights on a discretionary basis, 
such that privacy and personality legislation should account for such systems; that algorithmic decision-
making in the global digital economy will likely lead to novel requirements in business and human rights 
legislation; and that existing road traffic rules emphasising master’s liability have been shown by studies to 
be inadequate in the context of automated traffic control. The specific impacts of automation and AI systems 
should therefore be considered in all contexts regulated by Rome II. 
By contrast, there were also respondents who did not believe that AI requires specific rules. Comments 
included that AI is not a special case but merely a new application of rules on work, contract and tort; that 
special conflicts rules are inadvisable compared to judicial development; and that exceptional rules should 
in general be avoided but that sub-rules placing new issues in existing frameworks may be helpful. 
 









3.2.4 Personal Injury Claims 
 
57% of respondents to the personal injury section had been involved in cases where Rome II was applied 
to personal injury claims. Comments show that the vast majority of these were involved with personal injury 
arising from road traffic accidents, while respondents also had experience of insurance, accidents caused 
by other activities (eg skiing), product liability, maritime and aviation, business and human rights, and 
intentional crimes. 
43% of respondents were aware of issues emerging from the application of Rome II to personal injury 
claims, in particular road traffic accidents. This accounts for 56% of those who expressed an opinion. The 
proportion is higher (78%) amongst respondents who have been involved in cases to which Rome II has 
been applied to personal injury claims. Of those who responded ‘No’ or ‘Don’t know’, a few commented 











All respondents to this question:  
 
Respondents involved in cases where Rome II was applied to PI claims: 
 
Five respondents identified issues with the application of the general rule in Art. 4 to traffic accidents. Two 
commented on difficulties in defining the place of harm as the place of direct or indirect damage. The 
remaining three highlighted confusion about the exceptions to the general rule, one mentioning Art. 4(2) 
(habitual residence) and two emphasising the challenges of Art. 4(3) (closest connection). 
The most common issues, however, concerned quantification of damages, including assessment of damages 
under foreign law, evidence of damages, and provisional damages. 
As to the general assessment of damages under foreign law, many respondents noted the difficulties of 
applying Member States’ different rules on damage calculation, in particular the application of foreign 
tariffs. One highlighted that these tariffs are set to the standard of living in the state of the law being applied, 
rather than the country where the victim lives. Another questioned the significance of Recital (33), and 
whether it has any meaning for such assessment. One comment noted difficulties in determining whether to 
credit third party payments, such as social security and insurance payments, in such calculations. 
Evidence to prove damage was also highlighted as an issue, where different countries have different 
requirements concerning medical evidence. This was primarily (but not exclusively) a difficulty identified by 









Two respondents further noted difficulties with orders for provisional damages, in the sense of remedies for 
future deterioration or aggravation of injuries, including in catastrophic injury claims and as periodical 
payment orders. 
Closely related to quantification is the issue of interest on damages, identified by three respondents. One in 
particular described initial uncertainty in Hungary over whether Rome II applied to interest, the court 
interpreting Arts. 2(1) and 15(c) to decide that it did. 
Other matters identified that could be classed as procedural include limitation periods, identified by two 
respondents; and the establishment of foreign law, including the extent of its application ‘as the foreign 
judge would do’, identified by two respondents. 
Direct claims against insurers gave rise to several challenges, including issues under Art. 18 Rome II, and 
concerning the interaction of Rome II with Brussels I bis. One respondent raised the particular difficulties of 
insurers bringing claims against tortfeasors, for example in understanding which law determines the insurer’s 
ability to bring a claim, the amount of the claim, and the substantive requirements for liability. 
Claims involving multiple parties caused concern for three respondents, including whether a single 
applicable law or the mosaic approach should apply where Rome II’s general rule prima facie indicates 
different laws for different victims. 
Respondents also mentioned secondary victims, and the standing of victims’ family members to request 
compensation under Art. 15. One respondent reported that the Greek Supreme Court decided the latter to 
be a matter for domestic law. 
Two respondents highlighted difficulties where the applicable law conflicts with public policy of the forum, 
including the state’s ability to limit the amount of damages. 
22% of respondents identified issues emerging from the interplay of Rome II and the Hague Traffic Accident 
Convention, compared to 44% of respondents who were not aware of any such issues. Once those who 
responded ‘Don’t know’ are excluded, this represents 33% of participants (11/33), the same proportion 
(7/21) as of those who have been involved in cases where Rome II has been applied to personal injury 












All respondents to this question: 
 
Respondents involved in cases where Rome II was applied to PI claims: 
 
Respondents from Contracting Parties to the 1971 Convention: 
 
Of those who did respond, many broadly echoed the sentiments expressed in the general part on Rome II’s 
compatibility with other international instruments, including the Hague Conventions on Traffic Accidents and 
Product Liability which were given as examples (see above). 
The applicability of the Hague Convention over Rome II is sometimes overlooked. One respondent noted 
that this is a particular habit of German lawyers in Austrian courts, the latter state being a party to the 
Convention and the former not. Another respondent qualified the issue by observing that most of the cases 
of which they are aware where Rome II was erroneously applied would have resulted in the same outcome 









One respondent raised the risk of forum shopping, the interplay between the two instruments in some 
circumstances giving the victim the unfair advantage of being able select the forum that entails application 
of the law most favourable to them. 
Confusion is expressed regarding the parallel systems, in particular where a co-driver claims against the 
driver responsible for the accident. Some respondents call for harmonisation of rules amongst Member 
States or abandonment of the Hague Convention altogether. 
72% of respondents think that Rome II lays down an effective set of rules to regulate personal injury claims, 
in particular road traffic accidents, while 28% would prefer special rules. Amongst those who have been 
involved in cases where Rome II has been applied to personal injury claims, a higher proportion (33%) calls 




We received multiple suggestions for special rules to regulate personal injury claims. One respondent 
suggested relying on the ‘most connecting factor’ rule rather than the general rule in Art. 4(1). Other 
respondents suggested applying either the law of the forum or the victim’s ‘home law’ where to do so would 
be more favourable to the victim. One noted difficulties created by separating material damage, dealt with 
under Rome II, from interests, addressed by national law. 
Participants also suggested specific areas that could benefit from special rules, including: rules on indirect 
victims and claims by family members, for example in wrongful death cases; rules on multi-vehicle accidents, 
to which Art. 4 seems ill-suited, for example because it leaves unanswered whether Art. 4(2) applies where 
a driver injures multiple pedestrians from different countries; product liability rules, which could be more 
consumer-friendly; rules on automated traffic control in, for example, shipping and aviation, where current 
laws inappropriately emphasise master’s liability; rules on particular issues in assessing loss and damage, 
including the extent of damages to be recovered for long-term health problems; rules on interest; special 
All respondents to this question Respondents involved in cases where Rome II 









insurance rules, including a suggestion of limiting amounts of compensation payable and a reference to the 
Commission Proposal to amend the Motor Insurance Directive1309; and harmonisation of limitation periods, 
with reference to the EU Added Value Assessment on the Harmonisation of Limitation Periods for Claims 
Arising out of Cross-Border Road Traffic Accidents1310, although another respondent was of the opinion that 
limitation is better addressed by applying the rule of the place of residence. 
 
3.3 Collected data 



































 Surveys Interviews Total 
AT 5  5 
BE 4  4 
BG 2  2 
HR 1  1 
CY 2  2 
CZ 3  3 
EE 3  3 
FI 2  2 
FR 5 1 6 
DE 4  4 
EL 4 1 5 
HU 4 2 6 
IE 1  1 
IT 6 1 7 
LV 1 1 2 
LT 4  4 
LU 1  1 
MT 3  3 
NL 2 1 3 
PL 5  5 
PT 2 2 4 
RO 1  1 
SK 3  3 
SI 4  4 
ES 3  3 
SE 3  3 
UK 12  12 
BHR 2 1 3 
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